


SEPARATION OF SINDH FROM BOMBAY PRESIDENCY (1847-1936)

Chach's **Sindh** & its Provinces
as Xuan Zang saw them
(c.602-664 AD)



SEPARATION OF
SINDH
FROM
BOMBAY PRESIDENCY
(1847-1936)

*History is primarily politics of the past and
politics is primarily history of the future*

He, who has no interest in politics, has no interest in life

BY
Sahib Khan Channo



Peacock Publishers Sindh

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DEDICATION

Dedicated with unbounded love to Mukhtiar Channa, my better half, as a fitting tribute to a housewife's ungrudging patience and helpful forbearance over several years that research and writing of this monumental work took.

Author's Wife



Mrs. Mukhtiar Channa (b. 12.12.1954)



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* Map of Sindh as drawn by renowned Sindh scholar M. H. Panhwar for his book, *Six Thousand Years of Irrigation in Sindh*, Karachi: Government of Sindh (Culture Department), 2011, (Nos. 7, 26, 27, 52, 58, respectively). By profound courtesy of his son, Sani Hussain Panhwar, Chairman M. H. Panhwar Trust.

♥ Map of South Asia (India) has been very gratefully reproduced from R. C. Majumdar (gen. ed.), *The Mughal Empire* (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidyā Bhavan, 1974, Map No. I).

PUBLISHERS' NOTE

This 424-page research work consisting as it does of a brief but comprehensive introduction, four chapters, an all-embracing yet concise conclusion, besides eight appendices, mainly deals with the period from 1847 to 1936, during which the alien British conquerors tried to strengthen and entrench their control of the Indian Subcontinent including Sindh. The popular notion that after her conquest in 1843, Sindh remained quiet and calm under the formidable conquerors is hardly borne out by the events cited in the work despite the fact of its scope being conspicuously limited. "This study does not aim at giving a detailed account of Sindh's quest for freedom; . . . All these attempts and efforts against foreign rule, though out of the purview of this study, have been touched keeping in view their relevance to the subject."

After the conquest Sindh was incorporated into the British Indian Empire with initial bestowal on her the distinctive honour and status of a full-fledged fourth governor's province in British India, the other three, traditionally called the presidencies, were Bengal, Bombay and Madras. Later on, "Sindh, which had lost its sovereign political status in 1843, lost its autonomous political character in 1847." "This study is" thus "confined" as a whole "to the political struggle for the Separation of Sindh from the Bombay Presidency [in other words for regaining her autonomous political status] conducted, as it was, within the limits set by the colonial system." The work concludes as follows: "Sindh was indeed a unique political unit throughout the Indian Subcontinent where the mighty British invaders even at the peak of their prestige and power found it necessary to impose Martial Law Rule for many a year immediately after their entry in as well as before their departure from this land of selfless patriots."

Relying on more than 500 books, official publications, booklets and pamphlets, journals and newspapers, editorials and articles, interviews and statements, speeches, letters, memoranda and addresses, proceedings of organisations and associations, and maps, Dr. Sahib Khan Channo, the author, has described the substantial reduction in the legitimate territory of Sindh from time to time as and when powerful alien invaders and illegitimate occupiers found it expedient in their own vested interest to arbitrarily deprive Sindh of its lawful territory genuinely and veritably

held by her since the time immemorial, at least since the Indus Civilisation (2500-1000 BC).

First of all, as late as 712 AD, southern part of Sindh called Cutch (including Northern Kathiawar) and what is now known as Western Rajasthan (including Bahrmir, Jaisalmir and adjacent areas) were detached from mainland Sindh for the Arabs were totally unable to conquer these integral parts of Sindh. Again, as late as the second half of the third decade of the sixteenth century, the Afghan invaders under the rule of Shah Hassan Arghun (r. 1522-1554) gifted Sindh's Siraiiki region, the Multan parganna, to Babur (r. 1526-1530), the founder of the Mughal Empire in Hindustan in pursuance of his policy to appease the mighty Mughals at any cost. In turn, the Mughal Emperor Muhammad Shah nicknamed 'Rangeela' (The Rake), *inter alia*, offered it (Multan) to the then invincible invader Nadir Shah of Iran (r. 1736-1747) in 1739, indeed, as a tribute. After the death of Nadir Shah, like Peshawar and Lahore, Multan also eventually came under the domain of the Durrani Empire of Afghanistan established by Ahmed Shah Abdali (r. 1747-1773). But Multan and Lahore did not remain in the possession of the Afghans for long. Soon the Sikhs of the Punjab, under Raja Ranjit Singh (r. 1799-1839), occupied Lahore in 1799 and Multan in 1818—from that year Multan parganna, historically as well as traditionally part and parcel of Sindh since time immemorial (at least since the Indus civilisation), has continuously remained incorporated in the Punjab, of course, without consulting or knowing the genuine aspirations and desires of the people of the Siraiiki region or of Sindh.

To the best of my knowledge and belief, worthy author has done full justice to the subject of his treatise. I strongly recommend its reading to each and every one who takes interest in the study of history of Pakistan in general and of Sindh in particular. This work also deserves to be included by all concerned educational institutions of the country in the list of **Recommended Books** for the graduate and post-graduate level students of the relevant subjects like history, political science and Pakistan studies. I wish the researchers and scholars working on the relevant subjects, like Dr. Channo, will also contribute on the subject matter for the benefit and guidance of our young generation.

Dr. Aftab Abro
Chairman
Peacock Publishers

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To my former colleague, Dr. Aftab Abro, and his professionally competent sons, Qamar and Zafar Abros, the proprietor(s) of the Peacock Publishers, for taking above average personal interest in printing and publishing this work. Nevertheless, I owe special gratitude to Sayed Afaq Shah for making his best endeavours to compose this work error-free as far as humanly possible.

To the Chambers Harrap Publishers Ltd., an Hachette UK company, for extensively using the valuable information provided by them in their invaluable work, *Chambers Biographical Dictionary* (ed. Liam Rodger), paperback 9th edition (2013), especially for necessary verification of countless dates, facts and relevant quotations from the life sketches of different celebrities for suitable citation here and there in this work. Also to the Culture Department of the Government of Sindh, Karachi for providing English translation of a number of Sindhi poems in their valuable work, *The Epic of Dodo-Chanesar* (1st ed., 2011) edited and translated by Mr. Saleem Noorhussain, my revered teacher and guide. Once again, I am highly grateful to above mentioned two well-known organisations for providing such a useful public service to the scholars all over the world.

Last, but by no means least, my deep appreciation is due to Mukhtiar Channa, my dear wife, who is helpful to me in several ways—perhaps this research work would have not been possible without her limitless patience and enthusiastic encouragement.

ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|--------------------|---|
| anon., | anonymous |
| App., | Appendix |
| art., | (plural, arts.), article |
| b., | born |
| Bk., | (plural, Bks.), book |
| B.E.L., | British Empire League |
| c., | <i>circa</i> , about |
| cap., | caption |
| chap., | (plural, chaps.), chapter |
| col., | (plural, cols.), column |
| comp., | compiler, compiled by |
| cont., | contributed |
| C. & M. G., | <i>Civil and Military Gazette</i> |
| CISR, | Commissioner-in-Sindh Records |
| d., | died |
| Dept. | Department |
| D.G., | <i>Daily Gazette</i> |
| ed., | (plural, eds.), editor, edited by |
| 2d ed., | (plural, edd.), edition |
| <i>et al.</i> , | (for the Latin <i>et alii</i>), and others |
| ext., | (plural, exts.), extract |
| G. C. | Government College |
| gen., | general |
| <i>ibid.</i> , | (for the Latin <i>ibidem</i>), in the same place |
| 2d imp., | (plural, imps.), impression |
| <i>infra</i> , | below |
| int., | (plural, ints.) interview |
| ltt., | (plural, ltts.), letter |
| <i>loc. cit.</i> , | (for the Latin <i>loco citato</i>), in the place cited |
| memo., | (plural, memos.), memorial, memorandum |

| | |
|-------------------|--|
| n., | (plural, nn.), note, footnote |
| n.d., | no date |
| n.p., | no place |
| No., | (plural, Nos.), number |
| <i>op. cit.</i> , | (for the Latin <i>opere citato</i>), in the work cited |
| p., | (plural, pp), page |
| par., | (plural, pars.), paragraph |
| pt., | (plural, pts.), part |
| <i>passim</i> , | here and there (sometimes preceded by <i>et</i> , "and") |
| pol., | political |
| pr., | presented |
| prsd., | presidential |
| prog., | (plural, progs.), proceeding |
| pseud., | pseudonym |
| pub., | published |
| r., | rule, (time of) reigning |
| rep., | reproduced |
| reso., | (plural, resos.), resolution |
| Sc. | Science |
| sec., | (plural, secs.), section |
| S.G., | <i>Sind Gazette</i> |
| S.K., | <i>Sind Kossid</i> |
| s/o | Son of |
| sp., | (plural, sps.), speech |
| SU | Sindh University |
| <i>supra</i> , | above |
| UP | United Provinces (India) |
| trans. | Translator, translated by |
| Vol., | (plural, Vols.), volume |
| w.e.f., | with effect from |

PREFACE

This work aims at a study of the 90-year struggle for the autonomy of Sindh.

‘Introduction’ encapsulates the Sindhi people’s innate desire to ‘live free or die free [with dignity]’.

Chapter One briefly describes history of Sindh up to its conquest by the British Indian Empire.

Chapter Two deals with the factors culminating in Sindh’s annexation to the Bombay Presidency.

Chapter Three narrates the evolution and development of the proposal to sever Sindh from Bombay and absorb it in the Punjab.

The struggle to constitute Sindh as a separate province is discussed in Chapter Four.

The Final Chapter draws general conclusions about the whole struggle.

The appendixes deal with the matters of detail which cannot conveniently form part of the text, but which are nonetheless of much importance and general interest.

How you gather, manage and use your information will determine whether you win or lose.

Bill (William Henry) Gates (1955-)

From *Business @ the Speed of Thought* (1999)

I chose Virgin [topic] because it reflected an inexperience in business [writing pursuit] ... and also a freshness and slight outrageousness.

Commenting on the name in an interview to *New York Times* (28 Feb. 1993).

Sir Richard Charles Nicholas Branson (1950-) English entrepreneur and businessman, founder of business-chain called *The Virgin*.

INTRODUCTION

The time is now near at hand which must probably determine whether Americans [Sindhians] are to be freemen or slaves. The fate of unborn millions will now depend, under God, on the courage and conduct of this army [generation]. Our cruel and unrelenting enemy leaves us only the choice of brave resistance or abject submission. We have, therefore, to resolve to conquer [prevail] or die.

From general orders to
his army (July 1776).

George Washington (1732-1799)
First president of the USA

Sindh's recorded past and folklore are an inspiring tale of patriotism. As early as 326 BC even non-combatant people like Brahmans declared defiantly before the invincible invader, Alexander the Great, that they had risen in open revolt and that they had exhorted the people and the ruler to defend their homeland because they wanted "to live with honour or die with honour."¹ They had defied the conqueror of the then half the known world and died with honour. So did Dodo II (r. 1180-1194 AD) of Soomro dynasty (1010-1351 AD);² Doolah Darya Khan, the army chief, and Makhdoom Bilawal, a religious scholar of Sammo dynasty (1351-1524 AD); and Hosh Muhammad better known as Hoshoo Sheedi, a negroid commanding officer of gunners' detachment in the army of Talpur dynasty (1782-1843 AD). All are inimitable folk heroes who gladly embraced martyrdom for the national honour, identity and independence of their homeland.³

- Dodo Soomro in a landmark war, a *Mahasindh* in scale as its prehistory predecessor *Mahabharat*, waged during 1194 AD in which all, high and low, big and small fought to thwart the advance of the invading Afghan-Hindustani army.⁴
- Doolah Darya Khan Lashari in a battle at Thatto in 1520 AD while commanding Sammo army against Arghun (Afghan) aggression.

- Makhdoom Bilawal Sammo crushed alive in an oil-press at his hometown Baghban near Dadu in 1522 AD on the fabricated charge preferred by Arghun invaders of committing scandalous disgrace of the Holy Quran.
- Hoshoo Sheedi with his rallying war cry '*Mer vesoon per Sindh na desoon*' (Die we will but give up Sindh never) led warriors of Sindh against the British at Dubbo in 1843.⁵

Sindh down the ages has undergone vicissitudes of many wars of conquest and re-conquest by many a foreigner. It has seen the advent of different kinds of people, and at times has assimilated certain features of their cultures, yet it has maintained its independent and distinct identity. And whenever subjected to any foreign domination, the people of Sindh have fought and regained their cherished inalienable birth right to be their own masters in Sindh in good time.

The defeat at Dubbo brought Sindh under British domination. Initially, the individuality of Sindh was maintained, in a sense, by deciding to administer it as a separate province directly under the Supreme Government at Calcutta. This decision was subsequently changed, and Sindh was annexed to the Bombay Presidency in 1847 AD.

The 90-year period of Sindh's annexation to Bombay (1847-1936) saw a protracted controversy over Sindh's position in the British Indian Empire, revolving round the questions: whether Sindh should remain attached to the Bombay Presidency or it be separated and attached to the Punjab or it be reconstituted as a separate province. The discussion was, obviously, within the framework of the British colonial system.

This study does not aim at giving a detailed account of Sindh's quest for freedom; for it excludes the analysis of the early and continued resistance to the British rule in forms that are not easily recognisable (instances are on record of

the rampage of political desperados glibly described as dacoits) along with the militant efforts and attempts at the overthrow of British rule. Significant among these outbursts of resent that the British had to encounter in the nineteenth century are the Thar Uprising (1846), the Nagarparkar Revolt (1859) and the Hur Revolt (1896-1900AD), which, of course, continued intermittently (up to the end of the British Indian Empire in South Asia by mid-August, 1947). The twentieth century, however, saw many forms of resistance to British rule by Sindhi patriots. All these attempts and efforts against foreign rule, though out of the purview of this study, have been touched keeping in view their relevance to the subject.

This study is, on the whole, confined to the political struggle for the Separation of Sindh from the Bombay Presidency conducted, as it was, within the limits set by the colonial system.

If you want to understand me at all...you must understand first and foremost that I am an Australian [a Sindhi].

From *Melodies and Memories*, chap. 1.

Dame Nellie Melba (1861-1931)
Australian pioneer recording artist

Give me six lines written by the hand of a honourable man, and I will find in them something to make him hang.

Attributed.

Cardinal Richelieu (1585-1642)
French prelate and statesman

Knowing how to dissimulate is the knowledge of kings.

From *Mirame* (1641)

Cardinal Richelieu

CHAPTER 1

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

I can do you blood and love without the rhetoric, and I can do you blood and rhetoric without the love, and I can do you all three concurrent or consecutive, but I can't do you love and rhetoric without the blood. Blood is compulsory – they're all blood, you see.

From *Rosencrantz and
Guildenstern are Dead* (1966)

Sir Tom Stoppard (1937-)
English dramatist

Sindh occupies a unique place among the ancient civilisations. The civilisation that flourished here in the third and second millennia before Christ was an original, indigenous development produced by the local ecological conditions. It was a logical culmination of various complex and inter-related indigenous socio-economic and politico-cultural processes. The best evidence of these processes comes from the excavations at Mehrgarh (district Sibi) Kot Diji (district Khairpur) and Amri (district Dadu). The early levels of Mohenjodaro (district Larkano), and Jhukar (district Larkano) have also brought forth some evidence of an early formative phase.

The discoveries of well-planned whole cities with civic services, big and small dwellings, impressive public buildings, commodious houses, market places, the provision of ample public conveniences, elaborate architecture, excellent drainage system, public baths, use of cotton for textiles, wheat, granaries, single system of weights and measures, a developed script denoting common language, cult objects, wide range of pottery, intricately carved seals with hieroglyphics, stone and metal tools, close similarities

in urban layout and building techniques, the uniformity of motifs, the standardisation of artifacts; all these and other excavated findings lead to the following inferences:

- (1) That it was a highly mature and urbanised culture;
- (2) That the system of government was one of autonomous city states with some degree of central authority;
- (3) That the economy was primarily agricultural, advanced beyond the stage of subsistence farming to production for exchange through barter with sufficient resources to support a growing population especially urban, having enough surplus to mobilise labour, full-time craftsmen and to engage in trade with far off regions;
- (4) That there were a number of social classes such as priests, merchants, cultivators, artisans, bonded workmen and, probably, warriors;
- (5) That it was a society with uniform and homogeneous cultural patterns; and
- (6) That it was, in many ways, far ahead of its contemporary civilisations in Mesopotamia and Egypt.

All these inferences taken together indicate that as early as mid-third millennium BC the Sindhi society had reached a stage of social development when it was no longer a conglomerate of disparate, isolated tribes but a definite nationality¹ similar to contemporaneous Sumerians and Egyptians (both of which arose in early third millennium BC), according to current official beliefs, of the Sumerian pattern or *vice versa*. Nothing contemporaneous with or earlier than the Indus civilisation has yet been unearthed in whole of the South Asian Subcontinent.

This ancient Sindhi civilisation started to decline sometime in the second quarter of the second millennium BC. Various ideas have been put forward to throw light on the process of its decline, i.e., invasion by barbarous tribes,

tectonic disturbances, destruction and disappearance of river *Sarasvati*, alteration of monsoons, encroachment of the Rajasthan desert, break of trade ties between the ancient civilisation of Sindh and the earliest civilisations of Western Asia, salinity of the soil, flooding, changes in the course of rivers, the ruin of irrigation and degeneration of culture due to rapid extension of its territory. (In about 1900 BC, a terrible earthquake hit Sindh and the Punjab, which caused the diversion and destruction of the *Sarasvati* River, which was ten kilometres wide in places but is no more. Beside, almost all the remaining six big rivers witnessed countless breaches and overflows. These events triggered a great catastrophe in the shape of unprecedented huge floods over a wide area and for many a year. It appears this played possibly major role in decline and devastation of the Sindhian civilisation.) This subject requires further investigation but it is evident it was precisely internal phenomenon which brought about this decline. Judging by the recent excavations it is clear that the demise of these ancient settlements was neither overnight nor simultaneous. This process of slipping into uneven decay and degeneration of society is believed to have lasted a few centuries with some areas scattered all over doing well while others in advanced state of decay. This state of affairs, in fact, lasted for quite a few centuries. Indeed, some cities were still flourishing while others were in complete decay. It is a matter of conjecture that many a century of post-uneven decay was marked by many changes in economic, social and political conditions in Sindh. The development of productive forces, e.g. the use of iron and iron tools helped the people to develop new areas, improve agriculture, irrigation and handicrafts. The resultant increase in labour efficiency augmented production, which, in turn led to accumulation of surplus in the hands of the aristocracy, accentuating class distinction. These class distinctions consolidated the

territorial and social orientation of the Sindhi nationality. The migrant foreign tribes (according to the common view, 'Indo-Aryans')² which came in waves spread over several centuries, amalgamated with local population (i.e., the native Dravidians and the immigrant Indo-Aryan people), contributing to the ethno-genesis and culture of this nationality. The preponderant role, however, was played by the native population, not only because of its numbers but also because it determined the principal element of the economic activity—the productive basis—of the nationality, namely settled cultivation.

Little that is known about the political state of Sindh during the period between the decay of its ancient civilisation in the latter half of the second millennium BC and its annexation to the Achaemenian Empire in 519/18 BC comes from Sanskrit, Pali and Persian sources.

The earliest of these sources is the Sanskrit epic, *Mahabharat* which, though written down between the fourth century BC and the fourth century AD, describes events that took place in the first half of the first millennium BC. The *Mahabharat* tells about Jayadratha, King of Sindhus (Sindhis) and Sauviras (probably Sirais), who fought on the side of Kauruvas in the war against Pandavas.³ Warriors of Sivi (Sibi), Sauvira (Siro) and Sindhu (Sindh) are mentioned as fighting side by side in Jayadratha's army. The epic depicts the Sindhuraja Jayadratha as the sole ruler of the rich "countries" of Saivya (Saiwahan), Sivi (Sibi), Sindhu and other regions.

The Pali (Buddhist) literature, though little concerned with historical events, throws some light on political conditions in Sindh. In the *Digha Nikaya* one of the seven kingdoms is Sovira and its capital Roruka. The same is repeated in the *Jatakas*⁴ but the capital is spelt as Roruva (probably Aror).

Around the year 518 BC Sindh became a tributary to the Achaemenian King, Darius the Great (r. c. 521-486 BC). This was the result of the expedition undertaken by his Greek admiral, Skylax (Scylax/Skulax), who passed through Sindh with a fleet of warships. Sindh, at that time, was divided into various principalities ruled by independent chiefs. The lack of unity among them contributed to their subjugation to the Achaemenian empire.

The effective hold of Achaemenian kings over Sindh remained for about a century and a quarter. By the turn of the fifth century BC as the Achaemenian empire grew weaker, Sindhis succeeded in regaining their virtual independence. Thereafter the entire administration came in the hands of the native chieftains, so that subordination of Sindh depended on their nominal fealty to the Great King. Most of the Sindh chieftains, however, acknowledged the formal fealty of the Achaemenian Kings until the end of the ill-fated Darius III Codomannus (r. 335-330 BC) in his last stand against Alexander.⁵ The fact that Alexander did not encounter a single Persian official in the course of his expedition through Sindh four years later shows that the country was wholly administered by the local princes and chiefs.

The cultural influence of Achaemenia even in its heyday was by no means profound and indeed affected only the top of the society. The dominance of Achaemenians did not lead to the Persianisation of the territories and the native population they conquered. The Achaemenian invasion did not involve colonisation of Sindh and hence the role of Persian elements in the ethnogenesis of Sindhis was negligible.

In 326 BC Alexander the Great of Macedon (r. 336-323 BC) came to Sindh by way of Indus and established his rule over the country. He used a fleet of warships for conquest of Sindh, tactics earlier adopted by Skylax. Sindh, at that time,

was divided between a number of small state formations of tribes and tribal unions contending for supremacy and lacked unified command to meet the challenge of invader.⁶

Alexander's hopes of easy victories in Sindh, however, did not materialise. His enormous and well-equipped army had to encounter fierce resistance from the very outset of the march on Sindh. Even the Greek chroniclers of the campaign, prejudiced as they were, did not fail to take note of the persistent resistance put up by the Sindhis, their bravery and their passionate desire to fight unto death. Some of the rulers such as Musicanus, Sambus and Moeris, no doubt, preferred timely submission. In return for this Alexander allowed them to retain their former possessions. But the subjects of these rulers did not approve of their action and rose in revolt, élan vital of the revolt being the non-combatant community of Brahmans and under their influence the womenfolks. Popular resistance to the Greek invasion was so stiff that Alexander had to order wholesale massacres to break it. In one such massacre, "upwards of 80,000"⁷ Sindhis were put to swords.

On leaving Sindh in 325 BC, Alexander left behind military settlements of Greeks and their allies in various places.⁸ But the dust raised by Alexander's returning columns had hardly settled when signs of yet another revolt began to darken the Sindh horizon, which made Alexander's associate in Sindh, renowned Macedonian general Nearchus to pack and sail hurriedly his 80-ship fleet off Indus in November 325 (and skirting the coast reached Susa in February 324) without attempting to crush the revolt. (His narrative is preserved in the chief work of Flavius Arrianus, better known as Arrian, c. 95-180AD, *Anabasis Alexandrou*, a history of the campaigns of Alexander the Great, which has survived entirely; it is also available in the *Indica* of Arrian.)

Alexander's hold on Sindh was thus brief. Two years after his departure his own life came to an end in Babylon⁹ and the Macedonian empire fell into pieces. Local chiefs soon assumed independence in their respective territories in Sindh.

Seleucus I Nicator 'the conqueror' (r. 321-c. 281 BC), one of Alexander's generals and successors, having gained control of the countries up to the South Asian border, entered into an agreement with Chandragupta (or Sandracottus) Maurya (r. c. 323-298 BC), the ruler of Magadha, with capital at Pataliputra (or Palibothra) about 305 BC, by virtue of which Sindh including Las Belo came under the Mauryan tutelage. Sindh principalities became feudatory states of the Maurya Empire retaining their own rulers and forms of government. After the death of Asoka (r. c. 269-232 BC), however, the Maurya Empire declined. They were ultimately replaced by the Shungas about 180 BC.

Nothing is known of the conditions of Sindh during the reign of the Shungas (180-73 BC).¹⁰ It appears, like some governors and chieftains of the former empire elsewhere, Sindh chieftains also assumed independent status. Sindh, at that time, though practically independent of foreign rule, did not succeed in achieving a permanent form of political unity or stability and it eventually could not withstand the Scythian onslaught.¹¹

In the first half of the first century BC the Shaka-Massagetae tribes, better known as Scythians, from Shakastan (ancient Drangiana or modern Sistan, i.e. the easternmost province of Iran) began to pour, through south-west, i.e. from Southern Afghanistan and Northern Baluchistan (certainly not through north-western India), into Sindh including Cutch and Kathiawar. This region thereafter became known to Greek geographers as "Indo-Scythia," and in Indian literature as "Shaka-dvipa." Besides Sindh, Scythians

also settled in the Punjab, present-day Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Ganges Valley, Rajputana, Malwa (both in central and Northern India), the Konkon, Gujerat and Maharashtra.

This form of invasion was different than that of the Persians and Greeks, for the Scythians did not come to conquer but to stay. Initially, the Scythians disseminated a nomadic cattle culture. But in Sindh they began to merge into the native farming population by taking to the cultivation of agricultural fields. They had, however, nothing to offer; for they brought no new religion, no higher civilisation, no superior language.¹² As a result of the interaction and close contacts between the Scythian tribes and native population of advanced culture, the Scythians were Sindhised. The Scythians adopted the traditions, the culture and the language of native population and were ultimately absorbed by the people in the midst of whom they had settled.

In the first half of the first century AD the Parthians appeared on the scene after defeating the Bactrian and Shaka rulers. Sindh succumbed to Gondophares, the great Parthian/Pahlava¹³ emperor in India, who ruled some time between 20 AD and 48 AD. Around 50 AD Sindh, as described in a Greek work, the *Periplus of the Erythraean Sea*, was governed by the Parthian princes, who were constantly at war and supplanting each other.

In the latter half of the first century AD the Kushana-Tukharian tribes, better known as Kushanas, ousted the Parthians from India. Kanishka (r. c. 78-120 AD), the great Kushana King, within a few years of assumption of throne made himself suzerain of upper Sindh. In effecting his conquest, Kanishka made considerable use of local Pahlava and Shaka chieftains, some of whom had acknowledged the suzerainty of the Great King of Parthia (which located west of Bactria towards the Caspian Sea) while others were for all

practical purposes independent. In return they were allowed to retain their former possessions as his governors.

After the death of Kanishka many of his governors, the higher grade of whom was titled Mahakshatrapa and the lower Kshatrapa, assumed virtually independent status but continued to style themselves as Kshatrapa and Mahakshatrapa. One of them, Chastana, founded the Shaka dynasty of Kshatrapas at Ujjain in Malwa (in central India). His grandson Rudradaman's inscription at Junagadh dated the year 72, i.e., 150 AD reckons Kakura (? Kakrala), Kachchha (Cutch), Sindhu and Sauvira among his dominions. It is, however doubtful, if Rudradaman (r. 130-150 AD) ever conquered Sindh. It appears the practical control over several principalities of Sindh remained in the hands of local chiefs, some of whom acknowledged the supremacy of the Kushana Kings while others finding imminent danger from the rising power of Kshatrapas changed their allegiance to them.

The duration of Kushana (48-220 AD) or Kshatrapa (128-388 AD) influence over Sindh is not clear. During this period, however, Sindh appears to be divided into different principalities ruled by practically independent local chiefs who under the demand of the time acknowledged supremacy of the neighbouring powerful kings of the Subcontinent and Persia and paid tribute to them. This state of affairs seems to have continued intermittently.

In the second half of the fifth century AD the union of the Chionite-Ephthalite tribes, better known as the (White) Hunas (Chunas),¹⁴ emerged as the paramount power in the region. Under the King Toramana (r. 490-515 AD), whose centre of rule was Malwa, a country between Sutlej river and Delhi (not to be confused with Malwa in central India), they succeeded in penetrating Sindh. Under their rule, the local princes usually stayed as such on the condition that they

paid tribute to the Huna king, evidently a vassal or viceroy (*tajin*) of the Supreme King of the Hunas, the then ruler of Bactria, a vast empire consisting of modern northern Afghanistan, most of the present-day Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, on either side of the river Oxus or Amu Darya. The inroads of the Hunas involved the migration and settlement of some of the tribes of the Huna empire into the lands under their domination, including Sindh, and this changed to certain extent the ethnic character of the territories under the Hunas.

Towards the middle of the sixth century AD the Huna power began to decline. In 533 AD, Toramana's heir, Mihirakula, who had shifted his capital to Shakala (probably present-day Chiniot, near Sialkot), was overwhelmed by a coalition of local rajas of northern India. It was, however, Sassanian Iran and the West-Turkish Khanate that dealt, in their joint effort, a deadly blow to the might of the Hunas, who had established their powerful empire in Bactria (Balkh or Bakhtar) around 425. In 567 or 568 AD, the Huna empire collapsed.¹⁵

The weakness and disintegration of the powerful Huna empire provided ideal situation to some local chiefs in Sindh, like elsewhere, to consolidate their power over the whole country. Eventually, it was the Rais, most probably of Huna ethnic origin, the title of *Rai* or *Rao* was generally adopted by the progeny of the Hunas who managed to hold on and emerge as the most powerful.¹⁶ Initially they had to acknowledge the supremacy of the neighbouring powerful Sassanian emperor, Khosrau I (or Chosroes), better known as Anushirwan the Just (r. 531-579 AD), who, in alliance with the Western Turks, destroyed the Huna empire in Bactria in 567/568 AD. But soon after his (Khosrau's) death, Sindh including Makran went out of the Persian sphere of influence and the Rais assumed full independence. By the

seventh century AD, Sindh, under Rais, was certainly an extensive and powerful kingdom without any overlordship and, according to Xuan Zang (Hsuan Tsang), c. 602-664 AD, Chinese Buddhist pilgrim (who travelled 40,000 miles in 16 years), with three states as its dependencies. It included Multan region (including what were later called the Derajat and Hazara/Hindko territories) in the north, Cutch and Upper Kathiawar region in the south, whole of present-day Baloch and Brahui Baluchistan including Makran in the west, and in all probability western areas—Jaisalmer, Bikaner, Bahrmer—of present-day Rajasthan in the east.

Under the local Rai dynasty small and fragmented state formations torn by bitter rivalry were replaced under centralised dynastic rule which embraced almost all the motherland of Sindhis. The Rai period was a period of major political, social and cultural events; it was to leave a deep imprint on the evolution of Sindh's society and state. The creation of a unified Sindhi state led to the interaction and communication between a variety of tribes of different ethnic origins; this exposure gave birth to consolidated tradition raising them beyond petty and narrow tribal categories. Thus the resultant culture was a mature synthesis of diverse cultural patterns. Many of the traditions of this synthetic culture such as religious tolerance endured even after the fall of dynasty.

The foundations of many state institutions¹⁷ that were to develop in the years that followed, were laid in the Rai period. Under the Rai rulers warring tribes were made subservient to the dynastic rule of one monarch. The king was the cornerstone of the state. The principle of primogeniture was strictly observed. King had the prerogative of appointing high state officials including ministers and, as a matter of principle, conducted the business of administration in consultation with his ministers.

What is now the Upper Sindh, the southern part of Derajat and adjoining portions of Baluchistan including Sibi and Kachhi were directly under the king's administration ruled from his capital at Aror. The rest of the kingdom was divided into provinces of which four enjoyed special status, the capitals of which were Brahmanabad or Bahmanabad and Sehwan in the south and Askaland (Uch) and Multan in the north.¹⁸ These provinces were governed by the king's viceroys who were in some instances his relatives.

The Rai dynasty reached its zenith during the reign of Rai Sahiras II, who was killed in Makran (around 600 AD), while defending in person the frontiers of his country against Sassanian invasion led by governor (known as king) of Nimruz or Sijistan (now called Sistan). His son, Rai Sahasi II, therefore succeeded to an intact kingdom and enjoyed a peaceful reign. He died childless and, as a result of a palace conspiracy, was succeeded by his minister, Chach, founding the Brahman dynasty about 641 AD.

Chach ruled for over quarter of a century and was succeeded not by his son but by his brother, Chandar, then the governor of Aror, who ruled the country for a few years. His death gave rise to an internal strife amongst the claimants of the throne. Dahar, son of Chach and most capable among the claimants, succeeded him at Aror and Raj, son of Chandar, ventured to establish himself at Brahmanabad but soon made way for Daharshihun, his brother or cousin, who thereafter ruled as an independent ruler over his principality comprising former provinces of Brahmanabad and Sehwan. Daharshihun, however, lost control of Cutch to a Sindhi chieftain, Jasraj, who established there the Chawro dynasty.

Sindh remained divided into three principalities for sometimes but after the death of Daharshihun, in the last decade of seventh century AD, Dahar succeeded to all his

possessions, excepting, of course, Cutch.

The Sindh scene, since five centuries before the Christian era to the coming of the Brahman dynasty was marked not only by political changes but also by ethnogenetic and socio-economic changes.

Because they were mere conquerors and not colonisers, the ingress of Persian, Greek, Parthian and Kushana elements into the Sindhi society was negligible. By contrast, the Scythians and the Hunas had an appreciable effect on the ethnic character of the native population, the Scythian influence being much greater than that of Hunas.¹⁹ The clan aristocracy of these two elements became the dominant stratum of the ruling class. As to the commoners, they settled down in the towns or in the lands they had taken possession of, and gradually became part of the native land cultivators and artisans. As they underwent intensive Sindhiisation, the alien elements transmitted at the same time certain features of their culture and ideology to the native population. Thus they played a considerable role in the formation of ethnic elements from which the present-day Sindhis have in due course risen.

The socio-economic change was the slow and steady feudalisation of the Sindhi society. The process began with further advance in agriculture towards the end of first millennium BC, when not only new plots of land were brought under cultivation, but new crops were introduced and better techniques employing iron tools adopted. Those who cleared and cultivated forests and wastelands came to enjoy proprietary rights over these lands. Subsequent period saw further development of private landownership; they not only increased in numbers but were able to retain their rights to land regardless of whether or not they actually tilled it themselves or rented it out to temporary tenants. This development coupled with the gradual change in the

nature of royal land grants contributed to the growth of feudal society. Earlier grants had only been for land usage with no rights over peasants. Many of the grants had been temporary, lasting for as long as, for example, the official duties warranted. These grants now increasingly came to assume a hereditary character thereby turning the state lands into private lands and the grantees into owners. Gradually the private landowners came to enjoy the so-called immunity rights, which freed them from the previous obligation of admitting the state troops and functionaries to their lands. After the fifth century AD it became a practice with the kings to delegate almost all administrative, legal and fiscal functions connected with privately owned lands to the owners themselves. This practice gradually brought peasants under the dominance of landowners; and accelerated the process of feudalisation of Sindhi nationhood.

The most important event in Dahar's rule was the Arab invasion, which despite his unflinching resistance overwhelmed him and his kingdom in 712 AD. This in fact was the culmination of a constant effort on the part of Arabs to annex Sindh, which succumbed to their eleventh invasion. The first Arab invasion was in the form of a naval raid against the port of Debal (Deval) around 636 AD. During the 75-year period since 636 AD the Arabs mounted no less than nine expeditions against Sindh. In between, invasion plans were dropped twice on receiving unfavourable reports. Of the seven expeditions sent between 656 AD and 680 AD the only solid achievement by the Arabs was the conquest of Western Makran in or around 670 AD, which had remained a strategic frontier region of Sindh. Thus, after no less than ten unsuccessful attacks, Arab forces secured their final victory over Sindh at almost height of their power when they swept through the mighty Persian empire (642 AD), the Middle East and North Africa—Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Yemen,

Persian Gulf States, including Oman, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and Persia—by not only effectively replacing but also completely wiping out the Aramaic, the *lingua franca* of a vast region, along with the mother tongues of all the above referred to countries by the Arabic language, of course, except only two languages, namely, Persian in Persia²⁰ and Sindhi in Sindh, despite the Arab rule for a couple of centuries in both these countries.

The hostilities between Arabs and Sindh broke out about 708 AD after a respite of more than two decades. The reasons of Arab attack are alleged to have been (i) Failure of Raja Dahar to extradite Mohammad Illafi (Alavi) and his kinsmen, who were wanted by Arab authorities in connection with the murder of Arab governor of Makran (historically and strategically important part of Sindh up to the last ruler of Rai dynasty) and had taken shelter (*saam*, refuge) with Raja Dahar; and (ii) Ransacking of Arab ships in Sindh waters.²¹ Hajjaj, the Arab viceroy of Iraq (r. 695-714 AD), made renewed efforts on a large scale for conquering a country which had for so long posed a challenge to the might of Arabs. The Caliph, Walid (r. 705-715 AD), was at first unwilling to sanction the risky expedition, but ultimately gave his consent at the importunity and offer of Hajjaj to pay, from his own resources, double of what would be spent from the public treasury.²² Hajjaj then sent expedition for raiding Debal under Ubaidullah, who was defeated and killed. A second expedition, by way of sea from Oman, under the command of Budail, met with the same fate. Hajjaj then made elaborate preparations for the invasion of Sindh and sent an army under his close relative, Mohammad bin Qasim, whom he provided arms and ammunitions on a lavish scale.

The Brahman dynasty ended with the death of Dahar, yet Sindhis strove to maintain the struggle, particularly

under the command of his son Jaishihun, and there was much hard fighting before the whole kingdom could be subdued by the Arabs; which is not surprising as Sindh at the time was a prosperous country with firmly established traditions of statehood, regular army and a relatively popular administration, and had not only a distinct culture and language but also its own script, calendar and coinage.

The Arab policy was aimed at maintaining and strengthening the privileged classes with the result that these classes came to have vested interest in the continuation of the Arab rule. Their policy in Sindh is described in the following words:

"It was essentially a sound imperial policy. The policy was so constructed as to win the support of all politically and socially important classes, and at the same time keep them from uniting against Arab rule. The privileges of the Brahmins were fully maintained and in certain respects increased. The productive and commercial classes were protected and given a vested interest in maintaining and augmenting production and circulation of goods...."

*"Hajjaj's policy was essentially conservative. He avoided doing anything that would have disturbed the social structure in Sindh. The Brahmins remained the fattened calves of the society, while the underdog remained the underdog."*²³
(Emphasis added.)

Arabs, however, could not bring political stability to Sindh. No less than forty governors were changed in a short period of fourteen decades. This was direct reflection of the internal strife among the Arabs. Another cause of the instability was the resistance put up by the deposed ruling class against their supplanters.²⁴ That the native revolts occurred in the first three decades of the Arab rule and that there were no such significant attempts in the subsequent decades was perhaps due (i) to the gradual appeasement of the deposed native chiefs by including them in ruling

hierarchy; and (ii) to the great measure of autonomy allowed to Sindh in the conduct of its day-to-day administration.

Islam came to Sindh in the wake of Arab invasion. Various sections of its population adopted the new religion due to various reasons. The decline of Buddhism, which was already assimilated by Hinduism in the land of its origin,²⁵ also added the number of converts to new faith. In the course of several centuries, majority of the native population became adherent of Islam.²⁶ They together with the Arab settlers changed the religious complex of the population.

Arabs introduced certain changes in the feudal structure of Sindhi society without affecting its exploitative character. All land was ordained as state land and grants to individuals were confined to land usage only with no rights of ownership. In return they were required to pay to the state treasury a fixed portion/amount as a state tax. They were also required to supply a specified number of troops to the ruler's army as and when the need arose. As a matter of rule, land grants were not inherited. The grantees had but little administrative, judicial or fiscal powers. Number of private landowners was severely limited. Thus what distinguished the feudalism of the Arab period from the feudalism of pre-Arab period was the predominance of state ownership of land.

These changes and the system of deputing administrators from without led to disintegration of hierarchical structure of the Sindhi feudalism.²⁷ The Sindhi society thus ceased to be what it had been in the pre-Arab era—a feudal nation. This set-back in the social evolution of the medieval Sindh was, however, short-lived.

In the period from about the third quarter of the ninth century AD to first quarter of the eleventh century AD, Sindh remained practically divided into several principalities

ruled by Arab settlers as well as by native Sindhis, for instance the principalities of Multan and Mansura were ruled by two dynasties of Arab settlers and Cutch and Aror by native Sindhis.

By the beginning of the eleventh century AD both of these Arab dynasties began to lose their grip. A fatal blow was, however, dealt by Mahmud of Ghazna (r. 998-1030 AD), who after crushing defeat to the Qaramatians, the backbone of Multan principality, annexed that principality to his empire in 1010 AD. Mansura was also annexed by him about 1026 AD.

The absolute sovereignty of Sindh did not long remain with the Ghaznavids. Soon after the death of Mahmud, the people of Sindh began to revolt and ultimately many parts of Sindh became virtually independent. In a number of these territories power was ceased by local chieftains; thus a bitter struggle for supremacy in Sindh ensued. Eventually it was Soomros who emerged as most powerful. For some years Soomros acknowledged the over-lordship of the Ghaznavids and paid tribute to them but finding the appropriate opportunity about 1054 AD they restored the sovereignty of Sindh. They, however, continuously struggled against alien invaders and strived to consolidate Sindh into a single state. It was during the Soomro period that Sindh was subjected to ruinous devastations of the Mongols on the northern borders (Siro region) and perpetual incursions from Ghoris, Khiljis and Tughlaqs. The attempts of all these invaders to assert their power over Sindh came to grief. The notable feature of Soomro rule was their determined policy of giving none of the foreign power any lasting foothold on the soil of Sindh. This gave rise to many legends in Sindhi folklore, the valour of Dodo Soomro to the present day is an inspiring recital of their toil.²⁸

The Soomros gradually lost their power and were ultimately overthrown by another native tribe, the Sammo, in 1351 AD.

The Sammo dynasty reached the height of its power during the reign of Jam Nizamuddin, better known as Jam Nindo (r. 1461-1508 AD). Legends grew up around him and a number of his associates and friends such as Doolah Darya Khan, Makhdoom Bilawal,²⁹ Shah Haider of Sann (Mohtaram G. M. Syed, the topmost statesman and political thinker of post-British Sindh, was one of the latter's direct descendants) and a host of others honouring their patriotism and sacrifices for safeguarding and upholding the dignity, honour and independence of their fatherland.

The unprecedented economic prosperity, the great number of Madressos representing various *mazhabs* (schools of thought), and, above all, the creation of a strong state with a regular native army in the Sammo period mark it out as the "Golden Age" of Sindh. The Sammos restored to Sindh what had been lost after the fall of Brahmans in 712 AD, i.e., sovereign native rule over its different parts—Sindh proper was directly under them; Cutch and Las Belo were respectively under Jarrejo and Roonjho Sammos; and the area north of Sindh proper embracing Multan (referred to as Siraiki or Sirai region) under another Sindhi house, the Langah.

The Sammos were dislodged by the Arghuns, like the Mughals, the descendants of the Mongol leader Chenghiz (or Genghis) Khan the Great (c. 1162-1227), in 1512 AD. During their first expedition in the reign of Jam Nindo, the Arghun forces of the ruler of Kandhar, Mirza Shah Beg, were defeated so decisively that they did not venture to return during his reign. However, Jam Nindo's son and successor, Jam Feroz, who was an inefficient, immature and short-sighted prince, fell an easy victim to Shah Beg, who was then

ousted from Kandhar by Babur Mughal, the then ruler of Kabul.

That it should have been so was only natural. The political disunity that followed the infighting between the two claimants for the Sindh throne—Jam Feroz and Jam Salahuddin—paved way for the fall of Sammo dynasty.³⁰ The other contributory factor was the shift in loyalties of the Sindhi Mahadists³¹ from Sammos to the Arghun prince Shah Beg, who was, presumably, seen as the “Just Ruler” they believed would come to implement the Mahadists’ principles into practice.

Shah Beg took a straight course for Sindh’s capital, Thatto, through Laki Pass, avoiding a Sindhi force which had advanced to resist him. The Sindhi forces were defeated in the battle near Thatto and their commander, Doolah Darya Khan, killed in action. An arrangement was subsequently arrived at by which the territory extending from Laki hills, near Sehwan, to Thatto was assigned to Jam Feroz, while the upper part of Sindh from the same hills was to remain in Shah Beg’s possession. To the Sindhi masses, this was unacceptable. With the blessings of Makhdoom Bilawal Sammo and under the leadership of Mahmood and Mithan (both brave sons of Darya Khan), Jam Sarang Sahto, Ranmal Sodho, and Jodho Sodho, (the latter both Hindu Rajput patriots of Sindh) they posed a challenge to the Afghan invaders; thus ensued another valiant war at Talti, near Sehwan, resulting, however, in complete routing of the Sindhis—Sindhi Muslims as well as Hindu Rajputs of Tharparkar Sindh and neighbouring Rajasthan who, throughout the long history of Sindh, had always sacrificed their lives for the security and defence of their Sindhi (Muslim) brethren as and when in need or in danger: *Brothers are great stuff, may they live along.*” Likewise, folklore has it: *“A lonely tree is mere reed even if tall n’ strong.”* (Even to

this day word 'Sodho' is used as a synonym of words 'brave' and 'bold' in Sindhi language.)

Arghun rule began in 1512 AD and ended in 1554 AD with only two rulers—Shah Beg and his son, Shah Hassan. Shah Beg died in 1522 AD. The news of his death was heard by the people of Sindh with delight, and at Thatto drums were beaten with joy and gratification. Mirza Shah Hassan, the successor of Shah Beg, marched on Thatto. Jam Feroz fled to Cutch, where he obtained the help of Cutchis and returned with 50,000 men, challenging the supremacy of Arghuns. The ensuing battle at Chachkan near Badin was a bloody contest. Nearly 20,000 men died fighting (overwhelming majority of them being Hindu Rajputs of Cutch, then ruled by a non-Muslim Sindhi dynasty of Jarrejo Sammo Hindu Rajputs) for Sindh's independence. The Sindhi forces, however, were routed. Jam Feroz was demoralised and fled to Gujerat in south of Sindh, where he remained until his death.

After subjugating Sindh proper, the Arghuns turned their eyes on the Siraiki region and the Cutch, which were historically, so to speak, the northern and southern parts of Sindh. The Siraiki region was annexed in 1525 AD³² and the Cutch two years later. The Arghun hold over Cutch was, however, precarious. The Cutchis were soon able to liberate their homeland with their policy of total non-cooperation and 'guerrilla' type of warfare.

Shah Hassan died without a male descendant in 1554 AD and was succeeded at Thatto by his general, Mirza Isa Khan, founding a new dynasty, the Tarkhan. His other general, Sultan Mahmood, then governor of Bakhar, did not approve Mirza Isa's ascendancy to the throne and eventually an agreement was reached by which Arghun Sindh was divided between the two claimants; upper Sindh coming under the rule of Sultan Mahmood and lower Sindh under

Mirza Isa—on the death of the former, the principality of Bakhar was annexed to the Mughal Empire by Akbar the Great (r. 1556-1605 AD).

The rule of Tarkhans did not last beyond 1592 AD when after a series of battles—the last being fought at Unarpur—Mirza Jani Beg, the last Tarkhan ruler, was dislodged by the Mughal army under Abdur Rahim Khan Khanan in the reign of Akbar and the Tarkhan territory annexed to latter's empire.

The Mughal rule over Sindh proper ended in 1737 AD, when the power of a native tribe, Kalhoru, was recognised by the Mughals.

For more than two centuries Sindh remained under foreign domination. It is precisely because of this that the rulers were often unable to exercise their authority effectively. The entire period (1512-1737 A.D.) is marked by a series of uprisings by local tribes. During the Arghun rule the tribes which revolted were Jarrejo, Sodho, Dharejo, Jatoi, Buledi, Korai, Mangnejo, Samejo, Bughio, Lakhair, Modhro, Sakej Dal, Shoro Dal, Langah, Nahar, Sangi, Abro, Dahar, Machhi and Mahar. During the Tarkhan rule the resistance was put up by Samejo, Unar, Sodho, Hingoro, Junejo, Rahmo, Deparjo, Sahto, Jarrejo, Khor Mubani and Rahpotro. During the Mughal era it were Mangnecho (Mangnejo), Dharejo, Nahmardi (Numrio), Sayaro (Saryo), Nuhani, Machhi, Samejo, Chandio, Unar, Kalamati, Dal, Jokhio, Rajyal (?Rajar or Rajpar), Panhwar, Abro, Jam, Makrani, Magsi, Junejo, Nuhrio, Sodho, Sahto, Lashari, Rind, Dinari, Dombki, Kaluhar (? Kalwar or Katohar), Buledi, Babar and Kalhoru, who rose up in arms.

All these uprisings proved abortive mainly because the resisting tribes did so singly and severally, never joining forces.

The Kalhoro family as a dynamic force rose very gradually. They were leaders of the Mahdist sect in Sindh. Based in Chandko (modern Larkano) region they began their career as religious guides (*murshids*) with a considerable followers (*murids*) and the large estates that they managed to acquire subsequently through persuasion, chicanery and coercion started them on the road to feudal power. As they rose in the feudal hierarchy they began to entertain political ambitions, which they pursued relentlessly uninhibited by religious scruples.³³ By the turn of the seventeenth century AD they emerged as a dominant force under Mian Yar Muhammad Kalhoro.

The Kalhoro ascendancy on the political stage formally commenced in 1701 AD with the appointment of Mian Yar Muhammad Kalhoro as governor of a portion of Sindh, namely Sibi and Dhadhar, and culminated in 1737 AD during the governorship of Mian Noor Muhammad Kalhoro, when lower Sindh was also put under their rule.

Governors though they were called, the Kalhoros ruled as sovereigns, paying tribute to Mughals and their successors; that too under pressure. To extend their sovereignty, the Kalhoros launched a number of attacks on small state formations in the north, the east, the west and the south. Over the years Shikarpur, Thar, Kakralo, Dharaj and Kanji Kot were annexed. Their expedition against Cutch was, however, not fruitful.

In 1739 AD the Kalhoros became tributaries of the Persian monarch, Nadir Shah Afshar (r. 1736-1747), originally a Turkmen, and in 1747 AD of his successor, Ahmed Shah Abdali (r. 1747-1773; ethnically Ephthalite, Huna). The latter prince annexed a portion of Sindh, namely Sibi including Shikarpur, to his kingdom and ruled it initially from Kandhar and thereafter from Kabul.

The Kalhoru rule ended in 1783 AD, when they were overthrown by the Talpurs after a bloody civil war.

The notable features of the Kalhoru period were: (i) The development of Sindhi language and literature;³⁴ (ii) the rise of fundamentalist clerical thought and, in reaction to it, the maturing of Sufist tradition; and (iii) endeavours of the rulers to diminish foreign domination of the country by stopping, whenever the circumstances warranted, payment of the annual tribute to the Mughal, the Persian and the Afghan overlords.

However, what is of greater significance about this period was its relative lack of political peace and security, the setting back of feudal development of Sindhi society, and the beginning of a process of ethnogenetic change in the composition of the native population. This was a gradual albeit domineering inclusion of Sirai tribal chieftains (overwhelmingly of Huna ethnic origin) in the body politic and power circles of Sindh and soon monopolised the irreversible position of power brokers and virtual king-makers.

Of the 82 years (1701-1783 AD) of the Kalhoru rule, some three dozen (1701-1737 AD), were claimed by their gradual extension of power over different parts of Sindh and about a dozen and a half were consumed by Persian and Afghan incursions, civil wars and the expeditions against petty states and local uprisings. This insecurity coupled with the huge booties taken away by the returning armies of Nadir Shah, Ahmad Shah and Madad Khan Pathan (scourge of Sindh, who ravaged it, laying to waste the entire country from Shikarpur to Badin) told heavily on the economic welfare of Sindh. Thriving cities fell into ruin, trade deteriorated, irrigation suffered and the acreage under cultivation shrank sharply with the result that even in areas where settled agriculture was dominant feature of the

economy pastoral system and stockbreeding gained ground. One of the factors which contributed directly to this development was the large scale induction of the Siraiki-speaking Baluch (and non-Baluch) tribes, mainly Talpurs, into the feudal hierarchy. (Henceforward, during Kalhoro, Talpur and British periods—even to this day—the veritable aristocracy of Sindh is, on the whole, Siraiki speaking.) What had hitherto been a largely homogenous aristocracy came to be dominated by immigrant elements. As the number of these elements rose over the years, the homogeneity of the Sindhi society underwent an ethnogenetic transformation. The fact that these elements differed widely from the native people in economic outlook as well as in social make-up was to play a determinant (perhaps, also, detrimental) role in the subsequent course of Sindh's history.

The Talpurs formed the nucleus of the Kalhoro army, which was in the main composed of the immigrant Baluch and non-Baluch elements, from the Siraiki region. With the passage of time, these elements, led by the Talpurs, became entrenched in the ruling aristocracy and acquired the role of veritable king-makers. When the last Kalhoro rulers tried to outsmart them in the power game, the Talpurs finally unseated them after a bloody civil war and established their own rule.

True to their tribal traditions, they divided up the country among three branches of Talpur family—the Shahdadani house ruling at Hyderabad, the Manikani house at Mirpur and the Sohrabani house at Khairpur. The head of the Shahdadani house, Mir Fateh Ali, associated with himself in the government of central Sindh his three brothers—Ghulam Ali, Karam Ali and Murad Ali. Similarly, the Mir of Khairpur, Sohrab Khan, bequeathed his 'state' to be divided among his three sons, Rustam, Mubarak and Ali Murad. The purpose of these divisions and sub-divisions

appears to have been retention of tribal unity and prevention of internecine feuds. But as subsequent events were to prove, these intentions did not materialise. Weakened though Talpur polity was by these divisions, they were able to:

- i) Recover in 1795 AD the harbour of Karachi, which had been ceded to the Khan of Kalat by their predecessors;
- ii) Recapture in 1813 AD the fort of Umerkot, which had been gifted by the last Kalhoru ruler to the ruler of Jodhpur in 1782 AD;
- iii) Regain in 1824 AD the town of Shikarpur from the Afghan rulers; and
- iv) Extend their power over Sabzalkot and Bhounag areas then in the Bahawalpur state.³⁵

Talpurs relied for their strength and security on two main supports. First, the loyalty of most of the Sirai Baluch clans and, second, the cooperation of the privileged classes, namely, the Jagirdars, the Pirs, the Fakirs and the holymen who held **arms** and great tracts of cultivable land. Consequently, the regime was not popular outside the privileged classes; for this reason, they were unable to rally full strength of masses to meet the challenge of British.

In the first decade of nineteenth century, Sindh was unwittingly caught in rivalries and 'stratagems of the imperialist powers—the British, the French and the Russians.³⁶ A series of treaties was imposed on the Mirs by the British to further their imperialist ends. Finally Sir Charles James Napier (b. 1782 AD)³⁷ arrived in Sindh in September 1842 AD as the commander of British force to supervise the British troops' withdrawal from Afghanistan via Kandhar/Bolan pass, instead of via Jalalabad/Khyber pass. A fresh treaty, which virtually destroyed the independence of their country, was thrust upon the Talpurs. Incensed and provoked, the Sirai Baluch subjects

surrounded (*gheraoed*, encircled) the British residency at Hyderabad. Sir Charles Napier marched against Hyderabad and after two wars at Miani (17th February) and Dubbo, also known as Hyderabad (26th March), in 1843 AD, he annexed the whole of Talpur Sindh³⁸ except Khairpur whose ruler, newly ascendant Mir Ali Murad (r. 1843-1894 AD), had agreed fealty to the British at the opportune time and worked as their collaborator.

The British invaded Sindh after securing victory over almost the whole of Indian Subcontinent. The invaders' superiority both in the trained personnel and material resources, and Sindh's feudal fragmentation foreshadowed much more advanced capitalist Britain's ultimate success. The technological advancement coupled with well-equipped and well-trained regular army predestined the British success over divided, disunited, petty tribal rulers of Sindh with no standing army and requisite support of the masses. The battles in Sindh proved beyond any doubt "the superiority of musket and bayonet over the sword and shield and matchlock."³⁹ It was, in a sense, victory of a disciplined army over an "undisciplined multitude." In the opinion of Sir Charles Napier, the British conqueror of Sindh, "the battle of Meeanee [as well as of Dubbo] is among those of which history will speak as proving the superiority of discipline over numbers."⁴⁰

An impartial assessment of the events of those fateful days at the beginning of 1843 AD would inevitably lead to the conclusion that Charles Napier and Lord Ellenborough, Governor General of India (1842-1844 AD), were bent upon annexation of Sindh:

"The story of that much discussed event might be taken for a lost chapter from *The Prince of Machiavelli*. No amount of sophistry can disprove the charge that Ellenborough was determined from the very beginning

to carry through the project by fair means or foul, that the treaty engagements with the Talpur Amirs were cynically violated, that the ensuing war was forced upon them. Opinion at home was prompt in denunciation. Mountstuart Elphinstone [ex-governor of Bombay 1819-1827], the Nestor of Anglo-Indian politics at that time, gave the best of the many verdicts passed on the subject. 'Coming after Afghanistan it (i.e., the annexation of Sind) put one in mind of a bully who had been kicked in the streets and went home to beat his wife in revenge.'⁴¹

Napier's prejudgment of his own projected action, as recorded in his journal, cannot be improved upon. He had pithily noted: "We have no right to seize Scinde; yet we shall do so, and a very advantageous, useful, humane peace of rascality it would be."⁴²

We are dying continuously: I while I write this, you while you read it, others while they hear or do not hear it. I will be dying as you read this, you will be dying as I write it. We are both dying, we are all dying, we are always dying. [Why afraid of dying when the cause is noble.]

Francesco Petrarca Petrarch (1304-1374)

Ext. from his letter (c. 1360)

Italian poet and scholar

Whether I was in my body or out of my body as I wrote it I know not. God knows.

Quoted in Romain Rolland,
"Essay on Music" (1948).

George Frideric Handel (1685-1759)
German-English composer.

Abandon all hope ye who enter here.

Inscription above the gates
of Hell in *Divina Commedia*,
'Inferno', canto 3, line 9.

Dante Alighieri (1265-1321)
Italian poet and writer

*In the middle of the journey of our life
I found myself in a dark wood
Where the straight path was lost.*

Divina Commedia, 'Inferno',
canto 1, line 1-3,

Dante Alighieri (1265-1321)
Italian poet and writer

CHAPTER 2

ANNEXATION OF SINDH TO BOMBAY PRESIDENCY

A lot of people are afraid to say what they want. That's why they don't get what they want.

From *Sex* (1993).

Madonna (1958-)
US Popsinger

Soon after the conquest, a Martial Law regime was established and Napier was appointed Civil and Military Governor of Sindh, combining in his person the military command and the civil administration. Thus, Sindh was formally incorporated into the British Indian Empire, in 1843, bestowing initially on her the distinctive honour and status of the fourth fully-fledged governor's province in British India, the remaining three being, (traditionally called) the Presidencies of Bengal, Bombay and Madras. Keeping in view the size and the population of Sindh, and some other factors, the constitution of Sindh as a fourth governor's province was a peculiar decision.¹ The main reasons underlying this decision were:

1. A warlike people were likely to be disposed to obey the chief who conquered them than any other imperialist officer.
2. The man who had conquered Sindh wanted it to be administered separately.
3. The conqueror, Sir Charles Napier, was a senior military general, who, in fairness, could not be made subordinate to any of the junior provincial governors (of Bombay or Madras) except the governor-general of India who also held the charge of the governor of Bengal province as well.

4. The unsettled conditions of the Punjab necessitated maintenance of a strong force in Sindh, which in turn made it necessary to administer Sindh separately.
5. Strong, independent frontier province of Sindh would be in a better position to help contend the apprehended Russian-backed Afghan encroachments into India.
6. Napier and Ellenborough had to vindicate their "piece of rascality" for which they had come under heavy fire at home.

Consequently, Sindh was to be administered directly under the Government of India and efforts were to be made to make its administration a model for the rest of Indian empire.² Napier's prime duty was to consolidate British rule in Sindh. He expected danger of uprising from the Baluch elite. The Baluch were, however, a tribal community. The division amongst the tribes prevented the Baluch elite from having any national feeling or any intense attachment to the former rulers, for their elitist pride in tribal prejudices transcended their loyalty to Sindh and to its people as a whole. Napier, therefore, manoeuvred to conciliate the Baluch chieftains by attaching their interests to the continuance of British rule in Sindh. He did this by letting them retain the jagirs which they held from the former rulers:

"You Belooch Sirdars are required to present yourself before the Governor, and make your salams to him, and your jagheers and other property will be confirmed to you by the British Government, and no diminution will take place in your rank."³

All the Jagirdars, nearly two thousand, who tendered allegiance on 24th May, 1844, the date fixed for assemblage, were confirmed in their estates.⁴ Thus, the 19 lac bigah (about 4 lac hectares) land in-jagir was confirmed to the title holders.⁵ To conciliate the ex-rulers, Napier granted them cash pensions amounting in aggregate to about 3.72 lacs of

rupees yearly, and also permitted them to hold lands in jagir.⁶ A newspaper, commenting in 1854, stated that by adopting this policy

“all anxiety on the part of the holders of them [lands] terminated, and the security and consequently increased value of their lands as property, reconciled the owners in a great degree to the loss of the political power that before attached to them....the sovereign was changed, but the possessors of estates under feudal tenure remained in undisturbed possession.”⁷

Napier was empowered not only to govern British Sindh but also to exercise control over almost all its principalities, including Cutch, Khairpur, Bahawalpur and Baluchistan along with Las Belo. Thus, after a long time traditional unity of Sindh was achieved, in some sense, and it appears that Napier was determined to help unite historical Sindh albeit subservient to British interests. However after the disgraceful dismissal of Ellenborough, the then governor general of India (1842-1844) in July 1844, Napier felt himself greatly weakened.⁸ His administration became a subject of controversy in the Bombay press, which was clandestinely inspired by the Bombay bureaucracy. The *Bombay Times*, Bombay, started a campaign of vilification against him.⁹ Under the circumstances, particularly in view of the obstructive attitude adopted by the government of India after takeover by Henry Hardinge as the governor general of India (1844-1848), Napier by and large got himself into hot water. Hardinge, eventually, forced him to resign. As a result, Napier thought it expedient to tender his resignation, which he finally did.

Napier's resignation was more than a quittal. It was removal of a man who stood in the way of annexing Sindh to Bombay Presidency.¹⁰ Napier was very sceptical of the wisdom of annexing Sindh to Bombay and believed that

"under the Bombay Government Scinde is not likely to be safe, as it has been hitherto."¹¹ He repeatedly proclaimed:

"The civil servants of Bombay,...are watching this Government like the harpies of the ancients and the moment I go, or rather Lord Ellenborough goes, the whole will be changed into an enormously expensive civil Government: innumerable branches will extend from the foul stem of the Bombay Tree. All sons, nephews and friends of the Bombay civil servants will be provided for, and each idle head of a department will have what they here call an establishment."¹²

Napier's resignation paved the way for immediate implementation of the decision to annex Sindh to Bombay. The determination to do so was officially disclosed as early as May, 1845. The Governor General-in-Council vide letter No. 22 dated 2nd May, 1845, on the subject of transferring Cutch to the Bombay Presidency, had assumed that Sindh would ultimately be annexed to the Bombay Presidency.¹³ Finally in September 1846, he communicated to the Court of Directors:

"With regard to the arrangements which will be best adopted for the future management of Sind, I am of opinion the whole of that Province ought to be annexed to the Presidency of Bombay, that the troops and all the establishments, both Civil and Military, should be furnished by, and committed to the charge of, the Governor in Council of that Presidency. That so long as Major-General Sir Charles Napier continues to exercise the civil and military duties of the Government and the command of the Force in Sind, it will not be advisable to make any change in a country recently subdued."¹⁴

The factors culminating into the decision to annex Sindh to the Bombay Presidency were as follows:

- (1) The Government of Bombay was aggrieved by the decision of making Sindh a separate province under the Supreme

Government, since previously it had been entrusted to deal with the Mirs of Sindh. It was Bombay army that was sent to Sindh to guard Afghanistan and Sindh against encroachments of France and Russia; and it was the same army that, in subsequent conflict with the Talpur rulers, overturned them and took possession of their country. It was, therefore, natural for Bombay to hope that Sindh should be appended to it after conquest.

- (2) Napier soon after taking over charge of the affairs of Sindh managed to have under his command troops of Bengal army and carried on correspondence directly with the then Governor General, Lord Ellenborough, without any intervention of Bombay or Calcutta. This caused much disaffection, particularly in Bombay.
- (3) Keeping in view the indispensability of the closer cooperation between authorities in Sindh and Cutch, Napier managed to have not only command over the troops in Cutch but was also to unite with this the political authority as in Sindh. The Bombay government was highly dissatisfied over the cessation of its control over Cutch.
- (4) The Indian civil service, particularly of the Bombay Presidency, was not happy at the appointment of a soldier as a head of Sindh administration. This led to mutual recrimination, ill-feeling and distrust between Napier and civil service, which was ambitious to get that post reserved for the civil servants—they were eventually successful in their aim after quittal of Napier.
- (5) Sindh was considered the baby of Ellenborough and Napier, and after the dismissal of the former the Government of India as well as the Court of Directors being under the influence of their opponents, it came under low consideration both at Calcutta and London.
- (6) The Bombay Presidency had since long covetous eyes on Sindh, which was eventually conquered by its army. The Bombay bureaucracy considered it their privilege to enjoy the fruits of conquest. Napier and Ellenborough caused much disaffection by denying them lion's share in Sindh's administration.
- (7) The Bombay Presidency's native collaborators the comprador commercial-industrial classes—the Gujerati, Kathiawari, Memon,

Khoja, Marwari and Parsi capitalists—who had taken their position under the patronage and privilege of the British colonialists and had already harmonised their interests with the British imperialism, also, seemed to have their covetous eyes on Sindh and a claim to enjoy an exclusive position of privilege there, of course, in view of the fact that this newly conquered country was not only adjacent to them and their homeland but also because it was conquered by the army of their Presidency.

- (8) Bombay was keen to get more land, revenue and jobs. Sindh, with its fertile soil and magnificent river, developing port with vast hinterland and a very strategically geographical position, was not only prestigious but also lucrative for Bombay.
- (9) It was thought advantageous that the Bombay Government who had the experience of administering a first class port, have the developing port of Karachi under it.
- (10) It was felt that the European mercantile houses of Bombay, and the Indian commercial classes of Gujerat, Kathiawar and Cutch would be in a better position to give impetus to the trade of Karachi which could not be supplied conveniently from any other source.
- (11) It was hoped that maintenance of a separate province of Sindh was proving to be costlier than expected.¹⁵ A considerable saving in expenditure on administrative machinery was expected by its merger with Bombay.
- (12) The Bengal army employed in Sindh intermittently evinced a mutinous spirit for continuing the field allowance, on the plea that Sindh was not a portion of India but a foreign country. To quote:

“The unwarrantable annexation of the free country of Scinde eventually brought its own punishment, as it injured alike the loyalty and discipline of the native army, and gave us a foreshadowing of the dreadful climax which, thirteen years subsequently [i.e. during mutiny] was to end in its total destruction. The land of Ameers had now become a British province, and the sepoys, accustomed to extra *batta* granted to them there when it was foreign soil, failed to see any reason why it should be taken from them now, because Scinde had become a portion of British India. Hence, in

February, 1844, the 34th Bengal Native Infantry (known as the Bradsaw-ka-Pultan) refused to march to Scinde, without the same field allowance that had been given as before to troops beyond the Indus....The Government, finding it impossible to garrison the new conquest with Bengal troops, turned to Bombay and Madras; but a regiment of the former presidency, also mutinied; so the province was turned over to the Presidency of Bombay, which made satisfactory arrangement for the pay of its sepoys."¹⁶

- (13) In view of the danger apprehended from Afghanistan and Russia it was preferred to organise a streamlined chain of authority, with the provinces under the direct jurisdiction of the three presidencies which were thoroughly entrenched and organised seats of administration and military power.
- (14) Of all the then three Presidencies of British Indian Empire¹⁷ namely Bengal, Madras and Bombay, Sindh was not only nearest to the latter but was accessible only from that port; since it was separated from rest of British India by unfriendly/ hostile territories and Indian states. Consequently, military operations, if and when conducted, were necessarily to be entrusted to the Bombay army, which alone was in a position to send reinforcements there, as and when needed. Moreover, it was considered imperative that littoral part of western India should be under one and the same government.
- (15) The apprehension that there should be ten years of guerrilla warfare before Sindh was to be completely subjugated¹⁸ had been allayed. After restoration of jagirs to the former Jagirdars they turned out to be most loyalist lackeys of the British colonialism, and people of Sindh, being mostly under the thumb of Jagirdars, remained disinterested and apathetic to the new masters. Thus, there was no fear of any mass uprising by Sindhis.
- (16) The apprehension of unsettled conditions in the Punjab had been ended by making it a vassal principality of British imperialism in 1846. (Subsequently, the Sikhs revolted in 1848 but were completely routed and subjugated in 1849.)¹⁹

Napier resigned in August 1847,²⁰ and was relieved by Robert Keith Pringle.²¹ The day (1st October, 1847), Pringle

assumed charge as "Commissioner for the civil administration" of Sindh, it became an appendage of the Bombay Presidency.²² When Sindh was annexed to the Bombay Presidency one important thing or a major change that was offered in addition to losing autonomy was that, instead of martial law regime, Sindh was henceforth to be under a civilian administration which was presumed to be more rational, more civilised, more progressive and less arbitrary than a martial law administration under Sir Charles Napier. Indeed in a tug of war between Napier and the bureaucrats of the Bombay Presidency one of the reasons cited was that Sindh deserved 'a better' administration and 'a better' treatment than Napier's martial law regime. (But what we eventually found was that the civilian Bombay government, which was supposed to be more civilised, more rational, more progressive and less arbitrary regime, proved to be much more irrational and much more unjust than Napier's martial law rule in a separate province directly under the Government of India.)

Thus, Sindh, which lost its sovereign political status in 1843, lost its autonomous political character in 1847.

Nature, as we say, does nothing without some purpose; and for the purpose of making man a political animal she has endowed him alone among the animals with the power of reasoned speech.

Extract from *Politics*.

Aristotle (384-322 BC)
Greek philosopher.

England [Sindh, like Burma] still stands outside Europe [British India and its nouveau arrivé], Europe's voiceless tremors do not reach her. Europe is apart, and England is not of her flesh and body.

From *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* (1936).

John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946)
English economist

If I have seen further it is by standing on the shoulders of giants.

From a letter to Robert Hooke, 1676.

Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727)
English scientist and mathematician

CHAPTER 3

MOVES TO ABSORB SINDH IN THE PUNJAB

The broad mass of a nation ... will more easily fall victim of a big lie than to a small one.

From *Mein Kampf*, chap. 10 (1925)

Adolf Hitler (1889-1945)
German dictator

The Punjab, the land of five rivers (i.e. Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas and Sutlej, nothing to do with the Indus and, now lost, *Sarasvati* rivers), along with the present-day Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and Siraiki region both earlier conquered by a Punjabi empire-builder Maharaja Ranjit Singh by the power of sword, from Afghan rulers of Kabul, was increasingly looked to be a better *deus ex machina* (a god brought on the stage by mechanical device to devise a contrived artistic or inartistic, humane or inhumane, solution of a difficulty in a plot; an ancient Greek theatrical trick) for the Russian threat apprehended through Afghanistan. It was soon felt by some imperial strategists that the Punjab was to perform better the role earlier expected from the Bombay Presidency. Therefore, six years later, after the conquest of Sindh and two years after its annexation to the Bombay Presidency, the Punjab was also made an integral part of the British Indian Empire. (This added new dimensions to Sindh question being debated among the British policy-makers. Some albeit powerful suggested Sindh to be absorbed in the Punjab, others either favoured *status quo* or advocated making Sindh a separate province. The decision on the matter, as and when desirable, was supposed to be taken

absolutely on the basis of short-term and long-term interests of the British imperialism.)

The conquest of the Punjab (in 1849) by providing to the British Indian Empire easier alternative routes to Afghanistan, immensely changed the nature and situational (strategic) importance of Sindh. On the one hand, Sindh ceased to be the only channel of communication with Central Asia as Peshawar and Khyber Pass became a part of the British Indian Empire and, on the other hand, she assumed a far greater importance as the natural outlet for the entire north-west of India including the Punjab. Sindh was now not only of vital importance for the defence of the north-west border but was of even more importance for the import and deployment of troops in this part of India. Strategically she became an alternative to Calcutta (now Kolkata) for the internal security of the Empire. Sindh and its seaport at Karachi were, therefore, increasingly seen in relation to the Punjab. Consequently, as early as 20th February 1856, Lord Dalhousie, the then Governor General of India (1848-1856), officially put forward the proposal to elevate the Punjab from Chief Commissionership to Lieutenant Governorship with Sindh under its governance. He asserted: "The Punjab and Sind appear from their relative geographical position to constitute naturally the frontier province of the empire on its western side."¹ The Court of Directors, however, was not prepared on financial grounds to accept the proposal, though it admitted that at some later stage it might consider investing a lieutenant governor with powers over the Punjab and Sindh conjointly.²

The proposal was again revived in 1858 when subsequent to the traumatic events of the uprising of 1857 administrative reorganisation was taken up. The revolt was ruthlessly crushed and in its wake came the Government of India Act (1858) by which the British government took away

the political power of the East India Company that had hitherto ruled India. During the revolt of 1857, when Bengal had raised the banner of insurgency and all means of direct communication between North-Western Provinces (later in 1901 renamed United Provinces of Agra and Oudh or UP, traditionally known as 'Hindustan', the homeland of Hindi/Urdu speaking people) and Calcutta, the then capital of India, were disrupted, then "Karachi [seaport] became inevitably the mouth" and rest of Sindh "the throat through which alone the Punjab [the bulwark of defence against any invasion from Afghanistan and beyond] could be reinforced with troops and fed with supplies, or could even speak with Calcutta or London."³ The disruption not only dramatically emphasised the importance of British sea power to retain India but also the need to improve communications between Karachi seaport and the Punjab. Consequently, some newspapers in England and India began to advocate the idea of uniting Sindh with the Punjab, believing it to be congenial to imperial interests:

"The Punjab and Sind together may be looked upon as the barrier of India against invasion. With the commercial and agricultural prosperity of a country are closely connected its military security and defensibility. Those same means of inter communication which have been hitherto so strangely neglected and which are so confessedly the indispensable conditions of commercial and agricultural prosperity, are no less necessary to military security from internal revolt and defensibility against external aggression. A system of railways and steam boat navigation which shall enable us to concentrate at the shortest possible notice on any point our whole available force on the line of the Indus, would make the project of a successful invasion hopeless."⁴

The constitution of a fourth Presidency, comprising the Punjab (including Pakhtun territories conquered by the then Punjabi empire-builder Maharaja Ranjit Singh, 'Lion of the

Punjab' before the British conquest) and Sindh (including British Baluchistan), was, therefore, proposed.⁵ The unparalleled services of Punjabis in mercilessly crushing the revolt of 1857 gave additional impetus to the proposal. The British press, public opinion and official authorities of the time were highly appreciative of the Punjab as it was considered the only "province which in the hour of our danger and distress when India seemed to have slipped from the Queen's grasp, poured fifty thousand new soldiers to our aid."⁶ Sir John Lawrence, the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab (since 1853), afterwards elevated as the Governor General and Viceroy of India (1864-1869), was acknowledged "as the real conqueror of Delhi and saviour of India."⁷

The unprecedented services of the Punjab in ruthlessly suppressing the revolt of 1857 and completely emasculating the traditional Hindustan's will to fight, or even raise voice, either against the British or their staunch collaborators, the Punjabis, were eventually rewarded by adding to it (i.e. the Punjab) a sizeable portion of the North-Western Provinces (consisting of Delhi, Gurgaon, Karnal, Thaneswar, Hissasr, Rohtak and Sirsa districts or two commissionerships/divisions), historically known as principality or state of Malwa (not to be confused with Malwa of central India), and by raising its status to Lieutenant Governorship on January 1, 1859,⁸ of course, with the solemn pledge (unwritten word) that the mother tongue of the teeming masses of the Punjab shall remain as ever, merely the native idiom (spoken-language of illiterate masses) and Urdu (an important dialect of Hindi, or a Persianised idiom of Hindi language, with no grammar of its own except a very poor adaptation of grammatical rules of both the languages,—Hindi and Persian, a conglomeration of mismatches; giving birth to, rightly or wrongly called, a Lashkari and/or a Bazaari jargon—which had ultimately no place even in the land of its birth and upbringing, what to say become the mother

tongue of traditional Hindustan (then better known as the North-Western Provinces), and that also in Persian script, but for all practical purposes in the Punjab, it should be acquiesced to as the vernacular language of the Punjab, i.e., officially recognised there as provincial language of the literate people, actually the idiom of a microscopic elite of urban populace with their specific vested interests, which were/are in obvious clash with the genuine interests of the teeming masses, really and truly the down-to-earth legitimate sons of the soil of the Five Rivers. Five years later, in 1864, the summer capital of India (June to August) was shifted from Calcutta in Bengal to Simla in the Punjab, where it remained up to mid-August 1947. The headquarters of the newly formed Indian Intelligence Department were also located there instead of the then capital Calcutta. It remained there from its very inception (perhaps in 1867) to 1947 because Simla "was a good deal closer to the areas of Russian activity than Calcutta." The question of adding Sindh (consisting of merely three collectorates/districts of Karachi, Hyderabad and Shikarpur forming one commissionership or division) to the Punjab was also considered. But owing to the backward state of communication along the Indus, Lord Canning, the then Governor General (1856-1862) and first Viceroy of India (since 1858), previously England's Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office (1841), refused to give consent. The *status quo* was, therefore, maintained on the following grounds:

1. The means of communication were not developed between the Punjab and Sindh, and the administration of Sindh from the seat of the Punjab Government would hamper smooth running of the administrative machinery.
2. The political, judicial and revenue administration had not been developed fully in the Punjab and Sindh.
3. The Punjab and Sindh were governed under different systems of administration.

4. Sindh was admirably governed by Bartle Frere, and there was no need to upset the existing system and make an experiment with no guarantee as to its benefits.
5. The transfer of Sindh from Bombay to the Punjab would considerably reduce the jurisdiction of Bombay Government and affect its revenue.
6. The incorporation of Delhi and Hissar divisions (the heartland of traditional 'Hindustan') with a tract of about 12,000 sq. miles of territory was a sufficient addition to the Punjab. The integration of Sindh with the Punjab would make it unmanageable and unwieldy.

Nevertheless, some prominent officials closely connected with colonial administration in India continued to advocate the Sindh-Punjab amalgamation.⁹ The union was sought on purely political and military grounds. Its foremost purpose was to secure unity of action along the entire stretch of the then north-west frontier of India, because it was

"anomalous that on so important a frontier, we would be liable to have different policy advocated in Sind from that pursued at Peshawar, still more anomalous that the military force on the Lower Indus should be under the Commander-in-Chief at Bombay whilst the troops of the Upper Indus [not desirable in case of Lower and Upper Nile, shared by Egypt and Sudan, and other Rivers of the World] and its affluents are under the Commander-in-Chief in Bengal [why continuance of three commanders-in-chief, instead of one?]. One Government, one policy, one command should watch over the frontier from the seaboard to Peshawar."¹⁰

The continuance of two entirely different systems in two widely separated parts of the frontier inhabited by tribes, which differed considerably from one another in characteristics and constitution, was considered a necessity. However, in Dera Ghazi Khan district an anomalous state of affairs had developed in respect of tribes like Marris and Bugtis who had come into contact with both systems of the

frontier policy for their territories were contiguous to both the provinces.¹¹ To solve this difficulty, the Marri and Bugti tribal affairs were placed under the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khan, Captain Sandeman, who, though still retaining his appointment under the Punjab Government, for this purpose, was made subordinate of the Commissioner-in-Sindh, Colonel Merewether.¹²

This arrangement, however, did not work smoothly as it often resulted in clash of public policy pursued by officers brought up in different political schools with divergent interests.

Thus the problem remained unresolved and efforts to find a solution continued. Various suggestions and counter-suggestions were made during the period between 1875 and 1877.

Thomas Henry Thornton¹³ suggested in February 1876 union of the Punjab and Sindh.¹⁴ Lord Northbrook,¹⁵ in March 1876, proposed transferring of internal administration of the Sindh areas comprising the talukas (now districts) of Jacobabad and Kashmore from the Commissioner-in-Sindh to the Commissioner of the Derajat Division of the Punjab.¹⁶ The proposal was not approved by Lord Salisbury,¹⁷ the then Secretary of State for India (February 1874-March 1878). Northbrook's next proposal made in April 1876 wanted the transfer of the whole of Sindh to the lieutenant governorship of the Punjab.¹⁸ The proposal was approved by the Secretary of State for India in July 1876 with the suggestion that in compensation for the loss of Sindh, the Central Provinces may be transferred to the Bombay Presidency.¹⁹

Lord Lytton,²⁰ however, came out with an entirely new solution. In May 1877 he suggested the creation of an enormous trans-Indus province consisting of the six frontier districts of the Punjab and of the trans-Indus districts of

Sindh.²¹ This was to be headed by Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General. Under him were to function two separate Commissioners for the Pathan and Baluch tribes.²² In his dispatch dated May 17, 1877, Lord Lytton proposed that Bombay should receive the whole or part of the Central Provinces in compensation for the loss of trans-Indus districts of Sindh.²³

The Bombay government opposed the suggested change even though it was understood that *quid pro quo* for Sindh might be given by the absorption of the Central Provinces into the Western Presidency.²⁴

There were mainly three objections raised by the Punjab to this scheme. That some of these districts were an integral part of the Punjab, that their internal administration would suffer by separation, and that frontier affairs could best be supervised and administered by the Punjab Government. Lytton, however, felt that these districts were separate from the Punjab geographically, historically and racially.²⁵

The British Government did not accept the scheme as proposed by Lytton, and suggested a compromise in the form of a separate Commissioner for each of the two (Pathan and Baluch) tribes, but there was to be no Chief Commissioner. Both Sir Charles Aitchison, the then Foreign Secretary of India (1868-1878, after that Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab 1882-1887) and Sir Robert Egerton, the then Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab (1878-1882), vigorously protested against a compromise so full of "the seeds of future misunderstanding, confusion and divided responsibility."²⁶ Lytton, however, accepted the compromise proposal and appointed Sir Frederick Roberts²⁷ as the first Northern Commissioner in 1878, but due to the Second Afghan War (1878-1880), the plan had to be shelved.²⁸ By the end of the first phase of the war in 1879 Lytton resumed his

efforts to put the proposal into practice only to be upset by the revolt at Kabul and murder of Sir Louis Cavagnari, the British envoy in Kabul.²⁹ When the war came to an end in 1880, the Liberal Party had returned to power in England and Lytton resigned; in England he was made Earl (a rank of British nobility below a Marquis and above a Viscount) of Lytton. He was succeeded by Lord Ripon (1880-1884), who did not accept the separation of trans-Indus districts from the Punjab and the transfer of Sindh.³⁰

While Lord Ripon's decision put the Sindh-Punjab merger proposal on back burner at government level, it was taken up by the vested interests, particularly the European commercial community in both areas after completion of the railway between Sindh and the Punjab in 1879 because sure prospects of immense boost in the export and import trade had given them a stake in the issue. Their mouthpieces, the *Civil and Military Gazette* of Lahore and the *Sind Gazette* of Karachi,³¹ elaborated a series of arguments in support of the proposal. What had been previously sought for military and administrative reasons alone was now craved for geographical, ethnographical, political and commercial reasons also:

"The development of the communications, the completion of the Indus Valley Railway, the perfecting of telegraphic communication, the extension of British authority to Peshin and the increase of interest in frontier policy conferred by recent events, all tend powerfully to bring the Punjab into close connection with Sind."³²

"The paramount importance of bringing under one Local Government, and through it of the immediate direction of the Government of India, the entire line of our North-West Frontier is a matter that just now admits of no delay, [when] we consider 'the troubled state of affairs in Afghanistan, and the aggressive attitude of Russia, Karachi may at any time become the basis of

military operations, to be carried out on or beyond that frontier'."33

The question of amalgamating Sindh with the Punjab created uncertainty for future of Sindh. In 1889 Charles Bradley Pritchard, the then acting Commissioner-in-Sindh ventured to remark publicly:

"The prolonged uncertainty does not tend to increase the efficiency of the administration, and it cannot be expected that while this question remains open much Government money will be spent for the advancement of the province of Sind, or for the development of its resources, or its local institutions."34

Sensing an imminent danger of Sindh's amalgamation with the Punjab, the Sindh Sabha, a non-sectarian organisation formed by Sindhis in 1882 to voice and safeguard the interests of their homeland, could not but take serious exception to this persistent move. They found it necessary to make it known that the people of Sindh were strongly opposed to any move to make their homeland subservient to the Punjab. The Sabha submitted a well-argued memorandum to the Bombay Government specifying "arguments and reasons" against the proposed "transfer of Sind to the Punjab."35 In an address presented to Lord Reay, the incumbent Governor of Bombay, in April 1889, the Sabha, once again, reiterated "that inhabitants of this province [Sindh]...are opposed to the [proposed] transfer."36

Realising the strong disapproval of Sindhis in making Sindh play second fiddle to the Punjab, the advocates of the transfer proposal found it expedient to change their tactics in the face of Sindhis' vehement rejection of it and disguised their original stance by supporting other options. Accordingly one of their above cited two mouthpieces, namely the *Civil and Military Gazette*, having taken its time to think up the option, declared in 1890: "We are not, however, by any

means wedded to the idea of annexation [of Sindh] to the Punjab as the only, or perhaps even the best, solution of the Sind difficulty."³⁷ The paper having dilated on the alternative of creating a frontier province having the River Indus throughout its length in British territory as its eastern boundary, and placing it under the control of a chief commissioner or lieutenant governor,³⁸ discarded it by saying that "probably there is no territory in India more self-contained and homogeneous than Sind," and that it would be less congenial to the Punjab's interests, for the Punjab being chiefly interested in Karachi seaport, whose commercial interests were likely to be overlooked by the government of a purely frontier province. The *Civil and Military Gazette*, therefore, found it expedient to endorse "a third alternative to which no such objection would be raised."³⁹ "Taking everything into consideration" the paper opined that "rights and interests of all parties concerned would be most fairly adjusted by the creation of a Sind-Baluchistan Chief Commissionership," and trusted that "Lord Lansdowne will not allow his period of rule in India to pass without seeing some solution of this urgent Sind question carried through."⁴⁰

Lord Lansdowne (Governor General and Viceroy of India 1888-1894), however, saw no reason to alter the existing arrangement of the Baluch frontier.

After 1890, British interests chiefly revolved around the Pashtun frontier.⁴¹ Lansdowne was of the opinion that the Durand Agreement (1893),⁴² which had increased British responsibilities north of the Gomal, necessitated the creation of a separate frontier charge in direct communication with the Government of India.⁴³ At first, there was no special agency for dealing with the tribal tracts, and relations with the tribesmen were conducted by the deputy commissioners of the six districts of Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera

Ismail Khan and Dera Ghazi Khan. In 1876, the three northern districts formed the commissionership of Peshawar, the three southern ones that of the Derajat. The system of political agencies was introduced in 1878 during the Second Afghan War by appointing a special officer for Khyber. Kurram became an agency in 1892, while the three remaining agencies of Malakand, Tochi and Wana were created between 1895 and 1896 during the viceroyalty of Lord Elgin (1894-1899), who succeeded Lord Lansdowne. Malakand was placed under the direct control of the Government of India from the outset, all the other agencies remaining under the Punjab Government.⁴⁴ Lord Elgin found his time fully occupied in suppressing the Pathan uprisings of 1894, 1895 and 1897. British success in suppressing the latter prompted the Secretary of State for India to express, in a despatch dated August 5, 1898, the desirability of placing tribal policy under more direct control and supervision of the Government of India.⁴⁵ On receipt of the despatch Lord Elgin consulted officers of the Punjab government and found majority of them opposed to any dismemberment of the Punjab, but many of them admitted that an entirely new province was the only alternative to existing set-up.⁴⁶

This then was the state of affairs when Lord Curzon became Governor General and Viceroy of India in 1899 and remained as such up to 1905. Since the days of Dalhousie (1848-1856) changes had been deemed desirable, but from 1877 onwards the idea of a separate frontier province had steadily gained ground.⁴⁷ Lord Curzon, after due consideration of all previous proposals, was inclined to carve out a new frontier province across the Indus. The most important reason for the change was that between the frontier system and the Viceroy's authority there was a subordinate government through whose hands all frontier

questions had to pass before they reached the Government of India.⁴⁸ These hands belonged to the Punjab Government, which was placed in charge of the frontier at a time when communications were tedious and when Russia was a great but distant power. Subsequent developments had outmoded this set-up since the Russian threat had steadily increased, vast tracts of tribal territory had been absorbed, and the extension of railways and the introduction of telegraph had brought Calcutta in close touch with remotest parts of the Indian Empire.⁴⁹

His decision to create a new province led Lord Curzon to mull over various forms of its administrative structure. The grandiose scheme of Lord Lytton was rejected as it was found cumbersome and unmanageable by one man, and as Sindh was no longer a frontier area and Baluchistan was being successfully managed under the Sandeman system, he felt that no alteration of the existing administrative organisation of the southern borderlands was necessary. What he proposed to rearrange was the form of administration to the north of the Gomal where lived the most 'fanatical' and 'turbulent' of the border tribes.⁵⁰ Another form of administration suggested was to create a frontier province stretching from Chitral to Dera Ghazi Khan including within its limits the districts of Rawalpindi (strategically important location controlling route to Kashmir, British India's large military station and the Northern Army's headquarters) and Jhelum (one of the great military recruitment centres/districts of the north-west India). This he rejected as it meant a needless dismemberment of the Punjab.⁵¹ It had also been proposed to retain the existing set-up, that is, to keep the management of frontier affairs in the hands of the Punjab Government but appoint a lieutenant governor well versed in tribal politics and customs. The main objection to this was that it would be

contrary to the instructions of the Secretary of State for India as contained in the despatch dated August 5, 1898, and would not tend to place conduct of external affairs directly under the control of the Government of India.⁵² Finding none of the schemes suitable, Lord Curzon put forth his own scheme, which he believed to be the only remedy of the prevalent situation. His scheme envisaged separation of the frontier districts from the Punjab to constitute a new administrative unit called the North-West Frontier Province.⁵³ It was to comprise five settled districts of Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan as well as some trans-border tracts lying between administrative and Durand boundaries.⁵⁴ Its head the Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General was to be appointed by and responsible to the Government of India.⁵⁵ This province consisting of mainly Pashto, Hindko and Siraiki speaking areas came into being on November 9, 1901.

Creation of this new province, however, raised the silly question of "compensating the Punjab for the loss of its frontier districts."⁵⁶ The question provided an opportunity to all those who wanted to see destinies of Sindhis toyed with in the Punjab's secretariat.⁵⁷ Lord Curzon, however, decided that in view of the great development that had taken place in the Punjab and the consequent increase of work for that province's Secretariat, the question of compensation was highly superfluous. In his opinion, the Chenab and Jhelum agricultural colonies would far outbalance the loss of the Punjab's population resulting from transfer of its (non-Punjabi speaking) five frontier districts; whilst the Lower Bari Doab and Sindh Sagar schemes when completed, will not only greatly add to the revenue but also increase the settlement work and hence responsibilities of the Punjab Secretariat so much that the administration will have to be strengthened numerically. Thus it was decided that

compensation was not necessary.⁵⁸ The agricultural development works in the Punjab, upon which the no compensation decision was based, on the other hand, led to massive unrestricted upstream diversion and use of water of River Indus and its affluents (inflowing rivers) by the Punjab without any consideration for the rights or objections of the downstream user (Sindh) of those waters. (See comparative area irrigated in the Punjab and Sindh compared by five years period from 1850 to 1920, *infra* chap. 4, p. 89). It added fuel to the fire of Sindh's increasing bitter resentment against the Punjab.

The "question of compensation" once again came to the fore during 1902-1903 though not for downsizing of a province but for expansion in duties of a local government.⁵⁹ Acquisition of Berars on permanent lease from the Nizam of Hyderabad Deccan spawned all kinds of proposals for restructuring Indian provinces, which in turn revived the scheme of merger of Sindh with the Punjab.⁶⁰ The main official exponent of the scheme at the time was Denzil Ibbetson,⁶¹ who, apprehending that the Bombay Government would strongly oppose transfer of Sindh to the Punjab, suggested that Berars should be transferred to Bombay as compensation for the loss of Sindh.⁶² The Secretary of State for India, Lord G. F. Hamilton (1895-1903), being of the view that Sindh and Bombay did not have much in common, agreed with the suggestion to the extent of Sindh's transfer to the Punjab only, while to compensate Bombay, he suggested transfer of the northern districts of Central Provinces to it instead of Berars, and his suggestion for compensating Central Provinces was transfer to it of Berars and Chota Nagpur from Bengal (now part of Bihar).⁶³ Lord Curzon did not agree with the suggestions. He did not see any convincing reason for Sindh's transfer to the Punjab.⁶⁴ Moreover, the future of Berars was at last set at rest by

annexing it to Central Provinces instead of Bombay.⁶⁵ Lord Curzon further ordered that no change should be made regarding Sindh. Thus Sindh remained under Bombay as before.

The question of compensating the Punjab once again cropped up in 1911-1912, when in December 1911 at Delhi Durbar the shift of winter capital of India (September to May) from Calcutta to Delhi was announced. Almost all the prominent papers of the Punjab, ⁶⁶ vernacular as well as English, took up the cry rather vociferously. They kept the issue alive unto 1914 when international tensions forced them to leave it alone. What the Punjab wanted at that time boiled down to as follows: (1) as the partition of Bengal was annulled, so should the partition of the Punjab be annulled by restoring its five settled districts shorn from it in 1901,⁶⁷ and (2) Sindh should be annexed to the Punjab in compensation for separation from it of the Delhi enclave.

The uproar against loss of the Delhi enclave and the demand for the annexation of Sindh to the Punjab⁶⁸ moved the *Sind Gazette*⁶⁹ to retort: "Sind is to be the sop to quiet the angry growls of the northern Cerberus."⁷⁰ Describing the demand as "sinister," the paper observed that it had "originated, not in Sindh nor for Sindh, but in the Punjab and for the Punjab."⁷¹ The demand galvanised into action the people of Sindh as a nation and "Sindh for Sindhis" became a "motto" and slogan "which found voice in some quarters."⁷² The ground upon which the annexation of Sindh to the Punjab had first been urged, namely, the Punjab having suffered territorial mutilation could claim in solace of her wounded feelings to annex Sindh without reference to Sindh's own wishes or interests, was soon "recognised" what it, of course, had been "a tactical error." This ground was, therefore, "relegated to decent oblivion."⁷³ Efforts were now "directed towards showing that the transaction would

conduce materially to the general well-being of the state;" and, as an afterthought, it was added that "the change would carry important advantages to Sind."⁷⁴ Thus, "with much ingenuity," a wide series of arguments were elaborated, "on the apparent plan that if the bait is sufficiently varied every sort of fish in Sind will bite."⁷⁵

This issue remained a topic of vigorous discussion by the press of Sindh, the Punjab and the Bombay Presidency during the period from 1912 to first half of 1914. The discussion also found its echo in the Calcutta and London press. The feeling in Sindh against her suggested transfer to the Punjab was very strong, and "all the papers in Sind," vernacular as well as English, "protested against" the proposal.⁷⁶ Indeed, no one in Sindh supported it. "Practically the whole of articulate Sind," whether local or non-local, was "resolutely and irreconcilably opposed" to the proposal.⁷⁷ Articulated Sindh's unanimous opposition to the idea of amalgamation with the Punjab notwithstanding, disagreements did occur "among themselves [Sindhis] upon the alternative" choices of the question of their homeland's future. If one group wanted "forthwith an independent Chief Commissionership," the other preferred *status quo* at least for the time being.⁷⁸ But "so far as the choice" lay "merely between the Punjab and Bombay, the almost unanimous judgement of all classes, official, non-official, European and native, is unalterably in favour of Bombay, if only on the principle 'Of two evils choose the lesser'."⁷⁹

Finding Sindh resolutely against her proposed absorption in the Punjab, the advocates of the proposal, as discussed earlier also, changed their tactics and disguised their original stance by supporting the idea of Sindh as an autonomous province in the belief that Sindh would easily fall to the Punjab after its isolation from Bombay.⁸⁰ (And it indeed happened as envisaged within a little more than a decade only).

The outbreak of the First World War in August 1914 and the advance of Indian country-wide struggle diverted the attention of the government, the press and the public to more pressing issues than Sindh's absorption in the Punjab, which was consigned to cold storage.

Issuance of the Montagu Declaration⁸¹ in August 1917 started a vigorous debate all over India regarding the shape of things to come.⁸² In Sindh, the debate focussed on her future political status. Of the various proposals discussed the one that sought linking of Sindh to the Punjab found no support among Sindhis. The debate, however, ceased with the legislation of the Government of India Act, 1919, better known as Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms.⁸³

Despite stiff opposition by public opinion in Sindh,⁸⁴ the issue of merging Sindh with the Punjab re-emerged and remained a dominant theme throughout the 1920's with its supporters finding new spurs and disguises for it. The main spur this time was the construction of the Lloyd Barrage at Sukkur. Millions of new acres were expected to be colonised. Besides, thousands of new jobs were to be created. Both of these benefits accruing from the enormous project had Punjab's covetous eyes riveted for accommodating the increase in its population and expansionist farmer.

Yet another spur was, on the one hand, the firm stand taken by the Bombay Government to curb the unbounded ambition of the Punjab to divert for its own use as much water of River Indus and its affluents as it could without any reference to needs of Sindh; and, on the other hand, was the resolve of the Government of India to act as final authority in case of controversy between the Governments of the Punjab and Bombay concerning the use of water of the River Indus and its affluents. Hereafter no irrigation project was to be launched in the Punjab without the prior clearance of the Bombay Government because the construction of any fresh

project upstream was to jeopardise the working of the Sukkur Barrage. The thriving seaport of Karachi had its own lure. Punjabis wanted to round off their control of the railway.

The new disguise (bottle) for the old proposal (wine) was a great North-Western Province⁸⁵ comprising the Punjab, Sindh, British Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province, all of which were Muslim majority areas.⁸⁶ The Muslim leaders of the Punjab reframed and mooted afresh the idea of this great province, a solid and compact bloc, "to act as a greater Punjab."⁸⁷

What the Punjab had been seeking since 1856 (in fact since the days of Raja Ranjit Singh, the founder of first Punjabi state and empire in the history of the Punjab) was simply absorption of Sindh as its indispensable appendage under different pretexts and garbs for exploiting the Karachi seaport, water of the River Indus and its affluents and strategically located whole of Sindh for military, economic and demographic purposes, and also to satisfy its lust for more territory. Annexation of Sindh alone would have satisfied all these designs but in a small way. The idea of the envisaged great north-western province would satisfy all the above ulterior motives on a much bigger, indeed, stupendous scale. Besides, urging absorption of only Sindh would have been quite simply a colonial act of land grabbing. Moreover, the British imperialist interests at the time revolved around the north-west frontier of the British Indian Empire in view of perceived threat of the Soviet Union, which succeeded the Tsarist Russian Empire (1547-1917), armed with the then rapidly advancing communist ideology and the ideologically motivated, indeed, at the time, invincible Soviet army through that frontier, whereas both Sindh and the Punjab had ceased to be frontier provinces of the British Indian Empire since 1876 and 1901, respectively. Therefore, why not make it congruent with the short and long term British imperialist interests and avoid the damning charge of land

grabbing and achieve the old objectives by urging absorption of the NWFP (a part of the Punjab up to 1901) and British Baluchistan (a part of Sindh up to 1876) as well into something appearing much larger. The following apparently was the thinking behind the idea:

1. All the four areas meant to constitute the great north-western province of the British Indian Empire were geographically contiguous. (The NWFP was territorially and administratively part of the Punjab up to 1901 while Sindh and Baluchistan remained united up to 1876.)
2. Each of the four had then and has now Muslim majority. (The expansionist Punjabi emperor Ranjit Singh had his covetous eyes [actually one-eyed and as per Dutch maxim, *in regione caecorum rex est luscus*, in the country of the blind, one-eyed man is king] riveted on all these contiguous Pashtun, Hindko, Siraiki, Baloch and Sindh lands to be conquered and incorporated in his [short-lived] Punjabi empire [1799-1849], before the British conquest, but was partly successful elsewhere except Sindh, the latter remained an unfinished agenda for him and his successors and a most cherished dream of every Punjabi thereafter. [By the 'grace' of God I would take possession of my realm; the earth of Sindh would be in my two hands—I shall be happy to hear this news even in heaven or hell.]
3. The then Punjab with traditional Hindustan's Hissar and Delhi divisions sans Delhi enclave was numerically much more populous than the other three areas put together. (Their respective populations stood in the ratio of about four-fifth to the then Punjab alone and about one-fifth to the then other three provinces put together.)
4. The Punjab, located as it was (is) at the centre of the proposed great province, could easily reach any flash point in the other three areas. (Thus the Punjab occupied in it a strategically pivotal, rather decisive, position and unrivalled politico-administrative importance and role.)
5. The Punjabi proponents of this scheme rightly believed that in the long-run leadership of the new north-western province was the natural prerogative of the Punjab because of its numerical superiority, economic prosperity, central location and the

unparalleled predominance of Punjabis in the civil, police, military and para-military services. (Punjabis were therefore destined to rule over the whole of north-west of the Indian Empire up to the Arabian seaboard.)

6. The Punjab's out and out pro-imperialist role since as early as 1857 uprising and continually after that had made her a darling of the British imperialism and a dependable bulwark against any invasion of the British Indian Empire, especially from the north-west. (Being very congenial to the imperialist interests, the relevant British authorities may sooner or later be forced by the circumstances to extend their covert or even overt support to this scheme as and when they eventually deemed it desirable in their own short- and long-term imperial interests—in short, this scheme appeared to its proponents and would-be beneficiaries to be a move worth it.)
7. Only by achieving above referred to 'greater Punjab' with any label or name, of course, under any guise (make-believe), veneer (outer facade) and top-dressing of religion (i.e., continuously resorting to high-sounding Islamic verbosity—actually using it constantly as an effective instrument of achieving ulterior motives as and when expedient), for neither the proposed greater Punjab could be achieved nor could be prolonged without a large scale organised hypocrisy. Thus, overwhelming majority of the Punjabis in the proposed set-up would be hypocritically treated as overwhelming majority of Muslim nation or state (thus majoritarian concurrence would be fraudulently believed as the provincial or national consensus) and rank-parochialism of the Punjabis would be turned into fervent belief in the religionism. Hypocrisy shall, therefore, be the hallmark of the proposed set-up, not only for its establishment but also for its continuation. Its protagonists would and should not be accused of leading a dubious life, that is, pretending to be good when they are really wicked, for they would be living merely a hypocritical life, pure and simple. this, it has, like the 'modern journalism', its own bizarre justification.

Modern journalism justifies its own existence by the great Darwinian principle of the survival of the vulgarest.

From 'The Critic as Artist' in
Intentions (1891)

Oscar Wilde (1854-1900)
Irish playwright, poet and wit

By obscuring its original ulterior aims and objectives and giving it a fresh, new and novel look, subtle efforts were made this time to present the very same old parochial stance under the charming cloak of religion with a view to make it virtually unrecognisable and inconspicuous and, on the other hand, make it palatable to the British imperialist authorities who were ingeniously bent on cleaving the political movement of India on communal grounds. Although this idea was also floated by the same type of chauvinist Punjabi politicians, who strongly believed that their homeland the Punjab was more important than any other native land of India, but this time they asserted that they had mooted this scheme not as parochial Punjabi leaders but as the religious-minded Muslim leaders of the north-west India. By this deceit, deception or strategy, whatever it may be called, the Punjabi leaders on their own took it for granted that they are now not required to put forward any cogent reason in support of their scheme or furnish even any lame rebuttal to the incontrovertible evidence, arguments and objections put forward by Sindh as and when the issue of her merger with the Punjab was raised since 1856. But for the British it was a timely provided prop and political viability as they found it very congenial to their short and long term imperial interests. Hence they instantly made this scheme a vital part of the all-India Hindu-Muslim (communal) power politics in British India. (Accordingly, after long waiting for, official status of the Punjab was suddenly exalted from Lieutenant Governor's to fully-fledged Governor's province in 1921, and the Punjab's acclaimed great intellectual, poet and ideologue Dr. Iqbal was knighted in 1922—three years later, he became Member of the Punjab Assembly [1925-1928], joining the rank chauvinist Punjab National Unionist Party, with officially declared pro-British Punjabi jingoist [called nationalist] but secular policy, founded and led by Sir Fazal Hussain.) But Sindh considered it, as she had in case of the

original proposal of her annexation to the Punjab, a clever and cunning ploy for greater Punjab.

Notwithstanding Sindh's stiff opposition, the plea of the great North-Western Indian Muslim Province, under the guise of unity of Muslim areas of India, was insistently advocated in the Punjab press. For instance, the daily *Inqilab*, Lahore, published in December 1928 a series of articles under the caption "Muslim Hindi kay liey 'Watan' kee Zaroorat" (Need of a 'Homeland' for Hindi Muslim).⁸⁸

In mid-1930 Lahore's the *Inqilab*, the *Siyasat*, and the *Muslim Outlook* put forward the idea of organising a conference of the Muslim representatives of the Punjab, Sindh, British Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province.⁸⁹ Efforts to organise the conference did not materialise.⁹⁰ However, the mentor of the proposed conference, Sir Dr. Muhammad Iqbal, found an opportunity to express his point of view from the platform of the All-India Muslim League session held at Allahabad in December 1930. (The Allahabad session had a meagre attendance, just 32 listeners only and was held in the absence of Muhammad Ali Jinnah [and other prominent leaders], who was at London at that time.) In his presidential speech on 29th December 1930, Sir Iqbal declared his earnest desire "to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-Government within the British Empire, or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim state appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims at least of North-West India."⁹¹ The idea of a joint province of the above mentioned four territorial units (sovereign states before the British conquest except for the NWFP) plus Kashmir was further touched up in a pamphlet, (actually a leaflet) entitled *Now or Never: Are We to Live or Perish for Ever* issued from Cambridge England in 1933(?) by a Punjabi

pupil Choudhary Rahmat Ali (a Punjabi Gujjar born in 1895 in Hoshiarpur district's town of Balachaur in East Punjab) along with his three fellow students, namely, Muhammad Aslam Khattak, Sahibzada Shaikh Muhammad Sadiq and Inayatullah Khan.⁹² The scheme henceforth came to be known as 'Pakistan', a name presumably coined by Choudhary Rahmat Ali. (First three and last four letters of the coined name together respectively constitute the vernacular word[s] 'Pak' meaning 'pure' ['Khalis'] or 'purified' ['Khalisa'] and 'stan' [short for 'aastan'] meaning 'land' or 'abode' [on the pattern of 'Pak Panjtan' i.e. 'Purified Five Individuals', in this case, all the individuals of 'Purified Five Provinces' or political units]. Thus the whole name means 'land or abode of the pure'. The name, reflecting a typical Punjabi psyche, is synonymous with another vernacular term 'Khalistan' adopted by the Punjabi Sikhs ['Khalisas'] for their still-to-be-freed homeland in India, which would and could be feasible if the above referred to Punjabi Muslim homeland, after coming into existence, is capable and courteous enough to provide their remaining Punjabi brethren the desired assistance and outlet to Arabian Sea on one or the other pretext.)

Such a set-up, they (the much revered Punjabi Cambridge pamphleteers and Punjab's renowned political ideologue Sir Muhammad Iqbal) argued, would help contain the communist threat from the North: "This Muslim Federation of North-West India would provide the bulwark of a *buffer state* [emphasis added] against invasions of India either of ideas or of arms from any quarter."⁹³ A similar assurance was also held out by Sir Dr. Muhammad Iqbal while emphasising that they (i.e. the Punjabis and Pathans of the desired 'Muslim' state) "will prove the best defenders of India against a foreign invasion, be that invasion the one of ideas or of bayonets."⁹⁴ (Clearly hinting to USSR.)

But whatever its shape or guise, the people of Sindh saw through it and opposed it resolutely for what it really was, an attempt to use their homeland (Sindh) as the Punjab's colony. Indeed, so vehement was their opposition that British Government, despite its visible sympathy for any such scheme, had to stop short of implementing it.⁹⁵ So Sindh was made an autonomous province by the new constitutional reforms under the Act of 1935. This measure elicited following response from a Sindhi gentleman in 1936:

"We the younger generation of Sind are extremely grateful to those who stoutly opposed to fruition the amalgamation of Sind with the Punjab, for, it would have meant jumping from the frying-pan into the fire, and it would have nipped in the bud the growing consciousness of the Sindhis to be masters of their own house, to feel the pride, the privilege and the honour of moulding the destinies of Sind to their liking."⁹⁶

But soon the Sindhi gentleman's faith in Sindhis' growing consciousness appeared to be more wishful than realistic when viewed in the light of cataclysmic events that had and were to take place during some of the decades preceding and following the enactment he was grateful for. The preceding events revolved around Sindh's unwitting involvement in the all-India communal politics. Here is how this land of love and harmony let herself to be entrapped by communalism with fateful consequences. The trap of all-India game of Hindu-Muslim power politics was carefully designed, initiated and bolstered by the British imperialists keeping in view their short and long term interests.

After the outbreak of First World War in 1914 and the success of Russian Communist Revolution in 1917,⁹⁷ which struck a staggering blow to the whole structure of external imperialism, bringing, as they did, the issues of national self-determination and the dissolution of the old empires to the

forefront. Imperialism and colonialism with their expansionist wars and empire building were on the way out, while nascent neo-colonialism in the form of world powers' satellite and buffer states and concepts of decolonisation and national self-determination were on the way in. Liberation struggle in India could not but walk in step with the new trends. Alarmed by the shift in Indian politics toward anti-imperialism, the British Government, with the overt and covert assistance of the Indian leaders connected with it, took to cleaving the Indian political movement on religious, communal and sectarian lines. The systems of communal electorates and weightage introduced by the Act of 1909 and retained in the Acts of 1919 and 1935 strengthened the British policy of setting Muslims against Hindus. These legal provisions were extensively used by the British colonialists in India (including Sindh) with a view to galvanise into action the Indian religious communal parties and the middle-of-the-road politicians (who, since avowedly conducted their political struggle within the framework designed by the colonial masters, were truly loyalists and royalists, pure and simple) and to make Sindh a pawn in the all-India game of communal politics. Consequently, the issue of her separation from the Bombay Presidency and making her an autonomous province, a matter of life and death for all Sindhis, was deliberately and designedly made a victim of that game so much so what could have been achieved as her legitimate right with unity in 1919, if not earlier, was actually achieved 16 years later in 1935. This long delay obviously caused incalculable loss to Sindh, but the players of the communal game, the loyalists/royalists, did and do remain oblivious of it (as proved subsequently by traumatic events of 1947, 1955 and 1971).

Thus the movement for separation of Sindh from the Bombay Presidency, which had hitherto remained secular,

nationalistic and localised was purposefully imbued with communalism and capitalised together with other Muslim-majority areas in the political bargaining between Muslim and Hindu communalists. This tonal change, which eventually proved fatal to Sindh, was initiated by the All-India Muslim League (under the presidentship of M. A. Jinnah who was previously so committed to his secularism that he emphatically declined to support or even sympathise with the Khilafat Movement from its very beginning in 1919 to its end in 1922 because he was so far strongly against intermingling of the religion with politics in any case) through its communalistic resolutions passed at its annual sessions of 1925 and 1926, and it found its decisive expression in the 'Delhi Muslim Proposals' of March 20, 1927.⁹⁸ Consequently, in the Round Table Conference (RTC), which opened in London on November 12, 1930, the question of the constitution of Sindh into an autonomous province was treated simply a communal issue fit to be raised in the Minority Committee and referred to the Business Committee which set up a Sub-Committee, No. IX (Sindh), to examine it elaborately. This quite obnoxious attitude of the British Government was promptly and vehemently objected by the representative of Sindh, Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, who instantly and strongly "protested to the [British] Prime Minister that this ought not to be considered as one of the demands made by the Muhammadans, because it is not a minority demand; it is a demand made by the Sindhis." Bhutto reiterated this stance in the RTC's Sub-Committee No. IX also:

"This demand should be considered as a demand of the Sindhis, and not as a communal question. When this question was taken up by the Muslim League, in my public speech at Hyderabad, presiding over ten thousand people, I protested and said it was not fair to us at all. It is we Sindhis who want this question

considered, and we want it considered on its own merits. It is a demand of the Sindhis, including Hindus, Muhammadans, Parsees and Europeans—everybody.”⁹⁹

We have discussed above the brief history of the moves to absorb Sindh into the Punjab. During different periods, phases, junctures and under different political situations and scenarios many arguments and counter-arguments were put forward for and against the proposed merger. To save the readers from unnecessary repetition, they have been arranged subject-wise, instead of chronological order, and given below:

Arguments Advanced for Sindh's Merger with the Punjab

*A truth that's told with bad intent,
Beats all the lies you can invent.*

'Auguries of Innocence'
(c. 1803).

William Blake (1757-1827)
English poet and mystic

1. "The growing importance of the trans-frontier relations, their connection with Central Asian question and the Russian menace" through Afghanistan,¹⁰⁰ "the changed, and changing conditions of the Middle East," the "growing political importance of the [Persian] Gulf," the "defensive reasons connected with the Baluchistan" and "Sind littoral," the British military strength concentrated for action "in northern India," the potentialities of the North-West Indians in regard to the defence of the British Empire,¹⁰¹ the suitability of Karachi "as the base from which the ultimate defence of the frontier" as carried on from England "be directed"¹⁰² and Karachi's "situation with regard to Persia and Arabia" suggesting "the expediency of making her the centre of a stronger military concentration" particularly "as a naval station";¹⁰³ in short "the external political relations and the internal Military Defences" along the north-west frontier of India,¹⁰⁴ all underline the need for having common policy, unity of purpose and action along that frontier. This could be achieved only through uniting Sindh with the Punjab¹⁰⁵ which together, owing to "their relative geographical position," constitute "naturally the frontier province of the

empire on its western side."¹⁰⁶ This would "eventually solve the problem of India as well as Asia."¹⁰⁷

2. The Punjab was essentially an agricultural area and "in the absence of a port the spirit of commercialism" was "not largely developed."¹⁰⁸ The Punjab "without the outlet and inlet" which Karachi "Port affords, would be seriously handicapped so far as its foreign trade" was "concerned."¹⁰⁹ The "industries of the Punjab" were "mainly agricultural," though the province had "a large export trade, most of the firms engaged in it" had "their headquarters elsewhere" and were "only represented there by agents and branches." The Government consequently did "not come into immediate contact with the leaders of commerce." If Sindh were united to the Punjab it would have been able "to maintain that close touch with the commercial community" which was "essential for the proper development of the province."¹¹⁰ It was "certain" that trade would "follow the cheapest channel" bringing "additional wealth to the Punjab" because "Punjab products" routed "through Karachi" would "reach Europe a shilling a ton cheaper" than they did via Bombay.¹¹¹ "The success of the enormous Punjab irrigation schemes" depended "entirely upon the export trade of wheat and other grains from Karachi."¹¹² Sindh should, therefore, "come into the Punjab making Karachi the Port of the Punjab."¹¹³
3. Sindh and the Punjab were "really one, so far as trade" was "concerned;" and it seemed "absurd, therefore, to divide" what was "naturally and in practice one territory, between two separate and mutually unsympathetic administrations."¹¹⁴
4. The trading classes of the Punjab, which had "thriven so greatly" under British rule, found "the ordinary outlet for their sons and money insufficient." Karachi and Sindh would provide them such outlet.¹¹⁵
5. Sindh should be united to the Punjab because it would place the North-Western Railway almost entirely within one province.¹¹⁶ "A direct English mail steamer service between Karachi and Aden" as a rapid communication would be wholly favoured by the Punjab.¹¹⁷ "The United counsels of Sind and the Punjab might well expedite a scheme that would be of immense importance to Northern India."¹¹⁸

6. That Punjab and Sindh's "common share in the great river which traverses the whole length of each seems to make them largely dependent on one another."¹¹⁹ (It may be noted that this argument had some relevance prior to November 9, 1901 when Raja Ranjit Singh's conquered Pashtun and Siraiki territories were part of the Punjab but after the formation of NWFP in November 1901 there remained only one trans-Indus tehsil, now district, Mianwali, consisting of some Siraiki speaking areas of Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu districts of course for certain inexplicable reasons, hence the above argument in essence had become irrelevant and meaningless for all practical purposes.) Sindh should be tacked on to the Punjab because it would give administrative control over the Indus and its tributaries which irrigate its drainage area.¹²⁰ Irrigation would "receive a great impetus when all the Indus schemes" were "under a single administration and treated as a unified whole."¹²¹ The "question of the distribution of the water supply" was "all-important for both tracts,"¹²² and "unless" there was "an agreed policy between the two provinces" both would be "seriously affected."¹²³ As things were, the reconciliation of their interests had to be effected by the Government of India. The result was that the Government of India had directed that no water should be taken from the Indus and the other rivers of the Punjab until definite proof could be given that Sindh had a full supply for its irrigational projects, with the consequence the Sindh Sagar Canal from the Indus and Sutlej Dam Scheme and some other irrigation schemes in the Punjab on the Jhelum, Ravi, Beas and on other Punjab rivers were "held up indefinitely." If Sindh and the Punjab were "under one administration, it would be necessary for the engineering fraternity of both territories to think in wider terms before planning to further drain the Indus waters."¹²⁴
7. The union of Sindh and the Punjab would be especially beneficial to Sindh Hindus because they would derive great strength by being added on to the Punjabi Hindus.¹²⁵

We must indeed all hang together or, most assuredly, we shall surely all hang separately.

Warning his colleagues,
on signing the American
Declaration of Independence.

Franklin Benjamin (1706-1790)
Pseud. Richard Saunders
US statesman

Arguments Advanced against Sindh's Merger with the Punjab

How dare the Punjabis occupy Sindh and not to be called occupiers.

SKC

Politics is war without bloodshed; war is politics with bloodshed.

Mao Tse-tung (1893-1976)

From a speech, 1938.

Chinese Communist leader

1. "The historical connection" between Sindh and the Punjab was "extraordinarily slight." While "the Southern Punjab as far as Multan" had been, "at various periods," part of Sindh, "the Punjab" had "never ruled over Sind."¹²⁵ Sindh also "has had a connection with oversea countries," since the Mohenjodaro culture, which was not the case with the Punjab.¹²⁷
2. The transfer of Sindh to the Punjab was undesirable on military grounds. To sever Sindh from Bombay would result in placing "the littoral western part of India" under "two separate governments."¹²⁸ It would also be inconvenient if civil administration of Sindh was transferred to the Punjab and the garrison was allowed to belong to the Bombay army.¹²⁹
3. "If the Bombay connection be objectionable," then "the Punjab connection would be doubly objectionable." Not one of the points which told in favour of Bombay told in favour of the Punjab, while nearly all the points which told against Bombay told also against the Punjab.¹³⁰ Sindhis would, "first of all, lose" their "autonomy" which they had been practically enjoying on account of Sindh's connection with Bombay.¹³¹ For Sindhis "to sacrifice these advantages and to put their necks under the yoke of the Punjab would be simple madness."¹³² The "danger was that by amalgamation all the higher hopes of Sind" to acquire complete independence as a separate province "would be permanently extinguished."¹³³ The Punjab connection would be "a *cul-de-sac*, closing the way against the progress of the autonomous idea and extinguishing outright Sind's hope and chance of future independence."¹³⁴ The "little experience that Sind" had "got of the Punjab" not only precluded "the probability of any better treatment" but constituted "a good ground for fearing" that Sindh would "fare very much worse at the hands of the Punjab."¹³⁵ If Sindh was transferred to the Punjab, one great disadvantage under which the Sindhis would labour was that the Punjabis, on

account of their "numerical strength" and "material prosperity" would "oust out Sindhis from all departments" of government service.¹³⁶ "The effect would be disastrous. Wherever in Sind a Punjabi could find a place, he would somehow or other contrive to squeeze in."¹³⁷ As experienced in Railway because Lahore was "the headquarter of the North-Western Railway almost all the big posts on the Railway in Sind" were "monopolised by the Punjabis." The case of the province would be "still worse" if Lahore became "the Headquarters of the whole administration of the Province of Sind."¹³⁸ Besides "Sindhis would lose their individuality by the large number of Punjabis that would flock into Sind, buy up the land, erect their own houses, and monopolise all the trade."¹³⁹ The "Punjabis' interests would so predominate in a Punjab and Sind Council, that Sind would be sacrificed."¹⁴⁰

(i) An increasing transit business did "not necessarily imply an increase of wealth to any individual citizen of Karachi, or to the city generally."¹⁴¹ There was nothing in common between the Punjab and Karachi except trade. The latter city already had "the Punjab trade, and must continue to have it." Its grievance was that it had been "denied direct communication with the United Provinces" and it was "not convinced that the Punjab Government would assist them in obtaining this."¹⁴² As for the trade connection, it had "come into existence, prospered and grown great without the aid of any administrative connection, and it must surely continue to expand enormously" whether the two provinces came together or remained apart.¹⁴³ The Punjab Government, having "a secretariat of farmers," was "wholly untutored in commerce and shipping, and with no official equipment to administer intelligently the peculiar interests of a port and a harbour."¹⁴⁴ Karachi was "over 1,000 miles from Delhi, over 780 from Lahore." If Karachi felt isolated because of its separation "from Bombay by a distance of 500 miles," what would be the situation if the administration was located nearly double that distance.¹⁴⁵

(ii) Besides, the argument that the amalgamation would give seaport to the Punjab was "a puerile argument." It was "neither necessary nor possible for every province to have a seaport of its own." So the interests of Sindh were "not to be sacrificed to those of the Punjab with a view to provide the latter with a seaport."¹⁴⁶ If it was "undesirable to link administratively any other Indian port to

its hinterland," why "must Karachi alone be supposed to stand in need of such an expedient?"¹⁴⁷ The plain truth was that whether Sindh joined the Punjab or not canals would still be constructed, railway trains would "still run," and the courts would "still give (or deny) justice."¹⁴⁸

(iii) Moreover, the Punjab was not the only hinterland of Karachi seaport. "The geographical hinterland of Karachi" formed "nearly one-fourth of the whole of India." It embraced "Sind, Rajputana [now Rajasthan], the Punjab, Kashmir, the North-West Frontier Province, Baluchistan, the western parts of United Provinces, Cutch and northern Kathiawar." Outside India it included "Makran, Eastern Persia, the trans-frontier tracts of north-western India, Afghanistan, Turkistan [now Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, eastern Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, southwestern China including Sinkiang or Xinjiang] and western Tibet."¹⁴⁹ All these areas could not be merged in one province. Karachi was the natural outlet for the Punjab produce; nobody denied that. But all this happened while Karachi was under the Government of Bombay and one failed to see how the mere fact of change would materially increase the trade. "Private trading and shipping interests in Bombay" no doubt competed "with those of Karachi." They would "always do so, whether Sind be governed from Bombay, Lahore, Simla or London." This was not an argument for "suggesting that the lamb of Sind should sit down side by side the Lion of Lahore."¹⁵⁰ Both "Sind and the Punjab were substantial wheat producing centres and already there was keen competition between them; now an autonomous Sind blessed with Karachi as its seaport would have considerable advantage over the Punjab in the wheat trade which however would be lost if the merger came about, because the Punjabis would then dictate."¹⁵¹

5. To claim that railway management should constitute the test of appropriate territorial distribution was absurd. If we were "really going to consider the ownership of railway as a governing factor in administrative division" then we should have to "rearrange the map of India accordingly."¹⁵² The "railway in India were run by the Imperial Government, and provincial Governments could neither build, extend nor improve railway systems. So far as the Punjab opinion would weigh with the Government of India in such a case, the railway interests of Sind and of the Punjab were already identical and must remain

so whether the two provinces became one or not; so that in either event Punjab opinion must be on the side of Sind opinion."¹⁵³

6. Like the railways, the argument of administrative divisions governed by irrigation conditions was also absurd. "If redistribution was unnecessary and even undesirable in the case of every other great river in India," why it was "indispensable in the one case of the Indus?"¹⁵⁴ The "Sind Irrigation Department was fully competent to bear unaided all the responsibility which autonomy would involve."¹⁵⁵ In United Sindh and the Punjab province Punjabis would easily divert, for their own use, major portion of the Indus waters. Once Sindh got merged into the Punjab, "the reins of Government would pass on into the hands of the Punjabis and the voice of the Sindhis would be lost in the wilderness."¹⁵⁶
7. The province of the Punjab was hot-bed of communalism which had "made the administration of Municipalities and Local Boards almost impossible." In Sindh the relations between the various communities were exceptionally cordial.¹⁵⁷ The Hindus of Sindh did "not naturally cherish the idea of Sindhis sharing the same fate."¹⁵⁸
8. Geographically and historically, ethnologically and linguistically Sindh and the Punjab lay far apart. No one in Sindh understood Punjabi; no one in the Punjab understood Sindhi. They had different revenue systems, ideas, customs, traditions, habitudes and sentiments. "Their soils differ; their products differ; agricultural pursuits differ; arts and crafts differ."¹⁵⁹ There was "nothing in common in the traditions, sentiments and requirements of Sind and the Punjab," whereas "the treatment which the Punjabis" had "hitherto meted out to the Sindhis" had "served to create a feeling of distrust for the Punjabis."¹⁶⁰ Sindhis brooked no interference by Punjabis in their affairs and, therefore, they did not take to each other kindly.¹⁶¹ "The greatest bar between the two provinces is one of dread and dislike on the part of the Sindhi. 'Let the snake pass, but kill the Punjabi' [*Sup taar, Punjabi maar* and its *vice versa* in the Punjabi language is *Sup taar, Sindhi maar*] was a common proverb in Sind, and it may be doubted whether it has lost its popularity. The dislike is common to all communities."¹⁶²

CHAPTER 4

STUGGLE FOR AN AUTONOMOUS SINDH

The eyes of the world are upon you. The hopes and prayers of liberty-loving people everywhere march with you.

His speech while dispatching
US forces on D-Day (6 June 1944).

Dwight David Eisenhower (1890-1969)
US general and 34th president

The shackles that were clamped down upon Sindh in 1843 were tightened and hardened in 1847 by making her an appendage of the Bombay Presidency. That Sindhis would rise to break these shackles was foreshadowed by their war cry (mighty shout of advancing infantry) in the battle of Dubbo: "Die we shall but give up Sindh never." This was indeed an attempt, albeit abortive, to use the name of Sindh as a rallying point. It signaled the subsequent growth of national consciousness among the people of Sindh—a growth in which the British (and post-British) rulers acted as "the unconscious tools of history."

There were two objectives of the British policy in Sindh. The first and dominant was the consolidation of the British rule and turning the conquered territory into a jumping board for further expansion into Afghanistan, Iran, Central Asia and the Middle East. The second objective was to convert this area into a market for British (alien) goods and a source of raw materials for the British (alien) industry.

For consolidating the British rule, they perpetuated the feudal survivals in the socio-economic structure by supporting the local exploiting sections (feudal and semi-

feudal landlords and moneylenders) because these sections were the major social strongholds of colonial rule. Sindh was annexed to the Bombay Presidency in order to establish a common military command over littoral western India for further advancement.

For realising the second objective they converted Sindh into an agrarian appendix of metropolis and linked her up with the world market. Both these objectives necessitated creation of an infrastructure. So the British rulers had to, when and where exigencies of the time so demanded, establish modern means of communication like railways and post and telegraph, develop the port and undertake intensive irrigation works.

The progressive role performed by the British rulers in the pre-mutiny period manifested itself to some extent in Sindh also, especially during Napier's autonomous rule. Measures like abolition of slavery, ban on *Karo-Kari* (female killing on the pretext of illicit love affairs) and *begar* (forced labour), introduction of western educational and judicial systems, restructuring of administration on modern lines, replacement of kind with cash in wage payment and tax collection and establishment of a regular police force were undertaken. As a result of the administrative and educational reforms, a new middle class with lawyers, teachers, merchants, and doctors as its spokesmen, emerged in the last decades of the nineteenth century. In the years to come, this class was to play its leading role in the growth of Sindhi consciousness through such organisations as the Sindh Sabha (1882), Sindh Muhammadan Association (1884), Sindh Provincial Conference ((1908), Sindh National League (1928), Sindh Hari Committee (1930), Sindh Azad Conference (1932), and also through the Indian National Congress, Muslim League, Khilafat Committee and Hindu Mahasabha.

Another contributory factor, which preceded the emergence of the new middle class, was the protracted competition/rivalry between the commercial classes of Sindh and the Presidency proper over the growing seaborne trade of the Karachi port hinterland. This competition/rivalry was reflected through letters, articles, statements and editorials in the press, memoranda to the authorities, speeches at the annual dinners and farewell parties and formation of pressure groups.

One of the most important contributory factors was the drastic curtailment of the downfall of the Indus and its five tributaries' waters due to rapid development of canals and barrages in the Punjab over the years from 1880 to 1920. The area irrigated in the Punjab and Sindh compared by five years period from 1850 to 1920 was as under:¹

| Period | Punjab (Acres) | Sindh (Acres) |
|-----------|-------------------|------------------|
| 1850-1855 | 750,000 | 1,000,000 |
| 1875-1880 | 1,500,000 | 1,500,000 |
| 1880-1885 | 2,000,000 | 1,618,000 |
| 1885-1890 | 2,649,000 | 1,979,000 |
| 1890-1895 | 2,984,000 | 2,227,000 |
| 1895-1900 | 4,842,000 | 2,247,600 |
| 1900-1905 | 5,970,000 | 3,198,000 |
| 1905-1910 | 6,820,000 | 3,526,000 |
| 1910-1915 | 8,253,000 | 3,413,000 |
| 1915-1920 | 9,000,000 | 3,400,000 |

The modernisation of Sindhi language (which included the standardisation of alphabet, manufacturing of Sindhi Type for printing purposes, development of Sindhi typewriter and Sindhi shorthand) was also an important factor to the growth of Sindhi national consciousness.

The wave of the lawlessness² that swept across rural

Sindh in the closing years of the 19th century was a sequel to the discontent among dispossessed peasantry and *Haris*, who had lost their holdings and means of livelihood as a result of the operation of the new revenue and civil laws. The Hur revolt (1896-1900)³ in the same period was another outlet for the discontent of these sections of Sindhi society. This discontent too was a measure of the growing consciousness among the people of Sindh.⁴

The awakening of Sindhi spirit could also be attributed, in varying degrees, to introduction of Sindhi intelligentsia to revolutionary movements as the American Declaration of Independence (1776), the Great French Revolution with its message of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity (1789) and the Russian Revolutions of 1905 and 1917.

No sooner had the annexation of Sindh to the Bombay Presidency taken effect than the contradictions⁵ inherent in the arrangement surfaced, starting a bitter conflict between the Sindh Commissioners and the Presidency Government over the apathetic and unsympathetic attitude of the latter.⁶ The conflict was so bitter that R. K. Pringle, the first Commissioner (1847-1850), resigned in disgust;⁷ and the second Commissioner (1850-1859), Bartle Frere, grew so exasperated in the early years of his tenure that he had a mind to follow his predecessor's example and resign.⁸

The Sindh Commissioners of the early period wanted to construct roads, *serais*, canals, bridges, to improve the Karachi harbour and to provide steamers to ply on the Indus. But all their requests for grants to implement these schemes were returned "with a sermon on economy." What one Commissioner had to say on the subject is typical of the Bombay Government's apathetic attitude towards Sindh:

"The Government do not object to any single specific proposition I make. They do not name any one

Department in which I have exceeded, nor any sum to which I ought then or now to confine my suggestions in a lump, but they call for fresh statements 'on a more economical plan' —the old story which has been going on ever since Charles Napier, went ..."⁹

Thus, within few years of Sindh's merger with Bombay Presidency, the unsoundness of the arrangement became apparent and demands grew for its annulment. The earliest such demand was made in 1854, when it was suggested to separate Sindh from Bombay Presidency and make it, like the Punjab, an autonomous province, directly under the Supreme Government.¹⁰

The press of Sindh, and also of the Punjab, was throughout the period since 1850s very critical of the Bombay's unfriendly attitude towards the interests of Sindh.

Their views were often supported by the press of London and Calcutta and sometimes even by the press of Bombay. A London paper observed in 1858:

"We believe that since the day when Sir C. Napier resigned his province, but one Governor of Bombay has ever visited Scinde. That Governor was Sir George Clerk [23 January, 1847-1 May 1848], who reported on the province in 1848. But during the ten years which have since elapsed no Governor, nor any member of the Bombay Government, has ever found leisure for personal examination of ... its topography and people."¹¹

Similarly, a Bombay paper admitted in the same year:

"It is matter of constant complaint with residents in Sind that the commercial interests are, if not sacrificed, at least neglected by the authorities in Bombay. Without considering the charges made of interested jealousy on the part of Bombay, it is easy to see that interests of Sind must always be subordinate in the eyes of a Bombay Government to the rest of Presidency...except as a

matter of revenue, its [Sindh's] prosperity can make no difference to the rest of the country. With regard to the other parts of the Presidency the case is the reverse. In the prosperity of Guzerat, or Sholapore, or even Beejapore, this place has a direct interest. Sind, on the contrary, is for all commercial purposes as far off as Bengal."¹²

The Sindh papers, and also the Punjab papers, were not happy with the state of affairs which allowed Sindh to remain at the mercy of the Bombay Government. There being rivalry between Karachi and Bombay ports the Bombay Government's treatment of Sindh was obviously step-motherly. A Sindh paper, commenting on the jealous attitude of Bombay, observed in 1856: "That Karachi will eventually rival Bombay there is but little doubt. Hence this petty jealousy.—'We will keep *that* back as long as possible'."¹³ (Emphasis original). A Punjab paper remarked in 1858: "Bombay has ever treated Sind as its step child; as a stray waif requiring just so much caress as to keep it alive, and had it not been for the incessant, perseverance and wisely-directed efforts of Mr. Frere, both in India and England, Sind would be little better than it was when Sir Charles Napier left it."¹⁴ The attitude of Bombay marked as it was by a persistent lack of sympathy for the problems of Sindh, enforced the demand for a complete divorce from Bombay as nothing less would satisfy the people of Sindh. There was much to be said in favour of the proposal of setting up Sindh as a separate province.

It was advocated by many, particularly in 1880s. The Karachi paper, the *Sindh Gazette*,¹⁵ and the Lahore paper, the *Civil and Military Gazette*,¹⁶ though basically in favour of amalgamation of Sindh with the Punjab, often supported the proposal. So did the *Sind Times*, Karachi.¹⁷ The Bombay Government was not helpful to Sindh, particularly to Karachi, "for the simple reason that its sympathies and

assistance" were—"naturally—already bespoke," in the interests of Bombay.¹⁸ Commenting on this a Karachi paper observed in 1884:

"It is well enough known on this side of India that the Bombay Government, in regard to all matters connected with the trade of Karachi, has been guided by a few ignorant or prejudiced officials, and, as was to be expected from such tutelage, has taken up an attitude of resolute hostility to any project for the improvement of the great harbour of Sind....in one quarter, at least, where Karachi might have looked for support and sympathy—where long association with Sind left no room for the excuse of ignorance,—the earnest representations of our local authorities were met with sneering criticism, and unfair attempt to discredit truth."¹⁹

The paper concluded: "But a continuance of the present treatment will make a separation from Bombay inevitable, and in the present opinion those who wish well to Sind, the sooner this consummation is brought about the better."²⁰ In another issue of the same year, the paper commented:

"One thing is very obvious and that is that Karachi has absolutely no chance of getting fair play as long as it is under the thumb of the Bombay Government. We have pointed out often enough in these columns, how invidious was the arrangement by which Karachi was placed completely at the mercy of the Government which is chiefly interested in promoting the welfare of its rival in trade."²¹

"Our difficulty is this;" observed the same paper in 1889, "that the influence which should be exercised in procuring for us that recognition and consideration by the only authority that can really help us, the Supreme Government, the influence of our Presidency Government at Bombay is exercised against us."²²

"The charges of apathy and continual neglect of Sind" were "substantial against the Bombay Government in every line of the history of the province"²³ and underscored the demand for severance of Sindh from Bombay.

Up to the end of three quarters of the nineteenth century the cause of Sindh was championed by its press and bureaucratic and commercial classes only. The people of Sindh were not in the picture. The first time that we find them appearing on the scene is in the year 1887, when Sindh Sabha opposed the proposal to amalgamate Sindh with the Punjab.

From then on the political activity gathered gradual momentum. As was natural, initially the political activity of Sindhi intelligentsia was confined to making of modest demands like curtailment of extraordinary powers of Commissioners-in-Sindh, separation of Sindh accounts/budget from that of the Presidency proper and constitution of Sindh as a Chief Commissioner's/Lieutenant Governor's province.

From 1843 to 1847 Sindh was a separate province with Sir Charles Napier as its Governor. After its annexation to Bombay in 1847, Sindh began to be administered by a Commissioner. Unlike other Commissioners of the Bombay Presidency, the Commissioner-in-Sindh enjoyed powers of the Governor-in-Council. These powers were delegated to him from time to time in pursuance of the Act V of 1868. He also exercised numerous other powers under no better lawful authority than the traditions of his predecessors. This concentration of exceedingly wide powers in the hands of one man resulted in despotic administration in Sindh. It was, therefore, strongly felt that Sindh was being practically denied the benefits of government by the Governor-in-Council. Sindh keenly felt the degradation of her position

being ruled by a bureaucrat Commissioner whereas other divisions were directly under the Governor-in-Council.²⁴

The scope of the demand for curtailment of extraordinary powers of Sindh Commissioner was widened in 1912, after the Delhi Durbar.²⁵ The demand then became two-fold. On the one hand, the leaders of public opinion in Sindh continued to press the demand for restricting the autocratic powers of the Commissioner, on the other they wanted provincial autonomy by making Sindh a Lieutenant Governorship/Chief Commissionership directly under the control of the Supreme Government.²⁶ An offshoot of the demand of provincial autonomy was the demand for separate accounts for Sindh, publicly termed as financial autonomy, which in opinion of the *Sindh Gazette* was true "practical autonomy."²⁷

In fact, the demand for separate accounts was voiced as early as 1908 by Shaikh Sadiq Ali in Bombay Legislative Council.²⁸ It was reiterated by Harchandrai Vishindas in 1912 during the debate on Bombay Presidency's budget.²⁹

What occasioned this demand was the unsatisfactory position allotted to Sindh in the matters of Governmental finance.³⁰ The great disparity between what Sindh yielded and what Sindh consumed led the *Sindh Gazette* to describe Sindh in 1912 as "the milch cow of the Bombay Presidency."³¹ The *Daily Gazette* (which succeeded the former paper perhaps in the last month of 1914) recalled in 1915:

"About three years ago we drew attention, in a series of editorial articles, to the unsatisfactory position of Sind in the matter of Governmental finance. We showed ... that there was reason to regard Sind as Bombay's milch cow, because of the great disparity between what Sind yielded and what Sind consumed. We showed that the milch cow did not have even the satisfaction of being liberally fed and tended, since almost all the departments

of the Sind Administration were suffering from financial hunger and were showing in their work unmistakable signs of being underfed. "³²

The Government declared the demand utterly undesirable because its acceptance would amount to treating Sindh as a separate entity and would lead to separate budgets for the other divisions of the Presidency.³³ Countering the Government argument Sindh paper observed:

"The other divisions are literally 'divisions' of one homogenous whole. Their boundaries are artificial and arbitrary, serving no purpose but that of administrative convenience. Their entities are unreal and could be dissolved and reconstructed at pleasure. The three divisions of the presidency proper in fact might, if required, without harm to any of them be recast into two divisions or into four divisions or otherwise. But nothing of the sort could be said of Sind which not only is a distinct sub-province in the administrative sense with only a fortuitous connection with Bombay, but has no affinity of climate, character, geography, ethnology, agriculture or habitude to Bombay. . . . charge against the Bombay Government is precisely that in the matter of these inexcusable financial inequalities the Government's own policy is to make of Sind a separate entity—an entity which is always to be denied the attention, the consideration and the generosity which are lavished upon the presidency divisions proper. If the Bombay Government do not wish to have Sind regarded as 'apart from the presidency' why do they consistently treat it as apart? Why is it that a Governor during five years of office can find time for only one brief and hurried visit to this province? And why, in an age when administrative tours are strongly recommended by the highest authorities, is Sind steadily shunned by all the other members of the presidency Government?"³⁴

Another spokesman of Sindh observed:

"Although it is quite true that considered as a political

division of the Presidency, Sind has no separate existence independent of the Presidency proper and is an integral part of it, yet in many respects its affairs are conducted in a way which could justify the idea that the province required a special and separate treatment.

"The Commissioner-in-Sind holds a singular position and possesses singular powers. In the nature of this authority or its extent he bears no great resemblance to the commissioners of the other three divisions of the Presidency. There are some Government officials who are appointed specially and exclusively for Sind and the other divisions have no similar posts, because Sind does not in all things require the same treatment as the rest of the Presidency. Some of its annual departmental reports are drawn up independently of the Presidency proper, although occasionally published in one and the same volume. Some of the subordinate services of Sind have long remained separate and exclusive and form complete wholes in themselves. The amalgamation of the grades of Deputy-Collectors is of a quite recent date.

.....
 "In all Government Reports, Resolutions, Press Notes, as also in the columns of the public press, Sind is regarded and treated although not as separate entity, yet as something that is to be distinguished from the Presidency proper. The invariable occurrence of the expressions 'The Presidency proper and Sind' and 'The Bombay Presidency including Sind' makes this obvious."³⁵

Financial neglect of Sindh reached such a crisis in 1914 that had not the World War broken out a movement would have been launched "for detaching neglected Sindh from a Government who took so little practical interest in the welfare of this Province."³⁶

The war drew off the attention of the press, the public and the government from the issues facing Sindh to more momentous issues.

The Sindh issue regained its importance in 1917, when E. S. Montagu, the then Secretary of State for India, and Lord Chelmsford, the then Viceroy and Governor General of India, were busy with eliciting public opinion regarding the future constitutional changes in India.

Before narrating various proposals put forward in Sindh regarding its position in the coming reforms it would be worthwhile to have a glance at the history of constitutional reforms in India and their effects on Sindh.

To work the colonial system successfully the British introduced a series of reforms and measures from 1861 onwards³⁷ with the proclaimed aim of steady and gradual extension of the Indians' association with the political administration. Side by side, the number of posts for Indians in the civil service (but never in the decisive positions) was cautiously increased so to have the support of the trained stratum of upper and middle class Indians to assist the British imperialists in holding the masses in subjection.

The Indian Councils Act 1861 provided for enlargement of the Governor General's Executive Council to form a Legislative Council, reconstituted and likewise enlarged the Legislative Councils in Bombay and Madras, and provided for the creation of similar Councils in Bengal, the North-West Provinces and the Punjab;³⁸ and it prescribed that at least half the new or "additional" members should in each case be chosen from outside the ranks of civil service. Since most of the "non-official" members thus chosen were Indians, the Act of 1861 may be said to have introduced the representative principle into the colonial rule. But it was by no means a concession of the representative government. The majority in the Councils were still officials, and the small groups of non-official members were carefully selected by the Governors, not elected.³⁹ (For insistence, from Sindh, Mir

Allahdad Khan Talpur son of Mir Sher Muhammad Khan Talpur, ex-ruler of Mirpur principality, was selected for the purpose, of course, after surrender of the latter, by the Governor of Bombay on his above referred to Council.) Their powers, moreover, were purely legislative. They could not even ask questions about, still less discuss, executive business. The conduct of administration, including all matters of finance, remained in the exclusive control of the wholly official Executive Councils. Like every subsequent reform, this "reform" was accompanied by a new repressive weapon; the Governor General was empowered to issue at will ordinances having the force of law for six months.

The Indian Councils Act 1892 added a few indirectly elected persons (recommended for approval, and not formally elected, by the local government and other bodies) who were made members to the Provincial Legislative Councils, and through them, at a further stage of indirectness, to the Governor General's Legislative Council.

The Indian Council Act 1909, better known as Morley-Minto Reforms,⁴⁰ provided for an elected majority into the Provincial Legislative Councils (in part indirectly, and in part directly elected), and an elected minority (indirectly elected except for the landowners' and the Muslims' seats) into the Governor General's Council. These Councils were given limited powers, having no control over either on administration or finance; their legislation could be vetoed; the franchise was extremely narrow and to the existing multiplication of electing bodies was added the system of separate Muslim electorates.

The Morley-Minto Reforms were the first reforms to be carried in the midst of, and as a result of, widespread national agitation and demand for self-government, and with the avowed political aim to defeat that agitation and, in

Morley's phrase, "rally the moderates." The colonial masters aimed not only to consolidate the position of the propertied classes in India (e.g. princes, feudal landowners, compradors) whose support they enjoyed but also to win over to their side the leaders of the moderate wing of the national movement. The reforms were first projected in 1906, following the great upswing of the Indian national movement in 1905, the boycott and *Swadeshi* (promotion of indigenous industries and goods) campaign which was launched in 1905, and the Russian Revolution of 1905, which had shaken the other great oriental despotism, that of the Tsar.

The First World War in 1914 and the success of the Russian Revolution in 1917 struck a lasting blow to the whole colonial structure, bringing, as they did, the issue of national self-determination and of the dissolution of the old empires to forefront.

The crippling war taxation, soaring prices and reckless profiteering added fuel to the fire of Indian unrest and demands for greater political reforms became crescendo.

The struggle which the people of India had been carrying on against the alien rule with the boycott and occasional acts of "terrorism and conspiracy" as the main weapons received a new impetus from the irresistible idea of national self-determination which was brought forward by the political changes that occurred during that period, particularly after the end of First World War and the success of the Russian Revolution.

The British Government realising that the weakest link in the imperialist chain, Tsarism, was about to snap hastened to arrest the advance of Indian national struggle⁴¹ and issued in August 1917 (i.e. within five months of the fall of Tsarism) what was known as the Montagu Declaration, in which the

Secretary of State proclaimed the aims of the British rule in India to be "the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire," and promising "substantial steps in this direction should be taken as soon as possible." As foretold in the Declaration, Montagu came down to India soon afterwards and began, in collaboration with Chelmsford (Frederick John Napier Thesiger), the Governor General and Viceroy of India (1916-1921), the endeavour to work out the shape the promised "substantial steps" should take.

The Declaration started a vigorous debate all over India regarding the shape of things to come. In Sindh, the debate centred around the future position of the province. Many proposals came up for discussion at public forums through the years 1917-1919. Of these the one for joining Sindh with the Punjab has already been dealt with in the previous chapter. The other proposals were:

- (1) To leave Sindh as it is attached to the Bombay Presidency with a promise that the Commissioner-in-Sindh Act of 1868 be repealed and Sindh be given a Commissioner with the same powers as other Commissioners have.
- (2) To join Baluchistan to Sindh and make a joint province of Sindh and Baluchistan.
- (3) To join to Sindh, the Siraiki region as far north as Multan and make the joint area as a separate province.
- (4) To make Sindh an autonomous province with a Governor and Council.

The Special Sindh Provincial Conference convened in 1917 submitted a memorial, through its President Harchandrai Vishindas, to Montagu and Chelmsford in which the evil effects of the numerous powers enjoyed by the Commissioner-in-Sindh were enumerated. The remedy

suggested by the memorial was:

"That, until the circumstances become ripe for the elevation of Sind to the position of the Independent Province, with, a duly responsible Executive Council and a Chartered High Court, the administration of the affairs of our province, should, for the time being, be placed directly under the Governor of Bombay-in-Council, and all enactments and measures, which relate to the delegation of powers to the Commissioner-in-Sind, be so amended or replaced as to place the Commissioner-in-Sind, on the same footing as other Divisional Commissioners, all the powers conferred on these latter being also retained by him, but no more. The Governor of Bombay should reside at Karachi during a few months of the year, and the members of the Executive Council should visit the Province more frequently than here-to-fore and at least one of the sessions of the Bombay Legislative Council should be held at Karachi every year."⁴²

On 1st April 1918 the same organisation through a resolution urged "the imperative necessity of repealing Act V of 1868 and all other measures authorising delegation of powers to the Commissioner-in-Sind and of placing Sind under the direct control of the Government of Bombay."⁴³ A Committee was formed in pursuance of a Conference resolution⁴⁴ to work on the desirability or otherwise of the separation of Sindh from the Bombay Presidency. The Report of the Committee, besides showing that Sindh was a surplus province, stated that "all the objections" raised against autonomy for Sindh were "unsatisfactory and unconvincing." They had, therefore, "no hesitation in recommending that Sindh should be constituted an autonomous province with its own legislature and the executive which will be responsible to the people."⁴⁵ The Report stressed the imperative necessity of the separation of Sindh, but at the same time wanted to wait and watch until

the scheme of Reforms was published.⁴⁶

The August 1918 special session of the Conference resolved to defer the question of the future system of Government of Sindh until the reconstruction of the reformed council.⁴⁷ The session through the same resolution demanded withdrawal of all special powers conferred on the Commissioner-in-Sindh over and above those enjoyed by the other Divisional Commissioners.⁴⁸

Jamshed Nusserwanji R. Mehta, however, struck a different note at the April 1919 session of the Conference held at Jacobabad. In his presidential address he proposed that the area as far as Multan should be joined to the proposed separate province of Sindh because the customs, the language and manners of Multan were more akin to those of Sindh and because resultant administrative advantages would be far greater.⁴⁹ However, he made it clear that the then Sindh could also be an independent province because it had the individuality, the capacity and the resources to stand on its own legs. He, therefore, advised the Sindhis to demand in the coming reforms nothing less than the reconstitution of Sindh as a separate province under a scheme of responsible Government.⁵⁰ In case of Sindh remaining with Bombay he suggested abolition of the special powers exercised by the Sindh Commissioner, establishment of a High Court for Sindh, allotment of a fair share of revenue to Sindh while framing the Budget, and holding of at least one meeting of the Bombay Council in Sindh every year.⁵¹

The euphoria generated by the public debate on the coming reforms galvanised even the Sindhi Zamindars into political activity and their grouping, the Sindh Muhammadan Association, stood up to be heard, albeit, with continued protestations of loyalty to the rulers. A deputation of the

Association presented an address to Montagu and Chelmsford in December 1917.⁵² The association expressed its satisfaction with the prevailing system of government declaring that "the country in general, and Sindh in particular, is not ripe for democratic Government, nor for the elective system."⁵³ They opposed reduction in authority of Sindh Commissioner. However, in case of any local change it wanted "Sind and Baluchistan combined" into a Lieutenant Governorship with Legislative Council.⁵⁴

The Association changed its stance later because the Joint Report of Montagu and Chelmsford, published in July 1918, refused to "wait till they are fit" and because "for reasons of strategy" the frontier provinces (the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan) were "to remain entirely in the hands of the Government of India." In a memorial sent to the Governor General and Viceroy of India, the Association "most humbly and respectfully" prayed for severance of Sindh from the Bombay Presidency and constituting it into a separate administration under a Lieutenant Governor or Chief Commissioner with Executive and Legislative Councils.⁵⁵ They based their prayer on the following grounds:

1. That "Sind is geographically and ethnologically distinct from the Presidency proper and there is nothing in common between the Province [Sindh] and other parts of the Presidency."
2. That the interests of Sindh were "in all matters subordinated to those of the Presidency," and did "not receive the special consideration which its characteristics and physical features" demanded.
3. That the Presidency proper appropriated "a portion of the revenue raised in Sind" with the result that Sindh was denied a fair share of its revenue for administrative and other expenditure.
4. That "the improvement of agricultural conditions" had "received but little attention; and Irrigation Schemes" had "not

been carried out on a scale proportionate to the requirements of the population and of the areas that might be brought under cultivation."

5. That the trade of the port of Karachi, "owing to Bombay being given preferential consideration in all matters," had "not expanded to the extent which owing to its favourable situation and fine harbour, it might have done."
6. That "owing to its remoteness from the capital of the Presidency," public opinion in Sindh did not and could not obtain "the same ready hearing as other parts of the Presidency," and that thus the requirements of Sindh received little attention. For the same reason Sindh did not obtain "its proper share of representation in the Bombay Legislative Council, and in the matter of higher appointments, such as High Court Judgeships, membership of the Executive Council etc." The case of Sindh "in existing conditions," was "almost hopeless."
7. That "the singular characteristics" of Sindh, "and the conditions prevailing therein, entitle it to a special form of Government, under which it would be enabled to advance and progress and achieve a position worthy of its importance as distinct and well defined tract of country, with a people markedly distinct from the inhabitants of the Punjab or of other parts of the Bombay Presidency."
8. That the revenues of Sindh were "sufficiently large to meet all expenditure incidental to, and connected with, the administration of a separate Province;" while its area and population justified "its claim to solidification under a form of Government not subordinate to any other Local Government."⁵⁶

The Chairman of the Karachi Chamber of Commerce, Montagu de P. Webb, also advocated a self-governing Sindh. In a letter to the *Times of India* he said:

"Personally, I should like to see the Joint Scheme attempted in selected areas in every part of India, Sindh (which is in reality quite a separate Province from Bombay), would make a very suitable experimental area. Let the present Commissioner-in-Sindh be styled the State

Governor of Sind. Let every man in Sind who pays land revenue or income tax be given a vote. Let these voters elect, say, thirty members of Council—one from, and to represent, every sub-division in every District; one to represent each of the chief municipalities; and the balance, the Karachi Chamber of Commerce and the Indian merchants of Karachi. From these elected Councillors the State Governor would summon one—the man best qualified to command the support of the Councillors—and ask him to form a Local Government, i.e., to select from the elected Councillors Ministers of (1) Agriculture, (2) Public Works, (3) Education, (4) Local Government and (5) Finance. The Ministry thus formed would remain in office for five years, unless any of their scheme were defeated in the Local Assembly, or they were voted out by a direct resolution of want of confidence. The Local Assembly and Sind Government which would, of course, have representation on the Viceroy's Legislative Council in view of the imperial importance of the Port and trade of Karachi, would now have an opportunity of showing what they could do locally and imperially. I should not be surprised if a such Sind Government improved on Sind's record for the last quarter of a century.

"... I personally, am so disappointed with the rate of progress and development in Sind that I would welcome a move forward such as that indicated above, that would give to the people of Sind an opportunity of showing whether the painful slow rate at which they have progressed during the last quarter of a century, has been due mainly to the apathy of the people themselves, or is attributed in some measure to the fact that Sind is too far away from the headquarters of Government to enjoy that continuous attention and vigorous constructive activity which the geographical and climatic advantages of this Province and its capital ought certainly to command."⁵⁷

The *Daily Gazette*, while supporting the idea advocated by M. de P. Webb, observed:

"Let the Province be brought directly under the control of the Government of India for all matters of Imperial concern. For the rest, let Sind govern itself and see what Mahomedans, Hindus, Parsis, Anglo-Indians and Europeans can do for themselves in patriotic co-operation with each other."⁵⁸

The main recommendations of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report were incorporated in the Government of India Act passed in 1919 by the British Parliament, which later came to be known as the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms. Under the Act, Indians were granted seats in the Governor General's and provincial governors' executive councils and were allowed in provinces to assume ministerial posts in charge of departments dealing with health, education and certain other spheres of secondary importance in the colonial administration. Despite a certain extension of opportunities for representatives of the upper echelons of Indian society to be employed high up in the country's administrative apparatus, the British had not relinquished virtually any of their powers. As before, they were in complete control of all matters concerning finance, the army, the police etc. In addition the Viceroy and provincial governors retained the right to dissolve the legislative councils and also to veto the decisions adopted by the latter, as they thought fit. This power structure in which the elective principle and limited responsibility of Indian ministers to the legislative councils was combined with autocratic power of the Governor General and his representatives—the provincial governors—came to be known as the diarchy (dual government).

Even this meager instalment of responsible government in the shape of "transfer" of authority in the provinces to ministers and elected majorities in the legislatures had no meaning for the people of Sindh. For Sindh remained as appendage of the Bombay Presidency and the Commissioner

-in-Sindh continued to enjoy the despotic powers as before.⁵⁹

This discriminatory treatment of which Sindh had been a victim so long became more pronounced as the working of the Act of 1919 progressed and Sindh ethos developed a feeling of alienation from rest of the Presidency.

Though the people of Sindh were active participants of all anti-colonial ferment,⁶⁰ they had still not advanced from the nascent stage of their national struggle to impart to the question of Sindh's autonomy the same militant revolutionary zeal. In fact, the question continued to remain what it had always been—a point of discussion/debate, rising at times to the level of half-hearted parliamentary initiatives.

One such initiative was made in 1920, when Sarma, a representative from Madras, moved a resolution in the Imperial Legislative Council to the effect that the headquarters of the Government of India should be permanently located in one place and that a suitable centre should be selected for the purpose.⁶¹ The resolution came up for discussion in the House in February 1920. A lengthy debate followed, in the course of which no less than 13 sites (e.g. Calcutta, Pachmarhi, Allahabad, Betul) were suggested. Shah Nawaz Bhutto of Sindh, member of the Council,⁶² suggested Karachi for the purpose.⁶³ In his opinion "from a geographical, climatic, industrial, and what is more from a strategical point of view the city of Karachi stands second to none should the Government of India decide to remain in one place."⁶⁴ The *Daily Gazette* on the request of "several readers" made out a strong case for "Karachi's claim to be selected for the honour."⁶⁵ In the course of a leading article, the paper observed:

"But if there is to be any such change which very many people will consider a desirable change—it may be taken

for granted that the claims of Karachi will be very strongly advocated, as the nearest port to Europe, and the future great airport in India on the empire route, to say nothing of the possibility of almost unlimited expansion and the availability of desirable sites for a new capital in immediate proximity to the City without interfering with present amenities.”⁶⁶

However, neither Karachi was converted into imperial capital nor the capital of India was changed to any other place. Sarma's resolution was put to vote and lost—other amendments to the resolution were either withdrawn or were defeated in the House.⁶⁷

Another initiative came in 1921, when I. S. Haji, a Sindhi gentleman who represented Bombay City on the Bombay Legislative Council, gave notice of a resolution under clause 15 (i) of the Government of India Act, 1919, which entitled the representatives of a sub-province to demand the constitution of a sub-province into an independent province. Haji sought appointment of a committee to take steps to separate Sindh from Bombay and to make it a Lieutenant Governor's province. This initiative, also, did not materialise.⁶⁸

Still another initiative which came up for discussion in September 1921 was a resolution moved by Harchandrai Vishindas in the Indian Legislative Assembly. The resolution, which was considered a “bombshell” by the *Daily Gazette*,⁶⁹ Karachi, sought abolition of Divisional Commissioners (including the Commissioner-in-Sindh) all over India. The motion did not materialise as it failed to muster enough support.

The masses of Sindh showed no interest in any of the parliamentary initiative.⁷⁰ They, however, remained very actively associated with the anti-colonial movement reflected through the *Satyagraha*, the *Khilafat*, the *Hijrat* and the Civil Disobedience movements.

The political situation at the time went through a rapid transformation.⁷¹ The period marked the beginning of a new phase in the development of the revolutionary advance all over India—from the economic strikes of 1918 to mass actions involving broad strata of the urban population and occasionally reaching the militant form of struggle i.e. armed uprising.

Alarmed by the revolutionary anti-colonial trend in Indian politics the British Government and the Indian political leaders connected with it took to cleaving the political movement of India on communal basis.

This divisive activity was a logical aftermath of the provisions of the Act of 1919, which by retaining the system of communal electorate strengthened the British policy of setting Muslims against Hindus. Making wide use of this system, the British officers started to fan hostilities between the two communities. This served to galvanise into action the religious communal parties, i.e. the Muslim League and the Hindu Mahasabha. The League which had played second fiddle to the Khilafat Committee and toed the Congress line, separated itself again. In opposition to the Muslim League, the Hindu Mahasabha (set up in early 1900s) raised its head as a counterpoise to the Muslim League.⁷² An important landmark in the spread of Hindu extremism was its session in 1925, at which vociferous appeals were made for the forcible conversion of Indian Muslims to Hinduism. The response of the Muslim religious leaders and communal organisations to this was fanatical anti-Hindu propaganda. It was in these conditions that the British, with the help of the communal organisations of these two religious groups were able in the period 1923-1927 to provoke a series of Hindu-Muslim clashes and mass killings.⁷³ The bureaucracy in many a case subtly engineered them and then gloated over the display of disunity. Besides,

most communal riots were in reality isolated instances of conflict of special interests fought in communal guise. Anyhow, the co-operation between the two religious groups which had been established during the *Khilafat* and Civil Disobedience movements had now been undermined. The Hindu *Shuddhi* and *Sangathan*, and Muslim *Tabligh* and *Tanzeem* campaigns well manifested the acute communal hysteria of the period.

This communal hysteria also affected the people of Sindh although to a lesser extent. Branch of Bharatya Hindu Shuddhi Sabha was opened at Karachi (March 1923). Nau (new) Muslim Conferences were held (1923-1927). A campaign of persuasion was launched to convert *Sanjogi* Shaikhs back to Hinduism (1923-1927). Targeted banditry were committed against Hindus in some areas who were in certain cases forced to recite *Kalima* as a sop to the bandits' religious frenzy (1923-1927).⁷⁴ Hindus and Mussalmans clashed at Ratodero, Laki, Hyderabad, Bagirji, Larkano and other parts of Sindh (1923-1927). Communal colouring of news items and publication of columns in the press satirically humiliating the other community was started (1923-1927).⁷⁵ Books, including novels and dramas, humiliating the other community and upholding the past 'heroes' of their community were brought out (1923-1927). First Sindh Hindu Conference (October 1925) and first Sindh Muslim Conference (May 1926) were organised. Communal *hartals* (literally—shutting shops) and agitations were observed in Larkano on the calls of the Hindu Panchayat Larkano (March-April 1927) and the Sindh Muhammadan Association (13th January, 1928).

The movement for the separation of Sindh, which had hitherto remained secular, nationalistic and local too was imbued with communalism and capitalised together with other Muslim majority areas in the political bargaining

between Muslim and Hindu communalists.

This tonal change, initiated by the All-India Muslim League through its resolutions passed at its annual sessions of 1925 and 1926, found its final expression in the "Delhi Muslim Proposals"⁷⁶ of March 20, 1927, when thirty Indian Muslim (in essence, communalist) leaders offered to accept joint electorates provided, *inter alia*, Sindh was "separated from the Bombay Presidency and constituted into a separate province."⁷⁷ These "proposals were communicated to the Congress, and the Congress Working Committee the very next-day passed a resolution appreciating the decision of the Muslim Conference to accept joint electorates and trusting that a satisfactory settlement would be arrived at on the basis of these proposals."⁷⁸

The reaction of Hindu extremist faction in Sindh⁷⁹ was sharp and quick. At the Sindh Hindu Provincial Conference known as Second Sindh Hindu Sammelan, opened at Sukkur on 1st May 1927, the proposal for the separation of Sindh was strongly opposed, as it was in their opinion "injurious to economic, political and educational interests of the province and especially of the Hindu community in Sind."⁸⁰

The opposition was also voiced by some prominent Sindhi leaders particularly to making it a Muslim proposal and using it as a commodity in the communal bargaining. Harchandrai Vishindas wanted the proposal to be considered on merits alone:

"The determining factor in the question of separation of Sind should be the welfare of the people of the province and not the fulfilment of communal aspirations or the satisfaction of narrow parochial or provincial sentiment. To divide a historic presidency merely to give a particular community a majority in a certain number of provinces is to accept a vicious principle which will lead to endless demands by other communities for its

extension and cause the country in the near future endless trouble. To reshape the map of India with a view to make a minority in one province hostages for the good behaviour of a majority in another province is to court war between communal provinces. The only sound principle for redistributing provincial areas is to attach more importance to the welfare of the people as a whole than to the demands of a particular community."⁸¹

Prof. H. L. Chablani was "not prepared to support any demand for redistribution of provinces with a view to increase the number of Provinces in which the particular community which demands separation shall be in the majority." He regarded it "very undesirable and even dangerous to divide India into Muslim India and Hindu India."⁸² (His foreboding had come true just within two decades only).

Khan Bahadur Shah Nawaz Bhutto opined that "by making it a 'Muslim proposal,' the [Indian] Muslim leaders who assembled at Delhi have merely helped to bring the militant Mahasabhas to the forefront to shed crocodile tears at the great 'loss' they are to suffer by the separation of Sind from Bombay."⁸³

It was regretted by some Muslim leaders of Sindh that if the separation of Sindh were not made an Indian Muslim communalists' condition in what were called the "Delhi proposals" the Hindus of Sindh would have themselves urged for separation as vehemently as they had done at the time of Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms. But communalist Hindus had now taken advantage of the Muslim communalists' offer and were propagating an idea that separation was to benefit the Mussalmans alone and were putting impossible conditions and were at the same time making the separation question more complicated than ever before.⁸⁴ In fact "the framers of 'the Delhi proposals' by asking for the separation of Sind and adopting it as a 'Muslim

[communalists'] proposal', clearly lost sight of the fact that the separation of Sind would do incalculable good to the Sind Hindus, who, considering their political, economic and official power in Sind, must remain masters of the situation and that the Sindhi Hindu was bound to agitate, in his own interests, for the separation."⁸⁵

The All-India Congress Committee, meeting in Bombay in May 1927, unanimously adopted the resolution⁸⁶ passed by the Congress Working Committee earlier with certain alterations. "The principal change suggested on behalf of the Hindu leaders present was that Sind should not be separated on communal grounds but on general grounds applicable to all provinces." A change in the wording of the resolution removed this objection and "it was passed unanimously."⁸⁷ The All-India Congress Committee thus endorsed the Indian Muslim communal proposals, including Sindh separation.

This resolution of the All India National Congress was confirmed by the Madras session of the Indian National Congress held in December 1927.⁸⁸ Thus, the question of the separation of Sindh despite strong reservations of Sindh, became in real sense an all-India communal question in 1927.

During the year 1927 a great deal of literature,⁸⁹ including articles in the daily and weekly press, was published on the subject of separation, crystalising the attitudes of various communities. The Muslim community favoured the separation, while the Hindus, the Christians and the Parsis were divided among themselves, some opposing the idea and some supporting it in line with their economic interests.⁹⁰

The disagreement over the issue on communal lines threatened to undermine the movement for autonomy. The nationalist minded leaders of Sindh decided to decommunalise the issue by bringing the separationists together in a broad-

based alliance, the Sindh National League.

While the Sindh National League set to work to create an inter-community pact for carrying forward the movement for separation, an All Parties Conference held at Delhi in March 1928 appointed a Committee under the chairmanship of Sir Purshotamdas Thakurdas⁹¹ to enquire into the economic viability of Sindh as a separate province.⁹² The question of separation was also considered by the Nehru Committee, headed by Motilal Nehru (1861-1931), which was formed by the All Parties Conference held at Bombay in May 1928.

The Sindh National League Pact was concluded in June 1928 and was mentioned later in the Nehru Committee Report as Sindh Hindu-Muslim Pact. The following leaders of Sindh affixed their signatures to the above pact: Santdas Mangharam, Jamshed N. R. Mehta, Narayandas Anandji Bechar, Maulvi Muhammad Sidik, K. Punniyah, A. Rehman Kazi, C. K. Thadhani, Mir A. Bakhsh, Parsram Tahliramani, Lokumal Pritamdas, Lalchand Jagtiani, Kewalram Motwani, Haji Abdullah Haroon, A. Qayum, Govindanand, Ghulam Hussain K., Shaikh Abdul Majid, Vishnu Sharma, V. Bukhari, Tikumdas Wadhmal, Din Muhammad, M. M. Kirpalani, R. K. Sidhva; N. T. Mansukhani, Tarachand J. Lalwani.⁹³

The pact emphasised *inter alia* that "the introduction of joint electorates and the separation of Sind from the Bombay Presidency should be effected simultaneously."⁹⁴ The province of Sindh, so constituted, should enjoy the full measure of provincial autonomy as was enjoyed by other major provinces of India. The official language of the province should be Sindhi. The Muslims and non-Muslims were pledged to vote for each other at every election. That is to say, a voter from either of the two communities would record his two votes for the Muslim candidate or candidates,

and would afterwards do likewise in respect of non-Muslim candidate or candidates. This process was calculated to eliminate communalism as far as it could be eliminated in public elections, and to ensure that the persons elected to the Sindh Legislative Council would be representatives of all communities. Each for all and all for each, in other words. On the question of representation, the Pact advocated that it should be on population basis only. Should the minority communities in the other provinces demand excessive representation, the non-Muslims of Sindh were to receive ten per cent extra representation. As regards the feasibility of separation of Sindh from the financial point of view, the Pact promised to "cut our coat according to our cloth." The Pact, it was believed, would "end once and for all communal friction if adhered to in the spirit and letter."⁹⁵

A section of Hindu communalists, however, rejected the pact. In a meeting of the Hindu citizens of Hyderabad held in June 1928 a resolution was passed against the separation rejecting the newly formed Hindu-Muslim Pact.⁹⁶ The president of the meeting, Dr. Choithuram P. Gidwani, declared that the real object of the Muslims of India in demanding the separation of Sindh was to have Hindu minorities in places like Sindh and elsewhere to be used as pawns in the political game.⁹⁷

This opposition by "a section of Hindu communalists" was condemned by the Sindh Muslim Political Conference in July, 1928, as "most unpatriotic, anti-national and detrimental to the best interests of the motherland."⁹⁸

The Nehru Committee Report, published in July 1928, dealt with the question of Sindh separation elaborately. The Committee had judged the Sindh case on the basis of "two general considerations in regard to the distribution of provinces—linguistic and the wishes of the majority"—and

had found her satisfying "both these tests." It was "a definite linguistic area and the great majority of its people" wanted separation.⁹⁹ All the Mussalmans, who formed "74 per cent of the population," supported it and also some "members of other communities in Sind—Hindus and Parsis"—supported separation.¹⁰⁰ Sindh happened "to contain a large majority of Muslims." Whether a new province was created or not Sindh must remain "a predominantly Muslim area." And if the wishes of this large majority were not acceded to, it would not only be violation of "the principle of self-determination, but would necessarily result in antagonising that majority population."¹⁰¹ To say "from the larger view point of nationalism that no 'communal' provinces should be created" was "in a way, equivalent to saying from the still wider international view point that there should be no separate nations." Both these statements had "a measure of truth in them." But "the staunchest internationalist" recognised that "without the fullest national autonomy" it was "extraordinarily difficult to create the international state." So also "without the fullest cultural autonomy, and communalism in its better aspect" was "culture, it would be difficult to create a harmonious nation."¹⁰²

The Committee's final recommendation was that "Sind should be separated from Bombay and constituted into a separate province after such enquiry about the financial position as may be considered necessary."¹⁰³

While the Nehru Committee Report was being considered by the All Parties Conference at Lucknow at the end of August, 1928, the Purshotamdas Committee published its report in the *Hindustan Times*, copies of which were distributed freely in the Conference Hall.¹⁰⁴ The report as published then was incomplete and did not contain the notes of dissent recorded by Shaikh Abdul Majid Sindhi, Jamshed Mehta and Haji Abdullah Haroon. The assenters to

the report had declared a separate Sindh province financially unviable, while the dissenters had declared it feasible, both basing their argument on widely divergent figures.¹⁰⁵

The All Parties Conference at Lucknow, in August 1928, accepted the Nehru Committee Report in principle and the Committee was reappointed with power to add to its numbers, to consider amendments proposed by the Conference.¹⁰⁶ One of the amendments related to the Sindh question. The original Nehru Report had recommended the separation of Sindh from Bombay after necessary financial enquiry. But the anti-Separationists from Sindh did not agree to this nor was the Sindh Hindu-Muslim Pact acceptable to them. It was after many hours of discussion and exchange of views amongst the Sindh delegates, in which Moulana Shaukat Ali and Chagla of Bombay took an active part, that a compromise resolution was moved and adopted in the Conference.¹⁰⁷

This resolution said: "Simultaneously with the establishment of Government in accordance with the Nehru Committee's report Sind shall be separated from Bombay and constituted into a separate province, provided —

- (1) after an enquiry it is found
 - (a) that Sind is financially self-supporting,
 - (b) in the event of its being found that it is not financially self-supporting, on the scheme of separation being laid before the people of Sind with its financial and administrative aspects, the majority of the inhabitants favour the scheme and express their readiness to bear the financial responsibility of the new arrangements;
- (2) that the form of Government in Sind shall be the same as in the other provinces under the constitution;
- (3) that the non-Muslim minority in Sind shall be given the same privileges in the matter of representation in the Provincial and

Central Legislatures as the Muslim minorities are given under the Nehru Committee's report in areas where they are in a minority."¹⁰⁸

The final report of the enlarged Nehru Committee included the above amendment. The amended report was submitted to All Parties Convention, chosen like All Parties Conference basis, at the end of the year at Calcutta (22nd-31st December 1928).

The Convention adopted the report as it was after rejecting the four amendments moved by M. A. Jinnah.¹⁰⁹ But the whole exercise proved to be of little practical value because the forces of dissension, which had been present in the background while the Committee was at work in autumn came to the forefront and destroyed the framework of communal agreement the Committee had so laboriously constructed.

In the meantime the all Englishmen Statutory Commission, better known as the Simon Commission, had come to India in February, 1928, charged with the task of drawing up a judgment upon India's fitness for a further instalment of reforms. The Commission was boycotted not only by the National Congress and the All-India Trade Union Congress but also by the Muslim League,¹¹⁰ the Hindu Mahasabha and the Liberals, few but the traditionally loyalist rank-opportunists co-operated with it. Sir John Simon and his colleagues met, instead of welcome, hostile demonstrators everywhere including Sindh;¹¹¹ the police *lathi* charged injuring even top leaders. In the *hartals* and massive demonstrations of that year organised working class took a very large part. In Sindh the loyalist protagonists and antagonists of the separation proposal, however, on the pretext to counter the machinations of the other side, sent deputations to wait on the Commission and plead their separate cases.¹¹² The deputation of the protagonists

represented Sindh Muhammadan Association and consisted of Khan Bahadur Muhammad Ayoob Khuhro, Khan Bahadur Wali Muhammad Hassanally, Mir Ayoob Khan and Abdur Rehman Bar-at-Law, while the deputation of antagonists represented the Sindh Hindu Association and consisted of Rai Bahadur Hiranand and Prof. H. L. Chablani.

Besides these groups, some of the Legislative Councils where the boycotting parties were in minority appointed their own Committees to assist and work alongside the Simon Commission. Reports prepared by these Committees were also taken in account by the Commission. The Bombay Provincial Committee, which was headed by Shah Nawaz Bhutto, echoing the Bombay Government's official stand opposed making Sindh a separate province on the grounds of administrative difficulties and also because it thought the time being too early for such a change,¹¹³ while two other such committees, the Punjab Committee¹¹⁴ and the Central Committee,¹¹⁵ favoured the change. All these opinions including that of the Bombay Government¹¹⁶ had been arrived at by majority decisions.¹¹⁷ Also all these opinions, including those of dissentients, had been arrived at by members of the colonial machinery or by loyalist lackeys, for anti-colonial nationalist organisations and leaders had boycotted the Simon Commission and the Committees which assisted and worked alongside it.¹¹⁸

The Simon Commission's Report, published in May 1930, claimed to have given "special attention" to the case of Sindh, for the

"Sindhis are both racially and geographically completely separated from rest of the Bombay Presidency, and the separatists of that area have pressed upon us the claim of Sind to become a self-contained province. We have great sympathy with the claim, but there are grave administrative objections to isolating Sind and depriving

it of the powerful backing of Bombay before the future of the Sukkur Barrage is assured and the major readjustments which it will entail have been effected. Even if it were held that the time is ripe for the separation of Sind to be seriously considered, there would have to be a close and detailed enquiry into the financial consequences which would follow from such a step before a decision could be taken."¹¹⁹

As is evident, the Commission's judgment on the Sindh question though sympathetic reflected in fact the minority view as embodied in the Bombay Committee and the Bombay Government's official position and ran counter to the views of great majority as embodied in the resolutions passed by all the major all-India political organisations¹²⁰ while the Commission was in India. It also ignored the views of not only the majority of people of Sindh but also of the majority opinion of the Punjab and the Central Committees which worked like the Bombay Committee alongside the Commission.¹²¹

The Report of the Simon Commission was strongly criticised in Sindh and it was emphatically asserted that the Commission had "not done justice to Sind in the matter of its separation from the Bombay Presidency."¹²² The report was publicly condemned by prominent leaders of Sindh like Haji Abdullah Haroon who declared in the Indian Legislative Assembly at Simla that the Report of the Simon Commission had shattered their hopes.¹²³ Some Sindhi leaders warned to "go even to the length of advising" Sindh public not to accept any constitution for India "unless and until the British Parliament conceded to" their "legitimate aspiration" of making their province "a separate and an independent one."¹²⁴

The period that the Simon Commission had been at work (1928-1930) witnessed the Indian national liberation

struggle spearheaded by the Congress reaching new levels; from protest demonstrations and mass rallies to strikes and non-payment of taxes, from non-co-operation movement to armed uprisings.¹²⁵ The colonialists were staking their hopes on a split in the national forces in view of religious and caste factors, on the consolidation of the influence of conservative, feudal social groupings.¹²⁶

Finding that it could not effectively contain the revolutionary upsurge with force, the colonialist Government changed its tactics and decided to ignore the recommendations of the Simon Commission and host a Round Table Conference for resolving the Indian political problems.

In the Round Table Conference which opened in London on November 12, 1930, the question of the constitution of Sindh into a separate province was raised in the Minority Committee and referred to the Business Committee which set up a sub-Committee,¹²⁷ better known as the sub-Committee No. IX (Sindh), which dealt with the problem elaborately. It was constituted as follows:

- Lord Russel (Chairman).
- Lord Zetland.
- Lord Reading (for whom Isaac Foot acted as substitute).
- H. H. the Aga Khan.
- M. A. Jinnah.
- Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto.
- Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah.
- Sir Abdul Qaiyum.
- Sir Muhammad Shafi.
- Dr. Shafa'at Ahmad Khan.
- Sardar Sampuran Singh.
- Dr. B. S. Moonje.
- M. R. Jayakar.

- Raja Narendra Nath.
- C. Y. Chintamani.
- B. V. Jadhav.
- Sir Phiroze Sethna.
- Sir Hubert Carr.

The sub-Committee came to the conclusion with two dissentients (Dr. Moonje and Raja Narendra Nath) that "the principle of separation should be accepted."¹²⁸ The sub-Committee concluded that (i) "the racial and linguistic differences" between the inhabitants of Sindh and those of the rest of the Bombay Presidency," (ii) "the geographical isolation of Sind from Bombay," (iii) "the difficulties of communication between the two," and (iv) "the insistency with which separation has been advocated, provide an impressive case for the division of Sind from the Bombay Presidency and the creation of a separate Provincial Government there."¹²⁹ The sub-Committee, however, noted that "no detailed examination of the financial consequences of separation" had yet been made. So, "on the figures available" to them they were "unable to express an opinion on the financial aspects of the question." They eventually recommended that "an expert Committee in India should examine carefully the probable revenue and expenditure of a separated Sind and the security of the debt on the Sukkur Barrage and should also recommend an equitable adjustment of the financial commitments for which Sind may properly be considered liable."¹³⁰ They went on to say that, if the investigations showed that separation would leave the new province with a deficit, "the representatives of Sind should be asked to show satisfactorily how the deficit would be met" before the new province was set up.¹³¹

This resolution of the sub-Committee was accepted by the general body of the Round Table Conference and it formed a part of the Premier's declaration made at the

conclusion of the First Round Table Conference. The British Prime Minister, J. R. MacDonald, made policy statement in the House of Commons in January 1931 announcing Government's acceptance of the Round Table Conference recommendation that independent province of Sindh should be created if the Expert Committee on Finance found it feasible.¹³²

In Sindh, decision was received with general satisfaction except by the anti-separationists to whom it came as a rude shock. They raised furor over it. They organised protest meetings throughout Sindh where the decision was condemned as *ex parte*.¹³³

The Expert Financial Enquiry Committee envisaged by the Round Table Conference decision was appointed in July 1931 with Miles-Irving as its Chairman and D. G. Harris as its member. The former was a senior and experienced officer of the Punjab Government and the latter a Consulting Engineer to the Government of India. The Committee began its enquiry on 13th July, 1931, and concluded it on 23rd September, the same year. Its report, which was unanimous, was released in November, 1931. The Committee's estimate of the total basic revenue of Sindh was Rs. 182.42 lacs and the total basic expenditure Rs. 279.82 lacs. The basic deficit was thus Rs. 97.40 lacs; adding the cost of separation (Rs. 11.05 lacs, of which Rs. 0.79 lacs represented contribution to Bombay for the use of various institutions) to the basic deficit the total deficit on the date of separation would amount to Rs. 108.45 lacs. Of this sum, Rs. 98.19 lacs represented the expenditure of which the Presidency proper would be relieved on separation and Rs. 10.26 lacs new expenditure.¹³⁴

On 1st December 1931 at the close of the second session of the Round Table Conference the Prime Minister, J. R.

MacDonald, stated that the British Government while accepting the principle of separation intended "to ask the Government of India to arrange for a conference with the representatives of Sind for the purpose of trying to overcome the difficulties disclosed" by the report of Financial Enquiry Committee.¹³⁵

On 16th March 1932, the Government of India announced setting up of the Sindh Conference to sit at Karachi in April, 1932. A. F. L. Brayne, Finance Secretary to the Government of India, was to preside over the Conference on behalf of the Government of India.¹³⁶ The members of the Conference were:

- Mian Ali Bakhsh Muhammad Hussain, Member of the Council of State.
- Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, M. L. C.
- Lalchand Navalrai, M. L. A.
- Seth Haji Abdullah Haroon, M. L. A.
- Mir Bandeh Ali Khan, M. L. C.
- Khan Bahadur Muhammad Ayoob Khuhro, M. L. C.
- Khan Bahadur Allah Bakhsh Muhammad Umar, M. L. C.
- Prof. H. R. K. Batheja.
- Prof. H. L. Chablani.
- Hoshing N. E. Dinshaw.
- Diwan Bahadur Murlidhar Jeramdas Punjabi.
- E. L. Price.
- Kazi Abdur Rehman.
- H. Dow.

It was a Conference between the Government of India and the representatives of Sindh, majority of whom were pro-separation. The Conference opened at Karachi on 25th April 1932 and remained in session up to 17th of the following month.

At the very outset the estimates relied upon by the

Financial Enquiry Committee were challenged, the pro-separation group estimating a much lower deficit and the anti-separation men much higher. When the Conference Chairman wrote its report (June 1932), he while making a reference to the conflicting figures of the two groups gave his own estimates as follows:¹³⁷

- i) The deficit of Sindh on 1st April 1933 would be approximately Rs. 80.5 lacs including the cost of separation as compared with Financial Enquiry Committee Report Rs. 108.45 lacs.
- ii) This deficit through increased revenue from the Sukkur Barrage (inaugurated on 13 January 1932) would begin to decrease from 1939-40 until in 1944-45 when the deficit would be covered by available Barrage surplus.

Though Brayne did not recommend any specific solution of the financial difficulties, he hinted at one when he remarked that "at the outset and for some years to come" the new province of "Sind would require assistance to the full extent" of its deficit till it become self-sufficient.¹³⁸ He also seconded the proposal of the pro-separation group who wanted subvention to the new province for meeting its deficit till it become self-sufficient.¹³⁸

While the Sindh Conference was getting ready to begin its deliberations, the Sindh Muslims formed a new body, the Sindh Azad Conference, to further the cause of Sindh's autonomy. At its first session held on 18th April 1932 at Karachi, the Conference sought to reassure the Sindh Hindus that their rights would be safeguarded.¹³⁹ Exactly two months later, the 1st Sindh Azad Day (19th June 1932) was observed at Karachi, when over 3,000 people marched in procession and heard pro-separation speeches of their leaders.¹⁴⁰ The year saw two other observances of the Day, one on 16th September¹⁴¹ and the other on 2nd December 1932, when meetings were held all over Sindh to press for separation.

The third Day was observed at the call of the Second Sindh Azad Conference held at Hyderabad in the third week of November, 1932.¹⁴² Muslims of every class and interest—Pirs, Syeds, Zamindars, *Haris*, Jagirdars, Moulvis, workers, pension-holders—were represented at the gathering.¹⁴³

Besides appointing a permanent Working Committee and District Committees to carry on the struggle for autonomy,¹⁴⁴ the Conference passed a resolution urging the Government to announce immediate constitution of Sindh as an autonomous province by making suitable readjustments of its financial liabilities.¹⁴⁵

The Conference demanded unconditional separation and ignored the "Sind Separation Agreement" which had been hammered out at Allahabad on the instance of Unity Conference leaders earlier in the month. The Agreement which was endorsed by the Unity Conference had been signed by many leaders from Sindh including Shaikh Abdul Majid Sindhi and Prof. H. L. Chabiani.

The Agreement had conceded the principle of making Sindh an autonomous province subject to certain provisos, more important of which were:¹⁴⁶

- i) Sindh shall enjoy the same measure of autonomy as in other major provinces of British India with similar safeguards to minorities.
- ii) The Sindh Ministry would have at least one Hindu Minister.
- iii) There shall be equality of franchise qualifications for both Hindus and Muslims in the rural as well as urban constituencies.
- iv) There shall be joint electorates with reservation of 37 per cent of the total seats for Hindus.
- v) The recruitment to public services shall be made on quota basis, 60 per cent on merit and 40 per cent to redress communal inequalities.

The non-ratification of the Agreement by the Sindh Muslims, evoked a similar response from the Sindh Hindus. In an anti-Separation Conference held also at Hyderabad in the last week of November 1932, they declared that though the Hindus of Sindh had been and were "totally against the very principle of Separation of Sind from Bombay" they would "agree to the formula arrived at Allahabad between Hindu and Muslim representatives for the sake of peace and unity of whole of India," provided the Muslims did the same.¹⁴⁷

Meanwhile, the Communal Award announced in London in August, 1932, made confusion worse confounded so far as Sindh was concerned, adding to the unrest. The relevant clause allotted fixed number of seats for the two main communities and other interests in Bombay Legislative Council including Sindh and also excluding Sindh, in case Sindh was separated from Bombay. In the latter case, Sindh was to have its own local legislature of sixty members as under:¹⁴⁸

- General 19 (including 1 woman)
- Muhammadan 34 (including 1 woman),
- European 2,
- Commerce, Industry, etc. 2,
- Land holders, Special 2,
- Labour, Special 1.

Ever as the Sindhis were locked in verbal combat over the autonomy issue, the Round Table Conference assembled on 17th November, 1932, for its third and last session and finally broke up on Christmas Eve (24th December 1932).

Sir Samuel Hoare, the then Secretary of State for India (1931-1935), on the occasion of winding up the Round Table Conference declared:

"For the last two years we have discussed the question of certain new provinces. We have discussed the question of Sind from the very opening of our deliberations two years ago. Last year we discussed in detail for the first time the question of Orissa. Since those discussions we have had expert enquiries into both questions.

"Basing our views upon the reports of those enquiries, basing our views still more on what appears to be very general agreement both in India and in Great Britain, we have come definitely to the conclusion that Sindh and Orissa should both be separate Provinces."¹⁴⁹

It was now British Parliament's turn to take its part in the enquiry. In March 1933 the decisions taken by the Government in the light of the Round Table Conference were published in a White Paper, and in April a Joint Select Committee of both Houses of Parliament was appointed, with Lord Linlithgow (who later on was posted as the governor general and viceroy of India from 1936 to 1943) as Chairman, "to consider the future government of India" with special reference to the White Paper proposals.¹⁵⁰ This Committee invited representatives from both the groups to present their view points. The Separationists nominated Khan Bahadur Muhammad Ayoob Khuhro while the anti-Separationists sent Prof. H. L. Chablani and Diwan Bahadur Hiranand.¹⁵¹

With the publication of the White Paper, the attitude of the anti-Separationists in Sindh underwent a subtle but gradual shift in emphasis from March 1933 to March 1936. Realising that the Government decision to make Sindh a separate province was now irreversible, they began to seek adequate safeguards for the Hindu minority and reconciliation with the Muslim majority. The shift was discernible in the utterances/meetings of their leaders and organisations like Prof. H. L. Chablani (May 1933),¹⁵² Rai

Bahadur Diwan Pribhdas (October 1933),¹⁵³ Hotchand Chandumal (October 1933),¹⁵⁴ Mukhi Gobindram Pritamdas (October 1933),¹⁵⁵ the Sindh Hindu Conference (April 1934),¹⁵⁶ Dr. Choithram (July 1934),¹⁵⁷ the Sindh Nationalists' Association (January 1935),¹⁵⁸ the Sindh Hindu Panchayat (June 1935),¹⁵⁹ Dr. G. T. Hingorani (January 1936),¹⁶⁰ and the Sindh Hindu Conference (March 1936).¹⁶¹

While the Parliamentary Joint Select Committee was in session (April 1933-November 1934) in London the Indian Government appointed a Committee on Sindh, the Administrative Committee, to go into the administrative problems of the separated Sindh. The Committee comprised:¹⁶²

- H. Dow, C. I. E., I. C. S. (Chairman).
- R. B. MacLachlan.
- G. Kaula.
- Haji Abdullah Haroon, M. L. A.
- Khan Bahadur M. A. Khuhro. M. L. C.
- Rai Bahadur Hiranand Khemsingh.
- E. L. Price, C. I. E., C. B. E.
- H. T. Lambrick, I. C. S. (Secretary).

The terms of reference of the Committee were to consider and make recommendations as regards:¹⁶³

- “(1) The accommodation required at Karachi for a Government House, Council Chamber, Secretariat and the Residences of Senior Officials.
- “(2) The administrative arrangements that will be necessary to secure effective supervision and co-ordination on the work of the Sukkur Barrage Project.
- “(3) Whether, and if so, what affiliation will be made with the existing High Court, University, medical, scientific, veterinary, forest, engineering, agricultural or other institutions in the Bombay Presidency.
- “(4) Whether a self-contained cadre will be maintained for the

services in all the departments, and more particularly for the all India services.

"(5) Any other matter that may be referred to the Committee by the Government of India."

Later the Committee was asked to consider the question of providing an office for the new Sindh Audit and Accounts Office.¹⁶⁴

The Committee was appointed on 17th October, 1933, and held its first meeting at Karachi on 20th November, 1933. Its report was released in April 1934. In conclusion the Committee appended a note which stated:

"From the survey we have made . . . it will be realised that a vast amount of difficult administrative and organizing work has to be done before a separate Sind can work as an efficient unit of the federation. . . . if the separation of Sind is brought into operation only simultaneously with the introduction of the new reforms, the responsible Government of Sind will be placed at a great disadvantage as compared with the Governments of those provinces which are already separately organised administrative units. . . .

"For these reasons, we suggest that an interval between a decision to separate Sind and setting up of the new responsible Sind Government should be utilised as far as possible in bringing into working order the necessary administrative arrangements. This implies the setting up separate administration in Sind, not subordinate to Bombay, . . ."¹⁶⁵

In November, 1934, the Parliamentary Joint Select Committee finally submitted its report to the British Parliament wherein separation of Sindh was approved. On the subject of Sindh the Committee stated:

"On the constitution of Sind as a separate Governor's Province, we quote the following passage from the

Statutory Commission's Report: 'We have great sympathy with the claim, but there are grave administrative objections to isolating Sind and depriving it of the powerful backing of Bombay before the future of the Sukkur Barrage is assured and the major readjustments which it will entail have been effected. Even if it were held that the time is ripe for the separation of Sind to be seriously considered there would have to be a close and detailed enquiry into the financial consequences which would follow from such a step before a decision could be taken.' When this opinion was recorded the Barrage was still under construction; but it is now completed and successfully in operation, . . . The financial difficulties involved in the creation of an autonomous Sind have been examined first by an expert committee and later by a conference of representatives of Sind . . . and the findings of both Committees have been received by the Government of India and by His Majesty's Government. We are informed that it is now anticipated that the new Province would start with an initial yearly deficit of about 3/4 crore, which should be gradually extinguished in about 15 years, and that after that period the Province should be able to dispense with assistance. . . .

"The difficulty of administering from Bombay a territory racially and geographically separated from the rest of the Presidency has proved capable of being overcome under present arrangements but the case for separation, which is strong under any form of administration, is greatly strengthened if the administration of Bombay is transferred to an Executive responsible to the Legislature. The question is, however, one which has aroused acute communal controversy. The case for separation has been pressed not merely by the Sindi [sic] Muhammadans but also by Muhammadan leaders elsewhere in India. Separation has been as strongly opposed by the Hindu minority in Sind, . . . It is impossible not to sympathise with the desire of the Hindu community in Sind to remain under the rule of

the richer Bombay Government, . . . Nevertheless, it seems to us that, apart from other considerations, the communal difficulties that would arise from attempting to administer Sind from Bombay would be no less great than those which may face a separate Sind administration. It is proposed that the Hindus shall be allotted a considerable proportion of the seats in the legislature, and they will of course enjoy the protection of the special safeguards for minorities which will apply to the minorities in other provinces; . . . The alternative of a union between Sind and the Punjab has long been discussed, and there are very strong arguments in favour of it, especially in view of the joint interest of the two territories in the waters of the Indus. Unfortunately, this alternative now seems to be opposed by practically all sections of opinion concerned. On a review of all the factors in the problem, we have reached the conclusion that the constitution of Sind as a separate Governor's Province is the best solution possible in present circumstances. In view of the very special importance to the Province of the continued success of the Barrage project and of the very large financial issues involved, which will concern the Federal Government as well as the Province of Sind, it is proposed that the Governor of Sind should have a special responsibility for the administration of the Barrage. This seems to us an essential provision and is one to which we understand that little or no objection has been taken."¹⁶⁶

In December, 1934, a bill, on the lines of the Parliamentary Joint Select Committee's Report, was introduced in the British Parliament. The bill received the Royal assent on 4th August, 1935. It was provided by sub-section (1) of section 289 of the Government of India Act, 1935, that as from such date as Crown may by Order in Council appoint Sindh shall be separated from the Bombay Presidency and shall form a Governor's province to be known as the province of Sindh. And by sub-section (2) of the said section Crown was empowered by an Order in

Council to make other provisions in connection with the establishment of the province of Sindh.

The draft of this order entitled "The Government of India (Constitution of Sind) Order 1936" was laid before the British Parliament in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 309 of the Government of India Act, 1935. The order which received the Royal assent on the 3rd March, 1936, declared that Sindh shall as from the 1st April, 1936, cease to form part of the Presidency of Bombay and shall form the province of Sindh.¹⁶⁷

The Crown, by Royal warrant dated the 12th March, 1936, appointed Sir Lancelot Graham (b. 1880) of Indian Civil Service as the Governor of the province of Sindh (1936-1941).¹⁶⁸ Graham assumed the charge of the Governor of Sindh on 1st April, 1936.

The Governor of Sindh, under the provisions of the Order in Council, appointed in April, 1936, the Sindh Advisory Council for the transition period. The advisory Council consisted of 25 Members, two being officials, six new members (non-officials) and 17 Sindh Members (out of 19) of the Bombay Legislative Council.¹⁶⁹ Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto was appointed as the provisional Premier of Sindh for the transitional period of one year, up to April, 1937.

Meanwhile, for the year 1936-37, the Government of India announced a subvention to Sindh of Rs. 108 lacs (which included non-recurrent grants of four lacs for initial equipment and election cost and two lacs unallocated).¹⁷⁰ In addition, the Government of India undertook to provide seventeen and a half lacs for buildings in Karachi from their anticipated surplus for 1935-36.¹⁷¹

On 3rd July, 1936, a part of the Government of India Act, 1935, came into force when the electoral provisions

began to operate. The rest of the Act, except part II which dealt with the all-India Federation, came into force on 1st April, 1937, the date which marked the beginning of a new era in Indian history—introduction of provincial autonomy in its 11 provinces, including Sindh.

Sindh, thus, regained in 1937 what it had lost in 1847, its status as a separate province.

The more the fruits of knowledge become accessible to men, the more widespread is the decline of religious belief.

From *The Future of an Illusion* (1927).

Sigmund Freud (1856-1939)
Austrian neurologist, the founder of psychoanalysis

We are not interested in the possibilities of defeat; they do not exist.

Comment during 'Black Week' in the Boer War (1899).

Alexandrina Victoria (1819-1901)
Queen of the U.K. and (from 1876) Empress of British India

He speaks to Me as if I were a public meeting.

Said of Gladstone. Quoted in G.W.E. Russell, *Collections and Recollections* (1898).

Alexandrina Victoria (1819-1901)
Queen of the U.K. and (from 1876) Empress of British India

I am not a martyr. I have suffered, but there are many more in my country who have suffered more than me.

From an interview in *The Times Magazine* (2 March 1996).

Aung San Suu Kyi (1945-)
Burmese political leader

One is not born a woman [slave country]: one becomes a woman [servile].

From *Le Deuxieme Sexe*, chap. 1 (1949).

Simone de Beauvoir (1908-1986)
French socialist, feminist and writer

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSTION

How great a civilisation is to die in Sindh.

SKC

Looking in-depth at the history of the movement for Sindh's autonomy one is struck with its submissive, timid and humble character. It seldom, if at all, rose above the level of wordy duels. It was a typical case of *nishistund wa guftund wa barkhastund* (sat, talked and dispersed).

At no stage in its long duration, it became even seemingly militant or agitative. Not a single one of its protagonists was ever jailed or offered himself for arrest. Nor were any demonstrations held or strikes observed in its cause.

The only discordant note was when at the Second Sindh Azad Conference in November, 1932, that young editor of *Sindh Zamindar*, Sukkur, Pir Ali Muhammad Rashdi, sought with singular lack of earnestness to move a resolution urging non-co-operation to force the Government to make Sindh a separate province.¹ The attempt was a sop for the revolutionary zeal of the *Haris* attending the Conference. It proved abortive as it was meant to.

It is strange but significant that the movement should have retained its suppliant character in the face of anti-colonial militant tradition of the Hur, the *Satyagraha*, the *Khilafat*, the *Hijrat*, the Non-Co-operation, the Civil Disobedience and other agitative and revolutionary movements of the time, a tradition in which Nationalist Sindh had enthusiastically participated.

To understand this anomaly one has only to trace the history of what is euphemistically called the movement.

Until 1912 the autonomy proposal was mooted by the British business community of Karachi and bureaucrats through their mouthpieces, the Karachi press. They wanted a separate province because they believed the continued association of Sindh with the Bombay Presidency to be against their interests.

In 1912, a few persons representing the emergent Sindhi middle class joined the debate through letters and articles in the press.

The proposal became a subject of public meetings in 1917-18 when the Sindh Provincial Conference, an inter-community organisation representing local business and feudal interests, took it up.

In the twenties when the Indian national liberation struggle was growing increasingly militant and aggressive, the colonial authorities used this issue as one of the counterpoises. Fanning communal hostilities was a game at which the British officers were quite adept. They had played this game before and played it again in the twenties when massive Hindu-Muslim collaboration in the liberation struggle had made the collapse of British colonial structure look imminent. That was when the Sindh question was put on the bargaining counter of communal settlement. That the men in control of the autonomy movement would allow it to be used as such was no accident. These men represented the special interests that owed their very existence to colonial rule. To expect them to confront their colonial rulers and talk to them on equal footing was unthinkable. They could only make humble submissions and offer supplications. It is only a mass movement that dares look alien rulers in the eye. And autonomy movement was not a mass movement. Nor

was it meant to be. In fact since mid-1920s, Sindh (including its separation struggle) was deliberately and designedly made a perpetual pawn in the all-India game of communal politics — its future, sooner or later, was to be tied with the so-devised 'Muslim' India, by hook or by crook, which was supposed to "provide the bulwark of a buffer state against invasions of India [South Asia] either of ideas or of arms from any quarter," especially from the communist Russia, for the Punjabis and Pathans of the devised 'Muslim India' were, rightly or wrongly, believed to "prove the best defenders of India against a foreign invasion, be that invasion the one of ideas or of bayonets." (This imperialist venture also was endorsed by such type of submissive, timid and suppliant wordy duel again 'euphemistically called the movement'.)

Devoid as it was of popular base, the autonomy struggle would not, indeed could not, have achieved the success it did, had not the British strategy willed it so. What the *Daily Gazette* said in July 1934 is a succinct commentary on the case:

*"Separation does not depend on that [merits]; whether separation is good or ill for Sind it will come [and it actually came] if high political predispositions are in its favour, deficit or no deficit. A majority of the inhabitants of Sind is presumed to be in favour of separation . . . but that is a mere accident; the desires of Sindhis in this matter have only a minor bearing on it."*² (Emphasis added.)

Indeed, the struggle owed its inspiration as well as success to the long-term colonial objective of keeping their economic rule in the event of the end of their political rule in India. So they planned to cleave the sub-continent along communal lines in the name of autonomy and operate behind the autonomy façade. As events proved later, they achieved what they had planned for.

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX I

SINDH FINANCES (1843-1847)

The tone of the picture of economy is determined by the hands wielding the brush.

SKC

One of the most fierce controversies during the Governorship of Sir Charles Napier (1843-1847), and for long afterwards, was the concern with question of Sindh finances. Was Sindh a deficit province during Napier's regime? Or was it not?

The President of the Board of Control of the East India Company thought it was.¹ The Indian correspondent of *The Times*, London, suggested in the 4th January issue of his journal that the 5% loan raised by the Indian Government was partly to meet the burden imposed by Sindh.² The papers laid down before the British Parliament in 1846 showed Sindh's drain of Indian exchequer to the tune of one million sterling annually.³

But the man on the spot thought otherwise: "I shall make a full statement on this head in another paper, because the papers laid before Parliament and ordered to be printed by the House of Commons, 30th of April 1846, I do not think correct."⁴ Napier's balance sheet for the period between 24th March 1843 to 30th April 1846 showed a surplus of £322, 869.⁵ He did not take into account the military expenditure when drawing up the balance sheet. He argued that the whole of the military⁶ expenditure could not in fairness be exclusively charged to Sindh. The cost of protecting the former western frontier of British India should be deducted.⁷

He repeatedly remarked:

"The large force in Scinde has not been for *Scinde* but for the *Punjaub*. I have for two years constantly said that 5,000 men are sufficient, and more than sufficient, for the defence and for the maintenance of tranquility in Scinde. This has been contradicted by an ignorant and factious party at Bombay; but I can prove this force is more than sufficient."⁸ (Emphasis original.)

Napier also pointed out that he had already raised the revenue of Bombay very largely by stopping the smuggling of opium through Sindh and had reason to say that conquest was most profitable for the company and for England.⁹ Lord Ellenborough, the Governor General of India (1842-1844), had allowed forty two lac rupees (£420, 000) per annum, being the increase on opium passes, to be credited to Sindh.¹⁰ A Sindh official estimated more than that:

"There is in addition to the forty-two lacs [rupees] (£420,000) increase on passes, allowed per annum by Lord Ellenborough to be credited to Scinde, the sum of 41,347,150 rupees, being 275 rupees increase per chest on the 150,426 chests of the Company's own opium sold within that period. This in English money will be in round numbers, *four millions one hundred and thirty-four thousand pounds sterling!*"¹¹ [Emphasis original.]

It appears, the tone of the picture of Sindh economy was determined by the hands wielding the brush. Detractors of Napier painted it in much too gloomy colours. They not only degraded the economic potential of the country but charged certain unwarranted expenses to Sindh, while Napier was over-zealous to draw a favourable balance sheet. Some of the factors which greatly affected the Sindh economy in the days of Napier were:

1. The cash pensions provided to former rulers which amounted to about three and 3/4 lac rupees annually; and they were also allowed to retain lands in jargirs which were valued at little over

one and 1/2 lac.¹²

2. Over 19 lac bighas (about 4 lac hectares) of land were regranted in jagir to Baluch chieftains and others.¹³
3. The increase in the cost of civil administration due to the establishment of canal department.
4. The ex-rulers had neglected the development works, particularly canal clearance work.
5. The elements, which remained unfavorable. Locusts destroyed the crops of one season and the river floods those of another.¹⁴ In fact 1846 was the only year since the conquest of Sindh in which agriculture had not been distressed by wars, locusts, pestilence and/or anomalous inundations.
6. Realisation of land revenue in kind, which was anomalous. When the yield was good, the government's share, though high in kind, was low in cash for the prices of grain would fall due to increase in supply. Even when the prices of grain rose due to shortfall in supply, the government's share, being low in kind, would also be low in cash. It was a vicious circle.
7. Lack of transportation facilities, due to which Sindh Government not only could not sell its grain in the markets where the price would be high, also it could not lift the grain to safer places in time.¹⁵

There is no art which one government sooner learns of another than that of draining money from the pockets of the people.

From *Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, bk 5, chap. 2

Adam Smith (1723-1790)
Scottish economist and philosopher

Frankly speaking it is difficult to trust the Chinese. Once bitten by a snake, you feel suspicious even when see a piece of rope.

Quoted in *The Observer Colour Magazine*, 5 April 1981.

Dalai Lama, originally Tenzin Gyatso (1935-)
Spiritual and temporal head of Tibet

There is one safeguard, which is an advantage and security for all, but especially to democracies against despots. What is it? Distrust.

From *Philippics II*, sec. 34.
His greatest speech(es) against Philip.

Demosthenes (384-322 BC)
Athenian orator and statesman
who opposed the Macedonians

APPENDIX II

SINDH AND PUNJAB OFFICERS' DIFFERENCES OVER BALUCHISTAN 1867-1877

So you are lean and mean and resourceful, and you continue to walk on the edge of the precipice because over the years you have become fascinated by how close you can walk without losing your balance.

Quoted in the *Washington Post*, 9 August, 1979.

Richard Milhous Nixon (1913-1994)
37th president of the USA

The first contact between Baluchistan, which was then ruled by a loose confederacy of chiefs, and the British took place in 1839 when the Kalat was stormed by the latter and Mehrab Khan, Chief of Kalat, was killed by the British troops. In the following year the Baluchistanis overpowered and Kalat changed hands, but at the close of the same year it was reoccupied by the British under General Nott, and in 1841 Nasir Khan II (1840-1857), the youthful son of the slain Mehrab Khan, was recognised by the British who soon after evacuated the country. The Bombay Government was entrusted to deal with the matters relating to Baluchistan and Sindh, and after the latter's conquest in 1843 its Governor, Sir Charles Napier, was empowered to deal with the affairs relating to Baluchistan and the trans-Indus tribes along the border. When Sindh was annexed to the Bombay Presidency in 1847 the latter dealt with the matters through the Sindh authorities. But these affairs, which were then placed under the Commissioner-in-Sindh, who looked after the foreign policy relating to Baluchistan and trans-Indus

tribes. The Sindh Commissioner in this respect was authorised to communicate direct with the Government of India in the Foreign Department. However, in order to achieve cohesion and unity of administration in the policy pursued towards the trans-Indus Baluch tribes along the Sindh and Dera Ghazi Khan District, their affairs were placed under the immediate control of Captain Sandeman,¹ a Punjab officer holding the post of Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khan, who for this purpose was directed to consider himself subordinate to the Commissioner-in-Sindh, Colonel Merewether.²

Soon serious differences of opinion arose between Merewether and Sandeman; the latter was backed by the Foreign Secretary in Calcutta³ and the end was that the Baluchistan Agency, formed in December 1876, was placed exclusively under the political rule of Sandeman who was formally appointed on 21st February 1877 as the Agent to the Governor General of India with his headquarters at Quetta; and Merewether, in order to get him out of the way, was appointed to the Indian Council.

In order to make it clear how Sandeman managed to defeat Merewether an extract from a leading article published in the *Sind Gazette* in July 1895 is reproduced to show how the events were studied in those days:

"... From 1854⁴ the policy in Khelat affairs followed by the Sind and Bombay Government and acquiesced in by the Government of India had been one of non-intervention, 'to regard the Khan as supreme ruler and acknowledge no other authority, to recognise the chiefs in no other capacity than as his subjects, and to abstain from all interference otherwise than by friendly counsel and advice.' The question that Sir Robert Sandeman raised was whether this policy was to be maintained. There was considerable diversity of opinion upon the point. Colonel Phayre [latter Sir Robert Phayre, b. 1820],

the Political Superintendent of the Upper Sind Frontier [1868-1872] and Sandeman, took the view that the Khan was not an autocratic sovereign but the head of a confederacy of Chiefs, of whom he strove to render himself independent, the Khan without the countenance of the British Government would be quickly deposed, the chiefs were too powerful to be ignored, and that disturbances dangerous to the peace of the border and probably to British interests also would arise unless decided action was taken. The Commissioner-in-Sind on the other hand argued that the Khan though nominally the head of a confederacy was really a sovereign with whom the treaty of 1854 was made and we had no right to interfere between him and his subjects. Our policy, Sir William Merewether thought, should be to strengthen and not to weaken the Khan's hands, and we should abstain from listening to his rebellious subjects. Captain Sandeman, as he was then, expressed his conviction that it would be possible by friendly enquiry and intervention to settle the disputes between the Khan and his Sirdars and so preserve the peace of the border.

"Lord Mayo, to whom these conflicting representations were referred to as Viceroy [January 12, 1869-February 8, 1872] by the Governments of Bombay and the Punjab, directed the Lieut.-Governor of the Punjab, Sir Henry Durand [June 1, 1870-January 1, 1871; ex-Foreign Secretary to the Government of India 1861-1865 and Military Member of the Governor General's Supreme Council 1865-1870], to have a conference with Sir W. Merewether in the presence of Colonel Phayre and Captain Sandeman in view to the 'submission of such proposals in regard to frontier tribes, and the status of the Khan of Khelat and the members of the Baluch Confederacy as will enable the Supreme Government to reconcile existing differences of opinion and decide on a strictly uniform line of policy for the Sind and Punjab frontier'. The conference was arranged, but was attended by Mr. H. Davies as Lieut.-Governor of the Punjab [January 1871-April 1877], after Sir H. Durand's death by

an accident at Tonk. The conference made a series of recommendations which by a Resolution of the Government of India were sanctioned, and the policy of the Bombay Government under which the Khan of Khelat was regarded as supreme ruler and the rights of the confederate Chiefs were unrecognised was 'generally approved,' and a fresh trial was to be given to the policy of non-intervention. But Sandeman's measure for the employment for the protection of trade routes of tribal horsemen was recognised and approved. No sooner was the Resolution passed than intelligence came of serious disturbances at Quetta, the Khan's northern fortress, and at Mastung, the head-quarters of the Sarawan Chiefs. The rising spread rapidly; Kachi was in rebellion; Dadur the Khan's outpost at the mouth of the Bolan was taken after three days' resistance and the Khan's representative was burnt alive. Bagh and Gundavar were occupied by the rebel tribesmen, Lus Beyla fell into the hands of Ali Khan Jamot; the western province of Kej-Makran threw off its allegiance, caravans were plundered, and by the end of 1871 nearly the whole of the Khan's domains were in the hands of the revolted Sirdars. In this crisis it was suggested to the Commissioner-in-Sind that he might usefully avail himself of Captain Sandeman's experience, and the latter was directed by the Foreign Office to proceed to Jacobabad for consultation. But the Commissioner-in-Sind declined to avail himself of Captain Sandeman's services. Then on the 11th January, 1872, the Government of India addressed the Government of Bombay a despatch making a new departure in the Imperial policy. In this despatch it is noted that the insurrection would not probably have extended so widely unless based on some genuine grievances and supported by popular sympathy, and doubts were expressed of the soundness of a policy which refused to receive overtures from the insurgent Chiefs except on their unconditional surrender. Military assistance was refused, but pecuniary assistance was promised on condition that the Khan accepted the mediation of the Commissioner-in-Sind and that he

would consent to give the principal Chiefs a due share in the Government of the country and an interest in the maintenance of order. The Khan accepted the mediation and the rebel Brahui Chiefs suspended hostilities and attended at Jacobabad on March 6th, to submit their complaints to the arbitrament of the Commissioner-in-Sind. Shortly afterwards Lord Mayo was assassinated, and was succeeded by Lord Northbrook [May 1872-April 1876] before whom the award of the Commissioner-in-Sind was laid. The new Viceroy recorded an emphatic approval of Sir W. Merewether's proceedings and Captain Sandeman was reminded of his subordination to the Commissioner in matters relating to the frontier tribes. Notwithstanding the Viceroy's approval Sir William Merewether's mediation proved signally unsuccessful. On the 14th June, 1874 [1872], the Khan of Khelat dismissed his Wazir, who had represented him at the arbitration, appointed councillors distasteful to the Commissioner-in-Sind, and objected to carry out the provisions of the treaty, matters were patched up for a time and in November 1872, the Khan was permitted to pay his respects to Lord Northbrook at Sukkur. His demeanour though respectful was far from satisfactory. In April, 1873, the Khan had become so impracticable that the British Political Agent was withdrawn. In February, 1874, by which date affairs in Baluchistan had drifted into anarchy, a party of 200 Brahuīs crossed the Sind border and forcibly carried off some slaves who had sought refuge in British territory. In these circumstances the Commissioner-in-Sind proposed to send a Military expedition to depose the Khan and place on the throne a more amenable successor, and to reduce the Marris to order by establishing a blockade against the tribe along the Sind and Punjab borders. The Government of India declined to sanction an expedition and demurred to the blockade. Then Captain Sandeman suggested that an effort might be made at an amicable settlement by sending a mission of Sind and Punjab officers with friendly Baluch Chiefs to enquire into and to settle tribal disputes and grievances.

This suggestion was supported by the Punjab Government and favourably regarded by the Government of India, but was strongly objected to by the Commissioner-in-Sind. After much correspondence and wrangling the Viceroy adopted Captain Sandeman's proposals and a mission was despatched under him in November 1875, to Khelat. The Khan and Chiefs received him with friendliness, and everything was progressing favourably when an express from the Commissioner-in-Sind reached him, prohibiting him from proceeding beyond the Marri hills or taking action in regard to the Brahuis. These instructions clashed with those previously received from the Foreign Office, and were necessarily disregarded. Captain Sandeman reached Quetta on the 24th December, and was received with all honour by the Khan's agent. On the same day he received another express from Jacobabad directing him to return to Dera Ghazi Khan. An interchange of letters and telegrams then took place between the Government of India and the Commissioner-in-Sind, when the former decided that Captain Sandeman had acted in conformity with the orders he had received and must be supported, and that as the Commissioner-in-Sindh had evinced irreconcilable difference of opinion with the Government of India in regard to Khelat affairs, it was necessary to relieve him of all further responsibility in connection with them, which was transferred to Colonel Munro, the Commissioner of the Derajat Division of the Punjab."⁵

In May 1879, by the treaty of Gandamak, Peshin and Sibi were handed over to the Government of India by Yakub Khan, the then Amir of Afghanistan, as "assigned tracts," which meant that any surplus revenue over expenditure had to be handed over to the Amir of Afghanistan. Although the treaty was abrogated in the same year after the revolt at Kabul and the murder of Sir Louis Cavagnari, the British envoy in Kabul, these areas were retained by the British, but were not declared British territory until 1887, when the Agent to the Governor General, Sandeman, was appointed

Chief Commissioner for them. Baluchistan, as henceforth administered, could be divided into British Baluchistan, consisted of the tracts assigned by the treaty of Gandamak; agency territories, which had been acquired by lease or otherwise brought under the control of the Government of India; and native states of Kalat and Las Belo.

The matter was, however, not so simple, as described above, to be decided on the basis of the arguments proffered either by Colonel Merewether, a head of a sub-province, Sindh, formerly a sovereign state, or by Captain Sandeman, a Deputy Commissioner of a district, one out of 33 districts of a semi-province, the Punjab, or it was simply a routine type of difference of opinion between the Government of Sindh, fully supported by the Government of the Bombay Presidency, on one side, and a Deputy Commissioner of a district, fully endorsed by the Commissioner of the Derajat Division and the Lieutenant Governor of a semi-province, the Punjab, a much lower position in comparison to a Governor of a Presidency, for there were only three fully-fledged political units (Provinces or Presidencies) in whole of India. In fact, the matter was relevant to a very crucial geopolitical issue affecting the very survival of the British imperialist rule in India and the security, safety and continuance of the British Indian Empire itself.

Therefore, it was quite necessary to be decided on the basis of not only the local interests and issues but also of the broader and very vital geopolitical interests of the British imperialism at stake at the time. Captain Sandeman and the Punjab government were fully aware of the same because of their close association with, access to and personal acquaintance with the Foreign Affairs Department's related officials who were actively involved in resolving such vital issues of frontier policy, synchronising with geopolitical imperialist interests.

The Shal Valley, about seventy miles north of Kalat, at the head of the Bolan Pass, is exactly on the line of ethnic division of the Baluch and the Pathan. In the centre of it is the town of Quetta, which lies in the Central Brahui range, for centuries a strategic location on the trade route between Kandhar (Afghanistan) and Shikarpur (Sindh), its location controls both the Bolan Pass and the Khojak Pass; occupied by the British during the First Afghan War of 1838-1842; acquired by the British in 1876 through treaty with Khan of Kalat and developed into a strong fortress. All the country to the north and north-east of Quetta is a part of the Pathan belt and inhabited by Pathan tribes of which the Tarins, Achakzais, Kakars, and Panris (all of them of Turco-Persian White Hun ethnic origin) are the most important. To the southward and westward of Quetta all the people are Brahui and Baluch. On a veritable evaluation it is the Pathan tribes of Baluchistan who matter in geopolitics of the times. But even these are few in number, comparatively less than half a million individuals in all by mid-twentieth century (i.e., 1950), whereas about six million in the then N.-W.F. Province. Of them only Achakzais are in any way indomitable. Although a close border policy was adopted by the British officials on the Brahui and Baluch border by both the Bombay government, responsible for the Sindh marches to Afghanistan, and by the Punjab government, responsible for Dera Ghazi Khan district, there was a large gathering of intelligence and knowledge of hinterland piled over from the days of the first Anglo-Afghan War (1838-1842). The British officers had advanced with Shah Shuja's contingent and its backing of British and East India Company's troops up the Bolan and past Quetta on their way to Kandhar and Kabul.

In Northbrook's last year (1876), when Benjamin Disraeli as the Prime Minister of England had come to

power (1874-1880), but just before the arrival of Lord Lytton as the Viceroy of India, the Indian Government were pondering over the rival viewpoints of the Bombay and the Punjab governments with regard to the overall control of this part of the border. Robert Sandeman, with much intimate experience on the Dera Ghazi Khan border, was proffering strongly proposal for an agreement with the Khan of Kalat which, while guaranteeing the overall ascendancy of Khan of Kalat, should provide for the stationing of a British garrison on the Shal plateau at Quetta. The suggestion was the subject of bitter controversy between the two provinces, the Punjab backing Sandeman, and the Bombay outrightly discarding the whole venture as arduous and whimsical. The Bombay government was inclined to deem the whole project simply an ill-conceived notion for securing of more friendly and congenial conditions on the Sindh border. In fact, Sindh or Sindh border had neither any importance at all or any significance, or even any relevance whatsoever in this very vital geopolitical matter concerning long-run security and safety of the north-western border of the British Indian Empire endangered by the swiftly advancing Tsarist Russian Empire which had reached near the northern borders of the so-considered 'Buffer State' of Afghanistan. But Captain Sandeman and, also, the British Government of India, which fully supported Sandeman's viewpoint, approached the subject from a much larger perspective; they were thinking in terms of the defence of British India as a whole against apprehended advance of the Tsarist Russia, and were anxious, of course, with the help of the Khan of Kalat, to occupy an outpost against Russian expansionist ambitions, and not wait to be attacked upon for reaching the Indus River either through Kabul and Peshawar or via Kandhar and Quetta, in case of eventual fall of Afghanistan, a very precarious and weak country, especially from its northern border, the only and perilous 'Buffer State' between the

Russian Empire and the all-important British Indian Empire. It was the period of very swift Tsarist expansion all along the southern frontier of Russia. War with Turkey was in the offing—it started in 1877 and ended by the Treaty of San Stefano, concluded in March 1878. As a result Trans-Caucasia was being hammered into submission, Khiva, Bukhara and Farghana had been subdued. Unless the rulers of British India mounted on their north-western breastwork, it appeared most likely that Kabul and Kandhar would go the way of Bukhara and Samarkand.

Parleys with Kalat occupied 1876 and 1877, and Captain Sandeman had his way. Under settlements made by him with Khan of Kalat, Quetta and its vicinity, along with the Bolan Pass leading to it, were leased to the British Government on a perpetual quit-rent, to remain under nominal control of Khan of Kalat but to be administered by the British authorities in accordance with local custom. A British Indian force was stationed at Quetta and Sandeman assumed the position of first British Resident at Quetta. There can be no doubt that, however nominal had been Kabul's authority over Kalat and the Quetta route since the days of Ahmad Shah Durrani, Amir Sher Ali (r. 1863-1865, 1869-1878), son and successor of Amir Dost Muhammad (r. 1826-1839, 1843-1863), immensely grudged and dreaded the push forward of British India's border to Shal, and that this initiative more than the Sistan award (between Afghan and Persian claims in Sistan, which Sher Ali considered as unjust, and was considered a main cause of his discontentment against and estrangement from the British government) impelled his decision to play with the Russians and was thereafter a chief cause of the second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1880), with the result that Sher Ali fled to northern Afghanistan, seeking Russian support.

Meanwhile, Sir Louis Cavagnari, the then Deputy

Commissioner at Peshawar, had been appointed political officer to lead a mission to Afghanistan, under General Sir Neville Chamberlain, and was sent forward to try out the way. But Amir Sher Ali blatantly refused entry to above mentioned British mission which sought to proceed through the Khyber Pass, then in Afghan occupation.

The occupation of Quetta and the Bolan, along with great tracts of Baluchistan, preceded the outbreak of the second Anglo-Afghan War. But Robert Sandeman was still encircled by territory which, nominally at least, acknowledged Afghan sway. With the success of the two-pronged advance by the Khyber and Kurram, and the abdication of Amir Sher Ali, who three months later, died in February 1879, there was concluded with his son, Amir Yaqoob Khan, in 1879, the Treaty of Gandamak, ceding not only the Khyber and Kurram but Pishin, Sibi and Loralai (Bori Valley), the Pathan territories, north and east of Quetta, needed to round off the new province of Baluchistan. This cession had the effect of carrying the frontier across the Khojak range to Chaman within a short distance of Kandhar, and during the next ten years broad-gauge railway line was carried to the frontier at Chaman by tunnel through the hills. Thus, it was in Baluchistan that the new 'Forward Policy' was brought to life.

But there was still no lateral communication on the forward line between the older trans-Indus territories of the North-West Frontier of British India, ultimately formed a separate North-West Frontier Province in 1901, and the new province of Baluchistan, constituted in 1876. Before Sandeman left he had, in the 1880s, pushed forward from Pishin into the long and desolate Zhob Valley, where a headquarters was built at a place called Apozai, now known as Fort Sandeman. The Zhob River is a tributary of the Gomul River, it had long been a cherished dream to open the Gomul Pass, much used by tribal caravans on their seasonal

migrations, so furnishing an upland corridor which would connect also with Baluchistan, and supplement and complement the rear line of communication through Multan. A number of serious efforts were made to carry out this project but all went in vain for the tribes of Waziristan were (are) not the tribes of Quetta; they were (are) much too hard a nut to crack. It remained blocked up to the ultimate departure of the British from the South Asia in mid-August 1947. (Thus, it was eventually inherited by the succeeding state as an unfinished agenda to be completed as desired by the British imperialism as and when feasible.)

The Sandeman system, especially in Baluchistan, was founded on the occupation of central points in Kalat and tribal territory in sizeable force, linking them together by fair-weather roads, and allowing the tribes to handle their own tribal affairs according to their own customs and working through their chiefs and chieftains (*maliks*). The *maliks* were required to enroll levies paid by government but regarded as tribal servants. Except in the cantonments where troops were stationed and there was an influx of shopkeepers and others from India, there were no courts and no police. In later jargon the system would have been described as one of indirect rule. Custom was administered by the British Political Agents through *jirgas*, using the device of the Frontier Crimes Regulation (1872), which permits settlement by customary procedures of quarrels arising out of the blood-feud, disputes about women, and questions on the whole affecting Pathan honour. Under it the magistrates were empowered to withdraw such cases from the common courts of law and forward them for administration by a *jirga*. In such cases the *jirga* did not mean all the *maliks* and elders of a whole tribe, acting in conclave as a deliberative body, but a group of elders appointed by the magistrate—and agreeable to both parties to a dispute—who were required to

give a finding as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, in a criminal case, or on the points at issue in a civil dispute. In other words the jirga was a sort of tribal jury. It was not bound by the British law of evidence, and was expected to visit the place of the crime or dispute, and by its own methods and enquiries to state the facts and the solution. On conviction for murder the court could not sentence to death, fourteen years' imprisonment being the maximum punishment—this leniency might require a conspicuous deviation from custom and usage, but British authorities were not ready to take the onus of imposition of a capital punishment on a trial outside the sphere of British regular law.

The Frontier Crimes Regulation system, of course, entailed the elevation of the supremacy of chiefs and maliks, if needed by force, if and when their superiority should be questioned. Without penetration, concentration of force and support of the tribal chiefs and maliks the Sandeman system is absolutely rubbish. The essential requirements of the State are in this way adapted and adjusted to the ordinary people (masses) over which it rules. But this was not done in 1849 when the North-West Frontier region was overpowered as a result of the annexation of the Punjab. At the time, rather a system of regular law was enforced. To propose that a system introduced in 1880 in a virgin territory such as Baluchistan could have been put into operation in the already settled districts of the North-West Frontier region after thirty years' working of regular administration system was to ask the impossible, at any rate of a foreign government. This was true even of the mode of administering the law, to get rid of courts, police, all the paraphernalia of regular administration would have been totally out of the question. Yet the distinction between the two parts of Pashtun territories on the North-West Frontier was the root

cause of great number of problems. The advocates for Sandeman system were of the opinion that an effort should have been made to make use of the principles applied in Baluchistan to the tribes of the North-West Frontier beyond the then border, whose tribalism was not breaking up under the influence of the British administration. In fact, that was exactly done in such areas as Kurram and Malakand. Malakand – where it could not be done, it was not done for there existed quite different conditions.⁶

In the light of above discussion, the official status and the relationship of Baluchistan *visa-a-vis* Sindh and the Punjab was not to be decided on the basis of short- and long-term interests of Sindh and Baluchistan but wholly and solely on the basis of imperialist interests of the British Indian Empire. And the apprehended danger of rapid advance and expansion of Tsarist Russia towards its south-east to reach the hot waters of Arabian Sea naturally gave birth to a chain of 'defensive' reactions with regard to the North-West Frontier of the British Indian Empire, for instance, the commencement of the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1880), formation of a number of Political Agencies (1876-1896) alongside the North-West Frontier, in a sense, creation of an additional Buffer Zone of Pashtun territory parallel with the north-eastern border of Afghanistan, establishment of Baluchistan province (in 1876) with a sizeable Pashtun territory to work as another Pashtun Buffer Zone alongside the south-eastern border of Afghanistan, and, later on, formation of a separate North-West Frontier Province (in 1901) which was, in fact, a definite precursor of what would indispensably happen, as it actually happened, in the aftermath of the Second World War (1939-1945), birth of Worldwide Cold War (started w.e.f. 1945), division of world into two hostile ideological blocs of capitalism and communism, permanent departure of British army from

South Asia as a result of the eventual end of the British Indian Empire, the rapidly advancing ideology of communism and the swiftly spreading sphere of influence of the Soviet Union (old Russian Empire), and ever-increasing apprehension that Communist Russia wants to reach hot waters of Arabian Sea as early as possible, which, most probably, would leave the British authorities with no choice whatsoever but to help establish a faithfully dependable Buffer State alongside, and, in addition to, Afghanistan, at any cost and anyhow, before withdrawing permanently their physical presence from Indian Subcontinent, so as to effectively thwart such an imminent danger looming large in the minds of British imperialist strategists and American neo-imperialist geopolitical experts, which would eventually be constrained to form some anti-communist and anti-Soviet Union security pacts, of course, with inevitable membership of the so-designed all-important, above referred to nouveau arrived Buffer State anyhow in the best interests of the so-called free world (i.e. capitalist countries).

Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardships, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty [our honourable existence in the comity of nations].

From his Inaugural Address,
20 January 1961.

John F(itzgerald) Kennedy (1917-1963)
35th president of the USA

If you still have to ask, shame on you.

Said when asked what Jazz
[Buffer State] is?
quoted in Max Jones *et al*,
Salute to Satchmo (1970).

Louis (Daniel) Armstrong (1901-1971)
Popularly known as Satchmo or Pops
US Jazz trumpeter and singer

APPENDIX III

PROPOSALS TO UNITE CUTCH, SIRAIKI REGION AND BALUCHISTAN WITH SINDH

One can make this generalisation about men: they are ungrateful, fickle, liars, and deceivers; they shun danger and are greedy for profit; while you treat them well they are yours. They would shed their blood for you, risk their property, their lives, their children, so long as danger is remote, but when you are [seriously] in danger they turn against you.

From *The Prince*,
chap. 17 (1513)

Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527)
Italian politician and political philosopher

The British officers intimately connected with the colonial rule in Sindh at times felt the need of uniting with Sindh some of its contiguous ethnic and linguistic areas. For instance, the geographical and strategical unity of Cutch and Sindh proper compelled the conqueror and first British Governor of Sindh, General Sir Charles Napier, not to agree to part with the administrative control of Cutch; he ultimately preferred to resign than to consent to such "unsound" proposal.

In 1876, Major-General Sir William Lockyer Merewether, the then Commissioner-in-Sindh, suggested almost on the same grounds to transfer to Sindh the lower portion of Dera Ghazi Khan district as far north as Hurrund so that "the machinery of administration of this part of the British Frontier should once more work smoothly and satisfactorily."¹

The inclusion of Siraiki speaking purlieu in Sindh was time and again suggested since then. Even the Punjab paper, the *Civil and Military Gazette*, "taking everything in consideration," suggested as early as 1890 to extend Sindh's

territory up to Dera Ismail Khan, north of which British political relations were almost entirely with races of Pathan or the Afghan Government and south of which they were with Baluch and the Khan of Kalat. "It would be natural," observed the paper, "to leave the management of the Pathan and Afghan frontier in the hands of the Punjab Government which rules over a population containing a large Pathan element, and to give the control of the Baluch frontier to a Chief Commissioner, who should also have the Government of Sind with its large Baluch element."²

Some British officials and also a section of European controlled Indian press suggested that Baluchistan be placed under the exclusive control of Sindh by making Sindh a separate province. Major-General Merewether had this idea in mind and he had actually ventured to materialise it, but was outwitted by the Punjab authorities, who finally succeeded in depriving Sindh of the control of Baluchistan in 1876.

The union of Sindh and Baluchistan was suggested time and again since Merewether's time. It was supported, albeit half-heartedly, by the *Sindh Gazette* (1889),³ the *Civil and Military Gazette* (1890),⁴ and the *Alhak* (1912).⁵ It had sympathies of Colonel C. E. Yate (1909)⁶ whose connections with two provinces dated from 1868 and who had enjoyed the experience of the post of Agent to the Governor General in British Baluchistan (1890-1892 and 1900-1904), Sir Evan James (1909)⁷ who had held the post of the Commissioner-in-Sindh (1891-1900), A. H. Somake (1912)⁸ Dipchand T. Ojha (1912),⁹ Prof. S. C. Shahani (1912),¹⁰ Colonel A. C. Yate (1913),¹¹ the Sindh Muhammadan Association (1917)¹², Khan Bahadur Wali Muhammad Hassanally (1920)¹³ and Khan Bahadur Muhammad Ayoob Khuhro (1930).¹⁴

In 1930, H. H. Manghirmalani made a comprehensive proposal suggesting the inclusion in the proposed

autonomous province of Sindh its all contiguous ethnic and linguistic areas (a) the area up to and including Multan, (b) the area north of Jacobabad right up to and including Sibi and also (c) autonomous Sindh should embrace the two Indian states of Bahawalpur to the north and Cutch in the south.¹⁵

These proposals, however, couldn't materialise, as they were either imperialist oriented or subjective and no public opinion was mobilised in Sindh proper or in its detached areas.

I see all the birds are flown.

His comment (4 Jan. 1642).

Charles I (1600-1649)

King of Great Britain

The age of chivalry is gone.- That of sophisters, economists, and calculators, has succeeded; and the glory of Europe [Sindh] is extinguished for ever.

From *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790)

Edward Burke (1729-1797)

Irish statesman and philosopher

In England, even the poorest people believe that they have rights; that is very different from what satisfies the poor in other lands. [The latter also desire and deserve the same.]

From *The Philosophy of Right* (1821).

George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel

German Philosopher (1770-1831)

Our argument is about no ordinary matter, but about the way we ought to live our lives.

From *Republic*, bk 1.

Plato (c. 428-c.348BC)

Greek Philosopher

How could God do this to me [Punjab] after all I have done for him [Him]?

His reaction to hearing the news of the French defeat at Blenheim, August 1704.

Louis XIV (1638-1715)

King of France from 1643

APPENDIX IV

SIND MUST FIND ITS DESTINY OUTSIDE THE FEDERATION OF INDIA : SEPARATE DOMINION IN DIRECT RELATIONS WITH BRITISH¹ FROM A MUSLIM CORRESPONDENT²

And as for you, archers, soldiers, gentlemen, and all others who are besieging Orleans [Sindh], depart in God's name to your own country . . . I assure you that wherever I find your people in France [my motherland] I shall fight them, and pursue them, and expel them from here, whether they will or not.

| | |
|--|--|
| From a letter, dated 22 March 1429, to the English at Poitiers (3rd most important town in France after Paris and Lyon). | Joan of Arc known as the maid of Orleans (c. 1412-1431) French patriot and martyr. She forced the English to raise the siege retire in June 1429, thus turned the tide of French defeat. |
|--|--|

The Sind Separation Conference is scheduled to meet in Holmstead Hall, Hyderabad, Sind, on 15th and 16th November 1932, under the Presidentship of Moulvi Sir Muhammad Yakoob, M. L. A.³ The primary purpose of the Conference, as its name implies, will be to plan ways and means of separating Sind from Bombay and its constitution into an autonomous province, enjoying an equal measure of autonomy with the rest of the Federal units.

The talk of Separation of Sind from Bombay and its raising to the status of a Governor's Province or separation of Sind from Bombay and its amalgamation either with the Punjab or the British Baluchistan is a waste of energy.

The Miles-Irving committee have shown beyond any shadow of doubt that Bombay pays approximately a crore of rupees more to Sind than it receives therefrom. Mr. A. F. L.

Brayne, I. C. S., Chairman, Sind Conference, has shown that what with additional taxation and what with retrenchment, Sind will still be a deficit province to the tune of Rs. 80 lakhs.

Even if Sind were to appropriate new sources of revenue allocated to the provinces by the Federal Finance Committee, it is impossible that the additional taxation so derived will cover the deficit disclosed by Mr. A. F. L. Brayne.

NO PROMISING COMBINATION

Not even the best protagonists of Sind's connection with Bombay would deny that Sind has been treated step-motherly by Bombay, but it is not probable that Sind would be treated better by the Punjab, and more so when there is agitation in Sind over the 'Punjabisation' of services in Sind, especially in the Police and Railway departments.

There is no likelihood of the betterment of the financial position of Sind if Sind and British Baluchistan are united to form a single province.

The fact therefore stands prominent that *Sind, as an integral part of the Federation of India with heads of revenue demarcated as 'federal' and 'provincial', stands no chance of being a solvent and self-supporting province.* [Emphasis original.]

DOOMED FUTURE WITH BOMBAY

Sind is poles apart from Bombay ethnologically, linguistically, and culturally. Incidence and tenure of landholding in Sind are quite different to that prevalent in the rest of the Presidency. Now that it has been proved to Bombay that it spends about a crore of rupees more upon Sind than it realises from Sind in the shape of revenue, the future of Sind is doomed, for the treatment of Sind henceforth at the hands of Bombay is bound to be worse than before when it was altogether unsatisfactory. It is because of these reasons that the principle of Sind Separation

has been endorsed by foes and friends alike and if the principle of Sind separation is a sound and righteous one, *Sind must find its destiny outside the Federation of India.* [Emphasis original.]

HINDUS HAVE NO CAUSE FOR COMPLAINT

If one of the adult male members of a joint family feels that he can realise his life fully by separating from the joint family, it will be absurd to coerce him to remain in the family. If it is in the best interests of India that the Government of India should be wholly and solely responsible to the people of India through an elected Legislature, the Hindus say they can well dispense with the British connection if it stands in the way of realisation of the principle. The Hindus should therefore welcome the idea of forming Sind into an independent autonomous dominion, directly connected with England and associated with India as an ally, if it is a condition prerequisite to the solvency and self-sufficiency of Sind which are essential for the fullest realisation of the life of Sindhis.

A separate Dominion of Sind will enjoy a total revenue of about Rs. 10 crores, Rs. 2 crores being the present revenue from Sind through provincial heads of revenue and Rs. 8 crores revenue from Sind through central heads of revenue. There will be no additional military expenditure, Indian provinces interlying between the land frontiers of Persia, Afghanistan and Sind. Manora is a naval strategic point and is a gateway to India and he who commands Manora commands the North and the North-West of India and it will be in the interests of the federal government to reimburse Sind for its expenditure on naval protection.

NO NEED FOR MILITARY

There are no turbulent tribes on the frontier of Sind for the pacification of which Sind stands in need of Air Force. It

should be assumed that military expenditure should be nil in view of the talks of disarmament and of outlawing war as means of settling disputes between peoples and peoples.

The development of the port of Karachi which has hitherto been neglected will cheapen the cost of transport of goods from Karachi to the interior of India and there is no reason to believe that Punjab and Baluchistan, being predominantly Moslem provinces, will not trade through Karachi, or the merchants in Sind, being mostly Hindus, the rest of India will stop trading through Karachi. Or if need be, by lowering customs duties far in excess of those in vogue in other parts of Federal India, Sind will maintain its present volume of trade without any substantial diminution in the Customs revenue. A Government of Sind, with a revenue of about Rs. 10 crores which is greater than the revenue of either Siam [Thailand], or Afghanistan, or Persia, can well stand surety for its debts, barrage as well as non-barrage.

KARACHI AN INTERNATIONAL PORT

If for the sake of argument it is assumed that the port of Karachi is internationalised, Sind getting a fair proportion of Customs revenue, there is no ground to justify that Sind will be a deficit Dominion.

I would therefore humbly beseech Muslim leaders who would assemble at Hyderabad, Sind, to cease talking of separating Sind from Bombay and constituting it an autonomous unit in the Federation of India, but to press for the formation of Sind into a Dominion, separate and distinct from the federation of India and to that end, appoint a committee of experts to confer with the representatives of H. M.'s Government, the Government of India, and the Government of Bombay round a table on this question and settle it equitably to all parties concerned.

APPENDIX V

CONTEMPORARY ARGUMENTS FOR SEPARATION OF SINDH FROM BOMBAY

I am not interested in picking up crumbs of compassion thrown from the table of someone who considers himself to be my master. I want the full menu of rights.

On NBC News,
9 Jan. 1985.

Desmond Mpilo Tutu(1931-)
South African Nobel Prize Winner

1. Sindh is quite distinct from the Bombay Presidency historically. Through all the ages of recorded history up to the British Raj, Sindh had been a separate sovereign State under a ruler of its own. Even in the times, it was forced to owe allegiance to a foreign authority, it enjoyed full internal autonomy with its own seat of government. After the advent of the British in 1843 too Sindh continued to remain an autonomous province under a Governor. It was only after its first Governor resigned from his office in 1847 that Sindh lost its separate entity and was attached to the Bombay Presidency.
2. Sindh is racially, geographically and linguistically a separate entity (recognised as early as 1868 vide Act V of that year). The customs, usages, feelings, aspirations, manners, culture, habits, dress and mode of life of Sindh are different from those of the Bombay Presidency altogether. The natives of Sindh were of an ethnological stock totally alien to that of the Presidency. The principal languages of Bombay were Gujarati and Mahrathi. None of these is understood in Sindh,

whereas Sindhi is unknown in Bombay. Climatically too Sindh is a contrast to the Bombay Presidency; Bombay being one of the wettest regions of India and Sindh one of the driest. Each province have its own separate systems of land revenue, land tenure and agrarian economy. Both have a different system of irrigation. Their economic interests were widely different. Sindh has admittedly no economic relationship with Bombay. They lack even a railway and road link between the two provinces.

3. Geographically, Sindh is cut off from the Presidency by the states of Cutch and Rajputana. It is over 800 miles away by land and 500 miles away by sea.
4. The people of Sindh transact their business, carry on correspondence in Sindhi language. It was/is the Court language and the entire Government business was/is transacted in it. In Civil and Criminal Courts the record of judicial enquiries was/is also maintained in Sindhi and the depositions too were/are taken in Sindhi. All kinds of decrees, orders, *parwanas*, and processes were/are issued in Sindhi language. There was/is quite a large number of Sindhi newspapers which maintained a high standard of journalism and were /are reputed for their excellent literary qualities. In Sindh education too was/is imparted in the Sindhi language, and there was/is a separate Sindhi Text Books Committee of the Bombay University. Type foundries were/are manufacturing Sindhi Type for printing purposes, and the best Sindhi Type was/is produced in England and Germany and its consumption was/is also very large. It had the necessary facilities of Sindhi Type Writer and Sindhi Shorthand widely available all over Sindh. Sindhi was/is an important language; it was/is universally spoken in the length and breadth of the

province and importance that this language enjoyed/ enjoys calls for immediate separation of the province in which it is spoken. By separation of Sindh, the Sindhi language would have received a fresh impetus rather than die a slow death which looked imminent in its continued union with Bombay.

5. The demand for separation of Sindh is based on the principle of self-determination. Sindhis are determined to break the cordon and to rise to their birth right, the self-determination which the League of Nations (now the U.N.) have decreed that nationalities shall have to work out their own salvation.
6. There are small provinces in existence namely Baluchistan, Ajmer-Merwara, Coorg, the North-West Frontier Province, Delhi and the like which, though less in area and population than Sindh, are exercising sufficiently strong influence on the Central Government. The Sukkur Barrage Works alone would irrigate as much area as the irrigated area of Egypt, without taking into consideration the cultivation in the south of Sindh. Sindh, therefore, would definitely be able to maintain the required administrative strength.
7. The union with Bombay is based neither on ethnological, cultural, linguistic, nor on any other plausible ground. A mere accident that it was the army of Bombay that conquered Sindh was responsible for this unnatural arrangement.
8. For all practical purposes Sindh is separate, except in this, that they sent their representatives to the Bombay Legislature (w.e.f. the Act of 1861, Mir Allahdad Talpur, being the first one, nominated in that year). Sindh is also completely independent so far as judicial administration was concerned. The Judicial

Commissioner's Court is the highest tribunal, the appeal from there lies to the Privy Council direct. Sindh, thus, was already separate (since 1868) and all that is required is an official recognition of that separation by Government.

9. Sindh has had as much training in the art of self-governing as Bombay or any other province, and therefore it requires full provincial autonomy with the same powers and privileges which the other provinces enjoy. Sindh is quite capable of running a separate autonomous government. It has had its share in the reforms as a part of Bombay since their very introduction.
10. Sindh's experience of connection with Bombay has shown that the whole of the machinery of every day governance in Sindh is controlled by the remote secretariat residing at Poona, which is ignorant of the distinctive conditions of Sindh. The interests of Sindh are in all matters subordinated to those of the Presidency, and do not receive the considerations which its characteristics and physical features demand.
11. The Bombay Government has neglected Sindh's economic and social development and has hindered the growth of Karachi port, which needs amplitude of facile communications with its hinterland. Everyone except Bombay Government could see that Karachi ought to have direct railway connection with Delhi, the Southern Punjab and Rajputana (Rajasthan).
12. The Bombay Government has hindered the spread of education in a province which, in pre-British days, was so advanced in education that one town of Thatto alone had got 400 educational institutions. Sindh ought to have had a University of its own long time ago, but she has not got a single Engineering, Agriculture, Medical,

Law or even Arts College maintained by Government. The attitude of the Bombay Government towards primary as well as secondary education too has been unencouraging.

13. The development of irrigation in Sindh is also neglected. Except for one canal—the Jamrao (where the Punjabi ex-army men had been settled as a check to patriotic Hur activities in the area)—they have made absolutely no improvement. The Sukkur Barrage was inevitable. The Government saw that if they delayed the scheme the Punjab would draw all the water from the Indus and Sindh would be barren. But, the Sukkur Barrage lands cannot develop easily and rapidly unless they are placed under the control of a Government which is within easy reach. The Bombay Government is reluctant to enact a Land Alienation Act in Sindh on the lines of Land Alienation Act elsewhere (including the Punjab which got it as early as 1900 A.D.), safeguarding the proprietary interests of the local agriculturists.
14. Health and medicine in Sindh are also in deplorable condition. Except at District Headquarters there is no Government dispensary in Sindh. Sindh receives very meagre help from the Bombay Government. Owing to this negligibly small help from the Government, the death rate is very high. Malaria, cholera, and other epidemics have been taking a heavy toll annually from Sindh.
15. Need of additional and improved railway (and road) communications between Karachi and Bikaner, Rajputana, U. P. and construction of trunk roads in Sindh out of Provincial Revenue are neglected. In the matter of communications the Bombay Government have given Sindh not more than 30 miles of *pucca* roads.

16. Sindh's union with Bombay has affected Sindh prejudicially in respect of matters under the control of the Government of India, like the development of railways in Sindh and the development of the port of Karachi.
17. The separation of Sindh from Bombay would relieve the province of numerous hardships under which it has been labouring. In the matter of higher appointments such as High Court Judgeships, membership of the Executive Council, Sindh does not get proper share. The police tyranny, official oppression, bribery and corruption have reached the limit in Sindh.
18. Separate province of Sindh would have bright career prospects for bureaucrats. In I. C. S. cadre they would rise to highest post of Commissioner and they could even become, if they join the Judicial Department, Judges of the Chief Court or of the Judicial Commissioner's Court. In the Engineering Department they could rise to be Chief Engineers. In the Police, they could become D. I. Gs.
19. Placing of Sindh under the despotic rule of the Commissioner which has made every officer very autocratic, however small his position is. Owing to its remoteness from the capital of the Presidency, public opinion in Sindh does not and cannot obtain the same ready hearing as other parts of the Presidency. The only remedy lies in the separation of Sindh.
20. There is tripartite authority in Sindh—some powers are vested in Commissioner-in-Sindh, some powers are domain of the Bombay Legislative Council and Ministers and certain powers are prerogative of the Governor of Bombay and his Executive Councillors. This tripartite division of authority means that there is no authority in

Sindh answerable for any desperate situation.

21. Since annexation of Sindh, the Bombay Government has found it difficult to administer Sindh efficiently. It has condemned itself by passing Acts by which it has delegated its power to the Commissioner-in-Sindh. So far as the powers that have not been delegated to the Commissioner are concerned, the various Commissioners from time to time have bitterly complained of inordinate delay in the disposal of matters by the Government of Bombay.
22. Experience has showed that the members of the Legislative Council, who decide the destiny of Sindh, are not able to understand the problems of Sindh, as they belong to a different country and are ignorant and apathetic to local conditions. The Sindhi members in the Bombay Council find themselves a lone group, and got very little sympathy and understanding from the Presidency members.
23. Sindh's case for autonomy rests on grounds much more substantial than a mere desire to acquire privileges. It is the need of the time to keep Sindh's money in Sindh—for over 80 years the people of Sindh have been thrust into an oubliette! Foreigners have come by land and sea to take up and thrust aside the Sindh Esau from his birthright, the birth-right of gaining an honest livelihood on his native soil. (According to Jewish mythology, Esau was the elder son of Isaac and Rebekeh, who forfeited his legal right of inheritance to Jacob, his younger brother who deceived and outwitted his elder brother Esau twice, so that Jacob was regarded as the ancestor of the people of Israel, while Esau was the ancestor of the Edomites,—inhabitants of land at the south-east end of the Dead Sea—who lived adjacent to

Israelites, with whom there were frequent conflicts though their close relationship was indicated by the legend of their ancestors going back to Esau, the elder brother of Jacob. These folk-stories about above individuals reflect historical relationship between Israelites and Edomites—in this case Esau is equated with Sindh and Jacob with the Punjab, while Israel and Pakistan are often equated with each other time and again.) The Foreigners from the Punjab, the Deccan, Marwar, and hundreds and thousands of the ubiquitous Purbeah from the United Provinces, all these come and thrust aside the Sindhi on his own soil, monopolise high wages and carry Sindh's revenue away; impoverishing the Province drop by drop as the water wears away the stone. Similarly in the higher walks where education is essential, the posts are all held by Foreigners from the Bombay-Deccan, and latterly Bengalis are also massing to snatch the loaves of office. These are highly paid appointments, and all this money is being carried away out of Sindh, and helping to impoverish and well-nigh bankrupt it. There are also some organisations which function as additional octopuses. The Karachi Port Trust, a purely local organisation, is one of them. The Trustees have employed thousands to carry on its work. These thousands were not only foreigners from Surat and places north of the Bombay-Deccan, but are enlisted from far down, south of the Bombay-Deccan, whereas the proper patriotic revenue-making policy for this purely Sindh Association would have been to employ Sindhis. Then and only thus would have the revenue of Sindh remained in Sindh to pay for a modest administration amply. But unfortunately the money earned in Sindh is all drained out of it by foreigners. In no other province in India is this done. Sindh has another octopus in the Karachi Tramway Company, a

purely Karachi concern. Here again the employees are all foreigners draining the revenue of Sindh away from the province. No Sindhi has a look in. It is need of the time to expel all foreigners from Sindh, back to their native Bombay, the U.P., the Punjab, Goa, Persia, England, so as to leave "Sind for. Sindhis." The separation of Sindh from the Bombay Presidency would be appropriate action in the right direction.

24. As the Bombay Presidency people were given to understand that they are spending a huge amount annually to cover Sindh's deficit, they would naturally demur still further to advance the interests of Sindh. It would be a height of folly to expect Bombay to provide Sindh with more amenities.
25. Bombay, being a deficit Presidency, had to go to the Government of India, which would have to come forward and help the Bombay Presidency in one way or the other. They would have needed money from the Government of India to run the Sindh administration. Sindh too could receive assistance for a very limited number of years from the Central Government directly instead of via Bombay. It was more appropriate to transfer the subvention, direct or indirect, payable to Bombay, to Sindh. It would be in no sense charity, since if Sindh were separated from India and enjoyed separate statehood, it would have paid its way just as well as Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), Iraq, Palestine and the Straits Settlements did. (The latter was a former British crown colony, comprising four earlier colonies of Penang, Malacca, Singapore and Labuan, bordering on the strategic Malacca Strait in southeast Asia—the colony was dismantled in 1946, Singapore becoming a separate colony and Penang, Malacca and Labuan joining the Malayan Union.) The port of Karachi is a great asset and

through it alone more revenues are collected in the shape of income-tax and customs duties than spent on the whole of Sindh. It is not allowed to appropriate the whole of this revenue on 'national' grounds. It is, therefore, proper that the Indian Government should make good the loss by some suitable means.¹

26. Until 1922 Sindh was not a deficit province at all. In 1922, also, Sindh did not appear to be a very grievously deficit province. It appeared there was manipulation in certain figures after the agitation for the separation of Sindh was started.²
27. In the event of Sindh being separated, the management of the Barrage would not be handed over to raw and untrained people. Sindh would continue to secure the services of experts drawn from the Imperial cadre. As regards the Barrage loan, it is not understandable how can Bombay any longer be considered more dependable surety for it than Sindh itself. The Sukkur Barrage lands couldn't develop easily and rapidly unless they are placed under the control of a Government which was within easy reach.
28. It is the bounden duty of the Central Government to help Sindh for early years to secure the contentment and progress of the people. Sindh has got special claim over the Central Government.³
29. The principle of separation of Sindh from Bombay is unequivocally supported not only by the entire Muslim India but also by non-sectarian all-India and all-Sindh political organisations, such as the National Congress, the All Parties Conference, the Nehru Committee, the Sindh Provincial Conference, the Sindh Hindu League etc. It was cornerstone of the Sindh Hindu-Muslim Pact of 1928.

30. Apprehension of separated Sindh's joining with other Muslim provinces and inviting the onslaught of Afghans is baseless. The separation does not mean independence outside the British sovereignty. The separated Sindh would have as much independence as the provinces of Bengal and the Punjab. The Punjab is much nearer to Afghanistan than Sindh, but it has never made any truce with Afghanistan or helped them in marching over India.

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APPENDIX VI

CONTEMPORARY ARGUMENT AGAINST SEPARATION OF SINDH FROM BOMBAY

Persons attempting to find a motive in this narrative will be prosecuted; persons attempting to find a moral in it will be banished; persons attempting to find a plot in it will be shot.

*The Adventures of
Huckleberry Finn*, Notice.

Mark Twain (*pseud.*) (1835-1910)
Real Name: Samuel Langhorne Clemens,
US writer and journalist

1. History does not support the proposal to constitute Sindh, as it stood, into a separate autonomous province, for in the past it had remained a sovereign State with vast territory. The demand for creation of an autonomous province under foreign paramountcy is, therefore, against the noble patriotic tradition of the selfless Sindhis. Did the Separationists seriously propose that Sindh should once again be enlarged State so as to include the veritable vast territory? Sindh was, for some years, administered as a separate province under British rule (1843-1847), but for achieving much more economy, the British Indian Empire, of course, with the approval of the East India Company (the colonial masters), a chartered (trading) company of London (England) merchants, with a view to earn as much profits/savings as could be possible found it expedient to agree its merger with the nearest British presidency of the British Indian Empire (in 1847). Thus, though decision of its disappearance as a separate province was taken without considering the pros and cons of the matter in the light of its colonial status, yet, out of all the three presidencies—Bengal, Madras and

Bombay — it was appended to the latter, perhaps, because it was the nearest one and, possibly, a little bit less inconvenient as well.

2. Emphasis on the contrast between Sindh and the Bombay Presidency was not a sound one. The fallacy underlying this reasoning arose from the mistake of treating Sindh as one unit on the one hand, and the Presidency as a whole on the other hand. There was difference between climate of Upper Sindh, and that of the Lower Sindh. The agricultural problems of Lar and Tharparkar and Upper Sindh are not similar. The habits and dress of Gujeratis, Hindus, Parsis and Christians of Karachi were different from those of people of Upper Sindh. The Hindu literates used the Devanagri script only a few years ago. The accounts, *hundis* and correspondence of the mercantile community in Sindh were not kept in Arabic Sindhi. The bulk of the residents even in Karachi, the seat of the Commissioner-in-Sindh, do not speak the Sindhi language.
3. The linguistic principle need not to be called to the aid of the demand for constituting Sindh as a separate province. A single language is no doubt an advantage from one point of view, but in a country like India with its multiplicity of languages a province with two or three languages has the advantage of facilitating fusion and strengthening forces of unity. Linguistic basis for redistribution of provinces is detrimental to the unity of Imperial India.
4. It might be desirable from an administrative point of view to bring together under one administration people speaking the same language but scattered about under two or more different administrations. But this has no bearing on the problem of Sindh at all. The Sindhi speaking people are already under the one administration

and the Sindhi language has received as much recognition as it would in a separate province.

5. Sindh has remained a part and parcel of the Bombay Presidency for over eighty years, which is not a small period and is to be generally admitted that there should be exceptionally strong reasons for severing the administrative connection that has continued so long. If Sindh is still undeveloped even after so many years of Bombay rule, so is much of the rest of India, except the Punjab. The real sinner before 1919 was not the Government of Bombay but the Government of India which paid very little attention to economic development, except in the Punjab, where military reasons required a contented peasantry. The Bombay Government is to be judged more by its record since 1920, and in fact it has done its best for Sindh since then.
6. From the wider point of view, the creation of small provinces is by itself an evil. From defence point of view smaller provinces on the frontier would prove a source of weakness in case of external danger.
7. Politically, the separation of Sindh from the Bombay Presidency would prove to be a retrograde step. Smaller provinces cannot exercise a strong influence on the Central Government and the interests of their people might suffer when provincial interests conflict. A separate Sindh provincial Government can never have the same influence with Government of India and the Secretary of State as one of the oldest Presidency Governments like that of Bombay. Behind the form of Government there is always a force of a vigilant, fearless and well-informed press backed by strong and organised public opinion, which alone can make the executive to follow the enlightened and well thought out programme of constructive effort. Sindh is not rich

in able men and wise, farseeing statesmen. If Sindh is separated, it would be mainly governed by large landholders, the Sindh Council would be dominated by the ignorant, fanatical and criminally inclined medieval oligarchy of Sindh Zamindars to whom few personal benefits like gun licence, a *Kursi* and a few acres of land are the be-all and the end-all of life, quite a large percentage of them being absolutely unfit for real Council work. By continued association with the more advanced people of Gujerat, Maharashtra, Karnataka and Bombay city and the large European official and non-official elements, Sindhis would learn art of parliamentary government quicker; they would know how to give and take and to compromise, to lead and to command which are the essentials of successful self-Government.

8. A small province is by itself a very serious handicap in the race for progress. The smaller the province, the smaller would be its revenue; the smaller the security on which a province could borrow, the higher would be the rate of interest it would have to pay in the open market and less would be its credit with the Government of India. With the Barrage revenue mortgaged for a generation, there would be little of money for nation building services. Being a purely agricultural province, Sindh has no expanding source of provincial revenue. Education, sanitation, medical relief, transportation and every branch of nation-building activity would receive a serious set back. From the purely economic point of view, a small province has nothing to commend it, particularly if it is an undeveloped area. Association with a first class Presidency meant the credit and security which a bigger unit ensured for all its component parts.
9. A small province has necessarily a small cadre of service; it would necessarily offer a lower scale of salaries; at

any rate it would have fewer posts in the higher scale. Hence it cannot offer adequate scope to ambitious men in the services. Undeveloped Sindh, which needed the supervision of experts more than any other part of the Bombay Presidency would be deprived of the valuable advice, suggestions and supervision that it gets from the Bombay headquarters.

10. Sindh would not be able to bear the heavy expenses of a separate machinery of government; for although this province is large in area, it is very small from the point of view of its revenue. There is no doubt that there would be increase of income on account of better attention to Karachi harbour and more efficient administration. But harbour dues, customs duties and even income tax which might indirectly increase by the improvement of Karachi harbour are not provincial sources of revenue.
11. With Bombay Sindh would enjoy full provincial autonomy which would not be the case when the Government of India paying the piper might order the tune. It is not understandable how financial assistance could be given without a measure of financial control. If outside control was to be retained, the control by the Central Government from Simla or Delhi would not be better than the control of the Bombay Legislative Council with Sindhi members, Ministers and Executive Councilors.
12. The justification for subvention to Sindh¹ is nil beyond the untenable proposition that Sindh had all along lived on other peoples' money and if Bombay ceased to pay to a separated Sindh, some one else might do it.
13. The Government of India Act 1919 has laid down specific conditions and procedure for effecting territorial changes or for constituting new provinces.

Instead of satisfying these provisions case was put before the Simon Commission and the Committees attached to it. The Simon Commission did not recommend immediate separation and wished all such questions to be referred to a future Boundaries Commission.

14. The Sindh separation question should have been disentangled from the general struggle for power between the all-India Hindu and Muslim politicians. The outside politicians have unwantedly thrown an apple of discord among the people of Sindh and have thus dragged Sindh as a pawn in the game of high Indian communal politics. There is no logical connection between the joint electorates, weightage and separation. The Sindh separation is purely an academic question to be decided on its intrinsic merits. The determining factor in this question should be the interests and welfare of the people of Sindh as a whole.
15. The formation of Sindh into an independent province would make it a centre of much worse communal tension than it has been. The all-India Muslim politicians could not trust Hindu majorities and it was to be expected that the Hindu minority in Sindh would not trust the Muhammadan majority specially in view of the recent happenings. Sindh Hindus were particularly nervous since the Larkano, Jacobabad, Sukkur, Rohri and Pano Akil riots of 1927-1930.
16. By separating from the Bombay Presidency, Sindh would easily fall victim to machinations and political manoeuvring of the Punjab to get it appended to and eventually absorbed into the Punjab once and for all, when Sindh would then be devoid of all support and protection of the Bombay Presidency because of its act of separation. (And this actually happened within eleven and a half years after her separation from Bombay.)

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APPENDIX VII

ROLE OF SINDHI PEOPLE IN INDIAN ANTI-BRITISH STRUGGLE (1905-1922)

All true histories contain instruction; though in some, the treasure may be hard to find, and when found, so trivial in quantity that the dry, shrivelled kernel scarcely compensates for the trouble of cracking the nut."

In novel *Agnes Grey*,
Chap. 1.

Anne Bronte (1820-1849)
pseud. Acton Bell
English novelist

SINDH'S UNWITTING INVOLVEMENT IN ALL-INDIA POWER POLITICS: SINDHIS QUITE OBLIVIOUS OF FATAL STRATAGEMS THAT LEFT THEM WITH NO CHOICE BUT TO BE ENTRAPPED BY PIR-E-TASMA-PA

Imperialist Authorities' and Indian Vested Interests' Strategic Machinations to Make Sindh a Mere Pawn in the Game of Indian Communal Power Politics

(1905-1922)

This study is, on the whole, confined to the role of Sindhi intelligentsia and people in Indian anti-British struggle conducted, as it was, within the limits set by the colonial masters. As a result the destiny of Sindh was gradually intertwined with South Western and Central Asian regional geopolitics not only by entrapping it in the all-India game of communal power politics but also by forcing it to play the role of a mere pawn in the Indian communal politics and become an inescapable part of Muslim India as and when division of British Indian Empire become desirable in the best interests of the world imperialism.

Emergence of Middle Class (1843-1900)

The British invaded Sindh in 1843 after securing victory over almost the whole of the Indian Subcontinent. The former rulers of Sindh, as against the British, were tribal and feudal in outlook. They ran Sindh as a personal *zamindari* and that also in a very outmoded form. Hence, their interest in the welfare of their subjects and improvement of their property—Sindh—was, to put it mildly, casual. Whereas, the new rulers of Sindh represented a capitalist society which had not only learned how fully to utilise and exploit the resources and people of new colonies but were also radicalised in outlook because of the American War of Independence (1776-1783), the French Revolution (1789-1799) and the Chartist Movement of England (1837-1854).

As a result of the administrative and educational reforms, during pre- and post-mutiny periods a new middle class with lawyers, teachers, merchants and doctors with all their positive as well as negative characteristics of a middle class—of course, with obvious inclination to opt for middle of the road approach to politics—as its spokesmen, emerged in the last decades of the nineteenth century. In the years to come this class was destined to play its leading role in the growth as well as distraction and distortion of Sindhi political consciousness—including false consciousness—through various organisations and vested interests.

Swadeshi Campaign (1905-1911)

The people of Sindh did play a significant role in almost all Indian anti-imperialist movements launched during the period from 1905 to 1922. In the *Swadeshi* (promotion of indigenous industries and goods) campaign, started in 1905, which reached its height in 1908, though not accompanied by concrete economic programmes to raise the productivity or purchasing power of the local peasant, nevertheless remained a mass demonstration of opposition to British rule,

especially inspired by the unwarranted partition of Bengal in 1905. In Sindh, its protagonists played their significant role in following ways: (i) They opened *Swadeshi* shops and factories, (ii) organised exhibitions of indigenous articles, (iii) held public meetings for the development of the campaign, (iv) made appeals in press and public meetings to encourage local industry and buy indigenous goods, (v) appointed committees to take measures for furthering the campaign, (vi) wrote and staged dramas full of *Swadeshi* enthusiasm and extended support to such plays, (vii) organised *Swadeshi* classes and lectures, (viii) published pamphlets, and (ix) composed and published songs and poems¹ in support of the campaign.

The first ever notable strike in Sindh in the twentieth century was observed by the Garriwallas of Hyderabad from 20th January, 1906,² against a directive of the local police, when not a single hackney carriage plied on the roads for three days.

The anarchist and terroristic activities of the Hurs, the peculiar Sindhi freedom-fighters, in 1907 synchronised with the wave of terrorism in other parts of India, despite strict surveillance, deployment of additional police, application of the Criminal Tribes Act and establishment of Hur Concentration Camps.

In April 1908 and again in April 1909 the Sindh Provincial Conference in its first and second sessions held at Sukkur and Hyderabad respectively accorded "most cordial support" to the *Swadeshi* campaign by passing special resolutions on the subject.³

In 1909 three Sindhi political activists, namely (1) Virumal Begraj, (2) Chetumal Harriram, and (3) Gordhanlal Topanlal were arrested under sections 124A and 153A of the Indian Penal Code for publishing in Sindhi a "seditious"

pamphlet *Swadeshi Halchal ya Muhban Vatan Sriyat Tilak ja Raya*, (Swadeshi Movement or views of patriot Tilak; in Sindhi), which was exposed to public sale at the Second Sindh Provincial Conference, Hyderabad.⁴ They were tried and convicted, the accused 3 to transportation for five years with fine of Rs. 500 and 1 and 2 each to transportation for three years with fine each of Rs. 1000.⁵

In June 1909 the Garriwallas and hackney carriage proprietors of Karachi went on strike against "the *zulum* of the police."⁶ 1911 witnessed strike of students in Sindh College, Karachi, and rustication of certain students. The rustication order was withdrawn on the 25th anniversary of the College. The student unrest, however, continued intermittently during the first half of the following year.⁷

In 1912, "criminal" activity by the Sindh Hurs was revived. In 1913, the number of "crimes" increased at an alarming rate. The Hur community became a "terror" of the whole countryside in 1912 and 1913. The 'crimes' committed by Hurs included targeted attacks on the police and their agents, particularly in Sanghar and Sinjhoru talukas. In Sanghar alone, no fewer than nine persons were killed by them in 1913.⁸

On 1st April 1913 the butchers of Karachi went on strike to protest against the directive of the Health Officer, which disallowed carrying of meat by the butchers in their own carts from the slaughter-houses to the markets.⁹

In April 1913, addressing the notables of Thatta, the Collector of Karachi, Lawrence (full name not known, perhaps H. S.), admitted: "There are people going about Sind to-day who are seeking to sow the seed of dangerous doctrines, in the hope that serious trouble may grow from this seed."¹⁰ The Collector associated these incidents with the Delhi "outrage"¹¹ and remarked:

"I ask you to consider, why was a bomb thrown at the Viceroy [Lord Hardinge]? In every country there are men who . . . in order to obtain helpers in their revolt against authority . . . persuade simple and ignorant people that their cause is just and that they are fighting against injustice. In India the chief argument that they proffer is that the people of India are growing poorer every year and that under the rule of the English great injustice is constantly done."¹²

The Collector called upon the notables to help the authorities in the matter. Commenting on the address of the Collector, the *Sind Gazette*, Karachi, observed: "The words of the Collector of Karachi may well cause serious searchings of heart in misguided places of political restiveness where there is a professed desire to 'wake Sindh out of its sleep'."¹³

Komagata Maru Incident and Ghadar Party

Two Sindhis, Prof. Javaharmal Mansukhani and his brother, were actively associated with the famous incident of *Komagata Maru* (1914).¹⁴

The Ghadar Party, named in commemoration of the 'Mutiny' of 1857, was established at San Francisco (USA), on 1st November 1913, which "laid down its aim as the overthrow of imperialist Raj in India and the building up in its place of a national republic based on freedom and equality. This aim could be achieved only by an armed national revolution."¹⁵ There is no doubt that the renowned Indian political activist, then working abroad, Lala Hardayal, was the guiding spirit of the Ghadar movement, which took final shape, in 1913, in the formal inauguration of Ghadar Party. The main activities of the Ghadar Party, besides the regular campaign of lectures, were the publication of *Ghadar* (mutiny or rebellion), a weekly paper, and various books and booklets. The first issue of this weekly journal boldly declared: "Today begins in foreign lands . . . a war against the British Raj. . . . What is our name?

Mutiny. What is our Work? Mutiny. Where will mutiny break out? In India. The time will soon come when rifles and blood will take the place of pens and ink." Each issue of the journal had on its front page a set feature which was called "*Angrez Raj ka Kachcha Chittha*" (a transparent account of the British rule). It contained a long list of the crimes perpetrated by the British in India. The *Ghadar* kept India's struggle for freedom in the forefront of world opinion by publishing the biographies of the great Indian patriots who fought for the freedom of the motherland. At the same time it inspired the Indians by publishing life-sketches of the fighters for freedom in other countries. Almost every issue of the *Gadhar* contained poems urging upon young India to take up arms, rise in insurrection, kill the English etc., on the other hand, it published informative articles on Indian culture—showing the great height attained by the Indians in the past in various spheres of life, in order to give lie direct to the British propaganda, which had been hitherto going on unchecked, that the Indians occupied a very low rung in the ladder of civilisation.

Along the specific measures suggested by the *Ghadar* may be mentioned as under: (1) The seduction of Indian troops; (2) the murder of loyal subjects and officials; (3) hoisting the revolutionary flag; (4) the breaking of jails; (5) the looting of treasuries, *thanas* etc; (6) the propagation of seditious literature; (7) union with the foreign enemies of the British; (8) the commission of dacoities; (9) the procuring of arms; (10) the manufacture of bombs; (11) the formation of secret societies; (12) the destruction of railways and telegraphs; and (13) the recruitment of young men for revolutionary work.¹⁶

As stated above, during the First World War, the Indian revolutionaries under the banner of the *Ghadar* Party, sought to overthrow British colonial yoke. They found in the

Sindhi merchants, known as the *Sindh Workis*, and their Sindhi employees, willing financiers, couriers and publicists. Reports of anti-British activities of these *Workis* reached the authorities from various parts of the empire—towns and countries situated thousands of miles apart, viz. London, Singapore, Hong Kong, Egypt, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Penong (or Penang in the Strait of Malacca, now part of Malaysia), Shanghai (the then largest city and port of [east] China), Philippines, Gibraltar (Arab 'Jebel Tariq' in Spain), Panama (in central America with a canal of same name connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans), Algiers (Algeria), Sumatra (island in West Indonesia), and involved a number of firms, notably J. T. Chainrai, Dhanomal Chellaram, Kimatrai Bulchand, and Pohumal Brothers.¹⁷ The imperialist authorities took stern measures to check their anti-British activities. These measures included (i) interception in the post of letters by *Sindh Workis* from abroad, (ii) investigation of the records of *Sindh Worki firms*, (iii) house-search of *Sindh Workis*, (iv) deportation of *Sindh Workis*, (v) denial of entry to *Sindh Workis* or even any Sindhi in certain colonies, and (vi) imposition of severe restrictions on *Sindh Workis'* movements overseas.¹⁸

Revolutionary Activities during the First World War

Turkey's entry in the World War I against British, in 1914, caused a strong anti-British feeling among Indian Muslims. In February 1915, fifteen young Muslim students from Lahore and several from Peshawar and Kohat joined in the so-called insurgency, publicly called *Jihad*, and later moved to Kabul. The identified leader of this militant insurrection, known in official records as a 'conspiracy', was Moulana Ubaidullah Sindhi, who was fully assisted by Moulana Mahmud Hasan, the then head of Deoband Madresso. They conceived a plan of destroying British rule in India by means of an attack on the northwest frontier, synchronising with a Muslim rebellion in India. With this

object Moulana Ubaidullah got into touch with the insurgents and left secretly for Kabul, along with his two Sindhi associates, namely Abdullah and Fateh Mohammad, in August 1915, where he met with other 'revolutionaries' from India. The Indian revolutionaries (called '*mujahideen*') had been favourably received by the Amir of Afghanistan (Habibullah Khan) and had established a Provisional Government of India in exile at Kabul.

The Liberation Army (*Junood-e-Rabania*)

Encouraged by the above referred to success, Moulana Ubaidullah Sindhi, with the concurrence of Moulana Mahmud Hasan, established an Islamic Liberation Army, called *Junood-e-Rabania* (the 'Army of God') with the headquarters at Madina, and subordinate commands at Constantinople (present-day Istanbul), Tehran and Kabul.

The above discussed Liberation Army, known as *Junood-e-Rabania*, organised by Moulana Ubaidullah Sindhi, of course, with the concurrence of Moulana Mahmud Hasan of Deoband, had a number of Sindhis on important positions, viz. Moulana Ubaidullah Sindhi, Commander (*Salar*) at Kabul; Moulana Taj Mahmood Amroti, Lieutenant-General; Pir Assadullah (?Rushidullah) Shah, Lieutenant-General; Prof. Muhammad Ibrahim Shaikh, Major-General; Moulana Muhammad Sadiq, Colonel; Abdur Rahim Shaikh, Colonel; and Haji Shah Bakhsh Lashari, Lieutenant-Colonel. A *fatwa* (religious behest) of *jihad* (holy war) was issued against the British by eminent *ulema* (theologians) of India, including Moulana Rushidullah, Moulana Taj Mahmood Amroti and Moulana Ghulam Muhammad from Sindh.

Provisional Government of India in Exile at Kabul

An Indo-German Mission led by Raja Mahendra Pratab (a chief of Hathras in U.P.) along with Moulana Barkatullah and Dr. Von Hentig of the German diplomatic service, holding the rank of Legation Secretary, on its way through

Turkey, visited Istanbul, where the Turkish Sultan gave an audience to the Raja and also a letter for the Amir of Afghanistan—Moulana Barkatullah procured a *fatwa* from Shaikh-ul-Islam asking the Muslims of India to act in unison with the Hindus. After suffering great deal of troubles from Iranian brigands, the mission reached Kabul on 2nd October 1915, and a few days later, the Afghan government gave the mission a royal reception and the members were treated as State guests. After a great deal of talk and many official meetings held between the mission and the Afghan officials, the net result of discussions and dialogue was the establishment of provisional Government of India in exile at Kabul, on the 1st December, 1915. Raja Mahendra Pratap became president, Moulana Barkatullah was appointed prime minister, and Moulana Ubaidullah got the portfolio(s) of home minister and/or minister foreign affairs. Secretaries also were appointed from among the Indians. This Provisional Government sent several missions, issued many proclamations, sent the letters of the German Chancellor to the Indian princes and even tried to come to some kind of understanding with Russia. The Raja Mahendra Pratap, as President of the Provisional Government of India, wrote a letter to the Tsar of Russia on a plate of solid gold, but this extension of hand to Russia, for the time being came to nothing, though on a later occasion, after the successful Communist Revolution of Russia, under the dynamic leadership of Vladimir Illich Lenin (d. 21 Jan. 1924), Raja Pratap was personally received by the latter's representative Leon Trotsky, the then Commissar for Foreign Affairs. Nevertheless, Moulana Ubaidullah Sindhi remained a leading figure of the Provisional Government and was in exile till 4th March, 1939.

During the period, especially in the aftermath of the First World War and the successful Russian Communist Revolution, some of the Sindh papers, particularly

Hyderabad's the *Al-amin*, the *Hindu* and the *Sindvasi*, adopted, in a limited sense, an anti-British stance which, by and large, was followed by the others with the passage of time.

Silken Letter 'Conspiracy' Unearthed

The Silken (or Silk) letters, written by Moulana Ubaidullah Sindhi from Kabul, were addressed to an 'agent' in Sindh with the instruction to forward the same by a reliable messenger, or convey them in person, to Moulana Mahmud Hasan of Deoband. They were carried by a family servant of two Punjabi Muslim students—two brothers—who had left Lahore and gone to Kabul. The letters were written neatly in Persian on lengths of yellow silk and sewn up inside the lining of his coat. There were other letters also describing the progress of revolutionary activities in Kabul. The servant met the father of the two boys, but the old man's suspicions having been aroused, he extorted a confession from the servant and got possession of the silk-letters. These he handed over to the British authorities who got "valuable information as to the sympathisers in India," interned about a dozen persons, and took other necessary preventive measures.

Reshmi Rumal Tahrik

The Silken (or Silk) Letter Movement, better known as the Reshmi Rumal Tahrik, of 1915-1916, aimed at the overthrow of British regime by an attack on the frontier and a simultaneous mass uprising in the country. Moulana Ubaidullah Sindhi was the mentor of the movement. Moulana Rushidullah Pir of Jhando, Moulana Taj Mahmood of Amrot, Moulana Ghulam Muhammad of Dinpur Bahawalpur, Khalifa of Hafiz Muhammad Siddique Pir of Bharchundi, Moulana Abdullah Leghari, Prof. Muhammad Ibrahim Shaikh, Abdur Rahim Shaikh, Abdul Aziz Shaikh, Shaikh Abdul Majid Sindhi, Fateh Muhammad, Muhammad Hassan Darzi and Haji Shah Bakhsh Lashari were its

prominent leaders.

However, the Silken Letter "Conspiracy" was "unearthed" by the Government in August 1916. The persons arrested in September 1916 and brought to Lahore included Sindhi leaders as well. Moulana Abdullah Leghari, one of the accused, was kept in jails at Lahore, Pathankot, Dinpur, Karachi, and finally detained in his native village Kot Nawab in district Sanghar till the end of the First World War. Other Sindhi leaders, including Abdur Rahim Shaikh and Fateh Muhammad, absconded and went underground and some of them ultimately escaped out of the country. Moulana Rushidullah and Moulana Taj Mahmood escaped punishment for want of evidence. Shaikh Abdul Majid Sindhi, Moulana Muhammad Sadiq and some others were tried and convicted. Shaikh Abdul Majid Sindhi and Muhammad Sadiq each were awarded three years imprisonment. Prof. Muhammad Ibrahim Shaikh was killed, on his way from Afghanistan to Russia, by British agents.

Aftermath of the Montagu Declaration

When the country-wide political debate started in the wake of the Montagu Declaration (August 1917), Sindh politics was dominated by the "extremists." The Government started a policy of suppression. Dissident newspapers were hard-hit. In 1918, within less than six months (from 28th January to 13th July) as many as eight newspapers of Sindh, namely the *Hindvasi*, Hyderabad; the *Larkana Gazette*, Larkano; the *Sind Patrika*, Karachi; the *New Times*, Karachi; the *Home Ruler*, Karachi; the *Sindhi*, Sukkur; the *Sind Advocate*, Shikarpur; and the *Hindu*, Hyderabad; were black-listed.¹⁹ Their entry in the registered libraries was banned and instructions were issued to the Courts and Officers not to send them notices or advertisements. Some newspapers including the *New Times*, Karachi; the *Home Ruler*, Karachi; the *Trade Advertiser*, Karachi; the *Hindvasi*, Hyderabad; and

the *Hindu*, Hyderabad;²⁰ were asked to furnish securities under the Press Act of 1910.²¹

Like the Sindh Congress, the Sindh Provincial Conference hitherto representing the moderates was completely under the control of "extremists" in 1918.²² Hyderabad became the hot-bed of nationalistic activities in Sindh.

This state of affairs scared the highest symbol of British rule in the Bombay Presidency. The Governor of Bombay declined to accept the Hyderabad Citizens Association's welcome address in February, 1919.²³

Satyagraha Movement

The people of Sindh played a remarkable role in the *Satyagraha* (passive resistance)²⁴ movement, launched on 6th April, 1919, to protest against the draconian law, Rowlatt Act, made public on 18th March, 1919. This law had intensified repression against freedom-fighters in India and empowered the Governor General and the provincial governors among other things to arrest people and deport them without trial.

To express indignation against the Act an unprecedented strike was observed in Hyderabad and other towns of Sindh on 30th March, 1919. To protest against the police action in Delhi, where unarmed demonstrators had been fired upon, along with condemnation meetings at various towns of Sindh, condemnation articles and editorials were published in the press. On one such article entitled "*Kalalkay Hut Kusan jo Kope Wahey*" published in the *Hindvasi*, Hyderabad, its writer and editor, Jethmal Parsram, was tried under section 124A and sentenced to two years imprisonment.

Jalianwalla Bagh Massacre

The Jalianwalla Bagh massacre (April 13, 1919) added fuel to the fire. There was a wave of mass unrest in Sindh. To

show public anger against the brutal action of the authorities, mourning processions were taken out in various towns of Sindh wherein thousands of people participated bare-headed and passed condemnation resolutions in public meetings.

The Khilafat agitation started in October 1919 further added to the agitative mood of the people of Sindh. In December 1919, on the occasion of the annual session of the National Congress held at Amritsar, a special train of Sindhis went there to pay homage to the Jalianwalla Bagh martyrs and on return blood-mingled dust was brought to and displayed in Sindh. This was the historic session of the Congress which acceded to the demand of Sindhis that their province be treated as a separate province in the Congress organisation and they be allowed to form a separate Sindh Provincial Congress Committee.

To check this "unrest," Prevention of Seditious Meetings Act 1907 was applied to Sindh in April 1919,²⁵ but it failed to help the imperialist strategy.

The *Bharatvasi*, Hyderabad; the *Hindu*, Hyderabad; the *New Times* Karachi ; the *Sind Samachar*, Karachi; and the *Sind Advocate*, Shikarpur; continued criticising the Government.²⁶

"Unlawful" bulletins and agitative pamphlets were published, proscribed literature was openly sold in violation of the Press Laws.

Some of the Sindh newspapers including the *Sind Advocate*, Shikarpur,²⁷ were issued show cause notices of depositing security for printing objectionable matter and some of them including the *Sind Samachar*, Karachi²⁸ were directed to deposit security under the provisions of the Indian Press Act 1910 for publishing "seditious" articles.

In April 1919, the police made raids and searches at the houses, offices and premises of political workers and some of them were arrested. In Hyderabad, the raids and searches were made at Mukhi Jathanand Partabrai's house, Lokram and Vishnu Sharmas' (Sharma Brothers) house, Brahamcharya Ashram and Tilak Home Rule League office. Office of the *Hindvasi* and house of its editor Jethmal Parsram, offices of the *Al-amin* and its editor Shaikh Abdul Majid Sindhi, Rais Ghulam Muhammad Bhurgri's office and bungalow, office of Shaikh Noor Muhammad (pleader), residence and dispensary of Swami Govindanand, Prof. Ghanshyam's house and Besant Home Rule League office were also searched. As a result of these searches Mukhi Jethanand, Jethmal Parsram, Dr. Choithram P. Gidwani, Shaikh Abdul Majid Sindhi and Swami Govindanand were arrested; all of them were later released on bail.²⁹ In Karachi, also, police raids were made at the houses of political workers including Hariram D. Mariwalla and at the office of the *Home Ruler*.

On April 11, 1919, after public announcement at a mass meeting held at Hyderabad following a successful procession attended by about five thousand people, three Sindhis, namely Jethmal Parsram, Jairamdas Daulatram and Sachoo Bania, sold proscribed literature.³⁰ A newspaper, *Satyagrahi*, published without declaration, was also sold by its editor, Utamchand.³¹ A "seditious" leaflet entitled the *New Call* was written and published by H. D. Mariwalla and printed by Durgadas B. Advani at the press of the *Home Ruler*, Karachi. Consequently, H. D. Mariwalla, Durgadas B. Advani and Narsinglal Dhamanmal were arrested in Karachi. In Hyderabad, European guard was kept at the Bank of Bombay and the local authorities were directed to be ready to face any eventuality. The Europeans were advised to keep two days provision in hand.³² The Superintendent of Police and the Commanding Officer, Hyderabad, contacted with

political leaders including Rais Ghulam Muhammad Bhurgri, Swami Govindanand, Dr. Choithram P. Gidwani, Jethmal Parsram, Mukhi Jethanand and Kanvalsing to exert their influence for keeping the situation under control.³³ In Karachi, non-occurrence of violence and bloodshed, in the opinion of the Commissioner-in-Sindh, H. S. Lawrence (1916-1920), was "solely due to" the presence at Karachi of "a strong military force of British and Indian troops."³⁴

Khilafat Movement

17th October 1919 was observed throughout Sindh as the *Dua Deenhun* (Prayers Day) in favour of Turkey. This day is known as the "First Khilafat Day." Anti-British public meetings, rallies and demonstrations were organised.

The Government sponsored "peace celebrations" (13th to 16th December 1919) were boycotted throughout Sindh by the nationalists. Processions against it were organised at Karachi, Hyderabad and other towns of Sindh. In a small town like Larkano a mourning procession of Hindus and Muslims numbering 7,000 carrying black flags was taken out.³⁵

The pro-Government paper, the *Daily Gazette*, Karachi, remarked in December 1919: "It is a sad fact that there is no political activity in this province except that carried on by the most bitter extremist agitators, whose only method of argument is abuse, whose only policy is hostility to the British administration."³⁶

The *Khilafat* movement, a protest against the injustices of "victorious" Britain and her allies to Turkey became a rallying point of Muslim mass unrest and agitation against British imperialism.³⁷ Participation of Sindh in this movement was outstanding.

No less than six Sindh Provincial Khilafat Conferences at Hyderabad (January, 4), Larkano (February, 7-9), Sann

(March, 17), Sehwan, (April 17), Jacobabad (May, 22-23) and Shadi Pali (June, 25) were held in first half of 1920.³⁸ The Sindh *ulema* lent their weight to the anti-British movement and issued a *fatwa* declaring India as *dar-ul-harb* (enemy country). The *fatwa* was endorsed by the Sehwan Conference which passed the *Hijrat* resolution. The Jacobabad Conference chalked out the ways and means of its implementation.

Hijrat Movement

The revolutionary tide of rising mass unrest, reflected in the *Satyagraha* and the *Khliafat* movements, was further intensified by the *Hijrat* and the Civil Disobedience movements launched in 1920. All sections of the people shared the general unrest.³⁹ For the first time authorities came face to face with the labour unrest in Sindh. In February 1920 Karachi Port Coolies and in June 1920 Railway Workers of Sukkur went on strike.

In July 1920 a special train⁴⁰ of Sindhis, about 758, led by Barrister Jan Muhammad Junejo, having sold their property (lands, houses, crops, bullocks, house-hold impediments) worth thousands at ridiculously low prices, migrated to Afghanistan in the hope that that country would help liberate their motherland. However, most of them soon returned, for the country's fight for freedom was to be fought, necessarily, on its own soil.

Civil Disobedience Movement

In August 1920 the Civil Disobedience movement against the colonial regime was started. The struggle soared to new heights. The anti-British wave surged more and more as the months rolled on. In Sindh this manifested itself in following events and actions:

1. Mass rallies, demonstrations and hartals at Karachi, Hyderabad, Sukkur and other towns of Sindh, and meetings and conferences in villages.

2. The spread of anti-British agitation in the mofussil.⁴¹
3. Renunciation of honorary appointments and titles. These included the renunciation of *Aafrin-namas* (letters of appreciation), *Parwanas* (licences) and *Kursis* (literally – chairs), membership of Municipal and Local Boards, School Committees, and Honorary Magistrateships.
4. Boycott of official receptions. Even the receptions arranged in honour of the Prince of Wales were boycotted.
5. Boycott of Government controlled and pro-British educational institutions including the Sindh Madresso and D. J. College⁴² in Sindh and Aligarh College outside Sindh. (Aligarh city, formerly an important stronghold of Jatts, Afghans and Marhattas, is in modern U.P., east of the river Yamuna, north of Agra, linked by rail to Chandigarh, Moradabad [old Rohilla stronghold], Rampur, Saharanpur and Delhi.) To accommodate such students a number of national schools and other educational institutions were established at different towns of Sindh. In order to identify themselves with the national movement some of the educational institutions including Mulla schools refused to accept Government's Grants-in-aid.
6. Boycott of law courts. Parallel to British law courts, conciliatory courts headed by local headmen were established in various towns and villages of Sindh. The lawyers' boycott was, however, less successful, except for a few outstanding examples such as those of Jan Muhammad Junejo, who publicly renounced his degree of Barrister-at-Law, and Abdul Jabbar, who surrendered his licence of practice to the Judicial Commissioner.⁴³
7. Elections to the legislatures were boycotted. Posters were displayed throughout Sindh crying shame and dissuading those candidates who contested the elections. The boycott of the election by the electors was markedly successful.⁴⁴
8. Imported goods were boycotted. Foreign cloth became the main item of boycott. A special Conference under the presidentship of Durgadas B. Advani was held at Karachi in 1921. The movement was so successful that Khadi became the symbol of patriotism. Exhibitions of Khadi were organised at different towns of Sindh – the Larkana exhibition (November 1922) was opened by Mrs. M. K. Gandhi.⁴⁵

9. Refusal to pay state taxes. Though no such appeal was made to the people by the leaders of the movement, a considerable number of persons in Sindh publicly declared their willingness for refusing to pay state taxes if the leadership of the movement appealed for it. Even at the local Khilafat Conference held at a remote village Dhoro Naro on 18th May 1920, about 42 landowners/zamindars declared their such willingness.⁴⁶

At Karachi, on 8th July, 1921 the All-India Khilafat Committee declared that no Muslim should serve in the English army or assist in recruiting. In September 1921, the Ali Brothers (Moulana Muhammad Ali and Moulana Shaukat Ali) and other leaders including Pir Ghulam Mujadid of Sindh were arrested on the charge of seditious speeches at Karachi. The trial took place at Karachi, and they were sentenced each to two years imprisonment. Sindhis raised funds for their defence and other expenditure.

On 21st July 1921, the police opened fire on a crowd who had come to register their protest against the unpatriotic activities of the loyalist lackeys (members of the Aman Sabha) of the colonial administration at Matiari village. One person was killed in this police firing and 12 persons were injured.

The Government and the loyalist politicians were denounced. In October 1920 at the anniversary of Shah Abdul Latif at Bhit attended by about 50,000 people, the garriwallas and camelmen refused to convey the Government officials and Co-operators to Government or else charged them much heavier than normal.⁴⁷

National volunteer corps were organised who used to wear uniform, drill and march in mass formation proclaiming slogans to organise *hartals* and boycott by peaceful persuasion and picketing of foreign cloth and grog shops. The Volunteers were declared an illegal organisation. Arrests ensued in batches.⁴⁸ However, this did not succeed in killing the morale of the political workers.

The *hartal* which greeted the Prince of Wales on his arrival at Karachi on 17th March 1922 was the most overwhelming and successful demonstration of popular disaffection which Sindh had yet known. Despite the fact that the Government had interned about 56 persons and directed the printing presses and newspapers of Karachi not to publish anything contrary to the Government policy, the whole city was flooded with anti-British posters, black flags and enthusiastic demonstrators making the strike unprecedentedly successful. Even the walls and roads of the city were decorated with boycott slogans. Hyderabad's paper, the *Hindu*, brought out a special boycott number on the day and copies numbering in thousands were secretly distributed in Karachi. The strike was so successful that no *tonga* or *victoria* plied on the roads; even tea and cigarettes were not available in the whole of city. Over 150 workers were engaged for distribution of pamphlets and chalking anti-Government slogans on the walls and roads of the city. Three of the leaders of this boycott movement, namely Maharaj Nathuram Satyapal, Lokram Sharma and Kesumal Jhangiani later known as Sadhu Keshevanand, were arrested and convicted for one year, one and a half years, and two and a half years respectively.

Infuriated by unprecedented political activity the Government made mass arrests. The imprisonment was, however, no longer a terror or fear, it rather became the badge of honour. The accused often pleaded guilty and declared in unequivocal terms that British rule was a foreign rule and it was their national duty to overthrow the Government of foreigners. The arrests were commemorated by boisterous celebrations, wherein the people displayed their joy through singing, dancing, distribution of *Kohar* and sweet drinks, and total strike. The lawyers conducted the cases of political workers without charging any fee.⁴⁹ The

demonstrations and meetings were held near the courts to offer felicitations to under-trials for their splendid courage and readiness to welcome imprisonment. On the release, political workers were given illustrious welcomes, which included taking them in a procession after garlanding them, giving them welcome addresses and in certain cases erecting welcome arches on a main road in their honour.

In certain cases even police officers and magistrates were insulted by the people and the persons under trial. The authorities took special measures to keep the tense situation under their control; for instance, to spread fear and harassment amongst the people of Hyderabad armed police platoons paraded the streets and aeroplanes fanned the skies on the occasion of the trial of the town's first two arrests, namely Shaikh Abdul Majid Sindhi and Vishnu Sharma who were convicted for two years and three years respectively.

When Pir Mahboob Shah, brother of Rushidullah Shah Pir of Jhando, was sent to jail for a "seditious" speech, thousands assembled in Hyderabad to offer him felicitations. Fearing the wrath of the people his trial was held inside Hyderabad jail.⁵⁰

During the period, "seditious" speeches were publicly delivered appealing to the people to "sacrifice" their "lives," "give up Parwanas and Chairs," "steal police horses, tear up rails, rob officers, break railways so that troops may not be able to move quickly."⁵¹ The mood of the country was also reflected in "the increasingly virulent tone of the vernacular newspapers."⁵²

More newspapers with decided anti-British and pro-noncooperation movement policy came out—the daily *Alwahid* from Karachi (1920),⁵³ the weekly *Vande Mataram* from Hyderabad (1921), the weekly *Azadi* from Larkano (1922), the weekly *Watan* from Shikarpur (1922) and the

weekly *Hamdard* from Jacobabad (1923).⁵⁴ Besides these the following papers took a very aggressive part in the anti-British current continued on at the time in the Sindh press—the weekly *Bharatvasi* of Hyderabad, the weekly *Hindvasi* of Hyderabad, the weekly *Shakti* of Nawabshah,⁵⁵ the daily *Swaraj* of Sukkur and the daily *Hindu* of Hyderabad.⁵⁶

Many Sindh newspapers were served with show cause notices and were asked to furnish securities for publishing objectionable articles. When the *Hindu* was demanded security of Rs. 2,000 the public immediately contributed the amount. Editors of newspapers welcomed imprisonment for publishing "seditious" articles in their papers. Editors of a number of Sindh papers were arrested. The *Hindu* of Sindh was the only paper throughout India whose more than eight editors were arrested and imprisoned one after the other but the policy of the paper remained unchanged.⁵⁷

In the last quarter of 1921 and beginning of 1922 nationalist enthusiasm in India including Sindh was at fever pitch, but her leaders were not ready to carry forward the movement because they feared the mass activity would undermine those vested interests with which they were closely linked.⁵⁸ The entire movement got stuck in the morbid mud of emotional frustration when Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869-1948), the Indian leader of the movement, called off the movement in February, 1922, after the incident of Chauri Chaura in the Gorakhpur district (in north-east India) in the United Provinces where a crowd of angry peasants, after driving policemen who had been firing on them into the police-station building, set fire to it.⁵⁹

OUTCOME

Thus, the first phase of the Indian anti-British movement, launched in the first quarter of the twentieth century and spearheaded mainly by the emerging middle

class, of course, adequately supported by the pro-active elements of other politically oriented sections of society, with an avowed aim to mobilise the masses against British imperialism, for achieving their respective objectives, eventually came to an end abruptly and unceremoniously. The masses were no doubt mobilised, indeed, beyond the expectations of their leaders but the movement's class-conscious leadership was not prepared to allow it to move to its logical conclusion, at least, at that juncture. This is the natural fate of almost all anti-imperialist struggles conducted, as it was, within the limits set by, or suited to, the colonial masters; especially when the leadership had vested interest in continuation of the prevalent socio-economic system.

SOURCES:

1. *Sind Gazette*, Karachi, 1905-1914.
2. *Daily Gazette*, Karachi, 1915-1922.
3. *Atwahid*, Karachi, 1920-1922.
4. Naraindas Chainrai Advani, *op. cit.*
5. Vishnu Sharma, *op. cit.*
6. Miscellaneous newspapers/periodicals of period.
7. Miscellaneous book/articles on the period.

No man has a right to fix a boundary of the march of a nation. No man has a right to say to his country, 'Thus far shalt thou go and no further'.

From a speech (21 Jan. 1885)

Charles Stewart Parnell (1846-1891)
Irish politician

Where observation is concerned, chance favours only the prepared mind.

Speech at the University
of Lille, 7 Dec. 1854.

Louis Pasteur (1822-1895)
French chemist, the father
of modern bacteriology

APPENDIX VIII

SINDHI PEOPLE IN THE ANTI-COLONIAL CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE MOVEMENT (1930-1934)

I am writing biography, not history, and the truth is that the most brilliant exploits often tell us nothing of the virtues or vices of the men who performed them, while on the other hand a chance remark or a joke may reveal far more of a man's character than the mere feat of winning battles in which thousands fall, or of marshalling great armies, or laying siege to cities.

From *Life of Alexander*, chap. 1
(trans. Scott-Kilvert).

Plutarch (c. 46-c. 120 AD)

During the period between April 1930 to May 1934, a sizeable portion of the people and public leaders of Sindh were active in Civil Disobedience Movement, launched by the Congress under the leadership of M. K. Gandhi, which was halted only for a short period (March 1931-December 1931) in consequence of a temporary truce between the All-India leadership of the Indian national movement and the colonial regime reached at in the shape of "Irwin-Gandhi Pact"¹ of March 1931.

During this period the people of Sindh violated a number of laws, including the Salt Law, and created law and order situation at numerous places. They boycotted foreign cloth, picketed liquor and foreign cloth shops, and boycotted the Government's educational institutions.

They also boycotted the official receptions. When Lord Willingdon, the then Governor General and Viceroy of India

(1931-1936), came to Sindh in January 1932 for performing the opening ceremony of the Lloyd Barrage and Sindh Canals at Sukkur; receptions in his honour were not only boycotted but the people of Sukkur also staged a *hartal* and in Karachi a protest meeting was held.²

On 16th April 1930, as a result of the police firing on unarmed people, in front of Karachi City Court, who came to hear the trial of their political leaders, two persons were killed and 36 injured including renowned political leader Jairamdas Dualatram—the number of injured by bullets as well as by *lathi* charges, which took place several times, went over a hundred during the whole period of the Civil Disobedience Movement.

Massive demonstrations, *hartals* and mass strikes were organised wherein young and old, men and women, braved police tyranny. Police officers on duty were abused by the people, and magistrates were insulted and driven to hold their sittings in the prisons in Karachi, Hyderabad and Sukkur.

Strict censorship was imposed, securities were demanded from the dissident papers. As a protest against the Press Ordinance some vernacular papers, like the daily *Hindu*, Hyderabad, and the weekly *Hindu Jati*, Karachi, stopped their publication for short periods. Both of them were ultimately seized by the Government.³ Before the seizure of the *Hindu* its proprietors, Vishnu Sharma and Lokram Sharma, and a number of its editors including Hiranand Karamchand, Dr. Vishindas Shivadasani, Hassomal Isardas and Mansingh Chauharmal were arrested one after the other and sentenced to different terms of imprisonment. After the seizure of the *Hindu*, a new newspaper the *Sindu* was issued from the same press. When the Government repression made it impossible to continue

the *Sindu*, it was stopped and again new newspapers with different names were issued from different presses to continue the struggle against colonial regime. Besides, illegal *Congress Bulletins* were sold. About a dozen of persons were arrested on this charge. A number of Sindhi books, booklets, pamphlets, even poems, were proscribed by the Government.⁴

The Government banned non-cooperation movement—51 defiant political and semi-political organisations in Sindh were declared by the Bombay Government illegal, their presses banned, their funds, property and premises confiscated.⁵ These organisations included the National Congress Committees, Congress Democratic Party, Bharat Naujawan Sabhas, Vidyarthi Mandals, Naujawan Mitra Mandals, Vidyarthi Samagams, Boycott Committees, Satyagraha Camps, Mahavir Dals, , Sunder Sewak Sabhas, Sudhar Sabhas, Shewak Mandlis, Prem Shewak Mandlis, Naujawan Brothers Mandals, Shri Krishna Shewak Mandals and Shewa Mandlis.⁶

About four dozen of persons were served with a notice under the Emergency Power Ordinance calling upon them not to take part in any way in the Civil Disobedience movement nor to leave their hometowns for a certain period. Some of them were required to report themselves to the police on certain fixed days every week. Some persons were served with a notice to leave immediately certain towns. In some cases orders were not obeyed and the persons either went underground or were arrested. *Chatti* (punitive) police was quartered in certain villages, like Pir-jo-Goth, at the cost of the inhabitants.

To face the unrest, Government opted for wholesale violence, physical outrages, mass-scale arrests, detention, imprisonment, seizure of property, fines and sentences of young and old, men and women; the number of women

including young girls arrested and convicted was around 75. The women and even young girls were sentenced to 2-year term of rigorous imprisonment. The number of persons arrested, detained, fined, imprisoned or sentenced on political grounds was around two thousand.⁷ Some Sindh patriots including the staunchest anti-imperialist leader of militant Hurs, Syed Sibghatullah Shah Pir Pagaro,⁸ were arrested and sentenced on criminal instead of political grounds.

THE AFTERMATH

It appears proper to conclude by recalling the fact that Sindh was not only the first but also the only independent state located in the Indian Subcontinent that was kept by the British imperialism under Martial Law Rule for more than four years (March 1843-September 1847) when, after its two consecutive military defeats in 36-day sequence, respectively, at Miani and Dubbo (the latter was desperately fought with the most celebrated war cry: *Marvesoon per Sindh na desoon*, 'Die we shall but give up Sindh we never'), Sindh was made a part of the British Indian empire. Similarly, the above referred to Hur Movement was indeed the continuation of the traditional Sindhi spirit of patriotism. It is self-evident from the Sindhi Hur freedom-fighters' combat cry: *Watan ya Kafan* ("Free Homeland or Shroud"). "Murderous outrages [deadly forays] were frequent. Twenty-six people were killed in the month of February, 1942. Telegraph and railway lines were sabotaged. In consultation with the Central Government; plans were made by the Provincial Government to cope with these disorders. Special police forces were organised, and in the course of April over 800 Hurs [freedom-fighters] were rounded up and jailed. But in May the situation rapidly worsened. The Karachi-Lahore mail train was derailed on the 16th, and some twenty of the passengers murdered, including the son of Sir G[hulam] H [ussain] Hidayatuallah, the [then] Home Minister [former

Premier of Sindh and the most loyalist lackey of the British imperialism]. Apart from this outrage [assault], there were 33 cases of murder [target-killing]—among the victims was a [loyalist] Congress member of the Provincial Assembly—or gang-robbery [guerrilla-operation] in the period; canals were breached, crops destroyed, and tribute [penalty] exacted from [loyalist] landlords.” [Reginald Coupland, *The Constitutional Problem in India* (London: Oxford University Press, 1945), Vol. II, p.76; quoted in R. C. Majumdar gen. ed., *The History and Culture of the Indian People: Struggle for Freedom*, (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhawan, 2nd. ed. 1988), p. 587.] The British authorities were unable to overwhelm the Hur insurgents by the use of civilian machinations. They were, therefore, constrained to resort to use of brutal force for achieving their long-term objectives. “It was clearly time for the Centre to take a hand.” The Central Government intervened, sent a brigade of infantry, and martial law was proclaimed in the troubled areas. By the end of July, 1942, “some 2,000 Hurs and dacoits [Freedom-fighters] had been arrested and tried by special tribunals and 45 hanged [sent to gallows]. But isolated crimes [militant actions] were still occurring . . .” (*Ibid.*, p. 77; quoted in *ibid.*) Consequently, in view of the utter failure of the civil administration, Martial Law was promulgated on 1st June, 1942: the area under Martial Law covered thirty thousand square miles of the Upper Sindh Frontier (now Jacobabad and Kandhkot-Kashmore districts), Sukkur, Khairpur, Nawabshah and Sanghar districts. This sizeable area of Sindh remained under the ruthless Martial Law Rule (military rule) or under a paramilitary rule i.e. under Sindh Rangers, especially trained for rapidly defeating an uprising/insurrection by quick action, consisting of totally non-Sindhian (i.e. Punjabi +Pathan) semi-soldiers, known to Sindhis as *Bborri Police* or ‘Mute Force’ because they were strictly tongue-tied so that their non-Sindhian composition and anti-Sindhi character

should remain undisclosed. Thus, Sindh remained under such martial law (military rule) and semi-martial law (paramilitary rule) from 1st June 1942 to the end of British rule in South Asia, i.e. till 15th of August 1947. As a result Sindh was indeed a unique political unit throughout the Indian Subcontinent where the mighty British invaders even at the peak of their prestige and power found it necessary to impose Martial Law Rule for many a year immediately after their entry in as well as before their departure from this land of selfless patriots. (Thus, under such momentous conditions, the British Indian Empire, popularly known as the 'British Raj', bequeathed their long-ago conquered territories—even the sovereign states—to the succeeding 'Hindu Raj', and the 'Muslim Raj', arbitrarily—the paramount control over Sindh, as foreboded time and again, was handed over to the latter, of course, for obvious reasons, beyond the scope of this research work to discuss in detail.)

SOURCES:

1. *Daily Gazette*, Karachi, 1930-1934.
2. *Alwahid*, Karachi, 1930-1934.
3. Motiram Satramdas Ramwani, *op.cit.*
4. Naraindas Chainrai Advani, *op. cit.*
5. Vishnu Sharma, *op. cit.*
6. Miscellaneous newspapers/periodicals of the period.
7. Miscellaneous books/articles on the period.

It is wiser not to rear a lion's whelp, but if you do, you must accept its ways.

Quoted in Aristophanes' *Frogs* (405 BC)

Alcibiades (c. 450-404 BC)
Athenian statesman

A dead reign... a strange epoch of folly and shame.

Comment on the France of the Second Empire.
Quoted in Jonna Richardson, *La Vie Parisienne* (1971).

Emile Zola (1804-1902)
French novelist

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INTRODUCTION

1. Plutarch, *Life of Alexander*, chap. LXIV, comp. R. C. Majumdar, *The Classical Accounts of India* (Calcutta: Firma K. L. Mukhopaddhyay, 1960), p. 201.
2. Dr. N. A. Baloch cites a traditional belief in Sindh to the effect that there have been two and half Qalandars in the world, likewise there have been two and half great fights (encounters between *Haq* [Right] and *Batil* [Wrong] in the world):

*As were two and half Qalandars in the world,
So are two and half fights in the world.*

Of these fights one is that of between Hazrat Imam Hussain and Caliph Yazid on the battlefield of Karbala in 680 AD, second is that of Dodo Soomro and the alien invaders from the north at Wigahkot in 1194 AD and the remaining half is shared by the whole world. Another tradition narrated by *Sughar* (professional bard), Haji Naahar Chaang, in a gathering on 19.11.1864, during the Shah Qadri's Fair, has it: "As God Almighty held the store of fights in His hand, the soul of Imam Hussain approached Him first and was given one-half of the store, then came the soul of Dodo Soomro and received one-fourth, the remaining one-fourth was apportioned among rest of the world souls." (Quoted in Saleem Noorhussain trans. ed., *The Epic of Dodo-Chanesar*, Karachi: Culture Department, Government of Sindh, 2011, pp. 14-15). Further, among the war stories available in different countries and languages, very few have their roots in history or semi-history. For instance, the *Shahnama* ('Book of Kings'), based on actual events from the annals of Persia, written in 1010 AD, by a great Persian poet and scholar, Abu

Al-Qasim Mansur Firdausi (c. 935– c. 1020), “is a voluminous chronicle of war stories in which versified tales of not only ancient historical periods are fictitious accounts but those of late historical (Sassanid) period [226-642 AD] also read like semi-historical fiction. Compared to it, the Tale of Dodo-Chanesar is more than a legend as it is connected with a historical period of Sindh and India. . . .” (*Ibid.*, pp. 15-16.) The concept of ‘great fights’ as described and depicted in the most renowned epics of the world, available in different languages, like the Greek/Latin, Sanskrit, Persian/Arabic and Sindhi, needs some necessary elucidation. Homer, Greek Homeros (c. 8th century BC), is a major figure of ancient Greek epic poetry. He is regarded in Greek and Roman antiquity as the author of the world-famous epics of *Iliad* (dealing with episodes in Trojan War, whereby ancient city of Troy—Turkish Truva and Latin Ilium—in modern Western Turkey, was besieged for ten years by a confederation of Greek armies, formed to avenge the gross infringement on their female honour by abducting a Greek lady named Helen, known in history not as Helen of Greece but as Helen of Troy) and *Odyssey* (describing the ten-year wandering of Odysseus, also known as Ulysses, on his way from the Trojan War to Ithaca; also known as tale of wandering). He was believed to be blind poet and was traditionally associated with Ionia, directly across the Aegean Sea from mainland Greece, where four city states had claims to be his birth place. Little is known for certain of these epics, but some believe that they were developed from orally transmitted poems which were modified and extended over many generations. They are usually dated to the 8th century BC, although *Odyssey* is probably later than *Iliad*. The texts were further modified at a later date, specially some sections of the *Iliad* underwent changes to suit the political aspirations of the Athens. More or less the same wont has been adopted in case of other important epics—like the *Mahabharata*, *Ramayana*, *Karbala* and *Dodo-Chanesar*—available in other languages all over the world. In Homeric legend, Troy, the capital city of King Priam, was besieged for a decade by the Greeks to recover Helen, wife of Menelaus, who had been abducted by the youngest son of King Priam.

Despite grave misdemeanour of immature young prince, king Priam, his whole family as well as people at large displayed complete solidarity with the prince and resolutely stood with him in all odd situations and circumstances, and proved themselves as the role model members of a role model family and state. Same applies in case of other major epics of the world. For instance, the epics of *Mahabharata*, *Ramayana*, *Karbala* and *Dodo-Chanesar*, respectively, display and depict the complete unity and solidarity shown beyond any shadow of doubt, by the role model families of Pandavas (in *Mahabharata*), of Sri Ramchandra (in *Ramayana*), of Imam Hussain (in *Karbala*) and of Dodo Soomro (in *Dodo-Chanesar*). All the members of all these families, individually as well as collectively, had proved in their own right as the role model members of these role model families – as head of the family, father, uncle, brother, sister, son, nephew, daughter, niece, people at large and whatnot. Above all, in all these epics, the role played by some women is pivotal, for instance, Helen (in *Iliad*), Draupadi and grandlady Gandhari (in *Mahabharata*), Sita (in *Ramayana*), Bibi Zainab (in *Karbala*) and princess Baaghhi (in *Dodo-Chanesar*). If the outstanding role played by these great ladies is deleted, much interest in all these epics and episodes would instantly be lost. Each and every member of Hazrat Imam Hussain's family is indeed a superb role model. Likewise, each and every member of Dodo Soomro's family, as depicted in the epic *Dodo-Chanesar*, is role model in his or her own right, second to none, or at most, except one, that is, except family members of Hazrat Imam Hussain, although the canvas of epic *Dodo-Chanesar* is much wider and need not be limited to one family only – Dodo Soomro was not only the head of his family but also the most popular sovereign of his country, fully supported by his own family, tribe, friends and the whole Sindhi nation, unconditionally and unquestionably. It is evident from the following observation of an acknowledged great Sindhi scholar, Saleem Noorhussain, in his above mentioned work (pp.13-14):

“The Epic of Dodo-Chanesar is a seven to eight centuries old story of extreme courage narrated

ever since to describe the glorious deeds of heroes belonging to different Sindhi communities and to transmit Sindhi peoples' traditions of honour, integrity, sacrifice, decency and fellow feeling from generation to generation. It can also be identified with a heroic age, which was experienced by the Sindhi Society while struggling for a national identity at a stage of its development when it was dominated by such powerful and war-like nobles as, *inter alia* [alia], Dodo and Chanesar from the Soomro tribe, [Abul] Abro and Bhalla from the Sammo tribe, and Jakhthro from the Jarrego tribe, who earned everlasting fame for their own selves as well as their lineages. The Sindhi peoples' struggle for national identity at this juncture of their history is instanced by the fights put up by all, big and small, high and low, to thwart the advance of the invading army so much so that its commander had to exclaim in exasperation: '*It's though pathways are fighting!*'"

It is also evident from the following incident; when the Sindhian sovereign Dodo Soomro informed his sister, princess Baaghhi, that mighty ruler of Hindustan, Sultan Alauddin

*Khilji has asked for thy hand in marriage
N' wants the throne for Chanesar.*

Her instant reply was:

*For me, you may accept anyone,
Khilji or a dog,
It's all up to you!*

*But you do grant
That your throne is a trust,
All treasure is a trust,
Though there be kings aplenty,
People are happy with you –*

*It you surrender your crown,
You will cause distress to everyone;*

*Those alien invaders, wherever they set foot,
 Let loose a reign of terror n' plunder –
 When a serpent crawls out of her hole,
 Nothing escapes her darting tongue,
 The monster gobbles up raw
 The little ones of the dove in bushes;
 If you've seen a serpent
 You must have seen,
 So long as her tracks remain intact,
 Every being trembles in terror.*

*If you go down fighting,
 You'll have sacrificed yourself for this Land;
 O Dodo, you'll breathe no more,
 But people's faith 'll live on.*

Dodo's response was:

*Thee n' me are of the same blood,
 Thee n' me have the same zest for life,
 It was wise what thee said just now,
 It's after my own heart;
 Man isn't a lump of clay,
 He is neither deaf or dumb,
 Man is all a mystery but a voice too;
 A teal flying off water
 Is like a flash of cold light;
 Death is a shadow sans substance,
 Yea, but something likely outlives,
 That's spark of gene,
 Living through eternity,
 Averting obsolescence,
 Imparting strength n' sap;
 Baaghhi, what thou sayest is true,
 That if I lay down my life today,
 Sacrifice myself for this Land,
 I'll breathe no more,
 But people's faith 'll live on.*

*Death is everyone's foe,
 Though a hunter lies in ambush,*

*The birds, hundreds of them
Fly from their nests down to water holes,
Flap their wings,
Hold sun to their bosoms,
Not worrying when and who of them
Would be pierced with an arrow!*

*Death is a fear in futility,
But time is inexorable.
There's no sunset over void,
Darkness is not infinite,
Stars twinkle within it,
Cascading in lights,
Life is the glow of generations,
Luster of bright gazebos,
From which look out every day,
Wise men, lighting their lamps;
Spark of life shall ever remain aglow,
It's come down aglow to me,
N' shall remain aglow after me,
From one generation to another.
What I've to do this day,
I shall do, that is,
Light up my own lamp.*

It is further evident from the last dialogue between Dodo and Chanesar; when the latter, looking over the dead bodies and the battlefield, saw his younger brother Dodo taking his last breaths. Chanesar said to Dodo:

*The swell of a water-bubble is in vain,
Why did you chose death, Dodo?
Every man's renown is dust,
His sway on this earth too is dust;
Had you agreed to submit,
You would've lived in luxury
N' not died in prime like this.*

Dodo's instant response, just before his dying breath, was:

*Say what thou may,
I won't die,*

*I'll come back in changed guises;
 Though thou may wish otherwise,
 Thou too, Chanesar, 'll come back before me,
 Under a new name,
 In a new guise,
 Thou n' I are locked in mortal combat,
 Since eternity,
 N' shall remain so locked
 Till eternity....*

3. First of these wars, commanded by Dodo Soomro with several community stalwarts, including Abul Abro of Cutch, was in a way successful in repulsing the alien aggression for his Soomro successors succeeded to an intact kingdom and each enjoyed comparatively a peaceful reign; the other three fought at Thatto, Talti and Dubbo (also the Hur armed struggle in last decade of the British rule in Sindh) were not because of weakness of the Sindhian warriors in the battlefield before a professionally trained, well-equipped, well-disciplined and superior military powers. Besides, internal infighting, acute rivalry between the ruling elites and disunity/antagonism among the Sindhian tribes, tribal chieftains and community leaders added a lot to their overall politico-military weakness. It was beyond any shadow of doubt that Sindh, in all fairness, could not be a match for, what to say outsmart, the British imperialism in regard to smart diplomacy, long-term military strategy and politico-economic tactics and manoeuvring. In spite of their best endeavours, the Sindhi political stalwarts—Syed Sibghatullah Shah Pir Pagaro had to welcome the gallows (and his countless followers, men and women, were tortured, jailed and kept in concentration camps for indefinite periods):

*One who retracts is robbed,
 Nangar [Pir] 'll die on destination,
 Give up on Nangar [Pir],
 He will be borne back shrouded.*

*Sky is higher than all, no one is higher than sky,
 Abro [Pir], even after death you had your head high,
 Bravo to you not surrendering any refuge seeker [Sindh].*

*O ye true sons of Sindh, Self-Sacrificers,
Go n' vie with the enemy today,
Each one of you should so train his bow
As to be right on target,
Shooting arrows in a swishing shower,
Like a heavy hail-storm,
Not even a reed is to survive!
Let thy thoroughbreds run in a gallop,
Raising dust-storms all around,
Their neighing striking such terror into enemy
That he loses his spirit instantly.
Today ere we return,
We'll cut down n' kill,
Or go down fighting!*

*Who knows who will be slain,
Those cowards coming in swarms
To attack thy brother [Murshid],
And may be Sindh will be lost.*

*I'll strike n' behead the enemy until I die;
As long as this head is on my shoulders,
They sha'n't occupy this Land,
Who is our [Earth] Mother [not simply a piece of land],
Else this life is of no use.*

*They fought with daggers and scimitars,
Hurled spears and javelins,
Steel swords slashed men,
Horses trained by them ran up to hit n' trample,
Piercing with spears, they hid under horses,
"Hit, Fight" was their lone cry.*

*Having fought southward, they turned eastward,
Having fought eastward, they turned northward,
Having fought northward, they turned westward,
Mighty dispensed death in all four directions,
Coast resounded with clash of arms, waves trembled.*

*What art people affrighted by death
When they die every day?*

*Some die of this,
Some die of that,
Some die this way,
Some die that way,*

*Those, who pass their time
With braves, with swords, with arrows,
N' have their limbs chopped in battlefield,
Those valiant ones, they die for some cause.*

.....
*O ye sons of those bygone brave hearts,
Those high-head mighties,
For whom retreat was a shame,
They wouldn't step into homes,
So long as alien steps trod this soil!*

*Those resolute intrepid men
Were never cowed by adverse wind,
Nor were those courageous steel-limbed ones
Ever shaken off their feet by a dust-storm;
Those valiant ones shine in thee, exultant and proud.*

*Not worrying when and who of them
Would be pierced with an arrow!
Why man is afraid,
Death being a catcher's catch!
Why is this fear in man?
No one can say after his death:
"Alas, I am dead, a pass-away with time."*

*When my [Sindh's] brave son goes to be slain by
Aladin's [archenemy's] soldiers,
His mother [Sindh] would become an ascetic for she has
no other [such brave] son,
She, the wretch of Wigahkot [World], would then be
your obligation, Soomros [Sindhis].*

*West is all black,
South is all violence,
Horses came from north,*

*Sindh lost its braves,
 But morning star has arisen in the east,
 New dawn'll come, new morn'll emerge,
 New Dodos [Heroes] 'll come, new Nangars [Patriots] 'll come,
 Sindh 'll have its braves again,
 Breeze is fragrant with scents of bridegrooms' blood,
 Breeze is fragrant with bridegrooms' blood.*

Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, former Premier of Sindh, was constrained to quit politics at the height of his political career and remained away from the main political battleground till the end of the British Indian Empire. Surprisingly, his philosophy of life at such a crucial juncture was totally unpatriotic, which he was not, and totally non-Sindhian; he unfortunately gave much more importance to his own (or his family's) survival over and above everything including the irreplaceable fatherland. It is truly shameful to believe:

*There's no greater glory than living,
 Is what the sages say.
 Death is total darkness,
 Fistful of bones knocked out by a single blow.*

*The other world is nowhere situate,
 Dust has no beginning,
 Whatever anyone may say,
 Whom doth death support?
 It turns all truth into untruth.*

*Even it be lame,
 A living dog is better than a dead saint,
 O my . . . [well-wisher], how do I know,
 If sun rises after my death!*

[The English Channel] is just a ditch, and will be crossed when someone has the nerve to try it.

From a letter of Nov. 1803.

Napoleon I Bonaparte (1769-1821)
 Emperor of France

All our failures are ultimately failures in love.

From *The Bell*.

Dame (Jean) Iris Murdoch (1919-1999)
 Irish novelist and philosopher

Khan Bahadur Allah Bakhsh Soomro, twice elected Premier of Sindh, was, in the first instance, strangely and extra-constitutionally, dismissed from the position, and later mysteriously killed:

*Horse runs with a rider, falcon flies off a clenched hand
We sons of soil repay readily what we take from Sindh,
Let my head, my breath be forfeit to your fortress [O' Sindh!].*

All of these Sindhi political stalwarts failed to stop Sindh slipping out of the hands of Sindhi patriots. Thus, after their sudden disappearance, the middle-of-the-road, coward and timid politicians of Sindh were easily coerced to toe the line of British imperialism which had obvious vested interest in establishing a buffer state alongside Afghanistan by joining together the Punjab and Sindh, notwithstanding the fact that both of these peoples (nations) had historically remained irreconcilably archenemies of each other since time immemorial.

*All comrades of a coward are liars,
When want stretches its hand to beg,
Its bowl is filled with falsity,
And when the beggar goes away,
Falsity laughs at him,
Tearing away the sheet that covers his face –
Whoever happens to touch it, regrets,
Whoever takes alms, becomes a leper,
Chanesar [quisling] may now think whatever he likes,
No one knows him better than I:
Whose string is in alien hands,
Can't help to dance to the string-puller's tune,
Utterly helpless that he is,
A tug at the string pulls him down,
Places him on a throne, then pushes him off,
Makes and breaks him by pulling his nose-string.*

*Every thought of a coward is false,
His gain, his toil is all false,
His way is false,
His love is false,*

As if he mistook a fragile bangle,
 For a handcuff of others!
 N' perhaps he thinks –
 There is no reaction to an action,
 Everything is here and now
 Man is no more than a corpus,
 That breathes,
 Death dwells in his guts,
 Like a tick on a dog's ear.

Oh, I know how you resent the way I have to show you up to yourself. I don't blame you. I know from my own experience it's bitter medicine, facing yourself in the mirror with the old false whiskers off. But you forget that, once you're cured. You'll be grateful to me when all at once you find you're able to admit, without feeling ashamed, that . . . I'm just an old man who is scared of life, but even more scared of dying. So I'm keeping drunk and hanging on to life at any price, and what of it?

Hicky in Act 2 of *The Iceman Cometh* (1946).

Eugene Gladstone O'Neill
 (1888-1953), US playwright

4. This war was commanded by Dodo II Soomro along with renowned community leaders like Abul Abro, Veerum Paahorio, Deo and Aasio Sodho, Ghalo Ghanghro, Jam Muhar Notiaar and his brother Aari, Jagsean Weghwaar (or Meghwaar), Morio Sammo, Odhar Udhejo, Bhallo Jam and his nephew Sabarr, Jakhrio Jaarrejani (or Hothiani) and his son Mumut, Ranmal Jarrejo, Sawai Samejo, Jakhro Jarrejo, etc. Following tribes are said to have been invited in the traditional 'turban-tying ceremony' (equivalent to coronation) to select out of three legal heirs—Bhaaghhi (elder sister), Chanesar and Dodo—the one rightful successor to late Bhoongar Rai's throne: Soomros from Bahrmir (now in Rajasthan), Bhattis of Jaisalmir (also in present-day Rajasthan), Chauhans of Ajmer (also in modern Rajasthan), Rajars from Mathelo, Sodhos from Dhutt (now in Rajasthan), Sammos from Kutch Bhuj (now in Gujarat province in India), and Channos from Kachho. Like *Mahabharat* civil war in Hindustan (and that of Lashari-Rind civil war in Baluchistan)), this Sindhian defensive war against the alien aggressors symbolises a watershed which provides equal and autochthonous status to all the tribes and peoples of Sindh

(as in modern terminology the term 'original citizens' is in contrast to 'naturalised citizens', or for example, 'Sindhi' tribes/people and 'Sindhiised' tribes/people, latter status is granted, of course, after fulfilling certain vital prerequisites as discussed below with reference to Hunas and Scythians), who participated in the above referred to war in the defence of Sindh's independence, honour and dignity—even the so-designated traitor Chanesar Soomro, elder brother of Dodo, who conspired, instigated and sided with the aggressor did not tolerate the unwarranted disgrace and humiliation of the dead body of his younger brother Dodo Soomro (the alien general's playing down or lowering the upward posture or position of his traditional Sindhian style mustachios—even to this day touching of moustache by an adversary is one of the great disgraces for a Sindhi—a matter of life and death for a jealous, *ghairatmand*, Sindhi) and instantly fought unto death belatedly against the callous invaders upholding the honour and dignity of his family and fatherland. According to one tradition, when Dodo was mortally wounded, Chanesar approached him and cried:

*I never imagined that lord Dodo would die like this,
He was protector of the weak, compassionate n' just.*

(This is perhaps the singular war in the chequered history of Sindh wherein the whole of heroic band of Sindhi patriots proceeded to fight the besiegers until everyone of them was martyred.)

In case of above referred to Hindustani and Baluchistani civil wars mere participation on either side is precondition but in case of Sindh only the tribes and people who fought for the defence of Sindh's independence, honour and dignity are entitled to be treated as original tribes and people of Sindh. This emphasises that rallying point of all the Sindhi tribes and people almost always could be and would be the name of Sindh only.

5. What the British commanders had seen of the daredevilry of the Sindhi warriors in their two encounters in Miani and Dubbo had so impressed them that they had to use draconian measures like martial law to forestall its likely

eruption. The martial law imposed in 1843 was a short-lived affair, but the one imposed 99 years later was not. What had been simmering all these years boiled over in early 1940s as armed challenge to British imperialism under the banner of 'Watan ya Kafan' (Free Homeland or Shroud) launched by Hurs (Sindhi Freedom Fighters) in heroic continuation of the traditional Sindhian spirit of patriotism. It surged ahead so powerfully that the civilian authorities were unable to cope with it. Consequently, highups had no choice but to use the same draconian measure it had used immediately after the capture of Sindh in 1843. This time the martial law or military rule and paramilitary rule (imposition of extraordinary laws, rules, regulations and handing over the maintenance of law and order to the army or the newly formed paramilitary force, called Sindh Rangers) had much longer life: from 01.06.1942 to 15.08.1947 (and thereafter up to 1952 when the uncalled-for and unwarranted victimisation of the Sindhi Hur patriots was eventually stopped). The British regime's this draconian measure covered an area of 18,433 sq. miles of Upper Sindh Frontier, Sukkur, Khairpur, and Sanghar districts. Thus, Sindh was the only political unit in whole of the Indian Subcontinent where the mighty British Indian Empire was constrained to establish military rule for more than four years after the conquest as well as before the departure from this Land of selfless patriots.

*No coward soul is mine,
No trembler in the world's storm-troubled sphere;
I see Heaven's glories shine,
And faith shines equal, arming me from fear.*

From 'No coward
soul is mine' (1846).

Emily Jane Bronte (1818-1848)
pseud. Ellis Bell

I hope you have not been leading a double life, pretending to be wicked and being really good all the time. That would be hypocrisy. [If so, what about vice versa?]

Said by Cecily in Act 2, *The Importance of Being Earnest* (1895)

Oscar Wilde (1854-1900)
Irish playwright, poet and wit

References & Notes

CHAPTER 1

1. Introduction of a settled agricultural economy involving, as it did, artificial irrigation led to fusion of heterogeneous elements into homogeneous ethnic community and emergence of different classes which brought radical changes in the socio-political make-up of Sindhi society. In populous centres of trade and craft and also in neighbouring countryside gravitating to those centres, the tribal isolationism based on blood and marriage weakened and gave way to strong territorial ties. In due process, the tribes and tribal unions that emerged at the final stages of development of the primitive-clan mode of production were consolidated into a single nationality.
2. The belief of Aryans' immigration into Sindh itself, though generally accepted, is still strongly debated. And if immigration be admitted, one has, probably, to admit not one but several successive streams of immigration.
3. When contacted for help by the Pandava emissaries, Sindhi Raja's blunt refusal was based mainly on four rational grounds: (1) Jayadratha was married to a girl of Kauruva royal family. (2) In Sindh, since time immemorial, the principle of primogeniture was strictly observed. As per this principle if there is a permanent disqualification applicable to any ruler, such as blindness of Dhritrashtra, the blind king of Hastinapur, the right to rule the kingdom will *ipso facto* devolve on his eldest son (in this case on Duryodhana) and not to any of his brother, what to say his any nephew (in this case, Yudhishthira, king of Indraprastha)—in other words, switching of rule from Kauruva family or sub-clan to Pandava, despite the fact that both families or sub-clans were sharing the common membership of the main tribe of Kuru, was not justified. It was therefore very difficult for

Sindhuraja Jayadratha to go against the principle of primogeniture, which was strictly observed in Sindh. (3) As per Sindhian standards, honoured in Sindh since time immemorial, Yudhisthira proved himself to be a 'Bad' king by putting at stake, and that also in gambling, his kingdom (along with himself, his four brothers, their co-wife Draupadi, and all his subjects except Brahmans, who were not saleable commodity), while as per Sindhian tradition the ruler (political leader of a state) was supposed to welcome death in action (political struggle) on the battleground along with his valiant army as a man rather than to surrender (compromise with adversaries) to save his skin and get some extension in his limited (political) life: In unequal war, as per Sindhian folk tradition, *"yes, you will surely die on the battlefield [in the political arena] but the people's solemn faith in you, as a ruler-protector [political saviour] of the vital interests of their beloved motherland, will surely not die down."* Thus, Yudhisthira's despicable act, in the eyes of all Sindhis, including their Raja (political leader), Jayadratha, i.e. placing his State at stake, in gambling, which in fact was undoubtedly an unforgivable crime against the innocent masses. On the other hand, despite many a flaw in the character of Daryodhana, his respond to Lord Krishna's request ('arbitration') is no doubt laudable: when the latter for the sake of peace, and in order to avert a disastrous war, offered his advice, if Kauravas agree to give (return) Pandavas five villages only, they would be satisfied and would make no more demand. Daryodhana's response as a veritable king was: "I would not part even with land as small as the point of a needle." Not only this, he instantly ordered his soldiers to kill (Lord) Krishna, believed to be an Avatar (incarnation) of god Vishnu, but failed. This response was naturally appreciable to the then Sindhi Raja, himself a great Sindhi patriot of that era. (4) The then Sindh had no significant grievance, antagonism or hostility towards any other country except the self-seeking Panjdoabi (later on shortened and called the Punjabi) chieftains who unilaterally and arbitrarily used to intervene and interfere in the flow of waters of the five rivers (Vitasta, Askini, Purusni, Vipasa and Satadri), as and when they desired, despite the fact that all of

them were the natural tributaries of the River Sindhu, later called 'Indus' by the Greeks, as they called the 'Punjadoab' as 'Pentapotamia' ('Penta' meaning 'Five' and 'Potamia' meaning 'rivers' or 'doab', exactly on the pattern of 'Mesopotamia' i.e. 'Meso' meaning 'Two' and 'potamia' meaning 'rivers' or 'doab' of rivers Tigris and Euphrates), passing through the Land of Punjdoab to their tail-ender country, Sindh. It was, therefore, very difficult for the Sindhuraja to take any arbitrary decision which could be (or, surely would have been) unwelcome to the Sindhian masses as well as the Sindhian army to fight alongside their archenemies, the Panjdoabis, against any other country. So the Sindhuraja Jaydratha was left with no choice but to fight simultaneously against both the Panjdoabis as well as against their patrons, the invincible Pandavas, rejecting outrightly all the forebodings about encountering the forces fully supported by Lord Krishna. (As forebode, the Pandavas were successful in this decisive battle and the Kauravas were completely routed—Sindhuraja gave his life, along with his whole army to a man, on the battlefield. However, his kingdom remained intact in the secure hands of his legitimate heirs.) The legacy of the Sindhi Raja's historic stance and stand based, as it was, on the objective conditions and patriotic grounds left indelible mark on the subsequent politico-ideological development of Sindh. The ancient Sindhi ruler did not hesitate, in the words of Jethmal Parsram, "to fight even against Lord Krishna whom Hindus believe to be God [god]." Jethmal Parsram, *D.G.*, 11 February 1920, p. 8. (Sp. at public meeting held on 6 February 1920 at Holmstead Hall, Hyderabad, progs. pub. under cap. "Outstations: Hyderabad.") This incident proves beyond any shadow of doubt that, if the influx of Indo-Aryans in Sindh is an undeniable fact, the Sindhuraja, certainly representing the new-comer Aryan aristocracy, by that time was completely Sindhiised, willingly and voluntarily accepting the pre-Aryan native culture, ethos and characteristics as well as age-old noble traditions of the native people of Sindh. Above all, even in Vedic Age, known for fanatical religiosity (i.e., *idee fixe* Vedic Hinduism), Sindhis at that time also were outstandingly and rightly, what is now called, 'secularists'; in other words, all social,

political, economic, moral or religious ideas and ideologies are supposed to serve the cause of human beings, not *vice versa*, that is, the ideas and ideologies have not been given birth to exploit inhumanely the human beings as and when they deem expedient keeping in view their own vested interests. This was, no doubt, a great achievement in so earlier times (i.e., before the last millennium BC). Therefore, Sindhiised Arayans at the time were certainly not the followers of fanatical religious dogmas, unlike elsewhere in India, including the Panjdoab.

4. The birth-stories of Lord Buddha (d. 486 BC), in previous existences, composed sometime before the third century BC but written down not till 80 BC.
5. However, no warriors or elephants, mistakenly claimed by some local writers, were sent in help of Darius III, in his decisive battle held at Gaugamela near Arbela (modern Erbil in the vicinity of Mosul in north-west of modern Iraq) in 331 BC. There is probability that a strong detachment sent by the satraps of Aracosia (Kandahar or Kandhar region) and Bactria (Balkh or Bakhtar, Afghan Turkistan), might have included, among others, Gandarioi (Gandharians of Peshawar Valley), Paktues or Paktuike (Pakhtuns), Aparutai (?Afridis) and Hinduśh or Indians (resident of Sindh Sagar Doab of the Panjdoab) sent possibly by Omphis (Ambhi) as a local satrap— all this inference is based on conjecture because there is no solid evidence available on the subject. Nevertheless, the stiff resistance to the Macedonians in the above referred to war was put up by the Scythian and Bactrian formations from Eastern Iran (now called Afghanistan).
6. In the whole description of Sindh by Alexander's historians we meet with the names of a number of tribes and tribal unions. In fact, the regions are named after tribes and tribal unions such as Malloi, Oxydracae, Xathri, Praesti, Sambastae, Patalae, Abastanoi, Siboi, Sodrai, Ossadii, Arabitae, Oreitai, Massanoi.
7. Greek historian, Diodorus Siculus (1st. cent. BC), *Bibliothēke Historike*, Bk. 17th, chap. CII, comp. R. C. Majumdar, *op. cit.*, p.

181. To quote another Greek source, "Clitarchus says that 80,000 of Indians [Sindhis] were slain in that part of country, and that numerous prisoners were sold as slaves." Roman historian Quintus Curtius Rufus, *The History of Alexander the Great*, Bk. 8th, chap. VIII, comp. R. C. Majumdar, *op. cit.*, p. 152. To Greeks, their 'crime' was: The Brahmans of each village *en bloc* along with volunteer womenfolk of neighbourhood in general and Brahman women in particular went to each and every dwelling of Khatri (warrior caste), from door to door, reminding them of their utter failure to fulfil their national duty to defend the dignity, honour and independence of their fatherland resolutely, and politely offered each of them to choose one of the two choices: either to take *malha* (rosary) from a Brahman and confine himself in a *marrhi* (temple) or take bangles and/or *rao/poati* (a sheet of cloth used as female head-cover) from any woman and secure himself in the home performing housework so as to avoid, *albeit* shamelessly, any risk to his life; for as a Khatri it was his bounden duty to selflessly defend his motherland and be always ready to fight unto death as and when the dignity, honour and independence of his people and motherland is in danger. Therefore, you Khatri, give us your war weapons and be witness to our inevitable massacre by the enemy forces for non-warrior Brahmans and Sindhi womenfolk would surely not be able to achieve any substantial success against an invincible invader like Alexander the Great. However, it will surely go in history that such number of Sindhi patriots, men and women, sacrificed their lives before the inescapable defeat, for surrender had never remained a choice worth consideration of Sindhis throughout the long history of Sindh. (Even to this day, presentation of an *asa* (Mulla's stick) or *tasbih* (rosary), as a ridicule, from a man or bangles or a *poati/rao* from a woman to a Sindhi patriot is one of the greatest disgrace and dishonour on earth (just declaring him in loud and clear words 'unmanly' individual i.e. not fit to leave behind his offsprings as he is merely an unholy burden on earth-mother) for any and every Sindhi living anywhere. Such a Sindhi deserves nothing but most humiliating taunts from all and sundry — first of all from his own mother and wife:

Mother: Before you're born, I sought blessings of holy men n' living saints,
 Prayed at shrines of dead saints,
 Happily suffered the pain of bearing you in my womb for ten months,
 Now it seems all my labours have been of no avail in the Lord's court.
 You, son, were born by the grace of Spiritual Guide,
 I fed you in diapers butter on the point of sword,
 So that you may grow up big n' strong,
 For greatness of you grown ups lies in waging wars,
 Crossing swords is the occupation, field and crop of we Samuats [Veterans],
 Now sell your horses n' get yourself a flock of sheep,
 While your sheep graze Indus banks,
 You roam about with lambs on your shoulders,
 A red cane in your hand, act weak n' frail, son,
 Your mom will work for monthly wages in the court of king,
 We'll live by selling butter milk.

Wife: Aunty, have a poati, dyed for my husband to wear,
 We two of afore would now become three.
 Send for carpenters n' other artisans of Wigahkot [town],
 Have them saw out spinning wheels of sandal-wood n' ivory,
 Have bundles of yarn brought from Jaisalmir,
 We used to spin hardly quarter of a seer [2 lbs] before,
 Now it would be more than a seer,
 That's what . . . [he] has won, aunty,
 He would now be a drain on the house.
 Without our hubbies we're hapless,
 May our saint protect our chastity,
 I'm ... [now my husband's] sister, he's my brother,
 God Himself knows I'll never share bed with him,
 Now Bro... [my ex-husband], you ought not to stay put.

*"In my ballets [Sindhian folk songs and folk stories], woman is first.
 Men are consorts. God made men to sing the praise of women. They
 are not equal to men: they are better.*

Quoted in *Times*, 15 Sept. 1980.

George Balanchine (1904-1983)
 US choreographer

8. The military administration, as elsewhere, remained with the Greek generals and civil administration, like elsewhere, seemingly came under the overall control of former Punjabi Raja, Porus, who, after his decisive defeat and getting his life

saved by mighty invader had beseeched to Alexander for fulfilling his cherished dream, and earnest desire, to serve him as a loyal governor over the areas conquered by him, especially Sindh—however, his dream and desire were soon frustrated because Greek conquest in Sindh was just short-lived.

9. The pride and joy of Alexander's untimely death, as per Sindhian folk-memory was an eventual result of fatal arrow-shot received by him, during his daring assault on the Multan fort, that caused him an incurable wound for the arrowhead was aptly treated (i.e. ~~its~~ iron was admixed) with donkey's urine, which sooner or later destroys completely the victim's immunity system, causing his/her sure death, either as a result of a disease now known as 'tetanus' or any other disease caused by immunodeficiency.
10. Though Hellenic princes from Bactria annexed parts of north-west India in the second century BC, it is doubtful if Sindh ever came under their effective rule. There are, however, some reasons to believe that during the reigns of Demetrius I (r. 189-167 BC), who conquered Gandhara and the Punjab around 185 BC, and Menander (r. 160-140 BC) they might have made raids over some areas of Sindh.
11. The Scythians, like their compatriots (Parthians) in the Central Asian steppes, were cattle-herders living in the tribal stage of development. The pressure on them of the vigorous and aggressive White Huns first pushed them down the Oxus to the Aral Sea, and then, turning south-eastwards, into the Kabul Valley and modern Sistan, to the north-west India (Peshawar Valley and the Punjab) and to the south-west of the Indian Subcontinent (Baluchistan and Sindh).
12. Nevertheless, they brought with them some specific institutions and distinct traditions: every Scythian village was a self-governing small state made up of people of kindred blood who were fully aware of their absolute equality between themselves, the poorest is by birth a gentleman, therefore, is equal of greatest: *Gorrhey kan brober*; every horse has equal number of ears; also they had consciousness of their superiority over the men of menial

castes like those of cobblers, potters and weavers (*Gorrhay ain gaddah mein farq aahey*; there is obvious distinction between a horse and a donkey); the relationship of a Scythian village to state (or a Scythian state to an empire) was that of a semi-autonomous/independent unit/state paying a fixed sum of revenue/tribute—only a few governments (and empires) tried to assert more authority or power and those which did soon found that dispatching armed militia/force against Scythian village/state was not very gainful; the Scythian spirit of freedom and equality refused to submit to Brahmanical/religious dogmas and in its turn drew the open denunciation of the privileged posture of clerics; the upper caste Hindus' (and privileged clerics') belittling of a Scythian did not in the least lower the Scythian in his own eyes nor exalt the cleric or Khatri/Mujahid in the Scythian's estimation, on the other hand, he assumed a somewhat disdainful attitude towards the clerics whom he regarded a little better than a soothsayer or mendicant. A Scythian is always prepared to fight combats (and battles) for his homestead (and homeland) and he seldom fled from his village (or state) when the intruders or invaders came. If a Scythian was maltreated or his women were molested even by the ruler or conqueror, he was honour-bound to settle his score by anyway. He was born worker and warrior. He had developed an attitude of indifference to worldly possessions and an inclination for staking his life against the odds. He was also conscious of his key role in the defence of his country—his type of patriotism was therefore straightaway inimical to foreigners and compassionate, even cynical, towards his own countrymen whose destiny depended so much on his boldness and perseverance. The Scythians also brought with them certain valuable institutions, for instance, the *panchayat*, a chosen body of five elders, to which they pledged their allegiance. Almost all of their peculiar characteristics, in essence, were either identical or congenial to ancient Sindhian traditions and practices. As a result, the intermingling or fusion between the two on the whole was not only less painful but also quite easier. Consequently, there did not take place any real, or even substantial, difference between the ancient and medieval periods of

Sindhian history because the living tradition concerning the ancient—in Sindh—was not broken at all as a result of three major eruptions of foreigners—the Scythians as well as that of the Kushans and the White Huns—the first through the south-west and latter two through north-west. Hence, the ancient tradition of native people of Sindh is very much alive even to this day for the Sindhis have never allowed the foreign invading hordes, including the Scythians, Kushans, White Huns, Arabs, Arghuns-Tarkhans, Mughals and even the British, to become so overwhelmingly predominant and influential, i.e., to be treated as role models of Sindhis,— with the benefit of hindsight—the veritable legatees of the magnificent Indus civilisation, who did not allow any alien either to be able or even be acquiesced to destroy all memory of Sindh's *amour-propre* glorious past and time-honoured, magnanimous, prehistoric traditions which still form an influential and standard practice to be followed by self-respecting Sindhis as and when in confusion.

13. The Parthians and Scythians of Eastern Iran were so intermingled as to have become almost a composite race—the Pahlavas or Pahlavis.
14. Together with these tribes there also came the Gurjaras, who settled in the Punjab, Sindh, Rajasthan, Malwa (both in central and northern India) and that part of the Subcontinent in south of Sindh which came to be known after them—Gujarat. Their settlement in the Punjab was overwhelming: Gujrat, Gojra, Gujranwalla (Gujuru-walla), Gujarnalla and a number of other places, localities and spots especially in the present-day (western) Punjab, and Gujar Garhi in Mardan and their large population in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Swat and Dir. Hunas destroyed completely the famous Gandhara civilisation along with its renowned centre, the Taxila city, and its university. Their influence on the genesis and ethos of the Pashtuns of K. P. and the Punjabis of Western Punjab was undoubtedly profound. It was like the Anglo-Saxon invasion of Britain. The Huna settlement on both sides of the Askini (Ascesines of the classical writers) river was overwhelming with the result that its name was changed from Askini to Chanab even to this day. The obsession with the word

'channa' in the Punjabi language is almost unparalleled as it had almost replaced all the shades of the term 'mahboob' (the 'loved one') in whole of the Punjab. The term 'Gujjar girl' had also become a 'symbol of beauty' in the Punjab as well as in Sindh even today.

15. But the White Hunas or Huns did not disappear altogether with their Empire. Among other legacies they left the title of *Khan everywhere*—besides in the country of their origin, later known as Mongolia—now hallmark among the Pathans, Punjabis, Baloch, northern Indians and to some extent Sindhis, of course, among Mussalmans only.
16. The origins of the Rai Dynasty of Sindh have been much debated by the historians. Sir A. (Alexander) Cunningham was the first person to put forth the view that the rulers of that dynasty were certainly descendants of the Huns who had invaded India in the third quarter of the fifth century AD. [Cunningham, "Later Indo-Scythians, White Huns or Epthalites." *Numismatic Chronicle*, XII (1894), pp. 243-93—a paper he read before the International Oriental Congress in London in 1892). *The Imperial Gazetteer of India*, Vol. XXII (Calcutta: Superintendent of Government Printing, 1908), p. 177, supported Sir A. Cunningham's view and so did Henry Cousens, *The Antiquities of Sind with Historical Outline*, Vol. XLVI of *The Archeological Survey of India*, (Imperial Series) Calcutta: Central Publication Branch, 1929, p. 7). A. F. Hoernle (*Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal* for 1889, p. 229) believed that Sindh was actually conquered by the Huns and he hinted at the Hunnish origins of the Rai dynasty. Indian historians are mostly silent about the origins of that dynasty. Neither R. C. Majumdar ("The Arab Invasion of India," *Dacca University Supplement*, Bulletin XV [1931] nor H. C. Ray (*The Dynastic History of Northern India*, Vol. I, chap. i, "Dynastic History of Sind") discusses the origins of the Rai dynasty. In 1921, C. V. Vaidya (*History of Medieval Hindu India*, Poona: Oriental Book Supplying Agency, 1921-1926, Vol. I, p. 19) advanced the view that it was of Mauryan origin and therefore its rulers were the descendants of the Maurya dynasty which was established in India immediately after the invasion of Alexander the Great. In 1946, B. D. Mirchandani in

his article ("Sind and the White Huns," *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bombay*, New Series, Vol. XXXIX, 1964, pp. 61-93) argued that Sindh was never conquered by the Huns. He rejected the Hunnish origins of the Rai dynasty, but failed to establish any new basis for its origins.

17. For example, administrative machinery, standing army, internal sources of state revenue, fortifications.
18. Provincial territories were as under. Brahmanabad: what is now *Wicholo* (Central Sindh), eastward of the Indus together with whole of *Lar* (Lower Sindh) and Cutch. Sehwan: broadly speaking (former) districts of Larkano, Dadu, Karachi, Thatto and Las Belo. *Askaland*: present-day Bahawalpur division and a part of adjoining areas now incorporated in the Punjab. *Multan*: ran up to as far as Salt Range. Edward Thornton (*A Gazetteer of the Countries Adjacent to India on the North-West*, Vol. II; London, 1844, pp.219-20 [Reprint]; Karachi: Indus Publications, 1996), quoting Pottinger and 'native authorities' describes the dominion extending, "on the north, to the present provinces of Kashmir and Kabool; southward, to Surat and the island now called Diu; along the sea-coast to Meckran; and eastward, to the provinces of Marwar, Beekaneer, &c."
19. Large scale induction of the Hunas into the body politic of Sindh (also in the Punjab), predominated by the already Sindhiised Scythians, gave birth to a process of ethnogenetic change in the thought process and composition of the native population. What had hitherto been a largely homogeneous nation came to be influenced by immigrant elements all over Sindh—but in the Punjab it influenced quite differently, giving birth to two groups of the populace, what are now known as the Muslim and Sikh-Hindu segments of the Punjab's population. (In Sindh, approximately 70% of the combined [Scythian and Huna] Sindhi population evince the Scythian and about 30% that of the Huna ethnogenesis—the ratio in the Punjab is nearly *vice versa* in case of the Punjabi Muslims, whereas about 70% of the Sikhs and Hindus display Scythian and nearly 30% that of Huna ethnogenesis. Distinction between the above referred to two main segments

of the Punjabi population is more marked than Sindh. Almost all the clans, tribes and *bradaris* commonly known as the *Jatts*, for instance, Bhinders, Bajwas, Chahals, Chathas, Cheemas, Dhillons, Gills, Maans, Sandhus, Sidhus, Siyals, Tararrs, Virks, Randhawas, Waraichs etc. are of the Scythian origin; whereas the *Rajputs*, for example, Arains [Bhuttos], Awans, Bhattis, Dogras, Gakhars, Chans, Khannas, Chauhans, Gujjars, Rawats, Rathors, Thakurs, Rangarrs, Janjuas, Johiyas, Tiwanas, Wattoos etc. are of the Huna ethnogenesis—in Sindh, both the Sindhiised Scythians and Sindhiised Hunas are treated as *Rajputs*, the former as Soorajvansi and the latter as Chandravansi, and in due course of time, the difference and distinction between the two had been slowly and gradually blurred—despite the fact that a number of clans and tribes are commonly found in the Punjab and Sindh.) Unfortunately, no scientific work, like genetic analysis of the different segments of the tribes/clans, is available on the subject. Consequently, one has to rely on guess work and conjecture, for instance, by looking at the physical features and ethological characteristics of each tribe/clan. In fact, use of the words ‘tribe’ and ‘clan’ in ethnic sense is not an appropriate usage because they are generally not homogeneous units or segments but a conglomerations of disparate ethnic entities, called *zaats* (castes), *bradaris* (brotherhoods) or *parros* (branches) of a tribe or clan. Consequently, the name of same zaat, bradari or parro could be found in more than one tribe or clan, indicating common ethnicity of the former because, historically, development of the tribal system has not started from family to zaat/bradari/parro to tribe or clan but *vice versa*—initially tribal/clan chief (sardar or chief sardar) asserted that he holds sway over some specific area where his tribe/clan forms majority (superiority)—some isolated segments of different tribes, if found convenient not to leave the area, acquiesced to or acknowledged fealty to that chief and in due course of time, the said segment was considered as the zaat, bradari or parro of that chief’s tribe. (Ahmad Shah Abdali was provided a number warriors by the then chief of Bugti tribe in one of the former’s invasions of India, perhaps in 1761, in return he [Bugti chief] was supplied more than a hundred Marathos as

slaves in compensation of the Bugti mercenaries' valuable service in the invasion—presently there is Maratho bradari or parro of Bugti tribe consisting of the offsprings of those Maratho slaves.) As the number of the Huna elements rose in Sindh over the years, the homogeneity of the Sindhian society (also of the Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) underwent an ethnogenetic transformation for the Huna elements differed widely from the native people, for example, in physical features, ethnological characteristics and ethological outlook, especially in view of their (Huna's) self-righteous ethos, sanctimonious mindset and totally self-centred world-view. It naturally gave birth to a deep and lasting socio-ideological cleavage and conflict between the two main segments of the people, especially in regard to:

1. PHYSICAL FEATURES: The Scythians were generally born round-headed. On the other hand, absolutely white-skinned Hunas were mostly born long-headed. Similarly, the cheekbones of the Scythians were on the whole flat and smooth, and those of the Hunas usually prominent (i.e., a little bit heightened).

2. ETHOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS: For the Sindhiised Scythians, like native Sindhis, the defeat and the escape from the battlefield was one of the greatest disgrace, dishonour and humiliation on earth not only for the particular person but also his family, tribe and the nation as a whole: (i) *khateen ya haraeen, handh tuhinjo heeo!* (ii) *bhaggo aaon na wass-haan, muo ta manjaan!* (iii) *Die or kill, never runback.* (vi) As per the folk tradition depicted in a folk ballad: *Even as he sustained eighteen sword cuts on head, He stood his ground like an unfeeling rock.* To a valiant Sindhiised Scythian warrior, the marks of enemy's pounds on his face or chest were indeed the badges of honour but any such mark, if on his back, was an absolutely unbearable disgrace and shame; *Kaandh mohun mein dhakrra, sekeenday soonhaan; ta pinn lajj maraan, jey huvwans puth mein!* (I'd willingly foment the blows borne by you [my husband] in face, fomenting them would be a shame if they be in the back.) For newcomer Hunas, however, defeat or runaway from the battleground had no importance at all except providing true feedback and disclosing the weakness

and non-conduciveness of the objective conditions at that juncture but the victory could be and would be achieved at another occasion in future, i.e., as and when it would be feasible, no matter if the waiting period was prolonged for many a generation. Therefore, escape or withdrawal from the fight with a view to save life for the future encounter was not deplorable but an appreciable act of bravery; *jitey pujjan naahey kam, titey bhajjan kam varyaam jo!* The Huna psyche, therefore, had always assigned priority to survival—ready to surrender completely, physically as well as ethically (without giving any consideration whatsoever to the individual or national honour) before the powerful invader and work for him as a compliant he or she captive, army camp-follower herlot or harlot and willing mercenary beyond any imagination as long as he holds his power intact. They disdained earning an honest, painstaking and painful living, were proud of being mercenary of the invincible invaders, irrespective of their race and religion, be that a Muslim or non-Muslim of the Central Asia or the British from the Western Europe. This psyche indeed is practical and pragmatic. The Sikh Punjabis, like Sindhis, on the whole, are largely free of this psychological trait whereas their counterparts the Punjabi Mussalmans did not because the latter are largely dominated by Huna ethnogenesis. For a Sindhiised Scythian it was a badge of honour to die on the battlefield: resort even to the acts of desperation (or self-destruction) was all right as and when, especially in case, they face a sure defeat, because the code of Sindhiised Scythian war etiquette, like that of old natives, did not know surrender and they could not reconcile themselves to a defeat; it guided them only to victory or annihilation. So, while charging their desperate final or fatal resistance, they usually take up naked swords (without shields) in hands, then they sally forth to court a sure but a heroic death by mutually tying up each other by iron chains or *patkos* (turbans) around their waists—as they desperately did as late as 1525 AD in the last battle fought against Arghuns (Afghan Mussalman invaders) at Chachkan near Badin and as a result around twenty thousand totally vulnerable valiant patriots of Sindh and Cutch were slain mercilessly and all of

them were shamelessly slaughtered to a man by the Afghan Muslim invaders in the name of so-called battle against an oppressed Muslim country, of course, on the battlefield but none runaway:

*There's no telling about life, I'll embrace death;
Playing with steel, never step back.*

*Braves are happy to be roasted on spits like moths,
They sacrifice themselves with their eyes open.*

*He falls upon the aliens like the wind,
Nangar doesn't fall back as if he were a river in spate.*

As per Sindhian war etiquettes, this type of posture, indication, mark of collective suicide or sure death is an age-old tradition of *jauhar*, literally 'mettle', a final gesture of valour and *amour-propre* displayed by the men of mettle, which is obvisourly preferred to collective flee or surrender; the latter being an everlasting national disgrace and shame even for erstwhile forefathers as well as the forthcoming offsprings. (On the other hand, they themselves refrain from fighting with their enemies if they had displayed such a sure collective suicide posture to them—in that case they usually would allow their enemies to return back safely without any humiliation or disgrace even of the defeat.) In case of a decisive defeat by their brave menfolk on the battlefield of homeland the womenfolk of Sindhiised Scythians and native Sindhis used to immolate themselves *en bloc* instantly in the forts, by jumping alive into the fire (performance of burning-alive ceremony called *Sati*) or into the wells or falling themselves from the fort-walls (while their menfolk fought unto death outside the fort walls), they (women) quite rightly strove for earning the cherished female honour of national martyrs as *satis*, revealing beyond any shadow of doubt their inherent abhorrence to become captives, kept women of enemies. The above referred to *jauhar*, to share the fate of their life-partners, was resorted to during the Arab invasion of Sindh (712 AD), also, in some forts and fortresses of Sindh, including Brahmanabad and Aror, of course, with the gallant participation and inaugural role played by the greatly adored first lady (ladies) and an all-time dauntless

Sindhian heroine(s) Rani Laaddee in Brahmanabad (Arab sources tell a purely fabricated story of her alleged marriage with the conqueror-general which was simply cracking of a cruel joke about the most celebrated lady-patriot of Sindh at the time) and Rani Maaeen, the other venerated widow of great chivalrous Sindhi sovereign, Raja Dahar, in Aror. Both of these renowned Sindhian lady-patriots were much more revered by Sindhis than, more than five centuries later, Rani Padmavati (meaning *Kamval* or Lotus) of Chitor by Rajputs of Rajasthan; as Chitor had become an eternal symbol of Rajput code of honour so, since 712 AD, Brahmanabad and Aror had become highly elevated symbols of Sindhian code of honour forever.

3. MISCELLANEOUS: The Sindhiised Scythians were virtually honour-bound to keep their *wachan* ('word') at any cost and risk, even of life. But for the Hunas, the *wachan* was a useless or futile concept, especially for the brave, daring and courageous people; for fulfilment of the *wachan* was just a constraint and compulsion of weak, helpless and coward individuals: *frindee ghrindee mardaan dee, na mardaan dee aik!* Therefore, an ethnogenetic change leading to mutual enmity and animosity between the two segments of populace which differed considerably from one another in physical appearances (features), socio-cultural characteristics and ethnogenetic ethos was just inevitable and was to continue for very long period before dying down once and for all. As political power in Sindh, at the time, was held by the newcomer Hunas, hence the already Sindhiised Scythians and native Sindhis were left with no choice but to take very desperate actions for resolving the conflict once and for all. Consequently, as and when the Scythians and native Sindhis found feasible, especially in isolated and opportune cases, after properly identifying the newcomer Hunas, as per their specific physical features, they (Hunas) were instantly killed, often, hitting by axe (their favourite weapon, called in their original Scythian idiom *segaris*) or sword blows on their elongated heads, which eventually compelled the Hunas to adopt some appropriate artificial methods for removing such physical identifications, as early as possible, for instance, by appropriately pressing the head, cheekbones and other

prominent dissimilarities especially of their newborn children. Almost at the same time, the Sindhiised Scythians and native Sindhis courteously reciprocated with the Hunas by adopting the same practice, apparently, for achieving the requisite attractiveness as per the age-old Sindhian standards of beauty—the said practice is still in vogue especially in rural areas of Sindh. Like physical features, the required consensus on the ethological characteristics and ethnogenetic ethos was also duly achieved, in due course of time, by acquiescing to or accepting the prevalent standards and norms of the then Sindh to become binding on all the Sindhis, of course, the Sindhiised Scythians' influence and contribution being much greater than that of the newcomer Hunas. However, unlike Sindh, no such serious endeavours were ever made either in the Punjab or in neighbouring Malwa or in the present-day Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to reach at a national consensus either on physical features or on ethological characteristics and ethnogenetic ethos of the Punjab and its neighbouring areas. This coupled with non-resolution of above referred to mutual enmity and animosity, for many a century, added by the religious cleavage and rivalry between the Muslims and Sikhs/Hindus in the Punjab, according to one theory, belatedly led them to the parting of ways, mutual riots and mass killings on a very large scale and the partition of the Punjab as late as 1947. In effect, the birth of Sikhism—started in the Punjab in 15th century by 'Baba' (Father) Guru Nanak (1469-1539 AD), by combining some elements of Islam (the concept of monotheism) and Hinduism e.g. accepting the Hindu concepts of *Karma* and reincarnation but rejecting its caste system—was the first significant effort to unite the Punjabis by demolishing the unwarranted cleavage and enmity created on the basis of outdated and unwanted caste system and communal (Hindu-Muslim) confrontation, in essence, an age-old Scythian-Huna animosity. Earlier Guru Nanak used to share his vision with the then popular *Bhakti* Movement, which consciously blended the elements of Islam and Hinduism and outspokenly preached fundamental equality of mankind and the unity of religions, especially of Islam and Hinduism. Being born into a Bedi clan's Khatri caste of Hindus in the Punjab (i.e., having neither of Scythian nor

Huna origin or genesis), Guru Nanak was fit to accomplish the historical task of bringing a working unity, if not a mutual consensus, like Sindh, between the two major ethogenetical segments of the Punjabi society. His first utterance after his mystical experience was, "There is no Hindu, there is on Mussalman." (Khushwant Singh, *A History of Sikhs*, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963, Vol. I, p. 31.) The same is endorsed by the traditional accounts about a dispute over the disposal of his mortal remains—Hindus (overwhelming majority of whom reflecting Scythian ethnogenesis) disciples suggesting cremation, and Muslims (overwhelming majority of whom revealing Huna ethnogenesis) disciples burial. In due course of time, Sikhs (in essence Jatts) were constrained to establish their political ascendancy over the whole of the Punjab in the shape of Sikh Punjabi Kingdom under the rule of Raja (courteously called Maharaja) Ranjit Singh (1799-1839 AD), having a Jatt ethnic background. There appeared every probability that such political ascendancy might have slowly and gradually transformed the Punjab into an overall ascendancy of already Punjabised Scythian ethological characteristics and ethnogenetical ethos, bringing like Sindh an eventual national consensus in the Punjab also, but the unwarranted and uncalled-for alien intervention of the British imperialism in 1849 which, in due course of time, brought in not only sudden stoppage and discontinuation of the above referred to process of national transformation but also gave birth and rapid speed to a new process of transformation of the Punjab, making her a hub of the Hindu/Sikh-Muslim disunity and division as well as the perpetual centre of fundamentalism, extremism and retrogressive communal sectarian tendencies. In chequered history of the Punjab, it had witnessed three major irruptions of foreigners (Persians and Afghans [or East Iranis] are not treated by some scholars as foreigners to the Punjab) — the Scythians, the Kushans and the White Hunas—through the north-west, especially in consequence of the last mentioned swarm (the White Hunas), the ancient living tradition of the Punjab was irrecoverably broken with the result that a medieval (also modern) Punjabi was entirely different from the ancient one, which belonged to a dead past. (In the words of Margaret Bourke-White, 1906-1971, "The beauty of the past

belongs to the past." (Quoted in *Christian Science Monitor*, 5 Dec. 1986.) The tradition of White Hunas is no doubt very much alive and still form the basic and most influential trait and disposition of the modern Punjabi—especially the Punjabi Mussalman—despite the fact that he appears inclined to disbelieve the same, which in fact is incontrovertible reality. However, in view of their peculiar vested interests the present-day Mussalman Punjabis resolutely prefer to pretend that during the long history of the Punjab, they had always been influenced only and exclusively by the Muslim rulers (conquerors/invaders) of Hindustan and their endorsed overbearing version of religion (*darog ber garden-e-ravi*), 'certainly' not even by the British, European ideologies, institutions and thought-processes. (If they are honest, would they be willing to welcome hereafter any invasion or Muslim Afghanistan or Iran, if and when expedient? Or work willingly as a complaint colony of any other Muslim country like Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Malaysia or Indonesia as the Punjab had been of England in past or as she demands from Sindh now?)

20. It appears relevant here to cite two striking passages found in the *Tarikh-e-Sistan* (History of Sistan) discovered and edited in Tehran about the year 1930: On a convivial occasion after one of his victories a poem in Arabic was read to Amir Yaqub-e-Lais (r. 861-879), the first of the Saffarids, the then ruler of Sistan. The Amir protested, asking what was the use of reciting something he could not understand, whereupon his secretary began to recite in Persian. The passage proceeds: "This was the first time after the Arab conquest that poems were recited in Persian language among Persians since the days when the Persian language had been intoned after the manner of the Sassanians. When the Persians were overthrown by the Arabs it was the custom always to recite in Arabic." The author of that work (*Tarikh-i-Sistan*) then gives an example of the verse recited, of which the first couplet runs:

*"The Lord had made Mecca the sanctuary for the Arabs,
Yet thy covenant has established a sanctuary in Iran..."*

These lines are attributed to a Kharjite who accepted an amnesty offered by Yaqoob and joined his army. From

another source (Abu al-Hasan Ali ibn al-Husayn al-Masudi's *Muruj-al-Dhahab*) comes an even more amusing anecdote representing one of the troopers in Yaqub's army speaking to his horse in forbidden Persian, though the narrative in this case is in Arabic. (Both sources are quoted in Olaf Caroe, *The Pathans*, Oxford: University Press, 21st imp., 2019, p. 106.)

21. Two other reasons were: (i) *Financial*.– The Kharjite menace and the ten years of the civil war (683–693 AD), during the reigns of Caliphs Yazid I (r. 680–683), Marwan II (r. 683–685) and Abdul Malik (r. 685–705), had heavily drained the resources of Ummayyads; and the resultant financial deficiency had to be recouped somehow. (ii) *Political*.– The infighting among Arabs had become a persistent phenomenon, necessitating diversion of their energies to new ventures. Edward Thornton (*op. cit.*, pp. 220–21 and fn.) gives following two reasons: (i) "At an early period of the Khalifate, the reputed wealth of Sinde seems to have excited the . . . [Arabs], but their attempts, for a time, were unsuccessful." (ii) "The [Ummayyad] Khalifs were in the habit of importing slave-girls from Sinde and a party of the followers of the Khalif Abool Mulik [Abdul Malik], in charge of a selection of Hindoo beauties, destined for the harem of their master, were attacked by the Rajah's troops, some of them killed, and the remainder made prisoners. This occurrence provoked a hostile visit from . . . [Arab] army." Thornton further adds:

"The victory gained by the . . . [Arabs] was followed by a remarkable instance of oriental revenge. Among the captives were two daughters of the [Sindhi] Rajah, esteemed, it is said, the most beautiful women in Asia in conformity with Eastern [Arab] custom, were reserved to grace the harem of the Kahlif. The princesses [Sooraj Devi and Parmal Devi] meditated vengeance on the general, whose success deprived their father of his throne and life, and reduced them to captivity in a foreign land; and, on their arrival at Bagdad, effected their object, by accusing him of conduct which involved a breach of duty to his master, as well as an outrage on the feelings of his illustrious prisoners. The Khalif, enraged at the alleged insult, ordered the supposed offender to be sewn up in

the raw hide of a cow, and in this manner brought into his presence. The sentence was inflicted, and the unfortunate general, thus ungratefully recompensed for his success, died on the third day after being subjected to the punishment. The tale was subsequently discovered to have been fabricated, and the vengeance of the Khalif, then directed towards the beautiful, but vindictive princesses, was manifested in a mode not less characteristic of Eastern cruelty, than was the punishment inflicted on their victim. He ordered them, after being totally divested of clothing, to be tied by the hair of their heads to the tails of horses, and this manner dragged through the streets of Bagdad till they were dead. The horrible sentence was executed, and the mangled remains of the sufferers then ignominiously cast into the river."

22. According to Abul Hassan Ahmed Billaduri, *Futuh-ul-Buldan* (279 AH/910 AD), State had spent 60,000,000 dirhams on this expedition and had received 120,000,000 dirhams. This being the Caliph's usual share of one-fifth, the total value of booty, according to H. M. Elliot, must have been 600,000,000 dirhams. H. M. Elliot, *Appendix to the Arabs in Sind*, Vol. III, pt. 1, of the *Historians of India* (Cape Town, 1853), pp. 73-74.
23. Dr. Riazul Islam, "Arab Imperial Policy in Sind, 712 to 715 AD" (Summary.) Paper presented to Seminar 'Sindh Through the Centuries', Karachi, March 2-7, 1975, p. 1. Nevertheless, the Muslims of Sindh, as they later candidly acknowledged, did not accept the Umayyad Caliphate (and its succeeding Arab regimes) as well as its political set-up as an Islamic state/ caliphate for the *Ulema* (pl. of *alim*, one who possesses *ilm* 'knowledge') of Sindh, like those of al-Andalus (Moorish Spain and Portugal conquered by the Arabs, 711-718 AD), were of the opinion that every Islamic state/government was duty-bound to ensure that all the Muslim children, between ages 4 to 14 years, must be educated to be capable of understanding the Quran in true sense of the term, for it (the Quran) emphasises no less than 22 times the importance of knowledge, and urges mankind to read, observe, think, acquire and enhance the knowledge, understanding, comprehension, perception, cognition, wisdom etc. — and this

could be done only by enforcement of universal, free and compulsory education (termed as *ta'lim al-atfal* or *ta'lim al-sibyan*, 'education of children' or 'childhood education') by the state from the ages 4 to 14 years (now it should be up to matriculation). Otherwise it could be a Muslim state or government but certainly not to be termed as an Islamic state or an Islamic government. Hence universal, free and, above all, compulsory education was recognised as not only a distinct but also an authentic feature of an Islamic state. Abu al-Hasan Ali al-Qabisi (324-403 Hijri/935-1012 AD), the great educator of al-Andalus, also derived a specific juridical sanction (*al-hukum al-fiqhi*) for compulsory education; it was an indispensable compulsion to an Islamic state to have all its attention centred on educating the growing children. Thus, Sindhis were quite clear that they were actually ruled by an Arab caliphate (empire) or Arab rulers (despots) but by definition not by an Islamic state or government in true sense of the term (for how Yazid's government could be called an Islamic government?). Consequently, Sindhis certainly (and undoubtedly) reserved their inalienable birth right to get rid of unwarranted foreign domination as and when feasible, and to be their own masters in their own motherland in good time, as and when possible.

24. For safety and security of alien invading bands, Arab authorities were constrained to construct new garrison cities and towns like Mansura, near Brahmanabad an historic symbol of Sindhian resistance,—where countless Sindhi women patriots, along with their most adored patriot Queen (Rani) Laaddee, in order to avoid becoming disgraced slave-women of invaders, happily welcomed ceremonial death of joyfully performing the age-old lofty tradition of *jauhar* i.e. while the menfolk fought unto death outside the fort-walls, the women patriots immolated by burning themselves in the blessed fire—and Multan (originally *Malhstan*, the Land of Malhi tribe or people whose legacy of *malh*, Sindhian wrestling, is the most popular rural game of Sindh even to this day, displaying bravery, physical fitness, strength, and science and art of encounter with an opponent, one on one. Moreover, 'Mal' or 'mal' is a very favourite suffix and hallmark of the names of almost every Bhai-band, the overwhelming majority

of Sindhi Hindus, even up to recent times). Such garrison cities/towns were eventually made central/provincial capitals by the Arabs in Sindh. Also, with a view to stop sudden, swift and constant exit from the newly conquered territory, whose selfless patriots were in the mood of fighting unto death for the freedom of their fatherland, the Ummayyad Caliph Sulaiman (r. 715-717 AD), was constrained to issue orders that all Arab invaders serving in the garrison towns or elsewhere in Sindh are not allowed to return or leave Sindh in any case and [the ex-service men] were ordered to till land and settle down there (in Sindh) permanently—this was perhaps the first incident that any Ummayyad Caliph had ever issued such type of proclamation, which was not withdrawn even by the highly acclaimed Caliph like Umar bin Abdul Aziz (r. 717-720 AD).

25. In India, the ideology of feudal society taking, as it did, shape under the religious disguise of Hinduism replaced Buddhism almost universally.
26. In Sindh, however, as compared to other Muslim countries, Islam was to remain one of the main religions, never to become the single one—for the majority of its population in Thar, Parkar, Jaisalmer, Bikanir, Bahmir, Cutch and Kathiawar, and a considerable number in other areas remained non-Muslim.
27. The feudal set-up in Sindh differed from the European feudalism. Main differences were: (i) The hierarchical structure of the ruling class was well developed in the latter, while in the former it was weakly developed and at certain periods lacking altogether. (ii) As against the latter serfdom was almost absent in Sindh.
28. It was during the Soomro rule that a new genre of heroic poetry began to appear in Sindhi. An example of this genre is the epic, *Dodo-Chanesar*, which eulogises the heroic struggle waged by Sindhis under the leadership of Dodo Soomro against the alien invading forces. This alien invasion, according to Dr. Mumtaz Pathan (*Talpuers in Sindh*, Karachi, 2017, p. 21), was not sanctioned by Sultan Alauddin Khilji, ruler of Delhi (r. 1296-1315), but by Sultan Moizuddin

Shahabuddin Muhammad of Ghor (r. c. 1173-1206) and was commanded by his general Alauddin Ghori, better known as *Jahansoz* (World Burner). In his opinion, substitution of Sultan Alauddin Khilji for general Alauddin Ghori in the local sources is a great historical error for Alauddin Khilji was contemporary of later Soomro rulers, namely, Chanesar II (r. 1283-1300) and Bhoonghar III (r. 1300-1315) but not of Dodo II (r. 1180-1194), who was, in fact, contemporary of above mentioned Sultan Shahabuddin Muhammad Ghori. The opinion of Dr. Mumtaz Pathan is, in fact, as much controversial or debatable as the former one, on a number of grounds: First, Alauddin *Jahansoz* Ghori was not a general of Shahabuddin Muhammad Ghori but his real uncle and had died much earlier than the latter's assumption of rulership of Ghor (actually of Ghazni). Alauddin *Jahansoz* was succeeded by his son, Saifuddin Muhammad as ruler of Ghor, but the latter soon died. Saifuddin was succeeded by Giasuddin son of Bahauddin Saam, whom, as a younger brother, Alauddin *Jahansoz*, had succeeded as the ruler of Ghor. Shahabuddin was younger brother and commander-in-chief of the army of Giasuddin Ghori, who later handed over the rulership of Ghazni to his younger brother Shahabuddin, before his own death. After the death of Giasuddin, Ghor also came under the rule of Shahabuddin Ghori. He sent an expedition to conquer Sindh under his general Qutubuddin, who was able to conquer Upper Sindh (from Uch to Bakhar) after three months fierce fighting. This territory, later came under the rule of Nasiruddin Qabacha (r. 1206-1228), originally a general of Shahabuddin Ghori. The Lower Sindh was also conquered by Shabuddin himself, after intense resistance, in 1182, but his rule over lower Sindh proved very temporary and soon it again came under the native Soomro dynasty.

29. Of them all, Makhdoom Bilawal Sammo stands unique. He was crushed alive in an oil-press in 1522 AD on the fabricated charge of committing scandalous disgrace of the Holy Quran by having a torn leaf of the sacred book with a few Quranic verses written thereon sewn up in the sole of his *jutti* (indigenous footwear). Apparently a conspiracy hatched up with the connivance of a local *mochi* (cobbler), who at the behest of Arghun invaders, had presented a newly sewn pair

of *juttis* to Makhdoom just before the raid by Arghun authorities on the Makhdoom's *madresso*. Despite his prompt and on-the-spot denial of the charge, Makhdoom Sahib, a widely honoured scholar of Islamic lore, was instantly fed into the oil-press legs first. Even though the pain of crushing was excruciating, he bore it with equanimity for he knew that it wasn't alleged sacrilege of the divine word but his *fatwa* as well as his moves to have the native chiefs, tribes and the ruler to do what the *sharia* expected of them as enunciated in his *fatwa* (in Islamic law, a legal opinion concerning a point of law wherein doubt arises or where there is not an absolutely clear ruling in existence). Expressing as it did the true spirit of Islam, the *fatwa* (in all probability issued immediately after the alien Arghun Muslims' invasion) was, is, and shall remain a unique piece of legal opinion in the history of single-minded patriotism in Muslim world including Sindh. It said: 'Muslims of any (and every) country are fully justified and totally legitimate to seek any armed help or accept such assistance from any non-Muslim country/countries or their people for the lawful and indispensable defence of their homeland against an uncalled-for armed aggression by any hostile Muslim country or to get rid of foreign domination.' It was the *raison d'etre* of the tribal chiefs' joining forces with the Sammo army in the battle of Talti to fight the invaders 'despite enemy's victory and death of the great Sindhian patriot commander Darya Khan' in the battle of Thatto. So it was for the last Sammo ruler of Sindh to go, obtain and return with armed help of the non-Muslim neighbouring country of Cutch (historically part and parcel of Sindh, but at the time a separate local Hindu Sindhi principedom) to fight the invaders again at Chachkan, near Badin, even after the Thatto and Talti debacles.

30. Due to above referred to internecine fighting, Sammo ruler Jam Feroz, despite the solemn alliance between the Sammos of Sindh and the Lasharis of Baluchistan, was at great fault of not extending Sindh's timely assistance to Guhram Khan Lashari during his decisive fight against Chakar Khan Rind who got well-timed assistance from the then Arghun ruler of Kandhar as Arghuns were in alliance with the Rinds of Baluchistan. Due to decisive defeat received from the Rinds,

Lasharis of Baluchistan, in turn, were not in a position to provide any assistance to Sindh in hour of her crucial need.

31. What precipitated the change in the Mahdist loyalties was the repressive measures adopted by the ruling class against the movement and its founder, Mir Syed Muhammad of Jaunpur (1443-1505 AD), who claimed that he was the promised "Mahdi." He came to Sindh around turn of the fifteenth century AD and stayed at Thatta for over a year. He preached the principle of equitable distribution of property; pooling of individual incomes into a common fund and its equal division among all. The Mahdists, like all Utopians, pinned their hopes on the accession of "Just Ruler," who would follow the precepts of early Islam and put into practice the principles concerning equality within the Muslim community. Qazi Qadan, the renowned Sindhi scholar and poet of the time, and a section of Sindhi intelligentsia were attracted to the movement. The masses were also attracted to the personality and preachings of "Mahdi," Syed Muhammad. The Madhist principles, however, were found by the ruling class of Sindh to be dangerous to their class interests; (he was ultimately expelled from Sindh) and they were subjected to repression.
32. The emergent Mughal power in Northern India posed a direct threat to Arghun rule in Sindh. To forestall the threat, Shah Hassan made a clever diplomatic move and ceded the Siraiki region to Babur (r. 1526-1530 AD). This was beginning of the process which later changed the ethnogenesis and cultural outlook of this region. What was till now a part of Sindh came to be linked up with the Punjab. The process got a fillip when Ahmad Shah Abdali (r. 1747-1773 AD) became master of Multan and Lahore. The two principalities were then ruled through his two Pathan vicegerents. Maharaja Ranjit Singh (r.1799-1839), who had been successful in uniting the whole of the then Punjab with Lahore its capital city under his leadership and had covetous eyes on the neighbouring territories including Multan, Bahawalpur, Baluchistan and Sindh proper, annexed Multan to the Punjab in 1818 AD and accelerated the process of Punjabisation of Siro region tremendously with his policy of settling the Punjabi immigrants on the Siraiki lands. The policy was continued by his successor

and son, still a child Dalip Singh (r. 1839-1849), and the British (1849-1947) and their successors thereafter, till now.

33. That the Kalhoros subordinated their creed to their political aims is demonstrated by the assistance extended by Mian Yar Muhammad to the Mughal force in wiping out the Mahdist commune established at Jhok by the renowned Sindhi Mahdist Inayat Langah, better known as *Shah Shaheed*.
34. Indeed, the foundations of modern Sindhi were laid during the Kalhoro period. It was in this period that Sindhi as a language found its nationalistic bearings and a conscious effort was made to make it earth-bound and people-oriented. Poets like Miyoon Shah Inat Nasarpuri and Shah Abdul Latif Bhitai made pioneering contribution towards this development.
35. In 1847 A.D the Amir of Bahawalpur, Bahawal Khan II, assisted the British actively in the expedition against Multan, then (since 1818) under occupation of the Sikhs of the Punjab. As a reward for his services he was once again given possession of the Sabzalkot and the Bhounj areas.
36. At the time, the fears of French and Russian advance, particularly of the latter, through the north-west focussed the attention of British strategists on possible lines of defence and "safe frontiers" for the British Indian Empire. As a result Afghanistan (and also Persia) became continually the focal point of conflicting Russian (and also French) interests: "From 1807, when the armies of Tsar Alexander I [r. 1801-1825] reached its northern borders, Afghanistan became an uneasy neutral zone between the Russian and the British Indian Empires around which 'the Great Game' was played." Consequently, the British launched no less than three military interventions (in 1838-1842, 1878-1880, and 1919-1920), better known as three Anglo-Afghan wars, but none of them was successful. The first (1838-1842) occurred when British concerned about Russian influence in Afghanistan, sent an army to replace Afghan king Dost Muhammad (r.1826-1839, 1843-1863) with a pro-British king Shah Shuja-al-Mulk (r.1803-1809, 1839-1842). Initially, the British expeditionary force was able to capture the capital, Kabul, but eventually it culminated in an uprising (1841), which led to the destruction

of the British Indian forces in Afghanistan during their withdrawal to Jalalabad (1841). To quote, the “surrounding tribes forced a desperate retreat through mountainous country and only one member of the original army of 16,000 lived to cross the Khyber Pass back to India.” Subsequently, Kabul was reoccupied in the same year but the British forces were withdrawn from Afghanistan via Kandhar/Bolan Pass through Sindh—an experienced and senior military General (Sir) Charles Napier came to Sindh initially in September 1842 with specific task to ensure safe withdrawal of British forces from Kabul. (John Cannon, ed., *A Dictionary of British History*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001 reissued with corrections 2004, entry ‘Afghan Wars’, p. 8, and Allan Isaacs et. al., *A Dictionary of World History*, New York: OUP, 2000 reprinted with corrections 2001, entries ‘Afghanistan’ and ‘Afghan Wars’, pp. 5 & 22) These developments gave impetus to the policy to acquire control of the Indus and then make it the bastion of Imperial defence to counter and offset Russian influence in the region. Thus as early as 1840, some British strategists appeared inclined to focus their attention on the so-presumed ‘natural boundaries’ of the British Indian Empire comprising the river Irrawaddy (Ayeyarwady) in the east, in Burma (Myanmar), and the river Indus in the west in Sindh, at that time, like Burma, an independent state. The Indus as a frontier found discussion also in the British periodical press, for instance, in *Edinburgh Review*, Edinburgh, 1840. For further details, see J. A. Norris, *The First Afghan War* (Cambridge, 1967); M. E. Yapp, *Strategies of British India: British, France and Afghanistan 1798-1850* (Oxford, 1980); E. O’ Balance, *Afghan Wars: 1839 to the Present Day* (Dulles, 2002); P. MacRoy, *Retreat from Kabul: The Catastrophic British Defeat in Afghanistan in 1842* (London, 2002); F. Sale, *A Journal of the First Afghan War* ed. by P. MacRoy (Oxford, 2002), and P. Hensher, *The Mulberry Empire* (London, 2002).

37. Sir Charles Napier (1782-1853) was “commissioned in the army at the age of 12.” He served (1808-1811) in the Peninsular War—one of the Napoleonic Wars, fought in Spain and Portugal (1807-1814), which coupled with ill-fated invasion of Russia (1812) contributed to Napoleon’s decline—and also in

the American War (1812-1814), the last conflict between British and the United States (at that time the "Western American politicians campaigned for conquest of Canada to open land for settlement and eliminate [Red] Indian resistance" but the "American failed to overrun Canada despite battles including [the famous] Queenston Height"). From 1819 to 1830—a period coinciding with the Greek War of Independence (1821-1832), fought against Ottoman empire, covertly and overtly supported by Britain, Russia and France—Napier was military resident in Greece. In 1839 he was appointed commander of the troops in northern England to deal with Chartist unrest. In 1841 he accepted a 'lucrative' Indian staff appointment and "provoked the conquest of Sind from which he made £50,000 in loot." In this venture, i.e., the conquest of Sindh, he was fully supported by the then governor general, Lord Ellenborough (1842-1844) because in the aftermath of the catastrophic defeat in Afghanistan in 1842, Ellenborough's primary concern was to keep intact the prestige and integrity of the burgeoning British Indian Empire which, of course, hinged on its army, which was at that time facing conspicuous disgrace in the then Afghan 'misadventure'. In order to relieve this grave ignominy, Ellenborough thought it expedient that British Indian troops were to be successful elsewhere—Sindh provided him, such a well-timed opportunity. John Cannon (ed.), *A Dictionary of British History* (New York: O.U.P., 2001 reissued with corrections 2004), entries 'Napier, Sir Charles James', 'Peninsular War', and 'War of 1812', pp. 452, 505 and 663; and Allan Isaacs *et. al.*, *A Dictionary of World History* (New York: O.U.P., 200 reprinted with corrections 2001), entry 'Greek War of Independence', p. 254.

38. At the time of British conquest, Sindh, as it was known historically, was divided into various principalities ruled by different local rulers, almost all of them of Sindhi ethnic origin. For instance, Cutch—also, Northern and Western Kathiawar, which included the principalities of Morvi, Malia, Nawanager, Rajkot, Dhrol, Santalpur and Chadchat—was governed by Jarrejos; Las Belo by Kaurejos; Bahawalpur by Daudpotros; Khairpur, Mirpur and Hyderabad by Sohrabanis,

Manikanis and Shahdadanis respectively. The British authorities thought it proper to annex only two principalities of Sindh viz. Hyderabad and Mirpur. The other principalities remained independent, of course, under the overall suzerainty of the British.

39. Sir Charles Napier to Governor General (Lord Ellenborough), Mianee, February 1843, reproduced in Mirza Kalichbeg, *A History of Sind* (2 Vols.; Karachi: Commissioner's Press, 1902), Vol. II, p. 257.
40. "Reminiscence of the Battle of Meeanee," S. G., Karachi, 9 August 1898, p. 5. (Rep. from "an old newspaper of 1846 [*Kurrache Advertiser*].") Commenting on his success in Miani battle, addressing his regiments at Karachi, on the occasion of presenting to them the 'Meeanee Medals', Napier said: "Had we been without discipline, valour alone would not have won the victories of Meeanee and Hyderabad [better known as Dubbo]! Valour is like the strength of a man; discipline is like his mind that directs his strength to effective exertion. If two pugilists have a boxing match, and one strikes at random, while the other boxes with science, planting every blow home, we know how the fight must be soon decided: So it is with two armies, the one disciplined, and other without discipline. The General of the disciplined army directs his columns upon that part of the enemy's position which he deems to be the weakest; as the mind of the boxer directs his blow against the opening offered by his unskilled enemy . . . But not only is valour useless without discipline, but it is even dangerous; for without discipline the rashly brave would run heedlessly against the enemy; the cautious would seek vantage ground; and the timid would retreat. Thus army would be scattered; but when an army is disciplined, the ponderous charge of cavalry, the steady tramp of advancing infantry preparing to charge, with a mighty shout, and the rolling thunder of artillery pouring forth its iron shower, all combine simultaneously to strike and overthrow the enemy. Thus, soldiers, are medals won: more by discipline than by any extraordinary efforts of individual courage." (*Ibid.*).
41. *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, Vol. II, p. 211,

quoted in R C. Majumdar, "Sindh," chap. VIII of *The History and Culture of the Indian People: British Paramountcy and Indian Renaissance*, gen. ed. R. C. Majumdar (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1963), Pt. I, p. 220.

42. William Napier, *The Life and Opinions of Sir Charles Napier* (4 Vols.; London: John Murray, 1857), Vol. II, p. 203.

Like [early sixth century Britons' semi-legendry] King Arthur and several others, a legend maintains that Charlemagne [Sindhi nation] is only sleeping, awaiting the call of his country in its greatest need.

Charlemagne ("Charles the Great") 747-814
King of the Franks and Emperor of the West

On my word of honour, I have never felt such self-satisfaction, such pride, such happiness, as in the knowledge that I have created a good thing.

From a letter to
P. Jurgenson (Aug. 1893).
On the completion of his
6th Symphony.

Pyotr Ilyich Tchaikovsky (1840-1893)
Russian composer

I want to go on living after my death. And therefore I am grateful to God for giving me this gift . . . of expressing all that is in me.

In *Het Achterhuis* pub. in 1947
(trans. in English as *The Diary*
of Anne Frank (1952).

Anne Frank (1929-1945)
German diarist

*The marble not yet carved can hold the form
Of every thought the greatest artist has.*

From Sonnet 15 (trans. Elizabeth
Jennings).

Michelangelo (1475-1564)
Italian sculptor, painter and poet

The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; our task is to change it.

Theses on Feuerbach, no. 11 (1845).

Karl Marx (1818-1883)
German social, political
and economic theorist

References & Notes

CHAPTER 2

1. The prime objective of the first British governor of Sindh was to pacify all resistance, quell revolt and make the British rule palatable to the people of Sindh. It was quite in conformity with that objective that its governor was given martial law powers in contrast to civilian administration in the remaining three fully-fledged provinces of British India. The main distinction between the governor of Sindh and the governors of other provinces (traditionally known as presidencies) was that like the governor general of Bengal, the governors of Bombay and Madras were assisted by their 3-member councils (later, the number of members of the councils of the governors of Bombay and Madras, but not of Bengal who was named governor general, instead of simply governor, was reduced from three to two vide the Charter Act of 1833; thus the number of members of the governor general of Bengal's council remained same, i.e. three, as prescribed by the Pitts India Act of 1784) and all important decisions in all these three provinces were taken by their respective governors-in-council. However, as per the Charter Act of 1793 the governor general of Bengal at Calcutta as well as the governors of Bombay and Madras were empowered to override the majority decision of their respective councils. Sindh, the fourth fully-fudged province being under the martial law rule, its governor was not assisted by any council and all important decisions in this province were taken by him all alone. John Cannon (ed.), *A Dictionary of British History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001 reissued with corrections 2004), *passim*. Surjit Mansingh (gen. ed.), *Historical Dictionary of India* (Delhi: Rashtra Rachna Printers. 2005), *passim*.
2. What Napier did or wanted to do for Sindh is not yet fully evaluated. An impartial study of that period in true

perspective is yet to be done. Some research works on the period are no doubt available, but these appear openly biased written by the pens of prejudiced bureaucrat and *Zamindar* writers, who, true to their class interests and knowing that historically these classes were/are the mainstay of imperialism, colonialism (external as well as internal) and neo-colonialism, find it expedient to remain silent on the methods and extent of the colonial exploitation in Sindh. However, their inherent and obvious hatred for him was as evident as Napier openly and explicitly hated the bureaucrats "a set of old bitches whose God is mammon," and the *Zamindars*, whom he considered "unnecessary interlopers," "middlemen," "parasites" and "the curse of every country." For the so-called 'critical' evaluation of Napier's administration in Sindh from the view-point of a British bureaucrat, see H. T. Lambrick, *Sir Charles Napier and Sind* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952) and from that of a class-conscious Sindh *Zamindar* see Hameeda Khuhro, *The Making of Modern Sind: British Policy and Social Change in the Nineteenth Century*, (Karachi: Indus Publications, 1978).

3. Proclamation, 20 May 1843, CISR, Vol. 251 (pol.).
4. Proclamation, 6 April 1844, CISR, Vol. 251 (pol.).
5. B. H. Ellis, Report No. 12, 3 July 1858, par. 54, CISR, Vol. 257 (pol.).
6. A. W. Hughes, *A Gazetteer of the Province of Sind* (London: George Bell & Sons, 1874), p. 49.
7. "The Resumption of Lands in India," S.K., 18 August 1854, [p. 3, col. 4]. (Rep. from the Press.)
8. Napier knew that the new head of the Indian Government, Henry Hardinge, would not extend him support like his predecessor: "No man can supply Lord Ellenborough's place to me. Hardinge must hurt me: common sense tells me he must have his own plans or he would be a fool, which he is not." (Sir Charles Napier, quoted in William Napier, *The Life and Opinions...*, 1857, Vol. III, p. 127.) His foreboding came true as he was to remark later that "in Ellenborough's time for all I did or proposed to do, down come an answer

affirmative or negative, direct and decisive, with reasons and cause in every line. Now I get no answer for months." (*Ibid.*, p. 463.)

9. Bombay was originally obtained by the Portuguese from the Sultan of Gujerat in 1534 but, subsequently, was given to Charles II of England, in 1661, as a part of dowry of Catherine of Braganza, the daughter of the then king of Portugal, when she married to Charles. The latter passed it on to the East India Company, which shifted its west-coast station there from Surat, where the company was allowed to open a 'factory' (trading post) as early as 1612. The company found it useful as Maratha power expanded in eighteenth century (the Maratha power finally came to its end as a result of third Anglo-Maratha War, in 1818). British interests in the Persian Gulf as well as the administration of Aden (as a port commanding the entrance to the Red Sea, was ceded to the British by the Turkish Sultan in 1839), outside the South Asian subcontinent, also, came to be centred in Bombay, which had become the headquarters of a large province called the Presidency (i.e. power-centre) of Bombay. To be brief, at the time of British conquest of Sindh as well as at the time of Sindh's annexation to the Bombay Presidency, there existed in South Asia two more British presidencies, namely, Bengal and Madras. These three British power-centres were not acquired from one and the same government or ruler. Previously, they were under the domain of different independent local rulers, who did not recognise the hegemony of the Mughal empire. The same applies in case of the territories forming part of these presidencies; they were constituted presidencies (power-centres), under different circumstances, with no power of overall supervision, control or coordination entrusted to any presidency over its counterparts. Consequently, all of them were thoroughly entrenched and organised seats of administration and military power and all of them were headed by their respective governors, enjoying equal powers, prestige and status. It was for the first time that the Regulating Act of 1773, which for the first time asserted the right of British Parliament to interfere in Indian affairs and to legislate for

British India, designated the governor of Bengal as the governor general of Bengal with ultimate authority over the British presidencies of Madras and Bombay in cases of war and peace, excepting emergencies. Indeed, the governors of Bombay and Madras, embroiled at the time in wars with the Marathas and Mysore respectively, were resistant to direction and control from Calcutta. However, the Pitt's India Act of 1784 further strengthened the position of the governor general of Bengal who was empowered to superintend, control and direct the presidency governments which were to be suspended if they did not carry out the orders of the governor general-in-council. Thus, it tightened the control of both the home government over the Indian government and the governor general of Bengal over the presidencies of Bombay and Madras. However, it was under the Charter Act of 1833 that the designation of the governor general of Bengal was changed to the governor general of India and he was given greater control over the presidencies of Bombay and Madras. The Act of 1833 further empowered the governor general-in-council to make laws for the whole of British India; and for the first time the governors-in-council of Bombay and Madras were deprived of the legislative powers. It may further be noted that it was the Charter Act of 1853, which made the provision of the appointment of the lieutenant-governor in Bengal so as to relieve the governor general of India of the work of the administration of Bengal. John Cannon (ed.), *A Dictionary of British History*, (New York: O.U.P.), *passim*. Surjit Mansingh, *Historical Dictionary of India* (Delhi: Rashtra Rachna Printers, 2005, ed.), *passim*.

10. Napier's policies were defended by the *Kurrachee Advertiser*, Karachi, a biweekly, which came out in 1845 and was believed to have been published under his patronage.
11. C. J. Napier, *Defects, Civil and Military, of the Indian Government* (London: Charles Western, 1853), p. 366.
12. W. Napier, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 106-07.
13. Henry Hardinge (Governor General of India 1844-1848) to Court of Directors, No. 7, 18 September 1846, par. 7, *Selections*

from the Pre-Mutiny Records of the Commissioner in Sind, Nos. X & XI, p. 362.

14. *Ibid.*, par. 3, pp. 361-62.
15. For details about Sindh Finances during Napier's rule (1843-1847) see *infra*, appendix I, pp. 140-142
16. James Grant, *Cassell's Illustrated History of India* (London, 1891), Vol. II, p. 142.
17. The British Indian Empire, created gradually but haphazardly, was a by-product of a chartered monopoly company's trading objectives. The first English East India Company was formed by the merchants of London in 1599 (and chartered in 1600) to compete with the Dutch for the trade of the spice islands (Moluccas, now part of Indonesia). In 1623, in the wake of Amboyna massacre, the English settlement was wiped out by the Dutch. Consequently, the English East India Company abandoned the East Indies and concentrated on the Indian Subcontinent. By 1700, it was able to secure important trading ports, notably Madras, Bombay and Calcutta. It began to acquire a territorial empire after the battle of Plassey fought in Bengal in 1757. The year 1757 is therefore generally regarded as the beginning of British rule in India. The defeat of Maratha empire in 1818 gave it undisputed supremacy. Increasingly, the company acted as an instrument of colonial government. Having lost its commercial monopolies by 1833, it served as the Britain's administrative agent in India. It worked as a quasi-department of the British state until the Indian Revolt of 1857, whereafter the control of the Indian empire was transferred directly to the British crown in 1858, vesting the company's powers in a secretary of state for India. The company was finally dissolved in 1873. John Cannon (ed.), *A Dictionary of British History*. (New Year: Oxford University Press, 2001 reissued with corrections 2004), entry 'East India Company', p. 224; Dr. Allan Isaacs et. al. (ed.), *A Dictionary of World History* (New York: O.U.P., 2000 reprinted with corrections 2001), entry 'East India Company, English'. p. 189.
18. Byron Farwell, *Burton: A Biography of Richard Francis Burton*

(2d imp.; London: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd., 1964), p. 34.

19. The takeover of the Punjab by the British was effected through campaigns against the Sikhs in 1845-46 and 1848-49. In 1845, the British authorities provoked a conflict with the Sikhs, and in 1846 succeeded in turning the Punjab into a vassal principality. In 1848 the Sikhs revolted, but were completely subjugated in 1849. The Punjab, after its takeover by the British was made a Chief Commissioner's Province directly under Calcutta, the capital of the Government of India.
20. Napier served as governor of Sindh for a little more than four and a half years. He left India in 1847 after an obstructive attitude adopted by the government of India under the then governor general, Henry Hardinge (1844-1848), known as Hardinge of Lahore (secretary war from 1828 to 1830 and 1841 to 1844—during the 1st Sikh War he was present at the battles of Mudki, Firozshah and Sobraon as second in command to Lord Gough and negotiated the peace of Lahore in 1845. But, Sir Charles Napier, came back to India in 1849 as commander-in-chief of the Indian army. However, he again clashed with the then governor general of India, Lord Dalhousie (1848-1856), son of an ex-commander-in-chief of the Indian army, and again resigned and returned to England, in 1851, where he died in 1853. John Cannon (ed.), *A Dictionary of British History*, New York: OUP, 2001 reissued with corrections 2004, entry 'Napier, Sir Charles James', p. 452.
21. Chief Secretary to the Government of Bombay at the time of his appointment in Sindh.
22. At the time of annexation of Sindh to the Bombay Presidency (1847), the latter was ruled by a governor-in-council. The governor was empowered to override the majority decision of his council. As per the Charter Act of 1833, the number of councilors of the Bombay (also of Madras) Presidency was reduced from three to two only, but that of the governor general-in-council remained as before i.e. three, as prescribed by the Pitt's India Act of 1784. The Charter Act of 1833, further empowered the governor general-in-council to make laws for the whole of British India, and for the first time the

governors-in-council of Bombay and Madras were deprived of the legislative powers. Under the Government of India Act of 1858, enforced in the aftermath of 'mutiny' (1857), the control of the British India was permanently withdrawn from the East India Company (chartered in 1600) and transferred directly to the British Crown and the British Parliament. The Indian Councils Act of 1861, reconstituted and enlarged the Legislative Council in Bombay (and Madras). Its powers were purely legislative, majority of its members were official, who could not even ask questions about, still less discuss, executive business. Under the Act V of 1868, the Commissioner-in-Sindh, unlike other commissioners working elsewhere in British India, enjoyed a singular position with powers of the governor-in-council. These powers were delegated to him from time to time in pursuance of the above referred to Act of 1868. He also exercised numerous other powers under no better lawful authority than the traditions of his predecessors. In this way, since 1868, Sindh virtually achieved the position of a chief Commissioner's province (almost equal to enjoyed by the chief commissioners of North-West Provinces—the present-day U.P.—and the Punjab, the former got the legislative council in 1887 and the latter in 1897), of course, like the N. W. Provinces and the Punjab, Sindh was also devoid of a council—as Napier, the first provincial head of the British Sindh (1843-1847), worked as the governor of Sindh devoid of a council—so the Commissioner-in-Sindh had a virtual status closely approaching to that of a Chief Commissioner; he used to issue his own 'Government Gazette', he furlled and unfurled his own flag, he used to move abroad to the accompaniment of artillery salutes, in essence, implied a recognition that Sindh was entitled to the practical and visible form of separation, a patent distinction and autonomous status. Thus, Sindh in effect achieved a separate and semi-autonomous character which she had lost in 1847, within two decades or so in 1868—just missing only the so-called 'benefits', granted both by the Acts of 1861 and 1892 which for a feudal society, under alien domination, were almost meaningless—so the loss, if any, under the alien rule, especially to the brazen-faced feudals was practically

negligible. For example, the Indian Councils Act of 1892 added a few indirectly elected people who were made the members to the provincial legislative councils, and through them, at a further stage of indirectness, to the governor general's legislative council. Whereas the Indian Councils Act of 1909, for the first time termed a constitutional 'reform', provided an elected majority into the provincial legislative councils and an elected minority into the governor general's council. It was therefore, for the first time, strongly felt especially by the emerging middle class and Sindhiised special interests (i.e. European officers and other residents) that Sindh was practically denied the benefits of the government by the governor-in-council. So, Sindh keenly realised the degradation of her position i.e. being ruled by a bureaucrat commissioner, whereas other divisions in India were directly under the governor-in-council. This gave birth to two-fold struggle. On the one hand, the leaders of the public opinion in Sindh continued to press the demand for restricting the autocratic powers of the commissioner-in-Sindh, on the other, they wanted provincial autonomy by making Sindh a lieutenant governorship or chief commissionership directly under the supreme government. An offshoot of the demand of the provincial autonomy was the demand for separate accounts for Sindh, publicly termed as financial autonomy, which, in the opinion of a Karachi's newspaper, was true 'practical autonomy'. The financial neglect of Sindh reached such a crisis in 1914 that, according to Montagu de P. Webb, several times elected Chairman of the Karachi Chamber of Commerce (and member of the enlarged and empowered Bombay Legislative Council under the Act of 1909), had not the World War I broken out a movement would have been launched "for detaching neglected Sindh from a Government who took so little practical interest in the welfare of this [Sindh] Province." (M. de P. Webb, "Should Sind Be Separated from the Bombay Presidency?" D.G., 2 November 1920, p. 8.) The First World War (1914-1918) and the wonderful success of the Russian Communist Revolution (1917), which was viciously converted by the capitalist western powers into an uncalled-for Russian Civil War, better known as the War of Allied

Intervention (1918-1921). Such rapidly changing and extremely fluid global and regional geopolitical conditions, at the time, left Britain with no choice but to adopt the policy of 'wait and see' i.e. what odd challenges and outcomes they had to encounter in the aftermath of the World War I and, above all, the historic success of the Russian Communist Revolution—*status quo* was, therefore, maintained especially with regard to all the territories neighbouring the north-western border of the British Indian Empire, keeping in view the very fragile and capricious position of the then existing Buffer State (Afghanistan) between the British Indian Empire and the former Tsarist Russian Empire (now the most dynamic Russian Communist Federation/Confederation). Hence, the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms (1919) were not extended to Sindh, because her destinies were, obviously, linked with the British imperialist interests, callously ignoring altogether her (Sindh's) own indispensable interests, ambitions and aspirations.

References & Notes

CHAPTER 3

1. "The Re-organization of the North-Western Frontier," S.G., March 5, 1886. (Rep. on June 14, 1887, p. 5.) James Ramsay Dalhousie (1812-1860), 'greatest of Indian proconsuls' (governors of a colony or dominion), was third son of the 9th Earl of Dalhousie. In 1832, he succeeded by the death of his only remaining brother, to the courtesy title of Lord Ramsay. In 1838, on the death of his father, entered the House of Lords as Earl of Dalhousie. He was the youngest governor general ever sent to India. In 1848 he was made a KT (Knight), in 1849 received the marquissate (1st Marquess of Dalhousie) and the thanks of parliament. He is best known for pushing ahead an aggressive policy of conquest, annexation and absorption of territories ruled by native rulers with the declared aim of 'rationalising' the irregular map of East India Company domains. In 1849, after the second Anglo-Sikh war, he annexed the Punjab and brought more than 4000 square kilometres of real estate under direct British rule, and all of lower Burma (now Myanmar) was taken over after the second Burmese war of 1852. He annexed following smaller Indian states through the use of a novel and non-Indian practice called the 'Doctrine of Lapse': Satara in 1848, Baghat, Jaitpur and Sambalpur in 1850, Udaipur in 1852, Jhansi in 1853, Nagpur in 1854, and Karauli in 1855. He swept away many titles and pensions of nominal rulers or their heirs, as in the cases of the Nawab of Carnatic, the Raja of Tanjore, and the Maratha Peshwa. He also attempted to apply a maxim of trusteeship, or "good of the governed" to the Princely States of India. He used the accusation of misgovernment to force the Nizam of Hyderabad to cede a sizeable territory, and to annex entirely the rich lands of the ever loyal Nawab of Awadh in 1856. Dalhousie, in due course of time, developed a great dislike and hatred for Sir Charles Napier, the then senior

most military general and the commander-in-chief of the Indian army (1849-1851) and latter's previously conquered (and beloved) Sindh as much as he loved his own conquest of the Punjab with the result that he forced his commander-in-chief to resign, before completing the normal tenure and return to England in 1851, where Napier died in 1853, merely seven years before the death of Dalhousie in 1860. He also officially tried to provide a golden opportunity to the Punjab to assimilate Sindh which however did not materialise during his tenure.

2. *Ibid.*
3. "The Province of Sind," S.G., June 11, 1895, p. 4.
4. "The Punjab a Presidency," *Bombay Standard*, December 20, 1858. (Rep. in S.K., December 28, 1858, p. 416.)
5. "A Fourth Presidency in India," *Daily News*, May 20, 1858. (Rep. in Supplement to S.K., July 30, 1858, [pp. 1-2].)
6. "Our Policy in Oude," S.K., August 13, 1858, p. 260. (Rep. from *Friend of India*.)
7. W. P. Andrew, "The Commissioner in Sind," S.K., September 21, 1858, p. 303. (Ltt. to ed.) Also S.K., October 5, 1858, p. 319. (Progs. of Special General Court of East India Company held on September 25, 1858, for submitting to Court a resolution, agreed to by Directors, making a grant of £ 2,000 a year to Sir John Lawrence, pub. under the cap. "The Late East India Company and Sir J. Lawrence.") The despicable role of Punjabis against the liberation struggle (1857) had so incensed the freedom fighters that their recognised leader, the last Mughal emperor Bahadur Shah II (r. 1837-1857), proclaimed "*mandate for the slaughter of every Sikh and Punjabee* [Mussalman and Hindu] *who fell into the hands of his troops.*" (Emphasis added.) ("The Disarmed Troops in the Punjab," *Punjabee*, September 11, 1858; rep. in S.K., September 21, 1858, p. 304.) [Sir John Lawrence (1811-1879) was brother of Sir Henry Lawrence (1806-1857). The latter joined the Bengal Artillery in 1823, later transferred to civilian career and served in a semi-diplomatic capacity in the Punjab in 1840. He came to love and admire the people

of the Punjab and did not approve of Lord Dalhousie's militant policies that led to the Anglo-Punjab Wars of 1846 and 1849 and annexation. Nevertheless, he served the Punjab up to 1853—earlier he took part in the first Burmese war (1828) and in the first Afghan war (1838). Henry Lawrence, like his younger brother John Lawrence, was very popular not only as the British semi-diplomat in the Punjab since 1840 and as co-ruler of the Punjab from 1849 to 1853 but also among the British Indian bureaucracy and higher authorities for his marvellous competence and courage that made it possible for a thousand Europeans and eight hundred Indians in 1857 mutiny to defend the British Residency at Lucknow, as British Agent in Awadh, for nearly four months against 7000 rebels—eventually Henry Lawrence was mortally injured by a shell, and died four days later, before the capture of the Residency. His unforgettable service to India was the establishment of the Lawrence School of Sanawar, with his financial assistance, for the children of British soldiers serving in India, which is, even to this day, one of the best co-educational boarding schools in the Subcontinent. After the annexation of the Punjab in 1849, John Lawrence was appointed to administer it, first in a three-member board (remaining two being Henry Lawrence and Charles Mansel) from 1849 to 1853, and then as a chief commissioner up to 31st December 1858 and again as Lieutenant Governor from 1st January 1859 onwards. He administered the Punjab with a vigorous paternalism. As a result, the once restless Punjab had become so attached to his rule that John Lawrence was able to disarm mutineers in the Punjab in 1857, and raise an army of 59,000 men and to capture Delhi from the rebels after a siege of over three months. In 1863/1864 he succeeded Lord James Bruce Elgin (1861-1863), who died at Dharmasala in Punjab in 1863, as governor general and viceroy of India (1864-1869). He did not believe in British interference in Asia beyond the frontier of India, and was especially opposed to intriguing in Afghanistan. He adopted the policy of "masterly inactivity" rather than war toward Afghanistan and the tribal areas of the north-west. Within country, he tried to apply the principles he had used

in the Punjab to all of British India. The roads were built or extended, the most famous being the Grand Trunk Road from Calcutta, via the Punjab, to Peshawar. Great works of canal irrigation were commenced and railways were developed. Public loans were raised for these purposes. To be precise, the Punjab was fortunate enough to get the sympathy, patronage and requisite support of the most pro-Punjab British officials and administrators (Lawrence Brothers) for, perhaps, the longest time of thirty years (from 1840 to 1869) whereas Sindh was, perhaps, the unfortunate one in having the services of Charles Napier for a brief period of four and a half years (1843-1847) only.

8. The province comprised of following ten divisions with 33 districts (the Thaneswar district, which is not shown below, was broken up in 1862 and divided between Amballa and Karnal districts): 1. *Delhi* (Delhi, Gurgaon, Karnal); 2. *Hissar* (Hissar, Rohtak, Sirsa); 3. *Lahore* (Lahore, Gujranwala, Ferozepur); 4. *Amballa* (Amballa, Ludhiana, Simla); 5. *Amritsar* (Amritsar, Gurdaspur, Sialkot); 6. *Jullunder* (Jullunder, Hoshiarpur, Kangra); 7. *Rawalpindi* (Rawalpindi, Jhelum, Gujrat, Shahpur); 8. *Peshawar* (Peshawar, Kohat, Hazara); 9. *Derajat* (Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, Dera Ghazi Khan); 10. *Multan* (Multan, Jhang, Montgomery [now Sahiwal], Muzaffargarh). In 1884, these ten divisions were reduced to following six divisions, having in all 31 districts (the Sirsa district was abolished and divided between Hissar and Ferozepur): 1. *Delhi* (Delhi, Gurgaon, Karnal, Rohtak, Hissar, Amballa, Simla); 2. *Peshawar* (Peshawar, Kohat, Hazara); 3. *Lahore* (Lahore, Amritsar, Gurdaspur, Montgomery, Jhang, Multan); 4. *Jullundur* (Jullundur, Hoshiarpur, Kangra, Ferozepur, Ludhiana); 5. *Rawalpindi* (Rawalpindi, Jhelum, Gujrat, Gujranwala, Shahpur, Sialkot); 6. *Derajat* (Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, Muzaffargarh, Dera Ghazi Khan). These divisions remained practically unaltered until the creation of the North-West Frontier Province in 1901.
9. In Sindh, the idea was to suit mostly the commercial community of Karachi which was almost entirely non-Sindhi, and, considering the Punjab as a natural hinterland

of Karachi seaport, had covetous eyes on its trade. It earnestly supported the idea on various occasions. The Karachi Chamber of Commerce as early as 1866, in a memorial, addressed to the Secretary of State for India on the subject of railway and river traffic, concluded that "eventually Sind and Punjab must form one Government." Again in 1871, in an address to the Governor General presented by the Chamber of Commerce and signed by some sixty Indian merchants also, they concluded: "It must, however, be admitted that the true interests of this Province are much more closely allied with the Punjab than with the Bombay Presidency. Karachi being the natural channel through which the trade of the Punjab must eventually flow and on this and other commercial grounds, we think the annexation of Sind to the Punjab has much to recommend it." Herbert Feldman, *Karachi Through a Hundred Years 1860-1960* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1960), introduction p. xiv.

10. Sir Henry Durand, quoted in Z. H. Zaidi, "Proposed Integration of Sind with the Punjab, (1854-1876)," *The Proceedings of the Pakistan History Conference (Ninth Session) Held at Hyderabad, 1959*, comp. Dr. S. Moinul Haq (Karachi: Pakistan Society, n.d.), p. 159.
11. On Sindh frontier, under Sindh system better known as John Jacob's system, the outpost officers were held responsible for maintaining the frontier intact from raids, and they did not care under whose supposed control the raiders were. Any armed man crossing Sindh frontier was killed. All natives inside the Sindh frontier were disarmed, so as to prevent their making raids into the mountains and causing the inhabitants there to retaliate; for this, they believed, would have kept up a constant state of irritation and bloodshed. In the Punjab, however, all within the border were allowed to carry arms and do what they liked, and the military were under the political agents, and could not move without their authority. As Marris and Bugtis came into contact with both, Sindh and the Punjab, systems of the frontier policy, they used to loot in the Punjab in retaliation for the men from inside the Punjab frontier

looting them; and the moment the looting party of Marris and/or Bugtis perpetrated a raid in the Punjab, Captain Sandeman, the Deputy Commissioner Dera Ghazi Khan, would write to Sindh officers to call upon the Khan of Kalat to control his subjects. Sindh authorities knew that as matters stood the Khan could not effectively control these tribes, and that what was needed and what they strongly recommended was that Sindh frontier should be extended so as to take in the whole of the country inhabited by the Marri and Bugti tribes, bringing them under one system. For details see General J. J. McLeod Innes, *The Life and Times of General Sir James Browne* (London: John Murry, 1905), pp. 140-41.

12. C. Collin Davies, *The Problem of the North-West Frontier 1890-1908: With a Survey of Policy since 1849* (Cambridge: University Press, 1932), p. 29.
13. Secretary to the Punjab Government (1864-1876), after that officiating Foreign Secretary to the Government of India (1876-1877), afterwards Judge of Punjab Chief Court (1878-1881) and Member of Governor General's Legislative Council (1878-1881).
14. Zaidi, "Proposed Integration of Sind with the Punjab, 1854-1876," *loc. cit.*, p. 164.
15. Governor General and Viceroy of India (May 1872-April 1876). In India, Northbrook succeeded Lord (Richard Southwell Bourke) Mayo (1869-1872), who had been assassinated by a convict while inspecting the settlement at Port Blair on the Andaman Islands.
16. "The Re-organization of the North-Western Frontier," S.G., March 5, 1886. (Rep. on June 14, 1887, p. 5).
17. Third Marquis (a rank of British nobility between Duke and Earl) of Salisbury, Robert Arthur Talbot Gascoigne Cecil (1830-1903), had also previously held the post of Secretary of State for India as Lord Cranborne from July 6, 1866, to March 9, 1867.
18. "The Re-organization of the North-Western Frontier," S.G.,

March 5, 1886. (Rep. on June 14, 1887, p. 5.)

19. *Ibid.*
20. Governor General and Viceroy of India (April 1876-June 1880). The administration of Lord Lytton (Edward Robert Bulwer-Lytton) was principally distinguished for its aggressive external policies which in 1878, brought about the second Anglo-Afghan war.
21. Davies, *op. cit.*, p. 105. Six districts of the Punjab were Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu (except the cis-Indus tracts), Dera Ismail Khan (with the same exception), Dera Ghazi Khan, and trans-Indus Sindh (with the exception of Karachi). *Ibid.*, p. 105n.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 105.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 106. The argument was also advanced by certain quarters that the Punjab could justly claim to be given compensation for the loss of its frontier districts in the shape of an extension of the Lieutenant Governor's authority over cis-Indus Sindh. Karachi was to become the seaport of Lahore and the Lower Indus valley no longer to be under Bombay.
24. "Sind and the Punjab," S.G., December 11, 1903, p. 5. (Rep. from *Pioneer*.)
25. Davies, *op. cit.*, p. 106.
26. *Ibid.* Colonel Merewether had tried to provide a remedy in a modified scheme of his own. He proposed to leave Sindh and the Punjab as they were, with a slight territorial adjustment which would transfer to Sindh the lower portion of the Dera Ghazi Khan District as far north as Hurrund. By this change, the whole of that part of the frontier which faced the Baluch and Brahui tribes, acknowledging the supremacy of the Khan of Kalat, was proposed to be placed under the control of one officer of Government, who, it was suggested, should be the head of the province of Sindh. At the same time, by this scheme, the government of Bombay was to be relieved of the charge of Sindh, which would be placed directly under the Government of India. "A Frontier

Province," S.G., July 9, 1884, p. 3.

27. Frederick Sleigh Roberts (1832-1914) first demonstrated his talents as an army officer during the Indian mutiny (1857-1858), he served as the commandant of the Punjab Frontier Force (1878), in the second Afghan War, as major-general, led the British forces to the Afghan defeat and his assumption of the Afghan government. From 1885 to 1893 he was commander-in-chief in India. He, later, became field marshal and commander-in-chief in Ireland in 1895—he retired in 1904 and died in 1914 while visiting troops in the field in France.
28. Davies, *op. cit.*, p. 106.
29. *Ibid.*
30. *Ibid.*, pp.106-107. Also, A Late Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab [Sir Louis William Dane, May1908-April 1911 & August 1911-May1913], "Sind and the Punjab: Provincial Changes in India," D.G., January 30, 1929, p. 8. (Rep. from *Asiatic Review*.) [Lord Ripon had served as under-secretary for war (1859), under-secretary of India (1861), secretary for war (1863-1866), secretary for India (1866) Lord President of the Council (1868-1873) and governor general and viceroy of India (1880-1884), where he introduced a system of self-government and ended restrictions on the freedom of vernacular press by repealing the restrictive Vernacular Press Act of 1878.] Ripon strived to put an end to Lytton's forward policy in the northwest which had led to another costly and futile Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1880). He, therefore, reversed the belligerent Afghan policies of his predecessor, Lord Lytton. He also advanced the cause of Indian education and was responsible for the 1870 Education Bill as President of the Council (1868-1873). One of his important achievement was the Anglo-Russian Agreement, signed in 1884 containing a joint declaration on the borders of Afghanistan and Russia and reaffirming the kingship of Abdur Rahman in Afghanistan.
31. The *Sind Gazette* was originally a "Sind Issue" of the *Civil and Military Gazette*, Lahore, started from Karachi in 1878. It

adopted its new name on January 5, 1884, but continued its old pro-Punjab policy.

32. "The Re-organization of the North-Western Frontier," S.G., March 5, 1886. (Rep. on June 14, 1887, p. 5.)
33. "The Union of Sind and the Punjab," C.& M.G., June 3, 1887. (Rep. in S.G., June 14, 1887, p. 5.)
34. S.G., March 22, 1889, p. 4. (Sp. at the opening ceremony of Empress Market, Karachi.)
35. Reference to this memo. was made in the address of Sindh Sabha pr. to Lord Reay on April 3, 1889, S.G., April 5, 1889, p. 4.
36. S.G., April 5, 1889, p. 4.
37. "Sind and Bombay," S.G., September 16, 1890, p. 5. (Rep. from C. & M.G.)
38. *Ibid.*
39. *Ibid.*
40. *Ibid.* [Henry Charles Keith Petty-Fitzmaurice] Lansdowne (1845-1927), served as under-secretary of war from 1872 to 1874 and for India in 1880, governor general of Canada (1883-1888) and of India (1888-1894), British war secretary from 1875 to 1900, and served from 1900 to 1905 as British foreign secretary.
41. Davies, *op. cit.*, p. 35.
42. Known from the name of Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, the then Foreign Secretary of India (1884-1894), who conducted the mission to Amir of Afghanistan (Abdur Rahman) in 1893, declaring the spheres of influence of British India and Afghanistan, respectively, through the tribal belt on the north-west frontier of the Indian Subcontinent. All the important passes, including the Khyber, fell within British-Indian jurisdiction and were constantly manned. The Pakhtun tribesmen of the area were not consulted at all while this 2,250 kilometer dividing line from Gilgit in the north to Baluchistan in the southwest was demarcated between 1894 and 1896. For that reason the Durand Line was frequently challenged thereafter time and again.

43. Davies, *op. cit.*, p. 107.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 24.
45. *Parliamentary Papers*, 1901 (Cd. 496), p. 71, quoted in Davies, *op. cit.*, p. 107.
46. Davies, *op. cit.*, p. 107. George Nathaniel Curzon (1859-1925), the successor of Lord Elgin, became under-secretary for India in 1891, and for foreign affairs in 1895. He was author of three authoritative books on Asiatic Russia (1889), on Persia (1892) and on problems of the Far East (1894). A controversial and often turbulent governor general, constantly at war with his officials, he introduced many reforms, both social and political, including the establishment of the N.-W. Frontier Province and the partition of Bengal. Curzon was Russophobic and followed an assertive foreign policy. He aimed to bring the Persian Gulf, Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet within the British sphere of influence from India. However, Curzon moved more cautiously in the northwest, leaving routine control of the Afghan border in the hands of local tribal levies and separating the administration of a new North-West Frontier Province from that of neighbouring Punjab. After the arrival from the Sudan campaign (1883-1885), Horatio Herbert Kitchener as commander-in-chief of India (1902-1909), his serious difference of opinion arose with Lord Curzon, the Governor General of India, over the dual control system then in force in the Indian army. The British government, finding Curzon's regime too dynamic for its liking, manipulated this crisis in such a way as to procure his resignation, at the start of his second term in 1905, and Curzon left India, as a disappointed man for London failed to back him. Later, he became a member of the British prime minister Lloyd George's War Cabinet in 1916. After the World War I he became British foreign secretary (1919-1924), but again quarrelsome, and was disappointed at not becoming British prime minister in 1923—he died in 1925.
47. The following had, at different times, been in favour of the creation of a separate frontier administration: Sir Bartle Frere (1815-1884, Commissioner-in-Sindh 1850-1859, Member

of the Governor General's Supreme Council 1859-1862, Governor of Bombay 1862-1867, Member of the Council of India 1867-1877); Sir Henry Durand (1812-1871, Member of the Council of India 1859-1861, Foreign Secretary to the Government of India 1861-1865, Military Member of the Governor General's Supreme Council 1865-1870, Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab 1870); Lord Roberts (b. 1832, Commander-in-Chief of India 1885-1893); Sir James Browne (1839-1896, served as Executive Engineer in the Punjab, Engineer-in-Chief of the Sindh-Peshin Railway 1883-1887, Chief Commissioner of British Baluchistan 1892-1896); Sir Robert Warburton (1842-1899, appointed to the Punjab Commission 1870, Political Officer in the Khyber 1879-1897); Sir Robert Sandeman (1835-1892, Agent to the Governor General in British Baluchistan 1877-1892 and Chief Commissioner of British Baluchistan 1887-1892); Sir William Lockhart (1841-1900,) Commandant of the Punjab Frontier Force 1890-1895, appointed Commander-in-Chief in India in 1898); Lord Lytton (1831-1891, Governor General and Viceroy of India 1876-1880); Sir Charles Aitchison (1832-1896, Foreign Secretary of India 1868-1878, Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab 1882-1887); Sir George Chesney (1830-1895, Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department 1880-1886, Military Member of the Supreme Council 1886-1891); and Lord Lansdowne (b. 1845, Governor General and Viceroy of India 1888-1894, British Secretary for War 1895-1900, British Foreign Secretary in 1900). Davies, *op. cit.*, p. 104n. (Davies mentions only names, other information is added.)

48. *Ibid.*, pp. 107-108.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 108.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 110.

51. *Ibid.*

52. *Ibid.*

53. *Ibid.*, p. 111.

54. *Ibid.* Parts of Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan, both trans-Indus districts, remained in the Punjab and were formed into a

new trans-Indus tehsil (now district) Mainwali, making it part of reconstituted cis-Indus Multan division consisted of the districts of Multan and Jhang, previously in the Lahore division, along with Muzaffargarh and Dera Ghazi Khan districts. Sialkot and Gujranwala districts were transferred from Rawalpindi to Lahore division. Later, on April 1, 1904, a new district of Attock was formed by the transfer of certain areas from Rawalpindi and Jhelum districts. Again, on December 1, 1904, yet another district of Lyallpur (now Faisalabad), necessitated by the development of Chenab colony, consisted of three colony tehsils of Lyallpur, Toba Tek Singh and Samundri, was formed.

55. *Ibid.*, p. 112.
56. "Sind and the Punjab: I," S.G., February 24, 1903, p. 4.
57. *Ibid.*
58. *Ibid.*
59. *Ibid.*
60. "The Amalgamation of Sind and the Punjab," S.G., October 23, 1903, p. 5. (Rep. from C. & M.G.) The scheme of amalgamating Sindh with the Punjab was strongly supported by the Punjab papers, particularly the *Civil and Military Gazette*, and the *Pioneer*, Allahabad, which published numerous articles in favour of it. A Karachi paper, the *Sind Gazette*, also supported it on certain conditions like establishment of capital of the joint province at Karachi for about six months a year, grant of adequate representation to Sindh on the Lieutenant Governor's Council, establishment of an independent Chief Court for Sindh whose status should in no case be subordinate to the Punjab Chief Court, retention of separate local civil service and re-creation of separate Sindh Commission, creation of separate branch of Secretariat (with a Public Works Department especially) and a Secretary for Sindh, retention of not only Sindh's present educational, revenue and police systems, local Acts and forms of administration, but also majority of its more experienced Government officers etc.
61. The officials while discussing the issue were not immune to

provincial prejudices and prospects of their future advancement. Ibbetson (Member of the Supreme Council, afterwards officiating Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, 6 March 1907-26 May 1907 & 12 January 1907-2 January 1908) while persistently arguing for the transfer of Sindh to the Punjab was so motivated. As a matter of fact, by 1903, Ibbetson was expecting to be the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab. Ibbetson's aspirations provoked Curzon who wrote: "...the world being largely governed by sentiment there is the faintest chance of withdrawing Sind from Bombay..." S. Z. H. Zaidi, "The Partition of Bengal and Its Annulment: A Survey of Territorial Redistribution of Bengal, 1902-1911" (unpublished Ph. D. thesis, University of London, 1964 [? 65], p. 60, quoted in Philemon Mateke, "Curzon and Transfer of Sind to Punjab," p. 7. (Paper pr. to Seminar 'Sindh Through the Centuries', Karachi March 2-7, 1975.) Also quoted in Philemon Mateke, "The Separation of Sind from the Bombay Presidency," *Grassroots*, Vol. II. No. 2 (Autumn 1978), p. 22.

62. Mateke, "Curzon and Transfer of Sind to Punjab," *loc. cit.*, p. 3. Curzon, however, did not entertain this careful balancing of compensation. According to him what was important before any decision was arrived at with regard to the carving of provincial boundaries was that the welfare of the people to be transferred and of the areas into which they were to be incorporated should be the prime test and consideration. He, therefore, laid it down that "in the readjustment of boundaries and territories upon which we are about to embark, the less we disturb rooted relations, the better and the more we abstain from the dangerous plea of compensation, the sooner shall we reach our goal. Any man who starts with a perhaps unexpressed desire to add to one province at the expense of another finds himself unconsciously in favour of compensating the latter by giving it something else." Zaidi, "The Partition of Bengal and...", p. 55, quoted in Mateke, *Grassroots*, Vol. II, No. 2 (Autumn 1978), p. 21.
63. Zaidi, "The Partition of Bengal and...", p. 62, quoted in Mateke, *Grassroots*, Vol. II, No. 2 (Autumn 1978), p. 22.

64. The Punjab too at that time not having sufficient financial ability to administer a larger area was not zealous for the union. The Punjab had, at that time, undertaken various development projects, aimed at generating revenues. The irrigation, colonisation and various administrative schemes in progress needed more attention and constant supervision of the Lieutenant Governor, who was occupied with a number of problems still unsolved connected with the "partition" of the Punjab (1901). Already over-burdened, he lacked zeal for taking up new problems and burdens.
65. "The Amalgamation of Sind and the Punjab," S.G., October 23, 1903, p. 5. (Rep. from C. & M. G.)
66. They included the *Civil and Military Gazette*, Lahore; the *Tribune*, Lahore; the *Punjabee*, Lahore; and the *Pioneer*, Allahabad. The *Watan*, Lahore, was perhaps the only notable paper of the Punjab which disagreed with them: "We dissent from the view of the other Lahore papers, both English and vernacular, that Sind should be amalgamated with the Punjab. The best interests of Sind Mahomedans require that Sind should be made autonomous under a Chief Commissioner." ("What Moslem interests Require," S.G., January 23, 1912, p. 4; rep. from *Watan*.)
67. The proposal of annulment of the "partition" of the Punjab was time and again put forward by the interested circles. In 1923, the Government of India appointed the North-West Frontier Committee under the Chairmanship of Sir Dannis Bray to report upon the administrative relationship between the settled districts of the North-West Frontier Province and the tribal areas and upon the expediency of re-amalgamation of the five settled districts with the Punjab. This gave fresh impetus to the re-merger of the settled districts of the North-West Frontier Province with the Punjab. Report of the Committee was released in March 1924.
68. What the *Pioneer*, Allahabad, had to say on the subject is typical of the Punjab papers: "All the lessons to be learnt from recent experience point to the necessity of keeping up the Lieutenant-Governorship, at any rate, to a certain size. The weakest point in the re-distribution scheme is probably

its effect on the Punjab. Shorn in 1901 of its frontier districts and its important city of Peshawar, it now loses another great city and some of the surrounding territory...Sind united to the Punjab would place the North-Western State Railway almost entirely within one Province, would give administrative control over the Indus and its tributaries which irrigate its drainage area, and endow the Punjab with a port. If a province falls below a certain standard of population and resources its administration as a Lieutenant-Governorship will become unduly costly, it will be financially starved, and will fail to secure the cadres it should possess if it is to be entrusted with autonomy. No considerations of vested interests should be allowed to stand in the way of a thorough and final re-organisation of the Provinces of Northern India now that their redistribution is in hand." *Pioneer*, quoted in "Sind and the Punjab: Proposed Amalgamation: A Press Campaign Begun," S.G., December 30, 1911, p. 4.

69. The *Sind Gazette*, which had since its inception remained a persistent supporter of the idea of Sindh's amalgamation with the Punjab, changed its view and emphatically opposed Sindh's proposed merger with the Punjab. The paper strongly advocated Sindh's elevation to the status of a separate province directly under the Supreme Government at Delhi.
70. "The Future of Sind," S.G., December 30, 1911, p. 4. Cerberus was a dog-like monster, with at least three heads, it used to guard the entrance to Hades (in a sense synonym of Hell), the land of the dead or a place where the souls of bad people are believed to be punished after death, in the folk stories of ancient Greece. The West Asian equivalent of this European folk-story character is perhaps callous self-seeker 'Pir-e-tasma-pa', a proverbial folk story character with usual human body but countless strings instead of feet; hence his name Pir 'strings-footed' (prefix Pir indicates he was either nicknamed by his protagonists or sarcastically labelled by his antagonists), who badly needed, in this case, the sturdy shoulders of Sindh (e.g. the River Indus and the Karachi Seaport) for enjoying his life quite comfortably indeed at the cost of anyone else (i.e. Sindh).

71. "Should Sind Remain under Bombay?" S.G., January 22, 1912, p. 4.
72. Sindhi," D.G., July 27, 1916, p. 6.
73. "Should Sind Remain under Bombay?" S.G., January 22, 1912, p. 4.
74. *Ibid.*
75. "Sind and the Punjab: Proposed Amalgamation," S.G., December 30, 1911, p. 4.
76. "Sind Refuses to Be Linked with the Punjab," S.G., January 23, 1912, p. 5. (Rep. from *Alhalk*.)
77. "The Times on Karachi," D.G., May 13, 1912, p. 4. Opposition to the proposal was reflected through letters, articles, statements and editorials in the press and speeches at the public meetings. The proposal was opposed by Mir Ayub Khan, E. M. Pratt (the then Judicial Commissioner-in-Sindh) and Bernard Temple in an especially convened meeting of the Karachi Branch of the British Empire League held at Karachi in January 1912; Sindh Hindu Sabha in an address presented at Karachi to George Sydenham Clarke, the then Governor of Bombay (1907-1913), in January 1913; Colonel C. E. Yate (ex-Agent to the Governor General in British Baluchistan) and Sir H. Evan M. James (ex-Commissioner-in-Sindh) from the platform of Royal Society of Arts in London in March 1913; and Harchandrai Vishindas, as Chairman of the Reception Committee of the All-India Congress Session held at Karachi in December 1913.
78. "The Punjab Bogey Laid," S.G., January 29, 1912, p. 4. One of the main reasons for taking a non-hostile attitude towards the Bombay Government, at the time, by some residents of Sindh, was their strong opposition to the proposed merger of Sindh with the Punjab. As pointed out by E. M. Pratt, the then Judicial Commissioner-in-Sindh, the proposal to add Sindh to the Punjab, by itself, was impracticable on statistical grounds, because the then population of the Punjab was 22,000,000 and that of the Bombay 18,000,000, so that the suggested transfer of Sindh with its 3,000,000 people would give the Punjab 25,000,000

and leave Bombay with only 15,000,000. Bombay would then be too small for a Governorship, but to degrade so old and advanced a Presidency to the status of a Lieutenant-Governorship was unthinkable. The danger was, therefore, that a large redistribution might take place—that Sindh might be added to the Punjab and the Central Provinces to Bombay. Such a redistribution would give the Punjab and Bombay each a population of 25,000,000. The more Sindh abused Bombay, the greater the danger that Bombay would wish to be rid of Sindh and to annex the Central Provinces instead. E. M. Pratt, S.G., January 29, 1912, p. 5. (Prsd. sp. at a meeting of members of Karachi Branch of B. E. L. held at Karachi, progs. pub. under the cap. "Should Sind Join the Punjab? Interesting Discussion in Karachi.")

79. "The Punjab Bogey Laid," S.G., January 29, 1912, p. 4.
80. In this connection, a correspondent's article published in the *Pioneer*, Allahabad, and reproduced in the *Sind Gazette* on July 27, 1914, under caption "Karachi's Enlarged Outlook: As the Port of the Government of India: An Outside View of What Is Wanted," is worthwhile.
81. Known from the name of E. S. Montagu, the then Secretary of State for India (July 1914-March 1922), but in fact planned and prepared by Curzon, the then Lord President of the Council (1916-1919) and Sir Austen Chamberlain, the outgoing Secretary of State for India (May 1915-July 1917). The latter had previously held the position of Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1903 to 1906 (and also from 1919 to 1921), and a member of Lloyd George's War Cabinet. During the First World War he accepted the responsibility for the failure of the Mesopotamian campaign, resigning as secretary of state of India in 1917. Later, he was made British foreign secretary from 1924 to 1929.
82. The Punjab press renewed the old issue of amalgamation. For instance, the *Tribune*, Lahore, wrote in November 1917: "It is obvious that the people of Sind do not appreciate the merits of the Punjab-Sind ideal and their reason is that they do not gain by the amalgamation...For our part, we believe that the Punjab-Sind amalgamation can be and will have to

be effected in future in a manner acceptable to both the provinces and this can be better discussed at a joint conference of the people and officials of both the territories." ("Sind and the Punjab," D.G., November 12, 1917, p. 5; rep. from *Tribune*.)

83. Known from the names of Montagu and Lord Chelmsford, the latter was then the Governor General and Viceroy of India (1916-1921).
84. The Sindh Provincial Conference time and again rejected the proposal to amalgamate Sindh with the Punjab. The Sindh Muhammadan Association did the same. The Sindh Hindu-Muslim Pact of June 1928 discarded any such possibility. The Sindh Hindu and Muslim deputations who put forward their cases before the Simon Commission though held diametrically opposed views on many points including the separation of Sindh from the Bombay Presidency, were completely unanimous on the point of opposition to the idea of amalgamation of Sindh with the Punjab.
85. At different periods different names were suggested for the proposed greater Punjab. In December 1858, the *Bombay Standard* called it the "Punjab Presidency." ("The Punjab a Presidency," *Bombay Standard*, December 20, 1858; rep. in S.K., December 28, 1858, p. 416.) In February 1912, M. de P. Webb named it "Indus-stan." (Webb, "The Future of Sind," S.G., February 26, 1912, p. 5; ltt. to ed.) In March 1928, a correspondent in India of *The Times*, London, pointed out that the Muslim leaders of the Punjab wanted a solid and compact bloc in the north-west of India "to act as a greater Punjab." (*The Times*, London, March 14, 1928.) In August 1930, the *Daily Gazette* called it the "North West Presidency of Sind, Baluchistan and the Punjab." ("An Independent Sind," D.G., August 2, 1930, p. 8.) Subsequently, in 1933, some Punjabi new entrants to politics—Choudhary Rahmat Ali, Main Abdul Haq and others, especially the Cambridge University pamphleteers—named it "Pakistan," (for further details, see *infra* footnote No. 92) perhaps, on the prototype (pattern) of M. de P. Webb's "Indus-stan," which itself was on the pattern of and influenced by the name of 'Hindustan', containing suffix 'stan' (a Turko-Persian wont), historically

and sentimentally most popular pattern of attaching this suffix to the names of and creating an emotional bond between the Central Asian (northern half of Asia) Muslim countries (e.g. Turkistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Kurdistan, Baluchistan and Afghanistan) in marked contrast to West, South and East Asian Muslim countries, of course, except above mentioned Afghanistan, Baluchistan and Hindustan, the names given to them by Turco-Persian invaders coming from the Central Asia.

86. Such a far-reaching proposal that the Punjab, the N.-W.F. Province, Baluchistan and Sindh should be amalgamated together, and that there should be no reservation of seats, unless the minority desire it, was put forward in 1928 before the Nehru Committee, but the latter was unable to entertain the proposal which meant "the creation of an unwieldy province sprawling all over the north and north-west." (Nehru Report, rep. in *The Indian Quarterly Register*, January-June 1928, p. 20.) Clement Richard Attlee, who served on the Simon Commission on India (1927-1930), later became British Prime Minister (1945-1951), says that he heard of Pakistan when he was a member of the Simon Commission. (C. Attlee, *As It Happened* [London, 1954], p.182.) For achieving this greater Punjab province, Dr. Sir Muhammad Iqbal, knighted in 1922, the chief exponent of the scheme at the time, later hinted at an esoteric stratagem, known to (or perceived by) only the crypto-imperialists, when he alluded to the exclusion of Amballa division and of some districts where the non-Muslims predominate. (D.G., December 30, 1930, p. 11; prsd. sp. at All-India Muslim League Session held at Allahabad, pub. under cap. "Muslims Fear Hindu Domination.") This was, perhaps, the first subtle divulgence of the most confidential idea of communal partition of the Punjab/greater Punjab and all of a sudden mass migration of people from the Muslim to Non-Muslim Punjab and *vice versa*. In his address at Allahabad session of the Muslim League, Dr. Iqbal defined neither the eastern border/boundary of the Punjab that he saw after seceding from India nor the nature of Punjab's link with India, of course, for obvious reasons.

87. "The Indian Inquiry: Punjab and the Commission," *The Times*, London, March 14, 1928, cont. by a correspondent in India, quoted in K.K. Aziz, *The Historical Background of Pakistan, 1857-1947* (Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1970), entry no. 4738, p. 350. Interestingly, like the greater Punjab, the idea of the greater Afghanistan seems to have been in the air, at least, as early as 1919. Sir Arthur Berriedale Keith observed: "Among the Muslims also there was propagated a wild but not negligible scheme for the creation of a Muslim State based on Afghanistan and embracing all those North-Western areas where the faith [Islam] is strong. Such a State would inevitably form a permanent source of danger in India." A. B. Keith, *A Constitutional History of India* (London, 1936), p. 287.
88. These articles were written by Aqai Murtaza Ahmed Khan Muhammadzai who advocated the idea of a joint province of the Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province on various grounds. In one of the articles published on December 19, 1928 (p-1), he supported the formation of a large province, not an independent state or dominion, in an occupied colony directly ruled by the alien masters, and that also on the paradoxical (self-contradictory) ground of "right of self-determination."
89. Dr. Abdus Salam Khurshid, "*Pakistan jey Tahreek mein Muslim Press jo Kirdar*," (Role of Muslim Press in the Pakistan Movement; in Sindhi) *Hilal-e-Pakistan*, August 13, 1980, p. 3.
90. The moving spirit behind the idea was Dr. Sir Muhammad Iqbal, member of the Punjab Assembly (1925-1928) who (remained 'member' of Fazal-e-Hussain's pro-British and rank-opportunist, although non-communal, Punjab National Unionist Party during his whole tenure of three-year Assembly membership) time and again emphasised the need for such a conference. In this connection, one of his interview given to the *Muslim Outlook* was reproduced by the *Inqilab* on November 23, 1930 (p. 3). The formal decision for holding this conference was taken at a meeting of the Punjab Muslim leaders held at the invitation of Dr. Iqbal at Barkat Ali Muslim Hall Lahore on November 23, 1930.

(*Inqilab*, November 25, 1930, p. 5.) The decision was duly appreciated by the Punjab Muslim press including the *Inqilab*, which supported it in an editorial dated November 26, 1930 (p. 3). For holding this conference, a reception committee was formed with Dr. Muhammad Iqbal as Chairman, and Majid Salik and Syed Habib as Secretaries. A meeting of the reception committee was held under the presidentship of Dr. Iqbal on December 1, 1930. (*Inqilab*, December 7, 1930, p. 7.) Dr. Iqbal and other Punjabi leaders made an "Appeal to the Leading Muslims of the North-West Frontier Province, Baluchistan, Sindh and the Punjab" and also an advertisement under the caption "The Punjab, Sindh, the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan Are Islamic Country: Raise the Flag of Islam There" and got both of them published in the Punjab press. (For appeal entitled "*Muqtadar Mussalmanan Sarhad wa Baluchistan, Sindh wa Punjab se Appeal: Hazrat Allama Iqbal wa Deegar Karkunan ka Maktoob*" see *Inqilab*, December 19, 1930, p. 5; and for advertisement entitled "*Punjab, Sindh, Sarhad aur Baluchistan Islami Mulk Hain: En mein Islam ka Alum Buland Karo*" see *Inqilab*, December 29, 1930, p. 3.)

91. D.G., December 30, 1930, p. 11. It appears incredible, if it was not a mutual connivance between the two top-ranking Hindu and Muslim communal Punjabi political activists, representing apparently two opposite groups of the Indian political thought and action, to share the same idea of constituting a 'greater Punjab', within India or outside. The other Punjabi stalwart was none else but the then 'Lion of the Punjab', Lala Lajpat Rai (1865-1928), who, in 1924, i.e. five years before Dr. Muhammad Iqbal, "suggested the creation of Moslem provinces in the north-east [greater Bengal including adjoining Muslim areas of neighbouring provinces] and north-west [greater Punjab combining Sindh, Baluchistan and N.-W. F. P.] India....To set at rest the ceaseless Hindu-Muslim bickering and jealousies in some provinces." *Modern Review*, Calcutta, 1925, Pt. I, p. 489. "Three years later (on 15 December 1927), Governor [of the Punjab, William Malcolm] Hailey wrote to Sir Arthur Hirtzel, permanent secretary at the India Office in London, of unnamed Punjabi Muslims who 'seriously [thought] of

breaking away ... and starting a Federation of their own ... [which would] embrace the Punjab, parts of the UP, the Northwest Frontier Province, Baluchistan and Sind' and were willing to 'give up... some of our Hindu districts in the Southeast of the Province'." Rajmohan Gandhi, p. 307, quoting David Page, *Prelude to Partition: The Indian Muslims and the Imperial System of Control, 1920-1932* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 162, Hailey papers, file 11B. In December 1932, Bhai Permanand (Jhelum, Punjab) of Hindu Mahasabha said that he would not mind "even statutory majority for Muslims" in the Punjab if her Hindu-majority areas were separated and joined to Delhi or the United Provinces. (Letter of Bhai Parmanand to Madan Mohan Malvia [Allahabad, UP], *Tribune*, Lahore, 23 December 1932, quoted in Neeti Nair, *Changing Homelands: Hindu Politics and the Partition of India*, New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2011, p. 147.)

92. Choudhary Rahmat Ali et al., *Now or Never: Are We to Live or Perish for Ever*, rep. in G. Allana (comp. and ed.), *Pakistan Movement: Historic Documents* (2d ed.; Karachi: Paradise Subscription Agency, 1968), pp. 107-108. The idea was strongly advocated in a memorandum, by Mian Abdul Haq, President of the Pakistan National Congress, addressed to the Parliamentary Joint Select Committee, on November 1, 1933, wherein a separate federal constitution for the proposed Federation of the five north-western units of the British Indian Empire was also demanded. (D.G., November 27, 1933, pp. 7-8; memorandum rep. under cap. "Pakistan's Demand for Own Separate National Existence.") This lengthy memorandum was arranged to be published *verbatim et literatim* in leading newspapers of the country including the Punjab and Sindh (e.g. the *Daily Gazette*, Karachi). The proposed scheme was strongly supported in the Punjab press in the year 1933. In this connection study of the files of a Lahore paper, the *Civil and Military Gazette*, which published a number of letters, in 1933, written by different persons in favour of this scheme, is worthwhile. Letters of K. G. Ahmad (23rd May), Muhammad Anwar (7th, 19th, 29th, September and 1st November), Khalid Saifullah (19th September and 23rd October), and Haider Ali Abbasi (22nd December) need special reference. A Muslim Correspond-

ent's "What Muslim India Thinks," published in the same paper on December 11, 1933 also deserves special mention. It appears pertinent to mention here that the opponents to the above referred to idea were also very active in whole of India, including the U.P., but does not deserve any portrayal in this work for its scope is wholly and solely limited to Sindh only. For providing only a glimpse, suffice it to reproduce here two couplets of Shamim Karhani's Urdu poem written in 1942 titled '*Pakistan Chahne Walon Se*' (to those who yearn for Pakistan):

*Humko batlao tau kiya matlab hai Pakistan ka,
jis jagah iss waqt Muslim haen, najis hae kiya woh ja,
Nesh-e-tohmat se tere, Chishti kaa seena chaak hae
jald batla kiya zameen Ajmer kee na-pak hae.*

(Tell me, what does Pakistan mean? Is this land, where we Muslims are, any less pure? Your slur has wounded Chishti's breast; Quick, tell me, is Ajmer impure?) Quoted in Shamsul Islam, *Muslims Against Partition of India* (New Delhi: Print India Press, 2017), p. 19. One could add here, what about the sacred places of Saudi Arabia, Palestine, Iran, Iraq and Syria?

93. Choudhary Rahmat Ali *et al.*, *loc. cit.* Dr. Iqbal himself has explained his position explicitly in a letter to Edward Thompson on March 4, 1934: "You call me protagonist of the scheme called Pakistan. Now Pakistan is not my scheme. The one I suggested in my address [at Allahabad in 1930] is the creation of a Muslim province [in the manner as it was arbitrarily created in 1955 in the name of 'One Unit' of West Pakistan, now Pakistan, exactly as originally designed] i.e. a province having an overwhelming population of [Punjabi] Muslims in the North-West India. This new province [or 'One Unit' of four provinces] will be according to my scheme part of the proposed Indian federation. The Pakistan scheme proposes a separate federation of [five] Muslim provinces directly related to England as a separate dominion. This scheme originates in Cambridge." (Quoted in Iqbal Singh, *The Ardent Pilgrim: An Introduction to the Life and Work of Muhammad Iqbal*, Calcutta: Longman, Green Co. Ltd., 1951.) Rahmat Ali and his three friends, therefore, unequivocally

admitted that their proposed scheme of Pakistan was quite different from that of Sir Iqbal: "While he [Dr. Iqbal] proposed the amalgamation of these provinces into a single State forming a [one] unit of the All-India Federation, we propose that these Provinces should have a separate Federation of their own." It is claimed that Rahmat Ali 'communicated' his above 'pamphlet' to the Muslim members in the Round Table Conference assembled in London (with or without formal permission from the British Government [which was declined to Moulana Azad and Dr. Mukhtar Ahmed Ansari, despite Mr. Gandhi's all endeavours and entreating] for entry to the RTC was strictly restricted to official invitees only) but the names of those Muslim members, except Dr. Sir Muhammad Iqbal, had not been and could not be divulged for obvious reasons. (If that story is corrected, the mischievous mission assigned to him by the paramount powers that may be, if any is one of the riddles of that time.) Again, out of three sessions of the RTC held between 1930 and 1932, no specific session(s) or date(s) had been disclosed, nor the reason why the said leaflet was published in January 1933, after the end of all the sessions of RTC — its third and last session was wound up on Christmas Eve, 24 December 1932. Neither M. A. Jinnah and M. K. Gandhi nor Sir Iqbal (who attended the second session of the RTC in 1931 only) had the prerogative of attending all the three RTCs except, perhaps, the Cambridge leafleteers in view of their mischievous mission assigned to them by the paramount powers that may be, if any.

94. Dr. Iqbal, D.G., December 30, 1930, p. 11. Dr. Iqbal appealed to calculate the possibilities of North-West Indian Muslims in regard to the defence of the British Indian Empire 'against foreign [sic] aggression': "The Punjab with fifty-six per cent Muslim population supplies fifty-four per cent of total combatant troops in the Indian Army, and if the nineteen thousand Gurkhas recruited from the independent state of Nepal are excluded, the Punjab contingent amounts to sixty-two per cent of the whole Indian Army. This percentage does not take into account nearly six thousand combatants supplied to the Indian Army by the North-West Frontier Province and [Pathans territories of] Baluchistan.

From this you can easily calculate the possibilities of North-West Indian Muslims [Punjabis and Pashtuns] in regard to the defence of [British] India against foreign [sic] aggression." In his opinion "this concentration of the most living portion [in contrast to dead, lifeless fraction] of the Muslims of India whose military and police service has,...made the British rule possible in the country, will eventually solve the problem of India as well as Asia." He proclaimed that the "demand for the creation of a Muslim India within India is, therefore, perfectly justified." *Ibid.*

95. The British Government had always shown some sympathy for and appreciation of the proposal of amalgamation of Sindh with the Punjab. The idea was kept in mind by the Royal Statutory Commission, better known as the Simon Commission. So is the case of the Sindh Administrative Committee, appointed by the Government of India as late as October 1933, its report was released in April 1934. The idea was also in the mind of the Parliamentary Joint Select Committee who, while announcing their decision of separating Sindh from Bombay and making it an autonomous province, felt it necessary to put on record (in November 1934): "The alternative of a union between Sind and the Punjab has long been discussed, and there are very strong arguments in favour of it, especially in view of the joint interest of the two territories in the waters of the Indus. Unfortunately, this alternative now seems to be opposed by practically all sections of opinion concerned. On review of all the factors in the problem, we have reached the conclusion that the constitution of Sind as a separate Governor's Province is the best solution possible in present circumstances." *D.G.*, November 22, 1934, p. 3; exts. on Sindh of the Parliamentary Joint Select Committee Report pub. under the cap. "Sind's Place in the New India.") The pro-merger attitude of British authorities is also manifested in their change of policy towards Khairpur state. Until 1932 the Government of Bombay exercised political functions as an agent to the Government of India. The system was changed in 1932. Khairpur came then directly under the supervision of the Political Department of the Government of India and formed one of the forty-five Punjab states in

- political relation with the Crown Representative through the Resident of the Punjab States, whose headquarter was in Lahore. H. T. Sorley, *Gazetteer of West Pakistan: The Former Province of Sind* (Karachi: West Pakistan Government Press, n.d. [1968]), p. 787.
96. Ghulam Hyder K. Pir, "A Glimpse into the History of Sind Separation," *Alwahid*, Sindh Azad Number 1936 (June 15, 1936), English sec., p. 49.
 97. Following this successful Revolution, the British troops promptly invaded Southern Russia from Persia (now Iran). Britain also launched an armed attack, known as 'War of Allied Intervention', on Northern Russia along with the French, the German and the United States military units which landed at Murmansk in support of the resistance organised by the counter-revolutionary non-state Russian militants in December 1917 and occupied Archangel in north-west European Russia (1918-1920) but finally failed and led to the formal establishment of the Soviet Union (official name the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or USSR) in 1922.
 98. *The Indian Quarterly Register*, January-June 1927, pp. 33-34. It needs no emphasis to say that since 1919 (some assert, 1917), when the All-India National Congress made Sindh into a separate province in the Congress organisation and allowed to form a separate Sindh Provincial Congress Committee, no voice was raised in protest. Thus, by this very strange and most objectionable move, Indian parochial Muslim vested interests, obviously, against the long- and short-term wishes of Sindhis (both Hindus and Muslims), were easily able to convert those who were previously in favour of Sindh's separation from Bombay only a few years ago (like the supporters of All-India Congress) were now made opponents of it, and those who were against separation then (like the Punjabis *en bloc* and Indian Muslim Leaguers) now vehemently desired it, indeed, by adding strange 'ifs' and 'buts' based on pure communalism and quite unwarrantedly tacked on to certain other irrelevant matters with which it had no concern whatsoever.

99. *Indian Round Table Conference, 12th September 1930-19th January 1931: Proceedings of Sub-Committee (Vol. IX) Sub-Committee No. IX (Sind)*. (Calcutta: Central Publications Branch, Government of India, 1931), pp. 18-19. (Shah Nawaz Bhutto in the first meeting.)
100. S.G., April 29, 1887, p. 4.
101. A Former Delhi Resident, S.G., January 6, 1912, pp. 4-5. (Ltt. to ed. in connection with *Sind Gazette's* symposium on "The Future of Karachi: New Opportunities.")
102. Colonel A. Cory (ed. S.G.), S.G., October 16, 1891, p. 6. (Sp. at Karachi Chamber of Commerce Dinner, recalling his views since 1876 on Sindh's proposed amalgamation with the Punjab.)
103. "Karachi," S.G., July 14, 1903, p. 4. (Rep. from *Capital*.)
104. "A Fourth Presidency in India," *Daily News*, May 20, 1858. (Rep. in Supplement to S.K., July 30, 1858, [pp. 1-2]).
105. Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province, the former separated from Sindh in 1876 and the latter from the Punjab in 1901, to all intents and purposes were manifestly lumped together for military and defence purposes with Sindh and the Punjab respectively.
106. Lord Dalhousie (February 20, 1856), quoted in "The Reorganization of the North-Western Frontier," S.G., March 5, 1886. (Rep. on June 14, 1887, p. 5.).
107. Dr. Muhammad Iqbal, D.G., December 30, 1930, p. 11.
108. "The Amalgamation of Sind and the Punjab: II," S.G., October 27, 1903, p. 5. (Rep. from C. & M. G.)
109. "The Progress in the Punjab," S.G., February 20, 1903, p. 4.
110. "Why the Punjab Wants Sind?" S.G., January 23, 1912, p. 5. (Rep. from C. & M. G.)
111. "The Amalgamation of Sind and the Punjab: II," S.G., October 27, 1903, p. 5. (Rep. from C. & M. G.)
112. T. L. F. Beaumont, S.G., January 6, 1912, p. 5. (Ltt. to ed.)
113. James Currie (Chairman of Punjab Chamber of Commerce),

- S.G., February 17, 1912, p. 4. (Sp. at the annual meeting of the Chamber held at Delhi, pub. under the cap. "Punjab Chamber of Commerce.")
114. M. de P. Webb, "Sind and the Punjab," S.G., June 30, 1903, p. 4. (Ltt. to ed.)
 115. "The Amalgamation of Sind and the Punjab: II," S.G., October 27, 1903, p. 5. (Rep. from C. & M. G.)
 116. *Pioneer*, quoted in "Bombay Will Not Consent to Part with Sind," S.G., January 23, 1912, p. 5. (Rep. from *Times of India*.)
 117. M. de P. Webb, S.G., January 29, 1912, p. 4. (Sp. at meeting of members of Karachi Branch of B. E. L. held on January 27, 1912, at Karachi, progs. pub. under the cap. "Should Sind Join the Punjab? Interesting Discussion in Karachi.")
 118. "Why the Punjab Wants Sind?" S.G., January 23, 1912, p. 5. (Rep. from C. & M. G.)
 119. "The Re-organization of the North-Western Frontier," S.G., March 5, 1886. (Rep. on June 14, 1887, p. 5.)
 120. *Pioneer*, quoted in "Bombay Will Not Consent to Part with Sind," S.G., January 23, 1912, p. 5. (Rep. from *Times of India*.)
 121. T. L. F. Beaumont, S.G., January 6, 1912, p. 5. (Ltt. to ed.)
 122. A Late Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab [Sir Louis William Dane], "Sind and the Punjab: Provincial Changes in India," *loc.cit.*, p. 8.
 123. "Sind and the Punjab," D.G., February 8, 1929, p. 8.
 124. *Ibid.* Also, A Late Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab [Sir Louis William Dane], "Sind and the Punjab: Provincial Changes in India," *loc. cit.*, p. 12.
 125. A Hindu Nationalist [pseud.], "The Proposed New Moslem Province," D.G., February 14, 1931, p. 16.
 126. P. R. Cadell [ex-Commissioner-in-Sindh], "Should Sind Separate? And Join the Punjab? Or Combine with Baluchistan? Or Stand Alone?" D.G., July 5, 1930, p. 15. (Rep. from *Asiatic Review*.)
 127. *Ibid.*

128. Lord Reay, S.G., April 5, 1889, p. 5. (Reply to address of Sindh Sabha.)
129. *Bombay Gazette*, quoted in "The Transfer of Sind," S. G., April 16, 1889, p. 5.
130. "Should Sind Join the Punjab?" S.G., January 24, 1912, p. 4.
131. "Ten Reasons for Not Joining the Punjab," S.G., January 19, 1912, p. 5. (Rep. from *Phoenix*.) Also "Sind Refuses to Be Linked with the Punjab," S.G., January 23, 1912, p. 5. (Rep. from *Alhak*.)
132. E. M. Pratt, S.G., January 29, 1912, p. 5.
133. Bernard Temple, S.G., January 29, 1912, p. 5. (Sp. at a meeting of members of Karachi Branch of B. E. L.)
134. "The Future of Sind," S.G., December 30, 1911, p. 4.
135. "Sind Entirely Satisfied with Bombay," S.G., January 23, 1912, p. 4. (Rep. from *Phoenix*.)
136. "Ten Reasons for Not Joining the Punjab," S.G., January 19, 1912, p. 5. (Rep. from *Phoenix*.) Also "Sind Refuses to Be Linked with the Punjab," S.G., January 23, 1912, p. 5. (Rep. from *Alhak*.)
137. Mir Ayub Khan, S.G., January 29, 1912, p. 4. (Sp. at a meeting of members of Karachi Branch of B. E. L.)
138. Khan Bahadur K. H. Katrak, "Should Sind Separate from Bombay? The Parsi Point of View," D.G., May 21, 1931, p. 7. Also "Sind Refuses to Be Linked with the Punjab," S.G., January 23, 1912, p. 5. (Rep. from *Alhak*.)
139. This, according to the pro-merger paper the *Daily Gazette*, was "the main objection of the people of Sind to amalgamation with the Punjab." ("Sind and the Punjab," D.G., February 8, 1929, p. 8.)
140. Prof. H. L. Chablani, D.G., October 7, 1933, p. 11. (Int. to Associated Press, pub. under the cap. "Chablani Throws Light on Sind Problem: Narrates His Experiences in London.")
141. (Anon.,) "Sind and the Punjab: The Other Side of the

Question," S.G., May 12, 1903, p. 5. (Cont. article.)

142. P. R. Cadell, "Should Sind Separate? And Join the Punjab?" *loc cit.*, p. 15.
143. "Should Sind Join the Punjab?" S.G., January 24, 1912, p. 5.
144. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
145. (Anon.,) "Sind and the Punjab: The Other Side of the Question," S.G., May 12, 1903, p. 4. (Cont. article.)
146. "Sind Refuses to Be Linked with the Punjab," S.G., January 23, 1912, p. 5. (Rep. from *Alhak.*)
147. "Should Sind Join the Punjab?" S.G., January 24, 1912, p. 4.
148. *Ibid.*
149. "Why Sind Wants Autonomy?" S. G., February 2, 1912, p. 4.
150. M. de P. Webb, "Sind and Bombay," D.G., November 13, 1920, p. 7. (Ltt. to ed.) Webb had almost always supported the idea of union of Sindh with the Punjab since 1903. In 1918, he advocated for "a self-governing Sind." Again, in 1920, he changed his views and advocated the continuance of Sindh's connection with the Bombay Presidency. Following were main reasons given by him for the change of his opinion: "If I thought that a union with a politically enlarged and improved Punjab, *with Summer Headquarters in Karachi*, [emphasis original] was within the realms of practical politics, and that such Punjab could give to Sind within the next five years the educational and material assistance that we now so urgently need, I should continue to struggle for that ideal. But I do not think these things." (M. de P. Webb, "Sind and Bombay," D.G., November 17, 1920, p. 5; ltt. to ed.)
151. Syed Miran Muhammad Shah, D.G., October 7, 1933, p. 4. (Int. to special representative of D.G., pub. under cap. "More Talk about Sind Separation.")
152. "Bombay Will Not Consent to Part with Sindh," S.G., January 23, 1912, p. 5. (Rep. from *Times of India.*)
153. Bernard Temple, S.G., January 29, 1912, pp. 4-5.

154. "Should Sind Join the Punjab?" S.G., January 24, 1912, p. 4.
155. Bernard Temple, S.G., January 29, 1912, p. 5.
156. Syed Miran Muhammad Shah, D.G., October 7, 1933, p. 4.
157. "Ten Reasons for Not Joining the Punjab," S.G., January 19, 1912, p. 5. (Rep. from *Phoenix*.)
158. Shadi Lal, S.G., October 31, 1912, p. 7. (Prsd. sp. at Hindu Conference held at Delhi, pub. under cap. "Sind Not to Be Forced to Join the Punjab.")
159. "Should Sind Join the Punjab?" S.G., January 24, 1912, p. 5.
160. "Sind Refuses to Be Linked with the Punjab," S.G., January 23, 1912, p. 5. (Rep. from *Alhak*.) It was again and again asserted by Sindhis that "it is not probable that Sind would be treated better by the Punjab, and more so when there is agitation in Sind over the 'Punjabisation' of services in Sind, especially in the Police and Railway departments." (A Muslim Correspondent [pseud.], "Sind Must Find Its Destiny Outside the Federation of India: Separate Dominion in Direct Relations with British," *Daily Gazette*, 3 November 1932, p. 6.)
161. Syed Miran Muhammad Shah, D.G., October 7, 1933, p. 4.
162. P. R. Cadell, "Should Sind Separate? And Join the Punjab?" *loc. cit.*, p. 15. There were several reasons for age-old, deep and inherent dislike, hatred and animosity between the Punjab and Sindh in addition to the proposed merger of Sindh into the Punjab: (i) Sindhis and the Punjabis have gone through quite different situations and experiences, throughout their respective chequered history with the result that, their normal response even in almost same situations is quite different from each other. Sindh had witnessed only three main onslaughts of foreign aggression from the south-east of Iran and north-east of Baluchistan (i.e., the Scythians, the Arabs and the Arghuns from Kandhar) throughout her long history since the Indus civilisation. Whereas, the Punjab, located on the pathway of almost all the aggressions and invasions on India from the north-west—the Aryans, Achaemenians, Macedonians, Shaka-Massagetae confederation of tribes better known as

the Scythians (that also, unlike Sindh, from the north-west), Parthians, Graeco-Bactrians, Kushan-Tukharian confederation of tribes better known as the Kushans, Sassanians, Kidarites, Chionite-Ephthalite confederation of tribes better known as the White Hunas, Ghaznavids, Ghoris, Mongols, Timuris, Mughals, Nadirshahi Iranians and Abdali Afghans—that also not in an isolated one time irruption but several times and in a series of invasions. For example, Sebuktegin (r. 962-997 AD), the founder of Ghaznavid dynasty (962-1030 AD), raided India via the Punjab no less than six times and his son and successor Mahmud Ghaznavi seventeen times from 1001 to 1026 AD. (The latter eventually annexed the western Punjab in 1021 AD and made it base for further attacks on India.) Punjab, being the main gateway to India, was destined to be the perennial battleground and first home of all the invaders. Few conquerors, if any, brought wives with them, they were therefore constrained to acquire women as and when desired from the Punjab. Thus the blood (and gene) of many invading army-men came to mingle with the people of the Punjab. Out of this mixture of blood, the present-day Punjabis have risen. Therefore, the Punjabis to a great extent rightly and proudly boast about their recognition as a martial race in South Asia. The Mongol onslaught continued from the thirteenth to fourteenth centuries AD (during Salve, Khilji and Tughlaq dynasties). During the period, the control of the Delhi Sultanate over the Punjab was tenuous and trivial because practically the River Beas had become the frontier of the Delhi Sultanate with Mongols enjoying full sway in the large Punjabi territories west of the Beas (and in south up to Uch in Sirai or Siro region of Sindh). Sultan Iltutmish (r. 1211-1236), the real founder of the Delhi sultanate, and after him, Giasuddin Balban (r. 1266-1285), also, well-guarded the Sultanate against Mongol attacks with vigilance and substantial success, of course, again except the Punjab. Besides, Alauddin Khilji (r. 1296-1316), by his remarkable military prowess, inflicted a humiliating defeat to the Mongols near Delhi and successfully kept the Mongols at bay from Delhi, but not the Punjab. Two most outstanding generals of the Delhi Sultanate, Jalaluddin Khilji (r. 1290-1296 AD) and Giasuddin Tughlaq, (r. 1320-1325 AD) who earlier as generals valiantly fought

against the Mongols, were later raised to the Delhi throne as kings. However, due to continuing potential threat of the Mongols, Sultan Muhammad Tughlaq (r. 1325-1351 AD) found it expedient, in 1327 AD, to shift his capital from Delhi in northern India to Daulatabad (originally Devagiri), about 800 kilometres away in southern India, in present-day Maharashtra province. Major invasions of the Mongols, according to M. H. Panhwar (*Peraeti Sindh Katha*, Karachi: Umer Soomro Academy, 2011, p. 257) were carried out in the years 1221, 1241, 1246, 1260, 1291, 1298, 1304, 1317, 1341, 1358, 1396, 1429, 1520 and 1524—all of them were largely made into the Punjab. Some details are as follows: The first attack of the Mongols was a result of retreat and flight of Jalaluddin Khwarzam Shah from his western capital of Ghazni (1221) to the Punjab, and for the first time Genghis Khan (c. 1162-1227) himself came to Kalabagh and then returned. However, a Mongol army, commanded by Sardar Turbi Naven, destroyed the defenseless territory of the Punjab up to Salt Range, including Jhelum. The same army again launched a heavy offensive, in 1224, up to Multan but Nasiruddin Qabacha, at the time, ruler of Upper Sindh, from Bakhar to Multan, having capital at Uch, with appropriate strategy saved the country from much devastation. In December 1241, a Mongol army from Khurasan and Ghazni, under the command of Tyre or Tiar, attacked the Punjab in the reign of Sultan Moizuddin Bahram (r. 1240-1242), who succeeded Sultan Razia in 1240. Again, the Mongols attacked the Punjab in the reign of Sultan Alauddin Masud Shah (r. 1242-1246). The then Governor of the Punjab immediately fled to Hindustan, leaving behind the people of the Punjab totally helpless and hapless victims of ruthless barbarians. On 22nd December 1241, Mongols entered Lahore and brutally destroyed and devastated whole of the Punjab up to the River Beas, and then safely returned to Afghanistan. Once again, in 1258, the Mongols made a colossal attack on Multan and Uch, in the reign of Sultan Nasiruddin Mahmud (r. 1246-1266). In 1285, the Mongols, again, savagely attacked the Punjab, under the command of Tamar Khan, and at the cursed battleground of Debalpur, Sultan Giasuddin Balban's (r. 1266-1287) beloved and brave son and heir-apparent Prince

Muhammad, commanding Hindustani force, valiantly sacrificed his life. In 1292, Khurasan's new Muslim Mongols (amazingly, later, pronounced "*Paasbaan milgaey Ka'ba ko Sanam Khaney Se*") under the command of their new Muslim ruler Abdullah, grandson of Halaku Khan, attacked the Punjab with a huge army of about 15 *tumans* (each *tuman* comprising ten thousand warriors) and was confronted by Sultan Jalaluddin Khilji (r. 1290-1296) but with no positive result. During 21-year reign of Alauddin Khilji (r. 1296-1316), no less than six times major assaults were made by the (Muslim) Mongols, the main reason behind these attacks was that for continuing the occupation over Iran the then Muslim Mongol ruler, Duda Khan (r. 1291-1306), was engaged in confrontation with the Turk army and was in great need of funds which were acquired through merciless looting in the defenseless Punjab. For instance, in 1297, the Mongols pitilessly looted and divested the whole of the Punjab up to Jullunder where, after all, an armed encounter took place and the Mongols returned to Afghanistan. Second time more than two hundred thousand Mongols, under the command of a new Muslim prince, Qatlugh Khwaja, attacked Delhi and more than three hundred thousand Hindustani soldiers directly under the command of Alauddin Khilji opposed them near Delhi and after fierce fighting the Mongols faced a severe and very humiliating defeat and retreated to Afghanistan. This was, perhaps, the first remarkable defeat of the Mongols on the soil of Hindustan proper, but not in the Punjab. After this, Sultan Giasudding Tughlaq (r.1320-1325) faced a number of encounters with the (Muslim) Mongols but his all efforts went into vain. He was partly successful in securing Delhi, but not the Punjab. Despite all his arrangements the Mongols were practically free to loot anytime and everywhere throughout the Punjab in all those years. Giasuddin Tuqluq's name as a Hindustani ruler and, prior to it, as a competent general to thwart the imminent danger of constant devastating attacks of the Mongols on Hindustan, but not on the vulnerable Punjab, was certainly prominent like those of Iltutmish, Balban, Jalaluddin Khilji and Alauddin Khilji, previous to him. (Giasuddin installed a plaque in the Jamia Masjid of Multan wherein it was

asserted that my people have bestowed me the title of 'Gazi-ul-Mulk' for I have fought 29 battles against Mongols, despite the fact that by that period Mongols had become Muslims—thus, the title of 'Gazi-ul-Mulk' was bestowed on him for fighting against the Muslim intruders of the neighbouring Muslim country of Afghanistan.) To be brief, though Mongols freely pillaged and plundered much more the Punjab than even Persia and the Arab world, almost every year, for only the Gakhars, not far from the Khyber pass, were at times able to block the Mongols, who therefore often invaded the Punjab via Multan: "For three centuries this unhappy district [Multan] bore the brunt of the great racial disturbances caused by the Central Asian upheavals." (*Gazetteer of the Multan District 1923-24*, Lahore: Punjab Government, 1926 reprint by Sang-e-Meel, Lahore, 1990, pp. 32-33). With the above referred to exception of the Gakhar clan, the remaining parts of the Punjab were laid completely waste, savagely demoralised and dishonoured at anytime, anywhere and everywhere. Recalling this period of the Punjab's history a Punjabi historian, Sujan Rai Bhandari, writes (in his *Khulasat ut-Twarikh*, pub. in 1918) in 1696: "So long as the Mongols of Balkh and Kabul raided the Punjab every year, this country remained in a ruinous state, and one only saw devastation all around." (Rajmohan Gandhi, p. 26, quoting Shireen Moosvi in Reeta Grewal and Sheen Pall [eds.], *Precolonial and Colonial Punjab: Society, Economy, Politics and Culture*, New Delhi: Manohar, 2005, p. 99). With only sporadic help coming from Delhi-based kings and no rulers from their own region, the people of the Punjab coped as they could with the attackers quite impotently. In effect, the people of the Punjab were left with no choice but to bear the unimaginable shock and torment and cope with the unwarranted situation by total surrender, helplessly and unconditionally. For instance, they were constrained to continue *tahmad* (*dhoti*) not as a gender-specific item of the Punjab's dress with the result that it was obviously continued as a routine item of dress even during the British period when there was no such constraint at all. The motto of the Mongols, in the words of their great leader Genghis Khan, was: "Happiness lies in conquering one's enemies, in driving them in front of oneself, in taking their

property, in savouring their despair, in outraging their wives and daughters." (c. 1210 AD; quoted in Witold Rodzinski, *The Walled Kingdom: A History of China*, 1979.) The legend tells of how the sky god, *Tenggeri*, called Genghis Khan to bring the entire world into unity under one sword which, in effect, gave him what amounted to a mission to make *Shaminism*, Mongol mysticism called 'religion', universal religion. The whole story is vast and complex, bound up with the Mongol army's reputation for terror tactics effected by the "Three All" policy: 'Plunder all', 'Destroy all', 'Kill all' and the undisclosed fourth one 'Rape all'. Interestingly, both the Mongols and Hunas trace their origin to Mongolia, though the name to their country was given by the Mongols after about more than one millennium. In 1398-1399, Tamerlane (Timur Lenk), the then ruler of Samarkand and ancestor of Mughal rulers, possessing Mongol blood (genes), also professing Islam, not only spelt death and devastation for the people of Hindustan and the Delhi Sultanate but also completely destroyed much of the Mongols had fortuitously left the Punjab. He (Timur) sacked Delhi and the Punjab mercilessly—"the plunder, rape, and massacre of that . . . raid left behind him indelible scar of anarchy and devastation on the collective memory of Indians." (Surjit Mansingh, *Historical Dictionary of India*, p. 416; entry 'Timur'.) According to renowned Indian scholar, Rajmohan Gandhi: "The Mughals' connection to Timur, and through him to the Mongols, posed a problem for many Punjabis. Thus it has been said that Akbar—the third Mughal emperor, and son of Babar's son Humayun—could not, at the start of his reign, quickly 'erase from the minds of the [Punjabi] people the bitter memories of the invasions of Changiz [Genghis] and Timur. No genuine love and sympathy was felt for the Mughal Dynasty and... were quite indifferent to its fate'. The coldness was connected to the blood spilled in [the] Punjab during Babur's invasion and again during Akbar's action against rivals." (Rajmohan Gandhi, *Punjab: A History from Aurangzeb to Mountbatten*, New Delhi: Aleph Book Company, 2013, p. 33; quoting, Muhammad Akbar, *Punjab under the Mughals*, Lahore: Ripon Printing Press, 1948, pp. 25-26.) The last foreign invader of India, from the north-west, Ahmad Shah Abdali

(r. 1747-1773 AD) also undertook no less than nine successful invasions of the Punjab (he plundered Lahore in 1752 and Delhi in 1757, he defeated Marathas in the battle of Panipat in 1761 and Sikhs in 1762 near Lahore and razed the temple of Amritsar—the Punjabi Sikhs (Jatts) for the first time in history of the Punjab gave him a good resistance. As a result of going through the Mongolian type of utter helplessness and traumatic conditions, time and again, with serious threat to life, livelihood and human dignity, the Punjabi psyche, in due course of time, had almost always given priority to nothing but to survival. The Punjabis had, therefore, become of *wakhri* (different) type in contrast to Sindhi, Baloch and Bengali people because of going through quite different experiences in their chequered history. The Punjabis are, therefore, perhaps rightly accused of 'best servants but worst masters'. (ii) In the Punjab, the emphasis on 'Muslim' identity was usually invoked, perhaps, to get some 'undue' sympathy, in comparison to the non-Muslims from the alien Muslim rulers—the Ghaznavids, Ghoris, Slave-kings, Khiljis, converted Muslim Mongols, Tughlaqs, Timuris, Syeds, Lodhis, Suris, Mughuls, and also the invading Muslim forces of Nadir Shah of Persia and Ahmad Shah Abdali and his son and successor Timur Shah of Afghanistan—and their local/non-local Muslim governors and other officials. It may also be because, as per French philosopher Peter Abelard (1079-1142), "We do not easily suspect evil of those whom we love most." (From his *Historia Calamitatum Mearum*, c. 1132, chap. 6.) Whereas all the rulers of the above mentioned dynasties and all the above referred to invaders, without any distinction whatsoever, even on the basis of religion or race, were treated by Sindh as outright enemies and alien rulers. As and when, some of them established their rule in Sindh by the power of sword, they had to be defeated by Sindhis on the battlefield or Sindh got rid of them as and when feasible or possible. However, the period under their rule was always treated as foreign rule and slavery of Sindh without any exception whatsoever. The answer to the question—who are you?—is always given in Sindh by identifying the tribe, zaat or bradari (parro) or citing the location of the abode like Sirai, Larri, Thari, Cutchi, Dhati, Lasi etc. but never the religion or sect.

Since the Arab conquest of Sindh, in 712 AD, Sindh had always fought with the Muslim invaders, time and again, to defend their birth-right, the freedom and independence of their fatherland, from all the invaders whether Muslim or non-Muslim. Makhdoom Bilawal had always remained a beacon for all Sindhis and his noble *fatwa* (religious behest), an essential binding on everyone and all Sindhis and for all the times—past, present and future, individually and collectively. (iii) Sindhis, much influenced by the Scythians, usually try to give due respect to the universal principles of justice, equity and fair play: (a) *bba bhaair, triyoon lekho!* (b) *ggalh kajey Allah lagg, dhuko khanjey bhao laey!* Whereas for the Punjabis, much influenced by the White Hunas, it is almost impossible for them to strictly follow, in letter and spirit, the above referred to universal principles either at macro level in a society or at micro level in a family or even between his or her own children, perhaps, because they had inherited from their forefathers the Huna legacy of self-righteousness, sanctimonious mindset and totally self-centred world-view. There may be some exceptions but general rule is as described above. However, like Hunas, the Punjabis are not lacking some very meritorious characteristics, such as, accomplishment of any task whatsoever difficult is not impossible for a Huna, individually as well as collectively, if he/she is or they are determined to achieve the same. However, problem with him, her or them is retaining the same, because soon they lose interest in it, giving no adequate thought or consideration to their ceaseless efforts put in, precious time consumed and countless sacrifices made for achieving the same. Following are also some notable genetical characteristics of the White Hunas (likewise of the Punjabis): Rigid rules of hospitality, asylum provided to the refugees, jealousy of female honour, war like spirit, pride of race, jealousy of clan/race honour, personal dignity and the spirit that loves to domineer. These, on the whole, appear either congenial or less objectionable even to Scythians (likewise to Sindhis). Also, they have reckless daring, utmost loyalty to (military/warrior) chief whom they trust, love of sport, singing, dancing and jolly (*zindah dilan*) activities and the readiness to take offence and quarrel among themselves when they

could not find any other enemy. (For further details, on the subject, see H. W. Bellew, *The Races of Afghanistan*, Calcutta, 1880, which is worth reading.) Thus, the peoples of both territories (the Punjab and Sindh) have undergone through different experiences through the ages which had made them quite different from each other. Therefore, politico-economic and socio-cultural viewpoints of both peoples, on the whole, are poles apart from each other.

*I've still so much music in my head.
I have said nothing.
I have so much more to say.*

Spoken on his deathbed. Maurice Ravel (1875-1937)
French Composer.

Tous pour un, un pour tous. "All for one, one for all."

From *Les Trois Mousquetaires*,
chap. 9 (1844).

Alexandre Dumas (1802-1870)
French novelist and playwright

Holy scripture is placed before the eyes of our mind like a mirror, so that we may view our inner face therein.

From *Moralia in Job*,
bk 2, chap. 1, sec. 1.

Gregory I, better known as
Gregory the Great (c. 540-604)
Pope (from 590) and saint

A conservative government [Islamic democracy] is an organised hypocrisy.

Speech in House of Commons,
17 March 1845.

Benjamin Disraeli (1804-1881)
English statesman

Be a sinner and sin boldly, but more boldly believe and rejoice in Christ [religion]. [Keep firm belief that God will forgive your all sins, anyhow, even your heinous crimes against the humanity or other nations.]

From letter to Melanchthon (1521)

Martin Luther (1483-1546)
German religious reformer, and
founder of the Christian reformation

References & Notes

CHAPTER 4

1. T. Summers, *The Sukkur Barrage Project and Empire Cotton* (n.p., n.d.), p. 42. (Rep. from *Asiatic Review*, October 1921; originally a paper read before East India Association on 25 July 1921.)
2. The situation was so grave that Lord Northcote, the then Governor of Bombay (1899-1903), himself had to make an appeal to Mirs, Pirs, Jagirdars and Zamindars for co-operation in combating the menace. S.G. 7 December 1900, p. 5. (Sp. at Sukkur Durbar.)
3. The government could not crush the revolt on its own. They did it with the help of some Baloch tribes like Bugtis and only after the then Pir Pagaro exerted his influence on the side of Government, "the Hurs were thereafter subjected to various degrees of restraint under the provisions of the Criminal Tribes Act." H. T. Lambrick, *The Terrorist* (London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1972), pp. 10, 139-41.
4. The Hur revolt and their self-styled Government of Sindh inspired even some folk poets of the time who composed poems in praise of the bravery of revolt-leaders, particularly of Bachu Khaskheli alias "Badshah," Piru Wassan alias "Vizier," Tagio Chang, Gulu Mochi, Bhalu Gaho, Misri Gaho, Usman Hingoro, Issa Dahri, Khamiso Wassan, Soomar Gaho, Fatlu Qazi and Rano Wassan.
5. These contradictions as noted by two newspapers of Bombay and London in 1858 were:
 - (i) "Sind has no natural connection with the rest of the territories included in the Presidency." ("The Punjab a Presidency," *Bombay Standard*, 20 December 1858; rep. in *S.K.*, 28 December 1858, p. 416.)
 - (ii) "Bombay is separated from the seaport of Scinde by some

500 miles of ocean. By land the distance is much greater. By either route communication is, during the stormy period of the year, hazardous and uncertain . . . this dependency is different in its conditions of society, in its prevailing creed, in its judicial and revenue details of administration, and in its physical characteristics, crops, and artificial means of irrigation, from any other portion of the Bombay Presidency." ("A Fourth Presidency in India," *Daily News*, 20 May 1858; rep. in Supplement to S.K., 30 July 1858 [pp. 1-2].)

6. At the time of annexation of Sindh to the Bombay Presidency, there were no big business houses, local or European, which could withstand the hegemony of Bombay. Nonetheless Sindh officials, mercantile community and, under their influence, Sindh press took up the case of Sindh.
7. In opinion of the *Bombay Gazette*, Pringle resigned "after enduring more badgering than we should think any other un-offending officer has had for a long time at the hands of Government." The paper further pointed out: "And sure enough Government went on lecturing and teasing Mr. Pringle at a great rate, wanting him to do numbers of things which he either did not think necessary, or could not, or would not, do, the end of which very naturally was his resignation." ("Sindh Blue Book," S.K., 19 January 1855, p. 23; rep. from *Bombay Gazette*.)
8. In a private letter dated the 21st April 1853 he wrote to John Jacob that they (the Bombay bureaucrats) used in their sermons on economy "vexatious and semi-insulting language precisely as if they wanted me to follow Pringle's example and resign." Frere to John Jacob, 21 April 1853, Jacob Papers, quoted in Hameeda Khuhro, *The Making of Modern Sind: British Policy and Social Change in the Nineteenth Century* (Karachi: Indus Publications, 1978), p. 52.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 51-52
10. S.K., 4 July 1854, p. 33. The actual wording of the suggestion put forward by a Karachi paper, the *Sind Kossid*, was as under: "Perhaps the best course would be to place Sind like the Punjab directly under the Government of India . . . There is then a chance of Sind enjoying some of

that largesse already gained by the Punjab." Lord Dalhousie, the then Governor General of India, had, however something else in his mind. He proposed in February 1856 to elevate the Punjab Chief Commissioner-ship to Lieutenant Governorship and incorporating Sindh therein. Sindh's merger with the Punjab was time and again advocated by some eminent officials closely connected with the vested interests of the British imperialism and of the Punjab. For details about the moves to absorb Sindh in the Punjab see *supra*, chap. 3, pp. 53-86.

11. "A Fourth Presidency in India," *Daily News*, 20 May 1858. (Rep. in Supplement to S.K., 30 July 1858 [pp. 1-2].)
12. "The Punjab a Presidency," *Bombay Standard*, 20 December 1858. (Rep. in S.K., 28 December 1858, p. 416.)
13. S.K., 8 August 1856, p. 334.
14. "Sind Commerce," *Punjabee*, 9 January 1858. (Rep. in S.K., 26 January 1858, p. 32.)
15. "The idea of setting up Sind as a separate province, after the fashion of Assam, has been advocated by many, and there is much to be said in favour of the proposal." The paper itself favoured the idea of Sindh's amalgamation with the Punjab than its creation as a separate province. The paper, however, emphasised that "whatever is to be done ought to be done without further delay, for the present arrangement is thoroughly discredited, if by nothing else, by the tendency of the Bombay Government to favour Bombay at the cost of Karachi whenever the interests of the two ports are brought together in the commercial rivalry." ("The Future of Sind," S.G., 5 July 1884, p. 3.) In 1889 also, the paper made its position clear by observing: "We do not believe that so long as this unfortunate province is left to the tender mercies of the Bombay Government, anything will be done. . . . In the Imperial interests Sind may be separated from the strangling influence of Bombay, and either joined to the Punjab, or amalgamated with the newly acquired province of Baluchistan, and put in the hands of a Chief Commissioner under the Supreme Government. In our

view Sind could not possibly be worse off under any kind of administration than she is now under the 'Kingdom of Bombay'." ("Facilities for Trade," S.G., 18 June 1889, p. 3.)

16. The paper made it clear in 1890 that they were "not, however, by any means wedded to the idea of annexation to the Punjab as the only or perhaps even the best, solution of the Sind difficulty." "Taking everything in consideration," it was of opinion that "the rights and interests of all parties concerned would be most fairly adjusted" by the creation of a Sindh-Baluchistan Chief Commissionership: "The Chief Commissionership thus created would naturally fall into two divisions; the Quetta or Baluchistan division, and the Karachi or Sind division, the latter requiring more settled methods of administration than the former. By this means Sind and Karachi would communicate directly with the Government of India without the intervention of an antagonistic third party as in the case of Bombay." ("Sind and Bombay," S.G., 16 September 1890, p. 5; rep. from C.&M.G.)
17. "The Transfer of Sind," S.G., 16 April 1889, p. 5.
18. S.G., 12 July 1889, p. 3.
19. "Karachi Harbour Works," S.G., 27 February 1884, p. 3.
20. *Ibid.*
21. "Bombay Consistency," S.G., 13 September 1884, p. 3.
22. "Facilities for Trade," S.G., 18 June 1889, p. 3.
23. *Ibid.*
24. For some details about the evils of extraordinary powers of Commissioner-in-Sindh see memorial of Special Sindh Provincial Conference 1917 submitted by its President, Harchandrai Vishindas, to Royal Commission on Reforms consisting of E. S. Mantagu and Lord Chelmsford. Exts. rep. in Mohamed Ayoob S. Khuhro, *A Story of the Sufferings of Sind* (2d ed.; Karachi: Author, Bharat Printing Press, 1930), pp. 18, 23-24 *et passim* and also in Ghulam Hyder K. Pir, "A Glimpse into the History of Sind Separation," *loc. cit.*, pp. 49-50.

25. The announcement of territorial changes by the British Emperor, George V, at Delhi, in December 1911, gave special impetus to the idea of severance of Sindh from the Bombay Presidency. It brought about two main territorial changes, namely, (a) the transfer of the seat of Government of India from Calcutta to Delhi, and (b) the annulment of the partition of Bengal and its split up into three smaller provinces of (i) Bengal, (ii) Assam, and (iii) Bihar, Chota Nagpur and Orissa. It was asserted that the decision to remove imperial capital to Delhi rests largely on the avowed necessity of freeing Bengal from the incubus of a too immediate lordship of the Supreme Government. The point, *inter alia*, emphasised by the Sindh Separationists was that if it be desirable that a province should be emancipated from the benign tutelage of the Imperial Government, how much more desirable is it that a province should be freed from the envious and repressive dictatorship of another province? It was again asserted that the decision to create three smaller provinces in eastern India rests on four definite principles, viz. (a) an administrative unit should be a compact territory of moderate extent; (b) the head of the province should have ample time and opportunity to study the needs of various communities committed to his charge; (c) no hardship is involved to a presidency in the complete severance from it of a sub-province only loosely connected with it and differing from it in some marked features; and (d) the desire of the hardy and law-abiding inhabitants of a sub-province for clearer expression of their local individuality, differing as they do from the presidency proper in origin, in language, in proclivities and in the nature of soil they cultivate, should be gratified. The Sindh Separationists emphasised, *inter alia*, that if we turn from Eastern India to Western India, all of those four principles equally applied to their case. The sub-province of Bihar, which was, then to be detached from Bengal was obviously not more foreign to the eastern presidency than the sub-province of Sindh was to the western presidency. Bombay and Poona lay further away from Sindh and were more ignorant of than Delhi would have been. On that ground alone the case for

restoring to Sindh its original administrative autonomy in direct subordination to the Government of India would clearly have been valid enough. (For details see "Why Sind Wants Autonomy?" S.G., 2 February 1912, pp. 4-5; and "Sind's Demand for Autonomy," S.G., 6 February 1912, pp. 4-5.

26. The very fact that the Commissioner-in-Sindh has a nominal status closely approaching that of a Chief Commissioner, that he issues his own *Government Gazette*, that he furls and unfurls his own flag, and that he moves abroad to the accompaniment of artillery salutes, implies a recognition that Sindh is entitled to the outward form of autonomy; and if entitled to the outward form, why not to the inward reality. ("Why Sind Wants Autonomy?" S.G., 2 February 1912, p. 4.)
27. The *Sind Gazette*, in a series of articles, put forward the case very strongly. The paper pointed out that there were seven Chief Commissionerships in India viz. the Andamans, Ajmer, Coorg, British Baluchistan, the North-West Frontier Province, Assam and the Central Provinces. The revenue of Sindh "is larger than that of any of the seven Chief Commissionerships in India except the Central Provinces, and would be larger than that of the Central Provinces too, if it were not for the recent addition thereto of Berar." That was as to revenue. But how did expenditure compare? No one knew of "Sind's balance-sheet" and imagined nothing. And though one should search with all his wits he would "still know nothing of the provincial finances, because the Bombay Government take special care that Sind shall not learn how its revenue is spent. No separate statement of expenditure in Sind is rendered." Bombay was like "a guardian who, while collecting and discharging the revenues of his ward, left the ward to struggle in penury and refused to give any account of the estate." "What use to talk of 'practical autonomy?' If any form of autonomy more than another is urgently demanded by outraged public opinion in Sind, it is financial autonomy, which is the true 'practical autonomy.' To be plain, Sind claims the right to know what proportion of Sind's money is being spent in

Sind. Sind also claims the right to have the spending of it." ("Why Sindh Wants Autonomy?" S.G., 2 February 1912. p. 4.)

28. S.G., 26 June 1908, p. 4. (Sp. in Bombay Legislative Council at Poona in June 1908, reported under cap. "Bombay Legislative Council.")
29. S.G., 8 July 1912, p. 7. (Harchandrai's questions, and answers of Sir Richard Lamb, the then Finance Member, on behalf of the Bombay Government, rep. under cap. "What Sind Wants to Know: Questions in the Bombay Legislative Council.") Also S.G., 13 July 1912, p. 7. (Harchandrai's speech in Bombay Council, rep. under cap. "Separate Budget for Sind: Mr. Harchandrai's Stand in Council: A Plea for Financial Justice.") The demand was again made in the Bombay Legislative Council in 1915 by M. de P. Webb, who was lauded for this move by the Sindh press, particularly the *Daily Gazette*, *Sind Journal*, and the *Sind Advocate*. The Government gave the same reply which was given to similar demand of Harchandrai in 1912 and its reply was countered by the *Daily Gazette* on the lines of the *Sind Gazette*. For details see:
 - i) "Sind's Champion," S.G., 9 July 1912, p. 6;
 - ii) "Mr. Harchandrai's Demand," S.G., 13 July 1912, p. 6;
 - iii) (Anon.) "What Sind Wants: An Effective Reply to Sir Richard Lamb: Not Asking for the Moon," S.G., 16 July 1912, p. 7, art. cont. by anonymous correspondent and rep. from *Times of India*;
 - iv) "Sind Wants a Champion," S.G., 1 August 1913, p. 6;
 - v) D.G., 17 July 1915, p. 9, Webb's sp. in the Council pub. under cap. "Bombay Legislative Council: Is Sind in a Back-Water";
 - vi) "Financial Justice for Sind," D.G., 20 July 1915, p. 6;
 - vii) M. de p. Webb, "Financial Justice for Sind," D.G., 22 July 1915, p. 10, ltt. to ed.;
 - viii) New Sind [pseud.], "Sind and the Bombay Budget," D.G., 22 July 1915, p. 10, ltt. to ed.;

- ix) "Sindhi Opinion on Mr. Webb's Council Speech," D.G., 23 July 1915, p. 4, rep. from the *Sind Journal*; and
- x) "Sind in the Bombay Council," D.G., 24 July 1915, p. 5, rep. from the *Sind Advocate*.

30. The *Sind Gazette* time and again, in 1912 and 1913, published glaring instances of inequity in the allocation of funds to Sindh compared with corresponding allocations to more favoured parts of the Presidency. For instance, in June 1912 the *Sind Gazette* published following illustration: There lies before us the Final Budget Estimates for 1912-13 for Provincial Civil Works in the Public Works Department, one of the largest and most important spending departments under the Bombay Government. Certain figures in this document carry so striking an object lesson that one may be content to cite them without comment, merely recalling that the Bombay Presidency is divided into four divisions and that Sindh is one of the four and assuredly not the least. Under "Buildings" Sindh is granted Rs. 499,000 out of Rs. 2,127,000 for the whole Presidency. Under "Communications" Sindh receives nothing at all out of Rs. 518,000 for the whole Presidency. Under "Miscellaneous Public Improvements" Sindh gets nothing out of Rs. 273,000. Under "Discretionary Grants" Sindh gets Rs. 50,000 out of Rs. 309,000 for the whole Presidency. For "Repairs" Sindh gets Rs. 111,000 out of Rs. 1,930,000 for the whole Presidency. For "Establishments" Sindh gets Rs. 26,000 out of Rs. 1,280,000 for the whole Presidency. For "Tools and Plant" Sindh gets Rs. 3,000 out of Rs. 130,000 for the whole Presidency. The grand total allotted to Sindh amounts to Rs. 690,000 out of Rs. 6,567,000 for the whole Presidency. ("Injustice to Sind," S.G., 21 June 1912, p. 6.) In August 1913, after giving details of allocations, it observed: "If we take the aggregate of all these specially detailed allotments, we find that the Presidency proper gets forty-nine and a half lakhs and Sind four and a half lakhs." ("Sind's Great Grievance," S.G., 1 August 1913, p. 6.)
31. "Sind's Champion," S.G., 9 July 1912, p. 6.
32. "Financial Justice for Sind," D.G., 20 July 1915, p. 6.

33. "Separate Budget for Sind: Mr. Harchandrai's Stand in Council," S.G., 13 July 1912, p. 7. Also "Financial Justice for Sind," D.G., 20 July 1915, p. 6.
34. "Mr. Harchandrai's Demand," S.G., 13 July 1912, p. 6.
35. (Anon.,) "What Sind Wants: An Effective Reply to Sir Richard Lamb: Not Asking for the Moon," S.G., 16 July 1912, p. 7. (Cont. by anon. correspondent to and rep. from the *Times of India*.)
36. M. de P. Webb, "Should Sind Be Separated from the Bombay Presidency?" D.G., 2 November 1912, p. 8. (Ltt. to ed.) This was proper time—like proverbial 'Now or Never'—when Sindh should have been separated forthwith from the Bombay Presidency for no one in Sindh could know, comprehend or conjecture about the demands, prerequisites and essential imperatives of the post-War 'World Order', and probably start of new geopolitical 'Great Game' as a result of the successful Communist Revolution in Russia, making the regional geopolitical confusion worse confounded, giving birth to drastic new initiatives, adjustments and readjustments.
37. Prior to 1861 the important constitutional measure, which was due to the shock occasioned by the Indian "Mutiny," was the Act of 1858 under which the control of the British India was withdrawn from the East India Company and direct control over British India was assumed by a Secretary of State and the British Parliament.
38. Bengal got a Legislative Council in 1862 but the other provinces were not so fortunate; they got it in 1887 and 1897 respectively. The Punjab's Council differing from the rest both in constitution and functions.
39. In 1883-84 the local self-Government Acts introduced the elective principle into municipal government, and established Rural District Boards and Municipal Councils, members of which—in some cases a majority of them—were directly elected. For the first time, in the history of the British India, the alien government on its own initiative introduced the communal system of representation by

granting the Muslims the novel privilege of separate electorate initially at the local level—as envisaged, the same system was to be extended in due course of time at the provincial level (also at country level as and when desirable in the short and long term imperialist interests), as it was eventually done, vide the Morley Minto 'Reforms' of 1909.

40. Known from the names of Lord John Morley, the then Secretary of State for India (1905-1910), and Lord President of the Council from 1910 until the outbreak of World War I in August 1914 for he resigned instantly over the issue of war with Germany. Lord (Gilbert John Murray Kynynmond -Elliot) Minto, the then Governor General and Viceroy of India (1905-1910) had earlier served governor general of Canada (1898-1904). As viceroy of India, he dealt with border friction with Russia over Persia (Iran), Tibet and Afghanistan. Within India he sternly repressed extremist nationalist elements after an attempt on his life in 1909. Simultaneously, together with Secretary of State John Morley, he attempted to secure better representation of important Indian—especially Muslim—interests and the enlargement of the powers of the existing legislative councils—this Act of 1909 through special constituencies introduced the principle of communal representation for Muslims. "Six special Muslim constituencies of landholders were created for the Imperial legislative Council, and others in some other provinces. This measure is considered as the official germ of Pakistan." Liam Rodgers ed., *Chambers Biographical Dictionary*, 9th ed., London: Harrap Publishers, paperback ed. 2013, p. 1060, entry 'Minto, Gilbert John Murray Kynynmond-Elliot'.
41. A new revolutionary crisis was building up in India at the time. It found its expression in:
 - i. The *Ghadar* (Uprising) movement and mutinies in the army, which were suppressed with ruthless executions and sentences.
 - ii. Formation of the provisional Indian Government in exile at Kabul in 1915.

- iii. The Silken Letter "Conspiracy" discovered in 1916.
 - iv. Formation of the Home Rule League (the term was borrowed from Ireland and used by two separate organisations established simultaneously by Annie Besant and B. G. Tilak) for India in 1916.
 - v. The Congress (formed in 1885) and the Muslim League (formed in 1906) Pact, arrived at Lucknow in 1916, declaring their readiness to engage in united action for achieving the self-Government for India.
 - vi. Reunion between "moderates" and "extremists" of the Congress, who had parted company after the Surat Congress (1907), achieved at the Lucknow Congress in 1916.
42. Memo. of Sindh Provincial Conference 1917 submitted to Royal Commission on Reforms (E. S. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford), par. 10, quoted in M. A. Khuhro, *A Story of ...*, p. 44.
 43. Reso. of Sindh Provincial Conference held at Karachi in March-April 1918, *D.G.*, 2 April 1918, p. 10. (Progs. pub. under cap. "Sind Provincial Conference.")
 44. The Conference resolved for the appointment of a Committee consisting of twenty members to consider the Montagu declaration, "more specially with reference to Sind." But the actual work was conducted by a sub-Committee consisting of seven members including Harchandrai Vishindas, Jairamdas Daulatram, Durgadas Advani, Naraindas Anandji Bechar and Rustam Khurshid Sidhwa.
 45. Report of the Committee appointed by Fifth Sindh Provincial Conference (1918), quoted in Khan Bahadur M. A. Khuhro, *A Convincing Case for Separation of Sind* (Karachi: Navalrai Fatehchand, Bharat Printing Press, n.d. [1932]), p. 2.
 46. Moulana Muhammad Irfan, "A Brief History of the Movement of the Separation of Sind," *Alwahid*, Sind: Azad Number 1936, English sec., p. 53.

47. Reso. moved by Sri Kishindas H. Lula, D.G., 12 August 1918, p. 5. (Progs. pub. under cap. "Sind Provincial Conference.")
48. *Ibid.*
49. D.G., 22 April 1919, p. 4. (Progs. pub. under cap. "Sind Provincial Conference.") For details about the suggested Union of Sindh and Siraiki region see *infra*, appendix III, pp. 158-160.
50. *Ibid.*
51. *Ibid.*
52. Sindh Muhammadan Association's Address to Montagu and Chelmsford, D.G., 15 January 1918, p. 8. (pub under cap. "Sind Muhammadans and Mr. Montagu.")
53. *Ibid.*
54. *Ibid.*
55. Sindh Muhammadan Association's memo. sent to Chelmsford, D.G., 23 January 1919, p. 9. (Pub. under cap. "Sind a Separate Province: Entitled to Special Form of Government.")
56. *Ibid.* The Memorialists making Sindh's comparison with Assam, which was set up as a separate Chief Commissionership in 1874, argued: "In 1916-17 Assam had a revenue of Rs. 1,64,85,294, while that of Sind amounted to Rs. 1,65,62,563; a difference of over one lakh in favour of Sind," which demonstrated "the capacity and inherent right of Sind to be a Province under a Lieutenant-Governor or under a Chief Commissioner responsible to the Government of India direct." Assam for over half a century had been in that position "except for the brief period (1905-1911) when it was formed into a joint Lieutenant-Governorship with Eastern Bengal, but during the period of that connection Assam in no way suffered in status." On the contrary Shillong (the then capital of Assam) might be said to have "gained more importance as the summer head-quarters of the Local Government, with far greater powers than those hitherto possessed by the Chief Commissioner." The land revenue of Sindh, which was "its permanent and principal

asset," exceeded that of Assam "by about 45 per cent." *Ibid.*

57. M. de P. Webb, "A Self-governing Sind," *D.G.*, 2 January 1918, p. 4. (Rep. from *Times of India*.)
58. "Self-governing for India," *D.G.*, 15 January 1918, p. 4.
59. The introduction of Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms (1919) brought out yet another evil of powers of the Commissioner-in-Sindh, which were incompatible with the new "reforms." The post of Commissioner-in-Sindh carrying the powers of a Local Government under the Delegation Act V of 1868 had practically deprived the people of Sind of the benefits of the Government of India Act of 1919. In reserved or transferred departments of governmental activity in which the powers of a Governor-in-Council or Governor and Ministers had already been delegated to the Commissioner-in-Sindh, the improved Executive Council and Ministers could not effectively determine the course of administrative action in Sindh, so long as the powers delegated to the Commissioner-in-Sindh in matters within the sphere of the reserved or transferred subjects continued to remain in his hands. In other divisions of the Presidency the electorate obtained, through their representatives, the power of influencing and controlling the administration of reserved and transferred departments, respectively, but the members of the Executive Council and the Ministers could not respond to the pressure of the electorate of the Council, so far as Sindh was concerned, since they had no effective voice in their departments in Sindh so long as the delegation of powers to the Commissioner-in-Sindh held good. This only meant that Sindh did not get any substantial benefit from the Reforms Act. For further details see (i) Memorial of G. M. Bhurgri addressed to Sir George Lloyd, Governor of Bombay, dated 6 March 1920, quoted in Ghulam Hyder K. Pir, "A Glimpse into the History of Sind Separation." *loc. cit.*, pp. 50-51; and Haji Abdullah Haroon's prsd. sp. before Sindh Provincial Conference held at Sukkur on 3 April 1920, rep. in Ahmad Shafi, *Haji Sir Abdoola Haroon: A Biography* (Karachi: Begum Daulat Anwar Hidayatullah,

Pakistan Herald Press, n.d.), pp. 243-44.

60. For details see *infra* appendix VII, pp. 189-210.
61. "Imperial Enclave," D.G., 30 January 1920, p. 6. It may be noted that though Delhi was known as the capital of India, however, the summer headquarters of the Government of India were at Simla, in the Punjab.
62. Additional Member of the Governor General's Council.
63. As early as 12th November 1887, the Sindh Sabha in an address presented to Lord Dufferin, the then Governor General and Viceroy of India (1884-1888), had also suggested for exalting Karachi to the position of capital of the whole of the Indian Empire. S.G., 15 November 1887, p. 5. (Rép. under cap. "Addresses to Viceroy.") Lord (Frederick Temple Hamilton) Dufferin was under-secretary for India (1864-1866) and for war (1866), governor general of Canada (1872-1878). In 1884 succeeded Lord Ripon as the governor general and viceroy of India (1884-1888) apparently to continue his predecessor's policies but chose instead to put his weight on imperial interests, especially in India's neighbourhood. Therefore, Dufferin's administration was actively engaged in Afghanistan and Tibet and responsible for the annexation of upper Burma to India, supposedly to counter Russian advances in Central Asia and the French presence in Indochina. [Indochina was a French colony from 1887, when the Indochinese Union was formed consisting of Cambodia (a colony since 1884), Annam (a protectorate since 1884), Tonkin (a protectorate since 1884), and Cochin-China (a colony since 1867). To this was added the protectorate of Laos in 1893. The royal houses of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam (Tonkin and Annam) were retained within a federal system, with the governor-general in Hanoi controlling finance and defence. Cochin-China, with its capital of Saigon, was administered directly by a French prefect.] He (Lord Dufferin) found the work in India too hard and the social life too dull; he therefore left a year before his term expired to become ambassador in Rome.

64. D.G., 23 February 1920, p. 5. (Sp. in Council rep. under cap. "Karachi as the Permanent Capital.")
65. "Sind as an Imperial Enclave," D.G., 4 February 1920, p. 6.
66. "Imperial Enclave," D.G., 30 January 1920, p. 6.
67. D.G., 19 February 1920, p. 8. (Progs. of Imperial Legislative Council reported under cap. "Imperial Legislative Council: Seeking a Permanent Capital.")
68. Moulana Muhammad Irfan, "A Brief History of the Movement of Separation of Sind," *loc. cit.*, p. 53.
69. "Commissioner-in-Sind," D.G., 17 September 1921, p. 6.
70. However, as before, the proposal to make Sindh an autonomous province remained an important theme of public debate in the press. In this connection study of the files of the Karachi papers is worthwhile. The *Daily Gazette*, a European owned paper basically in favour of Sindh's merger with the Punjab, also published a number of letters written by different persons, often under pseudonyms, in favour of the proposal in 1920 and 1921. Letters of Wali Mahomed (30 October 1920), Faizullah Khan (9 November 1920 and 23 September 1921), Principles [pseud.] (16 November 1920), W. M. Hussanally. (13 December 1920), E. L. Price (11 August 1921 and 29 September 1921), A Wide Awake Citizen [pseud.] (20 September 1921), Separatist [pseud.] (22 September 1921) and K. B. Shahani (24 September 1921) need special notice. Similarly, a series of articles on the subject published in the *Sind Observer* in 1920 deserves special mention. In one of the article, published on 16 December 1920, it declared: "Those who say that between two powerful rivals like the Punjab and Bombay, Sind will be crushed merely draw a red-herring across the path. They have not adduced one argument to show how Sind could be crushed in that way. Assam was not crushed being made a separate Government and Bihar has not been crushed between the U. P. and Bengal by being made a Governor's unit, and Orissa has not been crushed by being separated from Bengal. And if there is such a fear of being crushed what is the Government of India for?"

71. In Sindh, during the period, the decades old struggle of its people come to fruition and the Government of Bombay finally gave its go-ahead for the Sukkur Barrage Project in 1923. This project proved to be a turning point in the Sindh's struggle for self-determination. Accelerating the pace of struggle it added new dimension to the same, by introducing a new progressive element in Sindh politics. For the first time Sindh witnessed the publication of literature on scientific socialism. In 1926, Jethmal Parsram published his two booklets *Karl Marx* and *Samivad* (Socialism). Both of these booklets were published from Hyderabad. In the next year, Vishnu Sharma brought out his book *Bey Insa'fi Kian Dur Kajey* (How to Remove Injustice?). The formation of the Sindh Hari Association in 1930 was a direct result of the Sukkur Barrage Project. The Barrage land disposal policy as announced by the Government in the latter half of 1920s was designed to benefit the Jagirdars and big Zamindars of the Punjab and Sindh. Fearing for the local *Hari* rights, well-wishers of the landless and small peasantry of Sindh started the struggle with plough as the symbol and "Hari Haq-dar" as the motto.
72. In 1925, the Hindu Sabha was organised effectively on all-India basis under the presidency of Lala Lajpal Rai, then known as, like Raja Ranjit Singh, "Lion of the Punjab," with substantial support of Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, the latter, in his presidential address at its special session held at Belgaum in Karnataka on 27 December 1924 opined: "For centuries, Muhammadans had been converting Hindus, and the majority of the Muslims of India were converts ... Therefore the question of having a Hindu Mission for proselytisation had become a pressing necessity ..." (R. C. Majumdar, *The History and Culture of the Indian People. Struggle for Freedom*, Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 2nd ed., 1988, p. 419, 1981.) The most sensational activity of Hindu Mahasabha was "the reconversion of more than 30,000 (or many more according to some account) Malakana [Muslim] Rajputs in the villages of U.P. and Rajputana." (*Ibid.*, p. 918.) According to one account, "four and a half lakhs of Malakana Rajputs who had embraced

Islam and were now eager to get back to the old religion. They were all taken back into the Hindu fold in 1923." (*Ibid.*, p. 420.) Besides, "More than two thousand Hindus who had been converted to Islam by the fanatic Moplahs in Malabar during their rebellion in 1922-23 were reconverted to the old faith." (*Ibid.*, p. 981.)

73. The number of "serious" communal riots in India rose steeply. There were eleven in 1923, eighteen in 1924, sixteen in 1925, thirty-five in 1926 and thirty-one up to November 1927. The death-roll for those five years was about 450, and at least 5000 people were injured. Reginald Coupland, *The Indian Problem, 1833-1935* (5th imp.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968 [1st pub. 1942]), Pt. I, p. 75.
74. Such as at Amri, which became a subject of newspaper columnists. ("Raz Niaz," *Alwahid*, 5 January 1926, p. 4.)
75. In this respect 'Hindu' the weekly *Mirpurkhas Gazette*, Mirpur Khas, and monthly *Arya Veer*, Hyderabad; and 'Muslim' the weekly *Mussalman*, Mirpur Khas, and monthly *Tauhid*, Karachi, played a prominent role.
76. There was a curious contradiction in the proposals. On the one hand, weightage was proposed to the minorities in the three Muslim majority provinces of Sindh, the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, on the other hand, no such provision was made in the case of the remaining two provinces viz. the Punjab and Bengal because both of these provinces opposed it as they had done previously in the case of Luknow Pact, belatedly declaring it to be against the interests of the Muslim majorities of their provinces.
77. *The Indian Quarterly Register*, January-June 1927, pp. 33-34.
78. All Parties Conference 1928, *Report of the Committee Appointed by the Conference to Determine the Principles of the Constitution for India* [frequently referred to as Nehru Report] (Allahabad, 1928), rep. in *The Indian Quarterly Register*, January-June 1928, p. 11.
79. The Hindu and Sikh reaction to these proposals in the Punjab, also, was extremely unfavourable. The intensity of

their reaction can be judged from the fact that many of their leaders considered the Muslim demands, particularly that of separation of Sindh, as calculated to partition of India into two parts—Hindu India and Muslim India. *Inqilab*, 7 June 1928, quoted in M. Rafique Afzal, *Malik Barkat Ali: His Life and Writings* (Lahore: Punjab University Press Publication No. 16, 1969), p. 19. (It actually happened within a brief period of two decades only.)

80. *The Indian Quarterly Register*, January-June 1927, p. 435. On account of strong communalism of Mahasabha workers the Hindu Sammelan did not accept Jethmal's proposal to appoint a Committee to consider the question of separation of Sindh. The daily *New Times*, Karachi (owned and edited by a 'Hindu' gentleman, T. K. Jeswani), in its leading note criticised the decision and observed: "The decision will give an idea to the outside world that the Hindus of Sind are prejudiced, and are afraid, as a minority, to even discuss the question whether on its own merit or as a matter of compromise." (Quoted in Abdullah Haroon's statement before Sir Purshotamdas Committee, rep. in Ahmad Shafi, *op. cit.*, p. 72.) However, the same attitude was expressed by the extremists in a public meeting of Hindus, held at Khalikdina Hall, Karachi, in June 1927, wherein a similar amendment brought forward by some Hindu leaders was rejected and resolution against the separation of Sindh was passed. (D.G., 24 June 1927, p. 7; progs. pub. under cap. "Separation of Sind: Public Meeting of Hindus.")
81. D.G., 19 July 1927, p. 10 (Press int. with date line of Simla, 16 July 1927, pub. under cap. "Separation of Sind: Joint Electorates a Distinct Issue.")
82. Prof. H. L. Chablani to the Chairman of the All Parties Conference at Delhi, D.G., 12 March 1928, p. 5. (Ltt. pub. under cap. "The Separation of Sind: Professor Chablani's Dissent.")
83. Khan Bahadur Shah Nawaz Bhutto, D.G., 10 June 1927, p. 5. (Sp. as Chairman of Sindh Muhammadan Association in its meeting held at Hyderabad.)

84. D.G., 5 November 1928, p. 7. (Sps. of Sindh leaders at meeting of Mussalmans held at Hyderabad, on 31 October 1928, under presidentship of Hakim Shumsuddin (brother of Kazi Fazalullah), progs. pub. under cap. "The Nehru Report: Sind Muslim Leaders' Attitude.")
85. Shah Nawaz Bhutto, D.G., 10 June 1927, p. 5.
86. This resolution proceeded on the basis of the Muslim proposals but was more detailed and dealt with some other matters also.
87. Nehru Report, rep. in *The Indian Quarterly Register*, January-June 1928, p. 11. This change was, however, strongly opposed by some Sindh Muslim leaders. The Sindh Muhammadan Association in its meeting held at Hyderabad on 5th July 1927 passed a resolution wherein they expressed "their regrets that the All-India Congress Committee" had "by their resolution obscured the important question of separation of Sind by mixing it up with questions of the separation of other provinces" and had "thereby strengthened the opposition to the most important part of the Muslim demand." D.G., 12 July 1927, p. 7. (Progs. pub. under cap. "Sind Mahomedan Association: A Meeting at Hyderabad.")
88. Moulana Muhammad Irfan, "A Brief History of the Movement of the Separation of Sind." *loc. cit.*, p. 54.
89. Pamphlets of Jamshed N. R. Mehta and Prof. H. L. Chablani in favour of and against separation of Sindh, respectively, need special mention. Prof. H. L. Chablani and other anti-separation economists opposed the separation of Sindh by advancing the peculiar abstract economic theories based on data of revenue receipts and expenditure ignoring the welfare-oriented economic theories of creating economic equilibrium among masses of various nationalities and their uplift.
90. The foremost Hindu supporters included Swami Govindanand, Jethmal Parsram, Prof. H. R. Batheja, Santdas Mangharam, K. Punniiah, T. K. Jeswani, Vishnu Sharma, Tikumdas Wadhmal and others. Among the opponents

were Prof. H. L. Chablani, Mukhi Gobindram, Virumal Begraj, Jairamdas Daulatram, Dr. Choithram, Harchandrai Vishindas and others. Three "Hindu" dailies in vernacular supported the idea. Two English dailies, the *New Times*, and the *Sind Observer*, supported the cause of separation, but other "Hindu" dailies and weeklies opposed. See Khan Bahadur Shah Nawaz Bhutto's prsd. sp. at the Sindh Muhammadan Association's meeting held at Hyderabad, D.G., 10 June 1927, p. 12; and Muhammad Irfan, "A Brief History of the Separation of Sind," *loc. cit.*, p. 55.

91. Other members were: Haji Abdullah Haroon, Shaikh Abdul Majid, Prof. H. L. Chablani, Jairamdas Daulatram, Jamshed N. R. Mehta, Bhai Ishardas Ramchand.
92. D.G., 12 March 1928, p. 3. (Progs. pub. under cap. "All Parties Conference: The Question of the Separation of Sind.")
93. D.G., 18 June 1928, p. 8. (Conference of leading Muslims and non-Muslims of Sindh convened by Sindh National League, progs. pub. under cap. "Sind Hindu-Moslem Pact.") G. M. Syed, quoting *Alwahid*, 20 June 1928, did not mention the names of N. T. Mansukhani and Tarachand Lalwani. He adds, however, the names of Jethmal Parsram Gulrajani and Mukhi Harkishindas. Instead of one Din Muhammad, he mentions two, namely, Moulana Din Muhammad Wafai and Din Muhammad Alig. Similarly, instead of mentioning the names of V. Bukhari and Ghulam Hussain K., he gives full names as Syaed Jamalluddin Hassan Bukhari and Ghulam Hussain Ghafoor Bhai. G. M. Syed, *Sindh ji Bombay khan Azadi* [Independence of Sindh from Bombay; in Sindhi] (Hyderabad: Noor Muhammad Palijo, Hydri Printing Press, 1968, pp. 56-57.
94. D.G., 18 June 1928, p. 8. The method of election is thus described in clause 5 of the 'Pact' as under: "In order to make the system of joint electorate truly effective, there shall be one common electoral roll for each constituency and the election of Muslim and non-Muslim representatives should be held separately but on the same day, so that the whole electorate, Muslim and non-Muslim shall have the right and opportunity to vote at both elections separately,

whereby the members so elected shall have been returned by the entire constituency and not only by the voters of their own communities."

95. "Sind Hindu-Moslem Pact," D.G., 19 June 1928, p. 8.
96. D.G., 26 June 1928, p. 6. (Progs. pub. under cap. "The Sind Pact: Rejected at Public Meeting at Hyderabad.")
97. *Ibid.*
98. D.G., 9 July 1928, p. 4. (Resos. pub. under cap. "Conference of Sind Moslems: Text of Resolutions Passed.")
99. Nehru Report, rep. in *The Indian Quarterly Register*, January-June 1928, p. 33.
100. *Ibid.*
101. *Ibid.*
102. *Ibid.*
103. *Ibid.*, p. 58.
104. Dr. Tarachand J. Lalwani, "The All Parties Conference," D.G., 8 September 1928, p. 7. (Ltt. to ed.)
105. D.G., 23 April 1931, p. 8. (Purshotamdas Report, pub. under cap. "Should Sind Separate from Bombay? III: The Financial Question: All Parties' Committee's Report.") Figures for annual deficit were: Assenters, 170 lac Dissenters, 43 lac. *Ibid.*
106. *The Indian Quarterly Register*, January-June 1928, p. 67. (Progs. of Fourth Session of All Parties Conference, Lucknow, 28 to 31 August 1928.)
107. Moulana Muhammad Irfan, "A Brief History of the Movement of the Separation of Sind," *loc. cit.*, p. 56. In opinion of Prof. H. L. Chablani, "the immediate importance of the agreement" lay in the fact that it removed, in a way, "the Muslim suspicion" that the separation of Sindh was opposed by Hindus only because the majority of the people of Sindh were Muslims. In his opinion, "some of the strongest arguments against the separation of Sind" would "disappear under a constitution based on joint electorates,

no reservation of seats in favour of a creedal majority, adult suffrage and fundamental rights of individuals" which guaranteed "to the minority protection from any unjust discrimination and any possible abuse of political power by the majority." Prof. H. L. Chablani, D.G., 3 September 1928, p. 7. (Int. to representative of D.G., pub. under cap. "The All Parties Conference: Prof Chablani Interviewed.")

108. *The Indian Quarterly Register*, January-June 1928, p. 65. (Progs. of Fourth Session of All Parties Conference, Lucknow, 28 to 31 August 1928.)
109. One of the amendment sought deletion of the words which stated that Sindh be constituted into a separate province only on the establishment of the system of government outlined in the Report. This amendment was a sequel to the developments in Sindh during the precedent months when the Lucknow Conference resolution on Sindh was subjected to adverse criticism and resolutions were passed rejecting it in part or in toto.
110. Even at the cost of a split, for a section under the influence of Punjabi leaders like Sir Muhammad Shafi and Dr. Sir Muhammad Iqbal broke away and offered its co-operation.
111. The Sindh Muslim Political Conference, held at Karachi, by a special resolution, enjoined on "Sindhi Mussalmans to completely boycott this Commission." D.G., 9 July 1928, p. 4. (Progs. pub. under cap. "Conference of Sind Moslems: Text of Resolutions Passed.") For some details regarding the boycott of the Simon Commission at Karachi see Naraindas Chainrai Advani, *Desh jey Rah min: Lokram* [Biography of Lokram Sharma; in Sindhi] (Ajmer: Sunder Printing Press, n.d. [1965]), p. 109.
112. Their respective cases were elaborately put forward in the memoranda submitted to the Commission by the Sindh Muhammadan Association and the Sindh Hindu Association. The former strongly urged that "Sind should be separated from the Bombay Presidency and given its own executive and legislative machinery." They emphasised that "the final goal of administration in India

should be the ultimate creation of a United States of India within the British Empire, the future constitution of the Federal States being on the lines of the United States of America, the Central Government possessing only such powers as may expressly be reserved by it and all the 'Residuary Powers' being vested in the individual States." The latter strongly opposed the separation of Sindh from the Bombay Presidency and *inter alia* demanded the establishment of a strong Central Government, recruitment on the services on merit alone, the conferment on the Central Government of the right to prevent internal disruption and intolerant communalism, and the abolition of communal representation. (D.G., 7 July 1928, pp. 3-4; memo. of Sindh Muhammadan Association pub. under cap. "Sind Muhammadans and the Simon Commission"; and D.G., 12 November 1928, pp. 3-4 & 17-18; memo. of All Sindh Hindu Association pub. under cap. "The Future of Sind Hindus: Memorandum to the Simon Commission.")

113. *The Indian Quarterly Register*, July-December 1929, pp. 108-09.
114. *The Indian Quarterly Register*, July-December 1929, pp. 109-110.
115. *Report of the Indian Central Committee, 1928-1929* (Calcutta: Central Publication Branch, Government of India, 1929), pp. 26-27.
116. D.G., 6 September 1929, p. 9. (Recommendations of Bombay Government, pub. under cap. "Bombay Government Recommends Abolition of Dyarchy: But is Opposed to Separation of Sind.")
117. The dissentient in the case of Bombay Provincial Committee was Syed Miran Muhammad Shah while the Bombay Government stand was opposed by one Executive Council Member and one Minister.
118. Henceforth, all the deliberations on the Sindh separation problem were conducted by well-known loyalists with the Government or in the different bodies appointed by it, including the Round Table Conference sub-Committee No. IX (1930), the Expert Financial Enquiry Committee (1931), the Sindh Conference (1931), the Parliamentary Joint Select

Committee (1933-34). The final fate of Sindh in the coming reforms was thus decided in consultation with the staunch loyalist leaders, of course, as found expedient by the British authorities. For details about Sindh's participation in anti-colonial Civil Disobedience movement of 1930-1934 see *infra*, appendix VIII, pp. 211-216.

119. *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, Vol. II, Recommendations* (Calcutta: Central Publication Branch, Government of India, 1930), p. 25.
120. All Parties Conference at Lucknow (August 1928); the All-India Muslim League, Khilafat Committee and the National Congress at Calcutta (December 1928); All Parties Muslim Conference at Delhi (January 1929).
121. The Government of India's opinion was embodied in their despatch dated 20th September 1930 wherein they observed that "the claim of Sind to be a self-contained unit" had "became increasingly prominent in recent years." The preponderance of the local population was Muslim, and "their claim to separation from the Bombay Presidency" had been "ardently advocated." They further stated that neither on Orissa nor on Sindh they were yet in a position "to tender final advice," but they urged that "enquiries be set on foot at the earliest possible date." They emphasised "the need for expedition in reaching conclusions on these two outstanding cases," which were respectively "of fundamental importance to the two provinces of Bihar and Orissa and of Bombay," as they then existed, in order that, if new arrangements were required, they might be "introduced simultaneously with the new constitution." *Government of India's Despatch on Proposals for Constitutional Reform* (Simla: Government of India Press, 1930), p. 17.
122. Khan Bahadur Mahomed Ayoob Khuhro, "The Simon Commission's Report," *D.G.*, 19 June 1930, p. 7.
123. *D.G.*, 19 July 1930, p. 11. (Sp. rep. under cap. "The Separation of Sind.")
124. Muhammad Ayoob Khuhro, *D.G.*, 2 June 1930, p. 8. (Sp. at Lower Sindh Muslims Meeting held at Hyderabad on 31

May 1930, progs. pub. under cap. "Muslims of India Take Action: Lower Sind Muslims Confer.")

125. At Peshawar, Chittagong and Sholapur in April-May 1930. Among these uprisings the most significant for the whole future was the "mutiny" of the Garhwali soldiers at Peshawar.
126. They were successful to a great extent in Sindh, where the struggle was sporadic, and limited to urban areas, with Muslims, by and large, keeping aloof. Communal passions were heightened in the wake of continuing deadlock over the communal problems. The period witnessed communal riots in Jacobabad (April 1929) in which ten persons were murdered; targeted gang-robberies/dacoities in Sukkur and Jacobabad districts numbering about a hundred in one month alone (August 1930) and involving about 200 villages (subsequently about a thousand "gang-robbers" were arrested by the authorities) and Hindu-Muslim riots in and around Sukkur (August 1930) in which about thirty persons were murdered, three hundred wounded, ladies were molested and property worth about ninety lac was looted, besides the houses that burnt to ashes. This, naturally, heightened the communal colouring of the separation question and widened the gulf between the separationists and the anti-separationists. As a result a virtual propaganda war was launched by both sides, each putting its case for mass approval. Important booklets published on the subject in 1930 alone were:
 - (i) *A Story of the Sufferings of Sind* by M. A. Khuhro.
 - (ii) *Sind a Separate Province: Have Sindhis Asked for It?* By Jairamdas Dualatram.
 - (iii) *Financial Aspects of the Separation of Sind* by Prof. H. L. Chablani.
127. A Sindhi representative, Shah Nawaz Bhutto, "protested to the [British] Prime Minister that this ought not be considered as one of the demands made by the [Indian] Muhammadans, because it is not a minority demand; it is a demand made by Sindhis." Bhutto reiterated this stand in

the Round Table Conference's sub-Committee No. IX: "This demand should be considered as a demand of the Sindhis, and not as a communal question. When this question was taken up by the [Indian] Muslim League, in my public speech at Hyderabad, presiding over ten thousand people, I protested and said it was not fair to us [we Sindhis, not merely Muslims] at all. It is we Sindhis who want this question considered, and we want it considered on its own merits. It is a demand of the Sindhis, including Hindus, Muhammadans, Parsees and Europeans—everybody." *Indian Round Table Conference, 12th September 1930-19th January 1931: Proceedings of Sub-Committee* (Vol. IX): *Sub-Committee No. IX (Sind)* (Calcutta: Central Publication Branch, Government of India, 1931), pp. 18-19. (Shah Nawaz Bhutto in first meeting.)

128. *Ibid.*, p. 91. (Report pr. at meeting of Committee of whole Conference held on 16 January 1931.)
129. *Ibid.*
130. *Ibid.*
131. *Ibid.*, p. 92.
132. D.G., 27 January 1931, p. 12. (Sp. pub. under cap. "Important Debate on India in House of Commons.")
133. The All-India Hindu Conference held at Karachi in March, 1931, emphatically protested "against non-representation of Sind Hindus on the Round Table Conference" and repudiated "the decision of its sub-Committee." It expressed "its strong indignation against Hindu and Muslim politicians making Sind a pawn in the Hindu-Muslim negotiations outside Sind." (Resos. passed on 29 March 1931 by All-India Hindu Conference held at Karachi, D.G., 30 March 1931, p. 10.) A deputation of the Sindh Hindu Conference under Mukhi Gobindram waited on the Governor General and Viceroy of India at Simla in July, 1931, and presented a lengthy address decrying the decision. D.G., 24 July 1931, pp. 7-8. (Address pub. under cap. "Sind Hindu Deputation to the Viceroy: Their Case against the Separation of Sind.")

134. *Report of the Sind Financial Enquiry Committee* (Simla, 1931), pp. 12 & 16-17 (Pars. 37 & 47-49). Also D.G., 3 November 1931, pp. 6 & 11. (Ext. of report pub. under cap. "Finances of a Separated Sind.")
135. Quoted in *Sind Conference 1932: Report* (Calcutta: Central Publication Branch, Government of India, 1932), p. 1 (par. 1).
136. D.G., 11 April 1932, p. 7. (News item "Sind Conference: Mr. Dow Represents Bombay Government.")
137. *Sind Conference 1932: Report*, pp. 27-29. (Pars. 33-34.)
138. *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30. (Par. 36.)
139. G. M. Syed, *op. cit.*, p. 91.
140. *Alwahid*, 21 June 1932, pp. 1-2. (News item "Karachi min 19 June Sindh Azad Deehun: Zabardast Julos ain Shandar Jalso.")
141. The decision to celebrate the Day on this date was taken at a representative meeting of Sindh Muslim leaders held at the Bungalow of Wali Muhammad Hassanally (Secretary of the Sindh Muhammadan Association) on 1st September, 1932. The meeting was presided over by Shah Nawaz Bhutto. In this meeting a Sindh Azad Committee under the presidentship of Shah Nawaz Bhutto was formed. *Alwahid*, 3 September 1932, pp. 2 & 5-6 (News item "Sindh jey Muslim Agwanan ji Conference.")
142. D.G., 17 November 1932, p. 8. (Reso. No. 6, progs. pub. under cap. "Closing Stages of Sind Azad Conference.") A few days before the Conference opened an article appeared in a Karachi daily suggesting dominion status for Sindh. The article is reproduced here as appendix IV, see *infra*, pp. 161-164.
143. A Muslim Correspondent, "Impressions of Sind Azad Conference," D.G., 17 November 1932, p. 6.
144. D.G., 17 November 1932, p. 8. (Reso. No. 6.)
145. *Ibid.*, p. 7. (Reso. No. 3.)
146. D.G., 15 November 1932, p. 7. (News item "Terms of Sind Separation Agreement Endorsed by Unity Conference.")

Also D.G., 19 November 1932, p. 16. (News item "The Allahabad Unity Conference.")

147. D.G., 30 November 1932, p. 8. (Reso. moved by Dr. G. T. Hingorani and seconded by Maharaj Dwarka Prashad passed at Conference of Sindh Hindus, progs. pub. under cap. "Hindu Meeting at Hyderabad.")
148. Communal Award, rep. in B. R. Ambedkar, *Thoughts on Pakistan* (Bombay: Thacker, 1941), appendix XI, p. 372.
149. D.G., 27 December 1932, p. 12. (Sp. pub. under cap. "Sind Definitely to Be a Separate Province, Says State Secretary.")
150. Sir Reginald Coupland, *op. cit.*, p. 132. Lord Linlithgow's connection with India developed through his chairmanship of the Royal Commission on Agriculture in India (1926-1928) and the Select Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform (1930-1932). His period of office as the governor general of India witnessed the growth of mass support for the Indian National Congress, the withdrawal of Congress cooperation for the Second World War, and the Quit India Movement of 1942. His harsh response to the Quit India Movement all over India and the Hur Movement (including the unjustified hanging of the great Sindhi patriot and the leader of the Hur Freedom Fighters of Sindh Pir Sibghatullah Shah Pir Pagaro Shahheed and unwarranted dismissal from the premiership and later on the mysterious murder of another great Sindhi patriot Shaheed Allah Bakhsh Soomro, twice elected Premier of Sindh, naturally resulted in rapid spread of guerrilla resistance to the British rule, especially in Sindh—Lord Linlithgow eventually resigned in 1943, and died in 1952.
151. G. M. Syed, *op. cit.*, p. 93.
152. Prof. H. L. Chablani, D.G., 25 May 1933, p. 12. (Int. to representative of *Associated Press*, pub. under cap. "Sind Separation Opponent's Fears.")
153. D.G., 2 November 1933, p. 5. (Sp. at Hindu-Muslim Unity Conference held at Hyderabad, progs. pub. under cap. "Hindu-Muslim Unity Talks.")

154. D.G., 2 November 1933, pp. 5 & 8. (Sp. at Hindu-Muslim Unity Conference.)
155. D.G., 2 November 1933, pp. 8. (Sp. at Hindu-Muslim Unity Conference.)
156. Reso. of Sindh Hindu Conference held at Karachi, D.G., 2 April 1934, pp. 7-8. (Resos. pub. under cap. "Sind Hindus Protest against Separation Move: Appeal to Parliament.")
157. Quoted in Press Statement issued by Central Office of Sindh Hindu Sabha, D.G., 10 July 1934, p. 8. (Pub. under cap. "Sind Hindus Alarmed: Separation Issue.")
158. D.G., 24 January 1935, p. 11. (News item "Hyderabad Politics: New Political Body Formed.")
159. D.G., 25 June 1935, p. 4. (Progs. of its meeting pub. under cap. "Preparing for Sind Separation: Hindus to Have Their Own Paper.")
160. D.G., 27 January 1936, p. 4. (Int. pub. under cap. " 'Do Not Repeat Non-Co-operation Blunder': Dr. Hingrani's Advice to Sind Hindus.")
161. Reso. of Sindh Hindu Conference, D.G., 23 March 1936, p. 4. (Resos. pub. under cap. "Sind Hindu Conference: Last Protest against Separation of Sind.")
162. D.G., 28 October 1933, p. 9. (News item "Sind Administrative Enquiry Committee.")
163. *Ibid.*
164. D.G., 27 April 1934, p. 1. (Report of Administrative Committee pub. under cap. "Sind's Separation Problems: Dow Proposals.")
165. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
166. D.G., 22 November 1934, pp. 1 & 3. (Report of Parliamentary Joint Select Committee pub. under cap. "Separation of Sind Approved: Joint Select Committee's Proposals: Sind's Place in the New India.")
167. The Government of India (Constitution of Sind) Order 1936,

rep. in *Alwahid*, Sindh Azad Number 1936, English sec. p. 1.

168. The Royal Warrant, dated 12 March 1936, rep. in *D.G.*, 1 April 1936, p. 14.
169. *D.G.*, 15 April 1936, p. 4. (News item "Sind Advisory Council: Sir Lancelot Graham's Decision.") Two illiterate scheduled caste Sindh members of the Bombay Legislative Council, who were elected by Sindhian non-cooperationists, as a taken of humiliation of the Bombay Assembly, had declined to serve, were Dhalumal *mochi* (cobbler) and Humphrey sweeper, hence 17 Sindh M. L. Cs. actually served as members of the Advisory Council, of course, some of them as illiterate and incompetent as above referred to two Honourable elected Members but felt no shame at all in continuing their membership.
170. *D.G.*, 2 May 1936, p. 4. (Exts. from Niemeyer Report, pub. under cap. "Sind's Subvention: Details of Niemeyer Report.")
171. *Ibid.* For future the Indian Financial Enquiry Report, known as Sir Otto Niemeyer Report, which was finally accepted in toto, recommended that: The initial subvention under the Act may properly be fixed at Rs. 105 lacs a year for a period of ten years and should then be diminished by 25 lacs a year for 20 years, by 40 lacs a year for the next 5 years, by 45 lacs for the next succeeding 5 years, and thereafter, until the whole Barrage debt is repaid by 50 lacs a year. When the debt has been repaid any remaining portion of the subvention will, of course, in any event cease. *D.G.*, 2 May 1936, p. 4. (Ext. from Niemeyer Report, pub. under cap. "Sind's Subvention: Details of Niemeyer Report.")

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CHAPTER 5

(Conclusion)

1. The resolution moved by Ali Muhammad Rashdi was seconded by Pir Ghulam Mujadid and Faqir Muhammad Tunio, but President of the Conference ruled it out of order on the ground that as it was not submitted in the first instance to the subjects committee, it could not be moved in the open session. D.G., 17 November 1932, p. 8. (progs. pub. under cap. "Closing Stages of Sind Azad Conference.")
2. "Sind Azad Conference," D.G., 30 July 1934, p. 2.

So little done, so much to do.

Attributed last words.

Cecil John Rhodes (1853-1902)
South African statesman

—

I am not a courtesan, not a moderator, not a tribune, and not a defender of the people; I myself am the people.

From a speech, 1792.

Maximilien Marie Isidore de
Robespierre (1758-1794)
French revolutionary politician

—

A review, however favourable, can be ridiculous at the same time if the critic lacks average intelligence, as it is not seldom the case.

From a letter, 1825.
Quoted in Derek Watson,
Music Quotations (1991).

Franz Peter Schubert (1797-1828)
Austrian composer

References & Notes

APPENDIX I

1. H. T. Lambrick, *Sir Charles Napier and Sind* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), p. 309.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 267.
3. *Ibid.*
4. Napier to Sir John Hobhouse, quoted in William Napier, *History of General Sir Charles Napier's Admirations of Scinde, and Campaign in the Cutchee Hills* (London: Chapman and Hall, 1851), p. 314.
5. *Ibid.*
6. Bartle Frere, the Commissioner-in-Sindh (1850-1859), was also of the same opinion:

"There are also some abstract financial accounts which you asked to see some months ago and which I have only lately got. Mr. Ellis would at any time shew them to you. They include the Military and Naval charges, which, as they are not incurred on account of Sindh alone should, I think, have been excluded. This accounts for the heavy deficit." (H. B. E. Frere to H. G. Briggs, dated 12 March 1854, pub. in S. K., 8 August 1854 [p. 3, col. 3].)

The press too was in sympathy. In this connection an extract from the *Madras Athenazum*, dated 5th August 1854, is worth reproducing:

"It occurred to the *Examiner* [London] on glancing over the figures in the Report (Report of the Administration of the Punjab), that no charge was made on the revenues of the Punjab on account of the 82, 000 soldiers employed to keep it in order, and he denounced the omission as strange and flagrant. . . .

.....

"And now to state the worst feature of the defence set by the *Friend of India* [Serampore]. The principle which he will not admit in the case of the Punjab, has been long since recognised and acted upon with reference to Sind. *The whole cost of the army in Sind is debited to that province!* [Emphasis original.] The public whilst they will not be slow to condemn the distinction, need no hint from us as to the cause of it. The one dependency was conquered by Sir Charles Napier, the foe and the dread of the Court of Directors; the other was annexed by Lord Dalhousie, to whom they delight to offer homage. Madras pays for Burmah, and Bengal for the Punjab, and the interests of truth and public honesty, for the necessity of a marquis who wants to be prime minister, and of a body of corporators who hope to profit by his assistance. . . ." ("The 'Friend of India's Mode of Arguing," *Madras Athenaeum*, 5 August 1854; rep. in *S. K.*, 25 August 1854 [p. 4, cols. 3-4].)

7. Lambrick, *Sir Charles Napier and Sind*, p. 202.
8. Napier to Sir John Hobhouse, quoted in William Napier, *History of . . .*, p. 314.
9. William Napier, *History of . . .*, p. 297.
10. Rathborne (15 August 1850), quoted in William Napier, *History of . . .*, appendix XVIII, pp. 401, 402.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 402.
12. B. H. Ellis, Report No. 12, 3 July 1858, par. 54, CISR, Vol. 257 (pol.)
13. Hughes, *op. cit.*, p. 49.
14. E. H. Aitken, *Gazetteer of the Province of Sind* (Karachi: Printed for the Government at Mercantile Steam Press, 1907), p. 142.
15. The voyage through country boats on the Indus was not safe. The annual losses were very high from the accidents. Between Kotri and Karachi six out of seven boats had been lost at one time. If one or two boats only of a batch of six or so were lost, it was generally considered a good venture. In

consequence the price of wheat was sometimes double at Karachi than the price at Shikarpur and Hyderabad. Sind, therefore, was unable to export grain, though Napier had offered, during Irish famine, (1845-1851, in which more than a million people died in Ireland of starvation and another million emigrated to the USA or elsewhere) 11,000 tons of grain, which could have been spared without interfering with the consumption of the country. (Major Preedy, speech before Sindh Railway Meeting held at Karachi on 28 August 1854, reported in *Sindian*, 30 August 1854, reproduced in S. K., 1 September 1954, p. 103.) Not only agriculturists were denied fair price of their grains, but Government, also, suffered a heavy loss, because revenue was mostly realised in kind. For example, the stocks of government grain of three successive years were swamped and utterly spoiled by the inundation of 1851 at one place (Nari near Sehwan) only, as no one was ready to buy it, because the cost of conveying it to market would have rendered it an unprofitable speculation. (Colonel Turner, speech before Sindh Railway Meeting, *Ibid.*)

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APPENDIX II

1. Sandeman (later Sir Robert Sandeman, b. 1835) entered the army in 1856 and saw fighting at an early date of his service. He was with his regiment in the Revolt of 1857 and was present at the siege of Lucknow. He did not, however, remain long in military employ, but early availed himself of an opportunity of entering the Punjab Commission. In the middle of 1859 he first got his foot into the stirrup and was appointed Assistant Commissioner at Kohat; and for the next 32 Years, up to the day of his death, he was employed at various places in the proximity of, or on, the north-western frontier of British Indian Empire. He had first become connected with Baluchistan in consequence of his appointment as Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khan. Captain Sandeman entered into direct relations with the Baluch tribes of Baluchistan in 1867 and within ten years managed to defeat Colonel Merewether, the then Commissioner-in-Sindh, and deprived Sindh of its frontier province of Baluchistan in 1876.
2. Later Major-General Sir William Lockyer Merewether (b. 1825), Commissioner-in-Sindh (1867-1877), Member of the Council of India from November 1877, died on 4th October 1880.
3. Sir Charles Aitchison (b. 1832, Foreign Secretary of India 1868-1878, afterwards Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab 1882-1887). Thomas Henry Thornton (Secretary to the Punjab Government 1864-1876), also, held the post as officiating Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in 1876-1877.
4. The relations between Khanate of Kalat and the Government of India were regulated by a treaty dated the 14th May 1854, which was concluded, on behalf of the Government of India, by General John Jacob, the then Political Superintendent and

Commandant on the Sindh Frontier. Sindh authorities' policy regarding to Kalat affairs was guided by this treaty during the "civil war," which broke out in 1857 between Mir Khudadad Khan, younger brother of Mir Nasir Khan II and the then Khan of Kalat (1857-1893), soon after his succession to the title in sixteen years age, and his Sardars. In consequence of these quarrels, there was constant desultory fighting in Baluchistan for nearly twenty years.

5. "Masterly Activity," S.G., 12 July 1895, p. 4. This leading article of S.G. was based on Thomas Henry Thornton's book, *Colonel Sir Robert Sandeman: His Life and Work on Our Indian Frontier* (London: John Murray, 1895). Thornton, being a party in the matter, was obviously biased against Colonel Merewether.
6. For further details, see Olaf Caroe, *The Pathans: 550 BC- AD 1957*, 21st imp.; Oxford: University Press, 2019, pp. 372-77.

I have not told even the half of the things that I have seen.

Comment on being accused of exaggeration
in his accounts of China (c. 1320). Quoted in
R H Poole and P Finch (eds.), *Newnes Pictorial
Knowledge* (Vol. 2, 1950).

Morco Polo (1254-1324)
Venetian merchant,
traveller and writer

Never forget what I believe was observed to you by Coleridge, that every great and original writer, in proportion as he is great and original, must himself create the taste by which he is to be relished.

From a letter to Lady
Beaumont (1807).

William Wordsworth (1770-1850)
English poet

Every body continues in its state of rest, or of uniform motion in a right line, unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed thereon.

First Law of Motion (1687)

Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727)
English scientist and mathematician

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APPENDIX III

1. "A Frontier Province," S.G., 9 July 1884, p. 3.
2. "Sind and Bombay," S.G., 16 September 1890, p. 5. (Rep. from C.&M.G.)
3. "Facilities for Trade," S.G., 18 June 1889, p. 3.
4. "Sind and Bombay," S.G., 16 September 1890, p. 5. (Rep. from C.&M.G.)
5. "Sind Refuses to Be Linked with the Punjab," S.G., 23 January 1912, p. 5. (Rep. from *Alhak*.)
6. "Sind and Baluchistan Dinner, 1909," S.G., 14 June 1909, p. 4. (Sp. as Chairman at Eighth Annual Sindh Baluchistan Dinner held on 25 May 1909 at London.)
7. *Ibid.* (Sp. at Sindh Baluchistan Dinner.)
8. A. H. Somake, S.G., 10 January 1912, p. 5. (Ltt. to ed.)
9. Dipchand T. Ojha, S.G., 10 January 1912, p. 4. (Ltt. to ed.)
10. Prof. Sahibsing Shahani, S.G., 29 January 1912, p. 4. (Sp. at meeting of members of Karachi Branch of B. E. L., progs. pub. under cap. "Should Sind Join the Punjab? Interesting Discussion in Karachi.")
11. Letter to *Times of India*, rep. in C.&M.G., 16 February 1913. (Cited in K. K. Aziz, *op. cit.*, entry no. 3722, p. 298.)
12. Sindh Muhammadan Association's Address presented to Royal Commission on Reforms (Montagu and Chelmsford), D.G., 15 January 1918, p. 8. (Pub. under cap. "Sind Muhammadans and Mr. Montagu.")
13. W. M. Hussanally, "Sind—a Separate Province," D.G., 13 December 1920, p. 4. (Ltt. to ed.)
14. Khuhro, *A Story of . . .*, p. 66-68.
15. H. H. Manghirmalani, "Should Sind Separate?," D.G., 9 July 1930, p. 6. (Ltt. to ed.)

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APPENDIX IV

1. *Daily Gazette*, 3 November 1932, pp. 6 & 8.
2. The identification of the contributor is not known. In all probability, it was written, paradoxically, by an outright loyalist Sindhi having nationalist veneer with marked aversion to see everything necessarily in communal terms. It appears definitely out of question that any true patriot would have ever submitted such a humble request to the alien rulers to grant the so-considered 'exalted' position of 'Dominion Status', in essence, silently acquiescing to the foreign domination over their fatherland. In fact the Sindhi patriots at the time, under the brave leadership of Syed Sibghatullah Shah Pir Pagaro were having their muscles tightened to wage a final and decisive war against the British imperialism which eventually commenced in early 1940s, with the desperate combat cry, *Watan ya Kafan* ("Free Homeland or Shroud"), and continued even after the shocking execution of Syed Sibghatullah Pir Pagaro (on 20th March 1943), till the formal end of the British Indian Empire in mid-August, 1947.

*Who knows who will be slain,
Those cowards coming in swarms
To invade thy Land,
And may be Sindh will be lost.*

*Bhaaghhi [Sister], what though sayest is true,
That if I lay down my life today,
Sacrifice myself for this Land,
I'll breathe no more,
But people's faith [in their leaders] 'll live on.*

It was certainly not penned down by any prominent politician of Sindh, who had any secular and nationalistic

credentials, like Shah Nawaz Bhutto. Of all the pre-1947 period pro-British middle-of-the-road Sindhi politicians, Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto was the only a prominent loyalist but also a decidedly steadfast secularist and Sindhi nationalist, throughout his whole political life, who, despite being feudal Muslim leader, outrightly refused to support or even sympathise the Khilafat movement because, in his own words, he was strictly against intermingling of the religion with politics—this stance was also adopted by M. A. Jinnah, but later on, he turned a somersault or made a U-turn). But Shah Nawaz Bhutto suddenly found himself in great predicament (damned if you do, damned if you don't).

*"In front is a swift river, behind a burning blaze,
If I step into water, river drowns me,
If I step back, the blaze burns me,
O maid [God], may the earth open up n' swallow me."*

Unlike Dodo Soomro, who, with dignity, pride and honour sacrificed his life for his beloved motherland, whereas the former (S.N. Bhutto), to put it mildly, failed to do so:

*In every man breathes his father
N' all his paternal, maternal forefathers,
One or the other confronts him every day,
As none of them ever remains unconcerned;
Any coward among them assaults him masked everytime,
Stifles the truth in him,
His grit n' courage all lost
This creature of blood n' sinews
Is indeed a reflection of his ancestry.
If you go down fighting,
You'll have sacrificed yourself for this Land,
O Dodo [Bhutto], you'll breathe no more,
But people's faith [in you as leader] 'll live on.
Your sons, if not, then your grandsons,
Would remain parallel with you,
For liberty they'll crawl
N' fight acrawling unto the last;
Leave a precedent for them,
Or leave a blank, if you so wish ...*

Alas! Shah Nawaz Bhutto preferred to leave a blank and his offsprings had naturally to fill-in the blank as they like and bear the consequences. His so-considered face-saving was by definition much below the lofty Sindhian standards and the age-old national tradition. When reached at a cross-roads in his political life, no doubt, he gladly preferred to quit politics for ever at the height of his political career (Member Bombay Legislative Council, Member Imperial Legislative Council and Premier of Sindh from 1st April 1936 to 30th May 1937), rather than turning a political somersault or U-turn, like many a prominent Indian Muslim politicians, he was certainly not prepared to turn a somersault and brazenly betray his cherished secularism and 'patriotic' politics for the assured personal political gains by endorsing the obnoxious colonial strategy of 'divide and rule' on the basis of damned communalism and the long-term imperial strategy to divide the British Indian Empire as and when expedient, into 'Hindu Raj', and 'Muslim Raj'. As a not-so-bad compromise, he (S. N. Bhutto) publicly and explicitly demanded 'Dominion Status' for Sindh, at the time when the parlays in Round Table Conference at London were in progress on long-term policy to be adopted for British India, in mid-May 1931. (D.G., 16 May 1931 p. 9: his statement pub. under cap. "We [Sindhis] Want Dominion Status: Not Hindu Raj or Muslims Raj.") It appears he was determined not to be a party to the politics of long-term enslavement of Sindh by the neighbouring Muslim co-province of the Punjab under the guise of 'Muslim Raj', which was to work surely on the pattern of 'British Raj', having only a thin veneer of democratic façade. Thus Shah Nawaz Bhutto was at the time a singular politician of Sindh, not matched even by late Seth Harchandrai Vishindas and late Ghulam Muhammad Bhurgri, whose unparalleled commitment to secularism and Sindhi nationalism, instead of mere gimmickry of democracy and religious tolerance, was second to none—Shaheed Syed Sibghatullah Shah Pir Pagaro and Shaheed Allah Bakhsh Soomro are perhaps the only exceptions. It's one of the political life's great ironies that Syed Sibghatullah Shah's strict adherence to time-honoured noble patriotic Sindhian tradition, for which he happily sacrificed his life, certainly,

for upholding the dignity and honour of the motherland of his forefathers, his own son(s) and grandson(s), not only discarded explicitly that noble tradition but also openly opted for and lived a pro-establishment safe, secure and risk-free life. Whereas despite open and explicit denouncement and renouncement of Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto's cherished political stance on Sindhi nationalism and paying merely lip-service to his uncompromisingly adhered to secularism, and active willingness to operate within the parameters laid down by the powers who really mattered in the country, his talented son (Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto), grandson (Mir Murtaza Bhutto) and granddaughter (Benazir Bhutto) were mercilessly slain in a state which courteously got the political power, legitimacy and legacy from the unceremoniously dying British Indian Empire, perhaps, because the proverbial 'elephant' has a long memory and unending vengeance. Frankly speaking, for Sindhis, Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto's only significant political 'villainy', if any, was that at the very decisive phase of Sindh's political struggle for survival, when its future was seriously at stake, he (S. N. Bhutto) kept deliberately himself away from Sindh's political arena and willingly remained quite aloof and preferred totally non-partisanship. In this way, in effect, he silently acquiesced to happen what happened, without contributing any of his input whatsoever, that is, either causing it to happen or not to happen. Thus, his above referred to action or inaction, in a sense, went in favour of those who eagerly desired to happen what actually happened. Poor Sassui said:

*"It was my own doing, how can I blame Kechis?
If I hadn't slept, Punhoon wouldn't have gone."*

Irony is that most valued lives of his no less than three most talented descendants, all of them, like him, first-rate pragmatic politicians, have so far met with their untimely, unnatural and unforgivable death. Presently, I can only pray to God to save his other descendants from such an untoward incident in future. (As a humble student of the applied politics and current history, I am really afraid of the same.)

3. The Conference on these dates was presided over by Abdullah Yusuf Ali, instead of Moulvi Muhammad Yakoob.

References & Notes

APPENDIX V

1. It was suggested that the Government of India could make up deficit of Sindh by adopting the following measures:
 - i) The abnormal expenditure incurred on the top-heavy administration of Sindh should be retrenched and brought in conformity with the earning capacity of the province. There is wide scope for reasonable retrenchment without jeopardising the efficiency of administration.
 - ii) The inter-provincial financial relations existing between Bombay and Sindh should have been re-settled and re-adjusted on equitable basis. Sindh should not be made to pay the interest charges for the pre-separation debts.
 - iii) Sindh should be allowed to tap its new sources of income which are wide and would yield enormous sums.
 - iv) The Government of India should allot a certain proportion of their revenues from Sindh drawn through centrally controlled departments, for instance, of the Customs realised from the Karachi port and, also, income tax proceeds without giving latter's any corresponding contributions to Central Government as recommended by the Percy Committee in case of Assam, and Bihar and Orissa.
2. One is that capital expenditure is included amongst the ordinary expenditure of Sindh without debiting against that capital expenditure assets which Government has gained. Other methods are:
 - i) Though there have been large lapses, but, all the same, the money is shown as having been spent on Sindh.
 - ii) Sindh was burdened with the supervision charges—Governor's salary and allowances, expenses on the

Secretariat and Heads of Departments etc. The expenditure is 16 crores and on Sindh only 2 crores are spent, but it is burdened to the extent of one-third or one-quarter.

- iii) Sindh is burdened with the interest charges on the loans which have not been contracted for the benefit of Sindh.
- iv) The Bombay Government's assets in the shape of roads, buildings etc., are worth about 60 to 70 crores of rupees, but the whole property of the Government of Sindh would be worth not more than two crores of rupees. Yet it is asked to pay off debts of the same to the extent of a third or a quarter on the money which had been sunk in the Bombay Presidency.

Thus, by such methods Sindh is shown as a deficit province.

3. The protagonists of separation of Sindh from Bombay based their case for subvention on following grounds:
 - i) The port of Karachi has proved its naval and military value in the Great War (World War I), and could not be dispensed with in any scheme of Imperial Defence. Even the Municipality of Karachi has foregone wheel-tax on military vehicles. There is, in addition, the Great Royal Air Force Depot and Aerodrome at Drigh Road. Though Sindh is not a Frontier Province, it has, however, claim on the Government of India for assistance. It occupies strategic and military position in British Indian Empire. The port of Karachi and North-Western State Railway are the chief links between Sea-Power, and all that it implies, and the Quetta-Zhob Defences, and the Peshawar-Khyber Defences.
 - ii) The province of Sindh has contributed and is contributing large sums of revenue to the Central Government in the shape of Customs duties, Railway, Post, Telegraph charges and the Income Tax. These sums are bound to increase from year to year as the result of the growing success of the Barrage.
 - iii) Sindh has a unique port of Karachi. The Government of India is deriving about 6 crores a year in the shape of customs duties. If Bombay and Bengal give to Government

of India large sums by way of Income Tax, Sindh too does so by way of customs, whereas the Punjab, U.P., Assam and other provinces did not contribute directly or indirectly to Government of India as much as Sindh does.

- iv) Sindh is of greater importance to the whole of India than even North-West Frontier Province, because of her being practically the frontier of India by land, sea and air.
- v) If Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, and Assam receive special consideration for financial adjustment than why not Sindh?
- vi) The separation does not involve any heavy burden on the Indian Exchequer as a whole inasmuch as it goes toward reducing the deficit of the Bombay Presidency. It is only a paltry amount of few lacs—extra cost of separation alone—which would cost the Indian tax-payer as a whole.
- vii) The claim of Sindh for financial help is of a temporary nature, since Sindh is sure to stand on its own legs in the near future when the the Great Depression (1929-1933) passes away and the Barrage is developed. It is certain that Sindh would then be able to balance its budget and even spend large sums on development of the province without any outside assistance.

"When I had my last meeting with my father in jail, he said: 'I leave the choice to you. You don't have to continue the struggle. You've suffered enough'. I said, 'No, Papa, I'll never leave the struggle'. At that moment I realised that I could not leave it." [What for? Do you saved his life or even of his lone son or of his sweetheart Pinky daughter, the dearest darling of every father—one totally fails to imagine his incredible reaction, if his son or daughter would have been so brutally slain, in his own life, or he would have been vindictively forced by the wicked rulers of Islamabad not to see the dead body of his so hard-heartedly murdered son/daughter or had callously not allowed him to bury the dead bodies of his loved ones.]

Quoted in *The Independent*,
28 Sept. 1996.

Benazir Bhutto (1953-2007)
(Non-Sindhi-speaking politician
of Sindh, completely ignorant of
Sindhian traditions)

References & Notes

APPENDIX VI

1. The demand for subvention was opposed by antagonists of separation of Sindh from Bombay on the following grounds:
 - (a) Sindh is not receiving a subvention from Bombay. Sindh is a part of the Bombay Presidency; the whole of the Presidency including Sindh is one administrative and legislative unit; the people of both parts controlled expenditure and determined policy; but a subvention from Simla is a different matter altogether as there would be no union of expenditure in that case.
 - (b) The conditions under which the North-West Frontier Province had been helped by the Government of India financially were not similar to those of Sindh. The Central Government having called the North-West Frontier Province into existence might be prepared to finance it fully and be ready to grant a subvention. The position in Sindh is far otherwise because, the province would be called into existence as the result of a demand from a section of the people of Sindh.
 - (c) A subvention to Sindh from a Federal Government in the future is not a contribution from a Unitary Government of India with its centralised finances and centralised responsibility for the whole of India but a tax on the pockets of other provinces for the benefit of Sindh.

The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.

From *On Liberty*,
chap. 1.

John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)
English philosopher and social reformer

References & Notes

APPENDIX VII

1. Government proscribed such literature which included Maharaj Ninaram's poem in Sindhi language "*Willaiti Khund jo Baheshkar*" (Boycott of Foreign Sugar; in Sindhi).
2. From 20th January, 1906.
3. Reso. no. 8 of First Conference, S.G., 24 April 1908, p. 4; and resol. no. 4 of Second Conference, S.G., 17 April 1909, p. 4.
4. Judgement of Sukkur Sessions Court, S.G., 28 January 1910, pp. 4-5. (Rep. under cap. "Sukkur Sedition Case.") Also Judgement of Court of Judicial Commissioner, S.G., 2 May 1910, p. 4. (Rep. under cap. "Sukkur Sedition Case Appeals.")
5. *Ibid.*
6. "The Garriwallahs' Strike," S.G., 14 June 1909, p. 4. They went on strike on 10th June 1909, as indicated by them in their petition submitted to the District Magistrate of Karachi wherein they said that their old grievances as detailed in their petition of the 19th October 1908 had yet not been redressed. (S.G., 12 June 1909, p. 4; text of the petition rep. under cap. "Garry-Owners' Petition.")
7. As late as 30th May 1912, the *Sind Gazette*, gathering from a senior student's letter, commented that "a class of students at the College, constituting a numerical majority, are in state of half 'ludicrous invective' against the Principal." ("Unrest at Sind College," S.G., 30 May 1912, p. 6.)
8. "Crime in Sind," S. G., 17 November 1914, p. 4. By the October 1913, the Government adopted a policy of sternest repression towards the entire Hur community, the Commissioner made excessive use of the powers vested in him under the system of sending picked members of the community outside Sindh as a punishment for their "past

misdeeds" and as a deterrent to those who were left behind."

9. "Butchers' Strike," S. G., 2 April 1913, p. 6.
10. "Sedition in Sind," S. G., 4 April 1913, p. 6.
11. Two Sindhis, Maharaj Lokram Sharma and his brother Vishnu Sharma, were staying on that day in the same building from which the bomb was thrown on Lord Hardinge, the then Governor General and Viceroy of India (1910-1916), at Chandni Chowk, Delhi in 1912. They also had a meeting with the main accused, Rash Behari Bose, prior to the event, through Amirchand with whom Lokram had studied in Benares and was in touch by correspondence and exchange of political literature. Amirchand and few others were arrested and sentenced to death. Bose absconded and came to Sindh in 1913 to leave the country through the help of Hyderabad *Sindh Workis* but later preferred to go to the Punjab from where he arranged his escape out of country. Vishnu Sharma, *Doctor Choithram Partabrai Gidwani ji Jiwani* [Biography of Dr. Choithram P. Gidwani; in Sindhi] (Bombay: Hindustan Sahitya Mala, 1967), p. 66.
12. "Sedition in Sind," S. G., 4 April 1913, p. 6.
13. *Ibid.* Some Sindhis including Lokram Sharma; Prof. Jiwatram Kirpalani later known as Acharya Kirpalani; Prof. Javaharmal Totiram Mansukhani later known as Swami Govindanand; Vishnu Sharma and Dr. Choithram P Gidwani came in touch with Indian terrorists in second half of the first decade of the twentieth century. Later some of the terrorists came to Sindh during their abscondence. These included two of the associates of Khudiram Bose who was hanged on the charge of murder of two English ladies through a bomb at Muzaffarpur, Bihar.
14. An steamer chartered by Baba Gurdit Singh, a member of the *Ghadar*—the Indian revolutionaries had started the *Ghadar* newspaper and the *Ghadar* party in San Francisco in 1913—taking about 376 Punjabi passengers to Canada. They were not permitted, on account of prohibitive immigration laws, to land at Vancouver, or on the return journey at Hong Kong, Shanghai and some Japanese ports. The steamer then left for

Calcutta, passengers landed at Budge-Budge, the Government restricted their liberty of movement and proposed to send them immediately by special train to their homes in the Punjab. The men tried to march towards Calcutta. A scuffle ensued, when eighteen persons were killed, twenty-nine including Gurdit disappeared — during his abscondment he remained in Sindh in 1920-21. A large number of persons were arrested and over thirty were imprisoned. Amongst the prisoners were two Sindhis, Prof. Mansukhani and his brother, who started their journey from Japan where the former had performed the duties of their spokesman with the British and Japanese authorities and with the Japanese press and correspondents of the British press, telegraphically informed the Indian leaders about the miseries of the men aboard and extended all help to them. Consequently, on his arrival in India he was arrested and imprisoned for 44 months in Bengal jails. For further details see Govindanand, *Komagatu Maru* [in Sindhi] (Karachi: Author, Kesari Press, n.d., Pt. I.)

15. Randhir Singh, *The Ghadar Heroes*, Bombay: People's Publishing House, 1945, p. 8.
16. R. C. Majumdar gen. ed., *The History and Culture of the Indian People: Struggle for Freedom*, 2nd. ed.; Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhawan, 1988, pp. 208-09; quoting G. T. Brown, "The Hindu Conspiracy 1914-17." *Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. XVII (1948), pp. 299-310.
17. D.G., 12 February 1919, p. 10 ("Press Note," rep. from the *Sind Official Gazette*, under cap. "Grievances of Sind Work Merchants.").
18. *Ibid.*
19. The first three papers were black-listed from 28th January and the last five papers from 13th July 1918. ("Newspaper in Sind," D.G., 5 August 1918, p. 6; quoting Bombay Government's reply to questions of Harchandrai Vishindas and G. M. Bhurgri in Bombay Legislative Council.)
20. The weekly *Hindu*, Hyderabad, instead of depositing within required 14 days an amount of Rs. 2,000 as security in

connection with the publication of 16 objectionable articles, they published all of them in a single issue, two days before the expiry of the period, with the comments that what was written in them was right and justified; and informed readers about the closure of the paper and the press in protest. 5,000 copies of the paper were sold out instantly. The press was sold out in pieces to different parties; the authorities were unable to seize it for they were unable to trace out the press or its purchasers. (Naraindas Chainrai Advani, *op. cit.*, pp. 62-63.)

21. The Sindh Provincial Conference by a special resolution, passed on 1st April 1918, strongly condemned Government's policy in Sindh of "demanding securities under the Press Act . . . without any justifiable grounds" and suppression of "all out spoken Indian newspapers in Sind by putting a ban on them." (*D.G.*, 3 April 1918, p. 9., resos. pub. under cap. "Sind Provincial Conference.")
22. The pro-Government paper, the *Daily Gazette*, Karachi, had no hesitation to admit in August 1918 that "the extremists in Sind being the only active political party at present and carrying off their feat by exuberance and volubility." ("Sind Provincial Conference," *D.G.*, 13 August 1918, p. 4.) Commenting upon the Special Sindh Provincial Conference held in August 1918, the *Daily Gazette* advised that "there should be a separate Conference of Sind Moderates to support the Chelmsford-Montagu scheme." The reply of the *New Times*, Karachi, was: "Where are the Moderates in Sind? There is not even a single in Sind." ("Orders from Madras: How the Sind Provincial Conference was Worked," *D.G.*, 20 August 1918, p. 8.)
23. In a public meeting called by the Association to consider the Governor's declination, a move, albeit abortive, was made to enter "a most emphatic protest," call upon the people "to abstain from taking any part in the functions that may take place during the visit of the Governor" and observe a *hartal* on the occasion. ("Petulant Hyderabad," *D.G.*, 14 February 1919, p. 4.)
24. Gandhian technique of non-violent action for social and

political reform, or policy of passive resistance to British rule in India. It is often equated with non-violence.

25. "News and Notes," D.G., 30 April 1919, p. 6.
26. The period saw widening of the horizon of Sindhi press of Hyderabad, Mirpurkhas, Sukkur and Larkano which dealt with "all-India topics and high politics almost to the exclusion of the local affairs" — a few years earlier they were concerned "almost entirely with local affairs." ("More Light: II," D.G., 17 January 1920, p. 6.)
27. D.G., 24 April 1919, p. 8. (Cap. "Outstations: Sukkur.")
28. D.G., 22 May 1919, p. 5. (Action against *Sind Samachar* was taken in connection with the publication of two articles, namely, (i) "Jindagi ya Mout" [Life or Death] and (ii) "Satyagraha" in its issue of 26th April, 1919.)
29. Mukhi Jethanand was required to give two sureties for Rs. 25,000 each and last four of Rs. 5000 each. D.G., 28 April 1919, p. 5. (Cap. "Agitators at Hyderabad: Domiciliary Visits by the Police.") Also D.G., 30 April 1919, p. 5.) (Cap. "Outstations: Hyderabad.")
30. D.G., 14 April 1919, p. 4. (Cap. "Outstations: Hyderabad.")
31. *Ibid.*
32. *Ibid.*,
33. *Ibid.*
34. D.G., 21 April 1919, p. 4. (Sp. at Karachi's Khalikdina Hall, rep. under cap. "Sind Up for Law and Order.")
35. *New Times*, quoted in "Tears, Idle Tears!," D.G., 22 February 1919, p. 6.
36. Extremist Hypocrisy," D.G., 22 December 1919, p. 6. The *Daily Gazette* time and again complained and warned about the development of a new revolutionary trend in Sindh politics. In February 1923, it pointed out: "A study of the Indian newspapers holding extreme political views and published in different parts of India, reveals the fact that they all print 'letters' from Sind,—generally dated from Hyderabad

or Karachi,—wherein the crude outpouring of immature, inexperienced minds obviously nourished on the *Daily Herald* [London] and other similar 'labour' 'socialistic', and 'communistic' sheets from Europe, find frequent publicity." ("Sind Politics," D.G., 19 February 1923, p. 6.)

37. For the first time authorities came face to face with the labour unrest in Sindh. In February 1920 Karachi Port Coolies and in June 1920 Railway Workers of Sukkur went on strike.
38. The broad masses of the Muslim population saw the anti-colonial aspect of the movement, rather than the religious one, as the most important. The rank and file of the movement often referred to it simply as the *Khilafat* movement (from the word *Khilaf* which means "against"), i.e. directed against alien rule.
39. In these Conferences aggressive anti-imperialist speeches were delivered such as equating the British Government of India with Nimrod (believed to be a great king who ruled an area consisting of the later Assyria and Babylonia, modern northern Iraq and part of Syria) who was ultimately destroyed by a mosquito and that because the Hedjaz Railway had been blown up, the Indian railways should also be torn asunder. (*Daily Gazette*, under the guise of a "rumour," reported such a speech delivered by a "crazy mullah" at Larkano Conference. "Sind's Mad Mullah," D.G., 23 February 1920, p. 6.)
40. Throughout India this was the first special train which was arranged in connection with the *Hijrat* movement. Similarly, throughout India it was again a Sindhi, Ali Hassan Ghanghro, who faced the first prosecution in connection with the *Hijrat* movement.
41. The pro-British circles in Sindh were not ignorant of its vital importance. The *Daily Gazette* remarked in August 1920: "The Karachi 'leaders' are mere figure-heads, wind-bags who have little real influence but whose vanity implies them to utter high-sounding words which they are perfectly ready to eat the moment the authorities show any disposition to hold them responsible. The agitation in the mofussil is far

more dangerous in that its source of inspiration is obscure,...but there can be little doubt that the propaganda is widespread and that it is none the less dangerous because no prominent Muhammadan or Hindu in the province is openly connected with it." (D.G., 10 August 1920, p. 6.)

42. About 150 students of this College left it on political grounds. (Vishnu Sharma, 1967, p. 120.)
43. Jan Muhammad Junejo died in April 1921 and Abdul Jabbar re-started his practice in 1924-25 when the movement had practically ended.
44. Even a staunch pro-Government paper like the *Daily Gazette* had no hesitation to publish a report of its Hyderabad correspondent admitting that "Non-Co-operation workers were very active and succeeded to a considerable extent in scaring the people away." The report further added: "Telegrams received here from different stations show the following percentages of voters who have gone to the polls:- Hala, number of voters 268, recorded 100. Matli, number of voters 300, recorded 13. Larkano, number of voters 1,957, recorded 268. Mirpurkhas, number of voters 261, recorded 168. Kotri, number of voters 500, recorded 52. Shikarpur, number of voters 6,780, recorded 80." (D.G., 19 November 1920, p. 5.) As per semi-official estimate accepted by the *Daily Gazette* as "approximately correct," 23% of the electorate exercised their vote in the franchise in Karachi. "In Hyderabad the percentage is rather larger being estimated at 25 percent of the electorate." ("The Election," D.G., 17 November 1920, p. 6.)
45. D.G., 8 November 1922, p. 4.
46. *Al-amin*, 31 May 1920, p. 6.
47. Non-cooperationists at Work," D.G., 4 November 1920, p. 5. The pro-Government leader and a candidate for Bombay Legislative Council election of 1920, Ali Akbar Hassanally Effendi, while returning to Shahdadpur station, was shown no courtesy and had to be satisfied with a donkey which he obliged and rode. *Ibid.*
48. The period saw for the first time in Sindh the organisation of

whole-time paid student-workers engaged in political work under the auspices of the Sindh National Service of Students. Initially around five dozen students joined the service and went to different towns and villages of Sindh for political work assigned to them. Each of them was given a stipend of Rs. 30 per month by the National Schools Service. Later on some of them were employed in the National Schools which paid them their stipend instead of the National Service. (Vishnu Sharma, op. cit., pp. 120-21.)

49. In this respect, Santdas Mangharam became the most prominent among all Sindhi lawyers.
50. Government's such action was strongly condemned by the nationalist press. The pro-Government press, however, upheld the decision: "It is entirely in the interests of the public peace and law and order. . . . excited people have been congregated in the vicinity of the Jail for the past few days and if the Pir had been brought out to stand his trial there is not knowing what disturbance might not occur during his passage through the streets in custody." ("Pinchbeck Martyrs," D.G., 11 August 1920, p. 6.) However, true to his class characteristics, Sindhi Pir felt no shame in offering an apology to the Government for his release, later.
51. D.G., 10 August 1920, p. 4. (Speech of Pir Mahboob Shah as reported by Haji Agedino, Sub-Inspector at Tando, rep. under cap. "Hyderabad Sedition Case.")
52. Making Martyrs," D.G., 10 August 1920, p. 6. The rising political consciousness was reflected through a number of books. Sadhu T. L. Vaswani alone wrote a number of books on the matter which included (i) *Indian Arise*; (ii) *Awake; Young India*; (iii) *Indian Adventure*; (iv) *India in Chains*; (v) *Secret of Asia*; (vi) *Builders of Tomorrow*; (vii) *Apostles of Tomorrow*; and (viii) *My Motherland*. G. M. Syed, *Janab Guzariyum Jin Sein* [Biographical Sketches of Contemporaries; in Sindhi] (Hyderabad: Sindhi Adabi Board, 1967), Vol. I, p. 138.
53. Its editor, Kazi Abdur Rehman, was convicted for one year in January 1921.
54. Its editor, Ramchand Bunsiram Bhavnani, was convicted for

six months in May 1923.

55. Its two editors, Khemchand Belani and Hemandas Shewakram, were convicted for one year, and nine months respectively in 1922.
56. The *Hindu* was converted from weekly to daily in 1919.
57. The list of its arrested editors included the names of Vishnu Sharma, Jairamdas Daulatram, Prof. Ghanshyam Jethanand, Dr. Choithram P. Gidwani, Lokram Sharma, Prof. Jhamatmal Lakhasingh, Hiranand Karamchand, and Prof. Choithram Valichha. (Vishnu Sharma, *op. cit.*, p. 97.)
58. As early as April 1919, Sindh's European owned pro- British paper, the *Daily Gazette*, Karachi, had proclaimed: "Bolshevism would rule the country by the most hideous form of murder and tyranny. The Government of India at present are not fighting against the comparatively harmless politician but against the forces of anarchy and chaos such as have converted unhappy Russia into a hell. Therefore the Government are entitled to the sympathy and support of all law-abiding citizens." ("Encouraging Anarchy," *D.G.*, 23 April 1919, p. 6.)
59. The incident, in which twenty two policemen were burned to death took place on 6th February, 1922. "On February 7, Gandhi unilaterally suspended the Non-Cooperation Movement to the consternation of other Congressmen." He was "worried that radical and unruly elements would takeover control if he continued the movement to the point of dislodging the existing British government." On the charge of 'conspiracy', "Gandhi was arrested on March 10 and imprisoned for six months." (By that time the heightened emotions of the masses against his arbitrary, unwarranted decision were virtually cooled down.) Surjit Mansingh, *Historical Dictionary of India* (New Delhi: Vision Books Pvt. Ltd., 2005), p. 294; entry 'Non-Cooperation Movement'.

References & Notes

APPENDIX VIII

1. Known from the names of Lord Irwin, (1881-1959), full name Edward Frederick Lindlay Wood Halifax, the then Governor General and Viceroy of India (1926-1931) and M. K. Gandhi, the leader of the Civil Disobedience movement. Lord Irwin later became British foreign secretary (1938-1940), and ambassador to the USA through World War II (1941-1946). His grandfather Sir Charles Wood, 1st Viscount Halifax (1800-1885) was Chancellor of Exchequer (1846-1852) and Secretary for India (1859-1866) Lord Irwin was succeeded as the governor general and viceroy of India (1931-1936) by Lord Willingdon (1866-1941), who had previously served as governor of Bombay (1913-1919)
2. "Addle-pated Congressmen of Sind," *D.G.*, 14 January 1932, p. 6.
3. In order to continue the fight against imperialist authorities, in place of these newspapers, the *Hindu* and the *Hindu Jati* bulletins were illegally issued from Karachi and Hyderabad, respectively, from the secret presses.
4. Following of these have been preserved in Sindhi Section of the India Office Library, London:
 - (1) *Dharasan ti kah* (n. p., n. d. [?1930], 47 pp. 19 cm. (An account of the police brutalities against the Satyagraha marchers.)
 - (2) Dwarka Prashad Rochiram, *Inqilab Zindahbad* (Hyderabad: Author, n.d. [?1932], 16 pp. 16 cm. (Swaraj Malha, 1.) (A story of the heroism of an imaginary freedom-fighter.)
 - (3) *Hindu* (Monthly; Hyderabad), Talik Number, 1 August 1931. (Articles on B. G. Tilak, Satyagraha, Swadeshi

campaign, and the British violence against the Satyagrah marchers.)

- (4) Sachendar Nath Sanyal, *Bandi Jivan* [1st ed.]; Karachi: Agnani Printing Works, n. d.), 13 pp. 16 cm. (An account of the Satyagraha movement in 1915.)
 - (5) Sachendar Nath Sanyal, *Bandi Jivan* (2 Vols.; [2nd ed.]; Karachi: Rejhumaal Pavandas Agnani, n. d.), illus. 18 cm. (Accounts of famous Indian "revolutionaries.")
 - (6) Naraendas Azad, *Azad Bhajanaivali* (Hyderabad: Jethanand Shamdas Verma, Bharat Bijli Press, n. d. [? 1931]), 30 pp. 16 cm. (Patriotic poems.)
 - (7) Hundraj Lilaram Dukhayal, *Alap-i-Azadi* (Larkana: Author, n. d.) 24 pp. 18 cm. (Patriotic poems.)
 - (8) Hundraj Lilaram Dukhayal, *Phasi Gitmalha* (Larkana: Nauroz Press, n. d.), 22 pp. 18 cm. (Poems in praise of Miran Bai, B.G. Tilak, Moti Lal Nehru and other nationalist leaders.)
 - (9) *Gandhi Git* (Hyderabad: Qaumi Sahitya Bhandar, n. d.) 23 pp. 16 cm. (Poems in praise of Gandhi and the Swadeshi campaign.)
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 - (13) *Swaraj jo Saniho* (Karachi: Ladikram Khushiram, n. d.), 41 pp. 12 cm. (patriotic poems.)
5. D.G., 11 January 1932, p. 5 (News item "51 Unlawful Political Bodies in Sind: Official List.")
 6. *Ibid.*
 7. According to a Sukkur newspaper, when the Pir was being

taken to the prison, he asked his followers not to engage a lawyer to defend him, as, like the members of the Indian National Congress, he did not wish to make any defence. The Pir was alleged to have stated: "India would get Swaraj the moment I am sent to jail." ("Sind Sensation: Pir Pagaro Arrested," *D.G.*, 29 March 1930, p. 7.) Pir was tried within the precincts of Sukkur jail instead of in the ordinary open Court of Law. On 28th August 1930, he was sentenced to eight years imprisonment for confining a boy, named Ibrahim, and for illegal possession of 12 rifles, 3 guns, 2 revolvers, 25,000 rounds of ammunition, and apparatus for manufacturing ammunition. Having served his sentence (with remission) in Indian jails, the Pir returned to Sindh in October 1936. Later on, he was tried by a Military Court under Martial Law on charges of conspiring and preparing to wage war, and abetment of waging war, against the British Government; found guilty, and executed on 20th March, 1943. H. T. Lambrick, *The Terrorist* (London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1972, pp. 31n & 179n.)

8. During the first phase of the movement (April 1930- March 1931) the persons arrested and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment numbered about 724, excluding those who were arrested but were soon released without trial. Areawise details were: Karachi 254, Shikarpur 100, Hyderabad 90, Sukkur 80, Mirpur Khas 60, Larkano 40, Jacobabad 40, Nawabshah 30 and Sahti (presented-day Naushahro Feroze) 30. During the second phase (December 1931-May 1934) at least 1,204 persons were convicted to different terms of imprisonment. Areawise details were: Karachi 628, Hyderabad 191, Sukkur 98, Shikarpur 68, Dadu 55, Larkano 46, Nawabshah 32, Jacobabad 30, Sahti 30 and Tharparkar 26. (Motiram Satramdas Ramwani. *Ratan Jaut* [in Sindhi], Karachi: Herald Press, 1958, Vol. II, pp. 724, 749.)

I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and sweat.

From a speech in the House
of Commons on assuming
premiership (13 May 1940).

Sir Winston Churchill (1874-1965)
British statesman & Nobel Prize winner

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Acta este fabula. "The play is over."

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| Last words attributed). | Octavianus Augustus (63 BC-14 AD) The first Roman Emperor |
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En ma fin git mon coubmmencement. "In my end is my beginning."

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| Mary's embroidered motto. | Mary, Queen of Scots (1542-1587) Queen of Scotland 1542-1567 |
|---------------------------|---|

—

The reward of labour is life.

| | |
|--|--|
| From <i>News from Nowhere</i> , chap. 15. | William Morris (1834-1896) English poet and socialist |
|--|--|

—


Publish and be damned.

| | |
|--|--|
| Attributed; his reply to a threat of blackmail. | Arthur Wellesley (1769-1852) 1 st Duke of Wellington ('Iron Duke') Irish-born soldier and statesman |
|--|--|


2500 - 1000 BC **THE EXTENT OF EARLY, MATURE AND** **DECLINING INDUS CIVILIZATION**




INDUS CIVILIZATION HAS ITS GENESIS IN MEHRGARH, WHICH FROM 6500 BC (7000 BC?) TO 2500 BC EVOLVED LEADING INTO AMRIAN (3700 BC) AND KOT DIJJIAN (3300 BC) CULTURES TO THE EARLY INDUS CIVILIZATION TO MATURE INDUS CIVILIZATION (2350 - 2000 BC). THEN IT DECLINED TO JHUKAR (CEMETERY H) AND JHANGAR CULTURE, FROM 3000 - 1300 BC AND 1300 - 900 BC. THE WHOLE CIVILIZATION WAS INDIGENEOUS WITH VERY LITTLE CONTACTS OUTSIDE AND LIMITED TRADE, WHICH MAY HAVE BROUGHT NEW IDEAS INCLUDING GERMPLASM OF WHEAT AND BARLEY AT MEHRGARH.




MAP 03




MAP 04




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Sindh ... what surge that sound can start

In every Sindh's inmost heart!

Two-words modification ("Moscow" and "Russian's"), with profound gratitude, has been made in Russia's "great poet" Alexander Pushkin's (1799-1837) unforgettable stanza (no. 36, chap. 7) in his masterpiece, *Eugene Onegin* (originally published in serial form between 1825 and 1832). English translation by A Room. (The modification, if appears inapt, is regretted.)

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